People v. Dunlap CA4/3

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Testo completo

Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Dunlap CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063191

v. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF2771)

JONATHAN BREON DUNLAP, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed
Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Jonathan Breon Dunlap challenges his convictions and sentence
for voluntary manslaughter and shooting at an inhabited dwelling house. He
contends (1) the evidence did not support his conviction for shooting at an
inhabited dwelling house, (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on
the victim’s right to eject trespassers, and (3) the court erred by imposing a
concurrent sentence for voluntary manslaughter before staying its execution.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
The Orange County District Attorney charged Dunlap with the
murder of John Nondorf, Jr. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1)1 and
shooting at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246; count 2). The information
included firearms enhancement allegations.
According to the evidence at trial, Dunlap and a group of friends
gathered at a motel, where Nondorf and his fiancée were staying. At some
point, Nondorf saw Dunlap near Nondorf’s car, near his room, and a heated
exchange followed. Nondorf retrieved a baseball bat from his room. In
response, a member of Dunlap’s group handed Dunlap a gun.
Seeing the gun, Nondorf retreated to his doorway and continued
arguing while his fiancée tried to call the police. Dunlap’s group pressed
forward and confronted Nondorf at the threshold. One member briefly
entered the room before Dunlap pulled her out; another tried to wrestle away
Nondorf’s bat, while someone reached inside to punch him.
Dunlap then raised the gun and fired four times. Two bullets
struck Nondorf, killing him: one bullet exited the back of his head and
another lodged in his lower back. Two bullets struck inside the room—one

1 Statutory references are to this code.

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passing through a wall before lodging in a back wall and another hitting the
floor. At trial, the jury saw surveillance video of the incident.
Dunlap claimed self-defense and the trial court instructed the
jury on that theory. At the prosecution’s request, and over Dunlap’s objection,
the court also instructed the jury on the right to eject a trespasser from real
property (CALCRIM No. 3475).2
The jury convicted Dunlap of the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter (count 1) and shooting at an inhabited dwelling
house (count 2). It found true the firearm enhancements. The trial court
sentenced Dunlap to 28 years to life on count 2. On count 1, the court
imposed a concurrent sentence of 16 years in prison but stayed execution
under section 654, concluding both counts arose from a single act.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONVICTION ON COUNT 2
Dunlap contends the evidence does not support his conviction for
shooting at an inhabited dwelling house because he fired at Nondorf rather
than at the motel room. We review a sufficiency challenge for substantial
evidence. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) A conviction for
shooting at an inhabited dwelling house requires proof that the defendant
fired with at least conscious disregard for the probability that a bullet would
strike the dwelling. (People v. Overman (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356.)

2 The instruction stated: “The lawful occupant of a home/property

may request that a trespasser leave the home/property. If the trespasser does
not leave within a reasonable time and it would appear to a reasonable
person that the trespasser poses a threat to the home/property or the
occupants, the lawful occupant may use reasonable force to make the
trespasser leave.”

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The evidence amply supports the jury’s finding that Dunlap at
least recklessly shot at the motel room. Dunlap fired multiple shots at
Nondorf from point-blank range while Nondorf stood at the doorway of his
motel room. Under these facts, it was almost certain that any bullet missing
Nondorf, or passing through his body, would strike the room. It’s therefore
unsurprising that two of the four shots did strike the room—one striking the
floor and the other passing through a wall before lodging in another. The jury
could reasonably infer that Dunlap acted with conscious disregard for the
probability of striking the room. (See People v. Chavira (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d
988, 993 [sufficient evidence of conscious disregard where defendant’s group
fired barrage of shots at persons near dwelling].)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED
ON THE RIGHT TO EJECT A TRESPASSER

The trial court properly instructed the jury on Nondorf’s right to
eject a trespasser at the prosecution’s request. “We review jury instructions
de novo. [Citation.] ‘A party is entitled upon request to correct,
nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case advanced by him
which is supported by substantial evidence.’” (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 555, 558.)
Although CALCRIM No. 3475 generally applies to cases in which
an occupant is charged with using excessive force to eject a trespasser, its
principles may also apply when assessing a trespasser’s right to self-defense.
(People v. Johnson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 702, 709–710.) If an occupant
lawfully uses force to defend against a trespasser, the trespasser has no right
to self-defense against that use of force. (Id. at p. 710.)

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The evidence supported giving this instruction. Dunlap’s
belligerent group confronted Nondorf at the entrance to his room. One group
member entered the room and another reached inside to punch Nondorf.
Dunlap does not dispute that his group members could be deemed
trespassers.
Although an initial aggressor generally cannot claim self-defense,
the aggressor may regain that right by communicating withdrawal through
words or conduct. (People v. Hernandez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 582, 588.) The
jury could reasonably have found that Nondorf had done just that by backing
away and returning to his room after seeing Dunlap’s gun. Dunlap claims
this was insufficient because Nondorf remained nearby, left the door open,
still held the bat, and continued arguing.3 But the jury could reasonably have
concluded that Nondorf’s behavior indicated withdrawal: from that distance,
he and his bat posed no threat and his continued yelling was arguably an
attempt to save face. The trial court properly gave the instruction.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PERMISSIBLY IMPOSED A
CONCURRENT SENTENCE ON COUNT 1 BEFORE STAYING ITS EXECUTION
The court fully implemented section 654, which generally
prohibits imposing multiple punishments for a single act or omission. When a
defendant is convicted of multiple offenses based on a single act, “the trial
court must impose sentence on all counts, but stay execution of sentence as
necessary to prevent multiple punishment.” (People v. Alford (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 (Alford).) That’s exactly what the court did here: it

3 Dunlap estimates the distance from the initial confrontation to

the doorway at about 20 feet, which appears consistent with the video of the
incident.

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imposed a lengthy total sentence on count 2 and then imposed a concurrent
sentence on count 1 but ordered its execution stayed under section 654.
Dunlap misreads a treatise’s statement that if section 654
applies, “it is improper for the court . . . to run the count concurrently.”
(Couzens et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter
Group 2025) § 13.10, citing People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 795–796
& Alford, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468.) The point of this language is
simply that an unstayed concurrent sentence is insufficient to implement
section 654 because it still punishes the defendant for both offenses. (People
v. Duff, at p. 796; Alford, at p. 1468.) Because the trial court did stay the
execution of the sentence on count 1, Dunlap was not subjected to multiple
punishments. (Alford, at p. 1469.) Labeling the stayed term as “concurrent”
had no practical effect and caused him no prejudice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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