People v. Garcia CA5

CourtListener 10746030Calctapp2 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/2/25 P. v. Garcia CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089452
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BF201025A)
v.

FRANCISCO ALEJANDRO GARCIA, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Andrew Kendall,
Judge.
Cynthia J. Zimmer, District Attorney, and Anthony Yim, Deputy District Attorney,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Monique Boldin and Siena Kautz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
The magistrate held defendant Francisco Alejandro Garcia to answer for
conspiracy to commit murder and another charge but found insufficient evidence to hold
him to answer for murder and other charges at his preliminary hearing. An information
was filed later, containing both charges. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss the information. The People appeal. We conclude that sufficient evidence was
presented at the preliminary hearing to hold defendant to answer. We shall reverse the
order and direct the trial court to deny defendant’s motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Kern County filed a complaint on September 4, 2024,
charging defendant with murder (Penal Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 conspiracy to commit
murder (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)), assault with a semiautomatic firearm
(§ 245, subd. (b)), two counts of carrying a loaded firearm while an active participant in a
criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3)), and participation in a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The complaint also alleged the murder was premeditated and
deliberate (§ 189), committed by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and in
aid of a criminal street gang (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and a
principal discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (d), (e)(1)). The complaint further alleged the conspiracy to commit murder and
assault with a semiautomatic firearm were committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), (B)).
At the preliminary hearing on January 10, 2025, the magistrate found sufficient
cause to believe that defendant conspired to commit murder and participated in a criminal
street gang and found the gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) as to conspiring to
commit murder true. However, the magistrate discharged and dismissed the remaining

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
counts and their associated allegations, having found insufficient cause to believe
defendant committed the offenses charged therein.
The district attorney filed an information on January 16, 2025, charging defendant
with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 182,
subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a); count 2), and participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (a); count 3). The information further alleged the murder was premeditated and
deliberate (§ 189), committed by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), and
carried out to further a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) as to count 1. The
information additionally alleged that the crimes were committed in aid of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)) and a principal discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)) as to counts 1 and 2.
Defendant and four other individuals who participated in the September 29, 2021
shooting were charged in a separate case, Kern County Superior Court case
No. BF198856ABCDE, with additional offenses arising from a December 24, 2021
shooting. The prosecutor moved to consolidate both cases.
Defendant moved to set aside the information due to insufficient evidence
pursuant to section 995. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to set aside the
information and denied the prosecutor’s motion to consolidate as moot on February 11,
2025. The trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration on March 5,
2025. This court issued an order denying the prosecution’s petition for writ of mandate
filed in Kern County Superior Court case No. BF201025A and the application for an
immediate stay in Kern County Superior Court case No. BF198856C on March 6, 2025.
The People appeal the trial court’s February 11, 2025 order dismissing the
information.

3.
FACTS
Bakersfield Police Department Officer Kayla Wainwright testified that she was
dispatched to a sports complex on September 29, 2021, at approximately 10:26 p.m., to
investigate a reported shooting. She saw the victim, later identified as Mario Bravo,2
laying on the ground with a gunshot wound to the face. Although she attempted to
resuscitate Mario, he did not respond and was not breathing.
According to Mario’s brother, Onorio B., he and Mario had played softball at the
sports complex. They went to their vehicle in the parking lot at approximately 10:15 p.m.
An individual who identified himself as “Ulices” approached them for assistance in
obtaining a ride. Onorio described Ulices as approximately 16 years old and six feet tall,
initially using a cell phone. They offered to provide Ulices a ride home. They had been
speaking with Ulices for about 15 minutes when Ulices pulled out a black pistol with an
extended magazine and fired at them. Ulices shot Mario in the head, and Mario dropped
to the ground as Onorio ducked behind a vehicle. Ulices fired approximately five to
10 shots before he fled on foot toward the street entrance to the complex. Wainwright
noticed a gunshot through a window of Onorio’s vehicle.
Bakersfield Police Department Officer Nicole Madsen also responded to the
shooting and interviewed James S. who advised that he was talking with friends in the
parking lot, heard what he believed were fireworks, and saw a man shooting a firearm
with an extended magazine behind him while running away. The individual ran toward a
green sedan with tinted windows that was stopped on the street near the parking lot
entrance. Another witness noticed defendant earlier that evening because he did not have
any sport’s equipment and was loitering the parking lot. She saw him fleeing after Mario
was shot.

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, and for clarity and convenience because
some persons share a last name, we refer to certain persons by their first names and/or initials.
No disrespect is intended.

4.
Bakersfield Police Department Detective Lance O’Nesky testified that he
responded to the shooting to investigate the scene. Mario was on the ground, and
O’Nesky observed one gunshot wound to Mario’s left cheek and one toward the back of
Mario’s neck. He observed a bullet hole in the driver door window and a bullet hole in
the headrest of the front passenger seat of Onorio’s vehicle. O’Nesky saw a trail of bullet
casings from Mario’s body toward the street entrance to the sports complex, consistent
with someone firing as they ran away. He recovered six nine-millimeter shell casings and
another .40-caliber casing on the street near the parking lot entrance.
Kern County Sheriff’s Office Detective Aaron Barajas testified about an attempted
murder in which four gang members shot at two victims on December 24, 2021.
Defendant was identified by one of the victims, and investigation determined that
defendant had been accompanied by Uriel Ramirez, Ulices Zelayandia, and Eric Faria.
Defendant told Barajas during a postarrest interview that defendant used the rap name of
“Soldier Gordo” and identified his social media account. Ramirez identified his social
media account that used the name “Uriel X3.” Faria used the name “Tronn Wit A
Choppa” for his social media account. Ramirez, Zelayandia, and Faria were arrested with
cell phones that Barajas used to connect them to the December 24, 2021 shooting. The
location information obtained for the cell phones indicated that Zelayandia’s cell phone
traveled from his residence to defendant’s residence, to Ramirez’s residence, and then
directly to the location of the December 24, 2021 shooting.
Bakersfield Police Department Detective Kyle McNabb testified he was the lead
investigator assigned to the September 29, 2021 shooting. He learned from Mario’s wife
that Mario dropped out of the Okie Bakers criminal street gang and she and Mario
testified in 2015 against Sureño gang members who shot her in the stomach while she
was pregnant. McNabb also obtained information from an employee at the sports
complex that she had noticed an individual hanging around the evening of the shooting

5.
whom she had not seen before and stood out to her because he did not have any sporting
equipment with him. She observed the individual loitering around the parking lot and
later saw him fleeing towards the parking lot street entrance while firing a gun. The
individual had arrived sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.
McNabb eventually identified Ulices Alonso as a suspect in the September 29,
2021 shooting after receiving a photograph of defendant and Faria and a tip that they
were involved in Mario’s death. While investigating defendant and Faria and their social
media accounts, McNabb identified Ulices Alonso as having been photographed with
defendant and present during multiple contacts with defendant. Two witnesses to the
incident identified Alonso as the individual who shot Mario from a photographic lineup.
McNabb located a group chat between defendant, Alonso, Ramirez, Faria, and
Zelayandia in their social media accounts, commencing at 7:47 p.m. the evening Mario
was killed.3 McNabb also obtained a search warrant for Ramirez’s cell phone and
obtained location information of the phone during the hours leading up to, and including,
the shooting.4
At approximately 7:47 p.m., defendant attempted a video call with Alonso and
then messaged, “[M]y Pop wants Y,” followed by, “[Y]ou.” Defendant and Alonso then
engaged in a one-minute audio call. McNabb testified that defendant’s father is known as
“Big Soldier,” is a member of the Colonia Bakers criminal street gang, and has status in
the gang. His residence, where defendant also lives, is a common hangout used by the
gang.

3 Alonso used the account “Been.That 600”; Ramirez used the account “Uriel 3X”; Faria
used the account “Tronn With A Choppa”; and Zelayandia used the account “It’s Ully.”
4 McNabb obtained defendant’s cell phone records, which had been seized by law
enforcement, and determined that defendant’s cell phone was not in use during the time period of
the shooting.

6.
At approximately 7:58 p.m., defendant messaged Ramirez, “Aye, yo, answer the
phone,” and then engaged in a video chat.
At approximately 8:27 p.m., defendant messaged Ramirez, “Me and Ully[5] here.”
Ramirez responded, “Where,” and defendant replied, “Front, and hurry up,” at 8:30 p.m.
At approximately 8:37 p.m., defendant initiated a video chat with Faria and then
messaged Faria, “Coke out,” which, followed by, “Come,” and then “her,” was believed
by McNabb to be a correction intended to read, “Come here.” At 8:51 p.m., Ramirez’s
cell phone was in the area of Faria’s residence, and Ramirez uploaded a photograph of
himself in the back seat of a vehicle.
At 8:47 p.m., defendant messaged Alonso, “On my way.”6 At 8:56 p.m.,
defendant and Alonso participated in an audio call, and Ramirez’s cell phone was in an
area consistent with travel from Alonso’s residence to the sports complex. Ramirez then
uploaded another photograph of himself in the back seat of a vehicle, depicting the
entrance to a highway leading to the sports complex.
At approximately 9:21 p.m. and 9:22 p.m., Ramirez uploaded multiple videos of
himself in the back seat of a vehicle, and his cell phone location showed he was in the
area of the sports complex. At approximately 9:24 p.m., Ramirez’s cell phone location
showed him in the same area, and at 9:25 p.m., Ramirez uploaded another video showing
himself in the back seat of a vehicle while the phone was in the area of the sports
complex.
At 9:40 p.m., Ramirez’s cell phone showed him in an area on the north side of the
complex.

5 Zelayandia used the social media account “It’s Ully,” indicating defendant may have
been with Zelayandia, although Zelayandia and Alonso share the first name of Ulices.
6 If Alonso was not yet accompanying defendant, he was most likely traveling with
Zelayandia who was also known as Ully.

7.
At approximately 9:46 p.m., defendant messaged Alonso, “Where,” and then,
“At,” and Alonso responded, “About to bat.” The September 29, 2021 shooting occurred
between 10:15 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. and was reported to law enforcement at
approximately 10:26 p.m.
At approximately 10:18 p.m., Ramirez received two incoming calls from Faria,
one lasted 15 seconds and the other 12 seconds. At 10:23 p.m., Ramirez messaged the
group, “Pickup. Let’s go,” and then, “Burnt.” Defendant messaged, “WYM” (what do
you mean), followed by, “Never mind.” At 10:24 p.m., Faria messaged the group, “Hurry
up, man,” and at the same time, Zelayandia attempted a video chat with the group. These
communications suggest that Ramirez, Faria, and defendant were not together at this
time, or they would have presumably just spoken to each other.
Ramirez’s cell phone was used to access a scanner radio application at 10:29 p.m.
and 10:44 p.m., supporting an inference that he was monitoring any police response to
the shooting. At 10:33 p.m., Ramirez’s cell phone was in the area of Faria’s residence.
At 10:57 p.m., Ramirez messaged his sister, “Sis, hot shit.” Ramirez’s sister responded,
“Way,” with several question marks. Ramirez responded, “Gordo’s,”7 while his cell
phone was in the area of defendant’s residence.
McNabb explained that defendant was coordinating the pickup of the individuals
involved in the group chat at the sports complex where Mario was playing softball and
that they were looking for Mario based upon the messages “Where at” and “About to
bat.”
Investigation determined that the .40-caliber bullet casing had been fired from a
gun seized from Faria’s residence, which had also been depicted in the photograph
received from the anonymous source. The firearm was distinctive in that the slide was

7 Defendant used the name “Official Soldier Gordo” in the group chat.

8.
gold and inscribed with the word “Tronn,” a name used to identify his social media
account.
The parties stipulated that Colonia Bakers was a criminal street gang. The
prosecution’s gang expert testified to facts, gave his opinion that defendant and Alonso
were active participants in the Colonia Bakers criminal street gang, and stated that
retaliation against an individual who had previously testified against Sureño gang
members would benefit the Colonia Bakers criminal street gang.
DISCUSSION

I. Sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established that
defendant engaged in a conspiracy to commit murder.
The People argue that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing
established facts sufficient to hold defendant to answer to the charge of conspiracy to
commit murder and the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss it. We
agree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Pursuant to section 995, a court properly sets aside all or part of an information
upon finding that “the defendant had been committed without reasonable or probable
cause.” (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B).) “ ‘ “ ‘Reasonable or probable cause’ means such a state
of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and
conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” ’ ” (People v.
Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 473.)
“To establish probable cause sufficient to overcome a section 995 motion, ‘the
People must make some showing as to the existence of each element of the charged
offense.’ [Citation.] ‘Evidence that will justify a prosecution need not be sufficient to
support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 582 (Scully).) “[A]n
indictment or information should be set aside only when there is a total absence of

9.
evidence to support a necessary element of the offense charged.” (People v. Superior
Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226.) “ ‘We will not set aside an
information “if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense
has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.” ’ ” (Scully, at p. 582.)
“ ‘On review … the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior
court and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate .…’ ” (People v. Gonzalez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) Insofar as the motion “rests on consideration of the
evidence adduced, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the information
[citations] and decide whether there is probable cause to hold the defendant[] to
answer.’ ” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072.)
“[A]lthough there must be some showing as to the existence of each element of the
charged crime [citation] such a showing may be made by means of circumstantial
evidence supportive of reasonable inferences on the part of the magistrate.” (Williams v.
Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1144, 1148.) “However, … an information will not be
set aside merely because each element of the charged crime is not established by direct
testimony. Rather, the inquiry is whether the evidence … discloses circumstances from
which the magistrate might reasonably have inferred the existence of each element of the
charged crime.” (Id. at pp. 1148–1149.)
“A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of the
evidence for that of the magistrate, and, if there is some evidence to support the
information, the court will not inquire into its sufficiency.” (Rideout v. Superior Court
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474.)
“ ‘Pursuant to section 182, subdivision (a)(1), a conspiracy consists of two or more
persons conspiring to commit any crime. A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that
the defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit
an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together

10.
with proof of the commission of an overt act “by one or more of the parties to such
agreement” in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ ” (Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 583.)
“ ‘ “Evidence is sufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime ‘if it supports
an inference that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to
commit a crime.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Evidence of an agreement does not require proof that
the parties met and expressly agreed; a criminal conspiracy can be shown through
circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘If the agreement between the conspirators is the
crux of criminal conspiracy, then the existence and nature of the relationship among the
conspirators is undoubtedly relevant to whether such agreement was formed, particularly
since such agreement must often be proved circumstantially. “ ‘The existence of a
conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the
alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302–303.) “It is frequently necessary to infer the existence of a
conspiracy through [such] circumstantial evidence .…” (Munoz v. Superior Court (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 774, 780.) “ ‘ “The agreement in a conspiracy may be shown by …
conduct of the defendants in mutually carrying out an activity which constitutes a
crime.” ’ ” (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1111.)
B. Analysis
We conclude that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was sufficient
to cause a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe and conscientiously
entertain a strong suspicion that defendant tacitly agreed to kill Mario based upon the
conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and
during the alleged conspiracy.
The evidence permits a reasonable inference that defendant contacted Alonso on
behalf of defendant’s father, a member with status in the gang; defendant’s father
provided instruction to Alonso; and then defendant gathered other gang members together

11.
to implement the direction given to Alonso. Defendant attempted a video call to Alonso,
then messaged that his father desired to speak with Alonso, and then engaged in a video
call with Alonso. Defendant lived at the same residence as his father, permitting a
reasonable inference from the sequence of events that defendant was with his father when
he communicated with Alonso. Alonso shot Mario point blank in the face shortly after
this conversation, supporting a reasonable inference that the murder was the subject of
Alonso’s conversation with defendant’s father, another member of the gang with status.
Thereafter, defendant traveled to each conspirator’s residence, communicated to
each when he arrived, and instructed each conspirator to come to the vehicle. Defendant
engaged Ramirez in a video chat at approximately 7:58 p.m. and announced to Ramirez
that he had arrived out front with “Ully” at approximately 8:30 p.m., allowing a
reasonable inference that defendant and Zelayandia drove to Ramirez’s residence to pick
him up. It is also reasonable to assume that defendant and Zelayandia were in the front
seat when they picked up Ramirez and Ramirez sat in the back seat (confirmed by
Ramirez’s pictures of himself sitting in the back seat). Ramirez’s cell phone location
provided information as to where Ramirez was located and, by reasonable inference,
defendant as well, since they were together.
Several minutes later, defendant communicated to Faria, “Come,” indicating he
(along with Zelayandia and Ramirez who uploaded a photograph of himself in the
vehicle) had arrived to pick up Faria. Defendant then messaged Alonso at 8:47 p.m., that
defendant was on his way and next participated in an audio call with Alonso at 8:56 p.m.
At 8:56 p.m., Ramirez’s cell phone records show it was in an area consistent with leaving
Alonso’s residence while in route to the sports complex, providing a reasonable inference
that all five individuals were on their way to the sports complex.
The prosecution’s map of the sports complex does not show any other nearby
businesses or residences, supporting a reasonable inference that the location of Ramirez’s

12.
cell phone at the sports complex was in support of a purpose to be performed at the
complex. Testimony of a witness placed Alonso outside of defendant and Zelayandia’s
vehicle during various portions of the evening and provided evidence that he was not
there to use the sports complex’s facilities. Ramirez’s cell phone location information
and uploaded photographs show that Ramirez, and by reasonable inference his
companions, were at the sports complex 9:21 p.m. through 9:40 p.m.
At 9:46 p.m., defendant asked Alonso, “Where,” and then, “At?” Alonso
responded, “About to bat.” Since defendant had picked Alonso up from his residence,
defendant would presumably have observed that Alonso did not have sports equipment
(as the witness who saw him testified) and have known that Alonso had not been dropped
off at the sports complex to play baseball or softball. Therefore, when defendant asked,
“Where” and “At?” and received the response, “About to bat,” one may infer that Alonso
understood the question as referring to the location of Mario who was at the sports
complex playing ball (according to Onorio).
Onorio and Mario were in the parking lot near their vehicle at approximately
10:15 p.m., half an hour after defendant’s inquiry to Alonso. Alonso approached Onorio
and Mario to discuss obtaining a ride, an obvious ploy to engage them in conversation, as
the evidence shows Alonso had a ride from his conspirators who were still in the area and
with whom he was in contact. Sometime between 10:15 p.m. (when Mario and Onorio
went to their vehicle) and 10:26 p.m. (when the first officer was dispatched to the sports
complex), Alonso opened fire on the brothers and killed Mario. At 10:23 p.m., Ramirez
messaged the group, “Pick up,” “Let’s go,” and “Burnt.” Defendant argues that he could
not have been present at the sports complex because, according to Ramirez’s
photographs, Ramirez was in the back seat of the car and would have no reason to
message defendant for a ride if defendant was also in the car. However, another
reasonable inference from these facts is that either Ramirez or defendant was somewhere

13.
other than the vehicle and walking around the sports complex during the time that they
waited on Alonso.
Additionally, officers later found a casing from Faria’s gun along Alonso’s flight
route from the parking lot to the car. These two facts support a reasonable inference that
Faria and either Ramirez or defendant had, at some point, left the vehicle to assist Alonso.
If Ramirez was in the car, he could have been alerting the other conspirators that they
needed to answer their phones because he was trying to let them know that they needed to
go because someone was seen making a call to the police. If Ramirez was not in the car,
his message could have been to alert the conspirators in the vehicle that they needed a
ride because the shooting had taken place. When defendant responded with “WYM” and
a question mark, he may have been confused as to why Ramirez texted, “Burnt.”
Ramirez’s cell phone shows that he was monitoring the police response after the killing
and that he, as well as the others in the vehicle, returned to defendant’s residence
thereafter.
Defendant argues that the evidence established only that defendant was a member
of a gang and generally associated with the other conspirators. He relies upon People v.
Orozco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 343 (Orozco) in support of his argument. In that case, as
the appellate court described: “On a deadly driveby mission, Daniel Orozco ventured
into hostile gang territory. A shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one
man and kill another. The jury convicted Orozco of murder, attempted murder, and
conspiracy to murder.” (Id. at p. 345.) The court reversed Orozco’s conviction for
conspiracy to commit murder because it concluded the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecution to add the charge on the first day of trial and the preliminary hearing had
failed to provide proper notice of the new charge. (Ibid.)
The appellate opinion describes the facts, appearing to summarize them from the
prosecutor’s opening statement at trial. (Orozco, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346.)

14.
The prosecutor asserted that “[g]ang warfare was the motive,” based upon expert
testimony that gang members inspire fear by killing rival gang members. (Id. at p. 346.)
Orozco, Adrian Nunez, and Isaac Miranda were gang members. (Ibid.) Nunez drove
Orozco’s vehicle, accompanied by Orozco, Miranda, and Martinez Garibo, who was an
associate of the gang, in the front passenger seat holding Orozco’s gun. (Ibid.) They
entered rival gang territory on a hunt and fled after Garibo shot and wounded a rival gang
member. (Ibid.) Thereafter, they returned to the area, and Garibo shot and killed another
victim who did not actually belong to a gang. (Ibid.) An officer opined that he
committed the shootings seeking membership status in the gang. (Id. at p. 347.)
After a witness telephoned a description of the car, police found the car shortly
after the shooting, arrested Orozco and the other three men, and retrieved Orozco’s gun
after it was tossed. (Orozco, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 346–347.) The gun and
ammunition matched the bullets and casings from the shooting. (Id. at p. 347.) Orozco’s
cell phone showed it had been at the locations of the two shootings. (Ibid.) Garibo
admitted to the shooting under interrogation before being advised of his rights, and the
admission was excluded from the preliminary hearing. (Ibid.)
At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate held Orozco to answer on charges of
murder and attempted murder, despite having suppressed the confession of Garibo, one of
Orozco’s conspirators. (Orozco, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) Garibo told officers
that he was driving Orozco’s car because Orozco “ ‘was unable to’ ” and “ ‘[l]ike under
the influence probably.’ ” (Ibid.) Defense counsel introduced Garibo’s suppressed
confession to argue that Orozco had been too intoxicated to form criminal intent. (Ibid.)
The appellate court found that without Garibo’s suppressed description of events,
the evidence at the preliminary hearing could not support a murder conspiracy because
there was no evidence that Orozco agreed to kill someone. (Orozco, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348–349.) On appeal, the prosecution maintained that, even

15.
without Garibo’s statement, the evidence sufficed. (Id. at p. 349.) According to the
prosecution’s description of the evidence, it showed gang members, including Orozco,
were together in a car when they entered rival territory and, by expert testimony, that
gang members “typically ‘put in work’ for the gang,” meaning that gang members
typically act to support the gang’s goals of killing rivals and intimidating potential
witnesses. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that this evidence did not show Orozco
agreed that someone in his group of four would kill a human being on the night in
question because there was no evidence that murder is the only action gang members take
when they gather. The four could have had plans other than murder, such as to eat, rescue
a friend from a jam, vandalize something, or no agreed purpose at all for the trip. (Ibid.)
We find Orozco, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th 343 of limited assistance in our analysis,
however, because we cannot discern from the appellate court’s recitation of the trial
evidence which of the facts described originated from Garibo’s confession and, therefore,
cannot ascertain the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The recitation of facts
also suggests that without Garibo’s confession, there was no evidence to suggest the
purpose of car ride was to target rival gang members. However, we conclude that the
evidence of the events prior to the shooting, including the phone calls, gathering of gang
members, and the conspirators loitering in the area of the sports complex for
approximately one hour and 15 minutes before the shooting distinguishes the facts of this
case, which provide evidence that shooting Mario because he had testified against the
gang was the object of their combined actions.
Defendant also relies on People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151 (Ware), wherein our
Supreme Court recently cautioned that proof of common gang membership alone is not
enough to establish participation in a criminal conspiracy. “The effect of such a rule
would be to criminalize mere association with gang members, which the law forbids.”
(Id. at p. 168.) Nicholas Hoskins was a member of a gang, the other members of which

16.
were engaging in killings that Hoskins supported on social media after they occurred, and
he was charged with participating in a long-running, large-scale, nonspecific conspiracy
to commit murder. (Id. at p. 175.)
Evidence of an individual’s membership in the gang, association with violent
members, general glorification of violence on social media, and isolated behavior with a
speculative link to any particular incident is insufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit
murder. (Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 175.) Our Supreme Court considered evidence
that Hoskins was a member of the gang and friends with gang members with whom he
regularly communicated by social media but concluded it was not sufficient evidence that
he intended to participate in a conspiracy to commit murder. (Id. at p. 168.) The People’s
evidence failed to establish that Hoskins membership in a gang subset demonstrated his
intent where it failed to show the subset’s mission was only to kill and without evidence
of the membership requirements or internal workings of the subset. (Id. at p. 169.) The
court also noted that evidence of gang rules and norms could be relevant in assessing an
individual’s participation in a conspiracy, such as evidence that becoming a gang member
necessarily involved a choice to participate in a conspiracy to commit murder, but no
such evidence was provided at trial. (Id. at pp. 169–170 [no reasonable jury could have
inferred that membership entailed an agreement by all members to kill rivals without
more specific evidence about the requirements of membership].)
While the People attempted to argue that Hoskins’s elevated status in the gang
meant he was involved in gang decisionmaking, the court found insufficient evidence that
he had such status or to support a conclusion that his status necessarily meant that he
would have been involved in the decision to kill rivals. (Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 170.) The court found that the evidence as to a particular shooting Hoskins was
alleged to have been involved established only that he was good friends with the other
gang member responsible for the shooting and had associated with the shooter sometime

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in the past. Although Hoskins posted a photograph taken seven hours before the
shooting, the court disagreed with the prosecutor’s argument that it showed Hoskins’s
intent to lure rivals to the subsequent shooting and, therefore, failed to indicate an intent
to aid and abet the murders. (Id. at p. 172.) Finally, Hoskins’s social media posts of
support after the murders did not reflect his knowledge of the murders before they
happened or that he had participated in them. (Id. at pp. 173–174.)
“The evidence showed that Hoskins was an active member of a gang whose other
members committed acts of violence, that he celebrated those acts of violence, and that
he had access to weapons that he could use in furtherance of those acts, if he so chose.
The evidence unquestionably establishes Hoskins’s membership in a group with violent
aims and his association with individuals who commit violent crimes. But it is not
sufficient to support a finding that Hoskins specifically intended to enter an agreement to
commit murder, or that he specifically intended to commit murder, either personally or
through others.” (Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 174.) However, as our discussion of the
facts of this case indicated, the preliminary evidence provided facts that support a
reasonable inference that defendant was aware of and acted to assist Alonso in killing
Mario.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400 (Lamb) is
instructive. In upholding the trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal as
to a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, the court found substantial evidence of
conspiracy even in the absence of direct evidence. (Id. at p. 442.) The victim was a
member of a gang who was found dead, with a single shot to his head, following his
participation in a news program about the gang and in violation of gang rules. (Id. at
pp. 408–409, 411.) Michael Lamb and Jacob Rump were arrested three days after the
murder, following a pursuit in which Lamb used the murder weapon to fire at an officer.
(Id. at pp. 409–410.) The prosecutor’s theory was that another conspirator drove the

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victim to an alley where Lamb, assisted by Rump, shot the victim in retaliation for the
victim’s participation in the news program. (Id. at p. 408.)
One witness testified that Lamb called her apartment to speak to Tanya Hinson
about something he characterized as very important. (Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 408.)
She later saw Hinson, Lamb, and Rump in her living room, and they left at her request.
(Ibid.) A few minutes later, she heard a single gunshot. Ten minutes after that, she saw a
vehicle with three men with shaved heads8 driving through the alley. (Lamb, at p. 408.)
The victim was found there with a single gunshot wound to the back of his head. (Id. at
pp. 408–409.)
Our Supreme Court found “substantial circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to
murder.” (Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 443.) “That [they] committed the murder
together is probative of an agreement to have done so” “when there is indicia of
organization and forethought.” (Ibid.) Although there was no direct evidence that Lamb
and Rump discussed killing the victim in advance, there was evidence that they were
alone together shortly before the killing, during which a discussion and agreement could
have taken place. Lamb wanted to discuss something important with Hinson on the day
of the murder, met with Rump and Hinson later that night, and left the apartment together
just before the murder and near where it occurred. (Ibid.) These circumstances were
sufficient to demonstrate that Lamb and Rump came to a mutual understanding to murder
the victim, and their flight demonstrated a consciousness of guilt. (Ibid.) The court
found that killing the victim with a single gunshot to the back of the head and the lack of
defensive wounds indicated planning, an intent to kill, and a surprise attack, which was
consistent with an agreement. (Ibid.)

8 Trial testimony established that Lamb’s head was shaven at the time of his arrest. (Lamb,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 409.)

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Additionally, the relationship of Lamb, Rump, Hinson, and the victim provided the
insight into their common understandings, motivations, and the bases for their agreement,
such as gang members would know that the victim’s cooperation with the news program
would be met with severe consequences, committing a violent crime would increase that
gang member’s status, a gang member would be expected to be accompanied by other
gang members for backup, and Lamb and Rump had a close relationship. (Lamb, supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 443–444.) “Along with evidence of Lamb and Rump’s conduct, the
‘relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators’ here provides
circumstantial evidence from which a conspiracy may be inferred. [Citation.] Contrary
to Lamb’s assertion, the absence of evidence that [the gang leader] ordered [the victim] to
be killed does not render insubstantial this other evidence supporting the conspiracy to
commit murder conviction.” (Id. at p. 444.)
Therefore, we find the evidence at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to hold
defendant to answer to the charge of conspiracy to commit murder.

II. Sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established that
defendant aided and abetted murder.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“ ‘When the defendant challenges the district attorney’s election to include charges
for which defendant was not held to answer at the preliminary hearing, “[t]he character of
judicial review … depends on whether the magistrate has exercised his power to render
findings of fact.” ’ ” (Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 581–582.) “ ‘ “A dismissal
unsupported by findings therefore receives the independent scrutiny appropriate for
review of questions of law.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 582.) Therefore, where the magistrate simply
concludes that the People did not put forth sufficient evidence to support the charges, as
happened here, we independently determine the sufficiency of the record at the
preliminary hearing to support the charges. (Ibid.)

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We set forth the applicable standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of
preliminary hearing evidence to hold a defendant to answer in part I.A. of the Discussion,
ante. “Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused
by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) Under direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty
of murder if the accomplice aids the commission of murder with “ ‘ “knowledge of the
direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those
unlawful ends.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463.) “[A]n aider and
abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second
degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another
and acts with conscious disregard for life.” (Reyes, at p. 990.) “ ‘[D]irect aiding and
abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and
abettor’s own mens rea.’ ” (Id. at pp. 990–991.) In the context of implied malice, the
direct aider and abettor’s actus reus includes whatever words or conduct aid the
commission of the perpetrator’s life-endangering act. (Id. at p. 991.) “ ‘The mens rea,
which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the
perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of
the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious
disregard for human life.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Having found that the preliminary hearing evidence was sufficient to establish a
suspicion that defendant was aware Alonso intended to kill Mario, we conclude that the
defendant’s acts of communicating and picking up the other gang members to assist
Alonso, driving Alonso to the location of the intended killing, and waiting nearby to

21.
transport Alonso and the others from the location of the killing demonstrate defendant’s
intent to aid and abet Alonso.
Therefore, we conclude that the evidence at the preliminary hearing was sufficient
to establish a reasonable suspicion that Mario was murdered and defendant intended to
aid and abet Mario’s murder.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order dismissing the information is reversed. The trial court is
directed to vacate its February 11, 2025 order granting the section 995 motion to set aside
the information, and to thereafter issue a new and different order denying the motion.

HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

GUERRA, J. *

* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

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