People v. Bahena CA3

CourtListener 10745281Calctapp1 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/1/25 P. v. Bahena CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100386

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE008690)

v.

ANGEL SANTOS BAHENA,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2024, a jury found defendant Angel Santos Bahena guilty of various crimes
including second-degree murder stemming from a fatal accident he caused while driving
under the influence of alcohol. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life
plus six years.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the
jury regarding the implied malice element of murder by failing to modify the instruction
to reflect the “high degree of probability of death” language from People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 989 (Reyes). We find no instructional error.

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Defendant also contends his sentence of 15 years to life for gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated must be reversed because the prior conviction
enhancement (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d) [statutory section citations that follow are to
the Penal Code unless otherwise stated]) did not apply. The People agree, as do we. We
will strike the enhancement and remand to the trial court to resentence defendant on this
count.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On May 15, 2022, at about 6:40 a.m., Mycajoy P. and her parents, Nelson and
Marilyn P., were driving to church in their SUV on Elder Creek Road. (Hereafter, we
identify the family members by their first names.) Mycajoy was driving, Nelson was in
the front passenger seat, and Marilyn was in the back middle seat. All three were
wearing seatbelts. It was a sunny day; the weather was clear.
The family drove towards the traffic light at the intersection of Elder Creek Road,
an east-west city street, and Florin Perkins Road, a north-south street. As they
approached the intersection at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour, the light was green.
When they were almost past the middle of the intersection, a car traveling at a speed of
45 miles per hour ran the red light, striking the SUV on the driver’s side and pushing it
over a fence into a field. Defendant, the driver of the car, got out of his car and lay on the
ground.
Inside the SUV, Nelson had lost consciousness. When Mycajoy was able to wake
him, her father asked what happened. Nelson could not move because of the pain in the
left side of his body. Mycajoy’s feet were trapped under the pedals. She felt pain in her
left side, on her hip and in her back. Marilyn’s eyes were closed and she was leaning on
the left side of the car. Mycajoy tried to wake Marilyn but she would not move.
Mycajoy called 911 on her father’s phone.

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Two men came to the aid of the family. The driver’s side door was too damaged
to open, so the men forced the passenger side door open and helped Mycajoy and Nelson
out. Marilyn’s seatbelt was locked and had to be cut to remove her from the back seat.
Her breathing was shallow and her pulse was weak.
Law enforcement and medical personnel arrived at the scene. CPR performed on
Marilyn—initially by one of the men who pulled her out of the SUV and then by medical
personnel—was unsuccessful. Marilyn died at the place of the accident.
Officers questioned defendant, who first said he was going home and then said he
was going to a convenience store. Defendant was taken to UC Davis hospital. At about
8:00 a.m., a police detective questioned defendant. She had been informed that defendant
was involved in a vehicle collision, and it was suspected defendant was driving under the
influence (DUI). The detective smelled an odor of alcohol coming from defendant and
noticed he had watery eyes. Defendant stated he drank three beers from 8:00 p.m. to
9:00 p.m. the previous night. Defendant denied ingesting drugs.
The detective administered two breath tests. The results were 0.114 percent
blood-alcohol at 8:14 a.m. and .109 at 8:17 a.m. (Two breath tests administered to
Mycajoy a little after 9:00 a.m. both recorded zero percent alcohol content.) When the
detective requested defendant submit to a blood chemical test, he declined, arguing he
had already had a breath test. When reminded he was required to submit to the blood test
as a condition of probation from a prior DUI conviction, defendant’s blood was drawn at
9:39 a.m. The results indicated a blood-alcohol content of .117 percent. There was also a
positive result for cocaine.
In October 2023, defendant was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count
one); gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 191.5, subd. (a); count two); causing bodily injury
while under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count three); and
causing bodily injury while driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or greater
(Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count four). The information alleged, as to count two,

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defendant had a prior conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision
(b) in 2012 within the meaning of section 191.5, subdivision (d), and, as to counts three
and four, defendant personally inflicted bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and
proximately caused bodily injury to more than one victim in one instance of driving in
violation of Vehicle Code section 23153 (Veh. Code, § 23558).
Defendant’s case was tried to a jury. At trial, Chris Fogelberg, a criminalist,
testified as an expert in forensic toxicology and the effects of consumption of alcohol and
drugs on the human body. Fogelberg testified the blood sample obtained from defendant
contained cocaine and benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of cocaine. Given that the time
required for half of cocaine to be eliminated from the body is 40 minutes to an hour,
Fogelberg testified the presence of cocaine in the blood sample indicated recent use.
Fogelberg further testified that cocaine impairs the ability of a person to safely operate a
car because it affects the ability to focus and concentrate. A person on cocaine could be
confused, agitated, fidgety and restless, and might engage in high-risk behavior such as
weaving in and out of traffic, speeding, and being distracted.
In terms of alcohol, responding to a hypothetical question from the prosecutor,
Fogelberg calculated that it would be impossible for a male weighing 230 pounds to have
a blood-alcohol content of .11 percent at 9:39 a.m. by drinking three beers between 8:00
and 9:00 the prior night. Based on an .11 percent blood-alcohol test result at 9:39 a.m.,
Fogelberg determined that, given the rate of elimination of alcohol from the bloodstream,
the blood-alcohol content of the person at 6:38 a.m. would have been .17 percent.
Fogelberg opined that all people with .08 blood-alcohol are too impaired to drive.
He also opined a person with blood-alcohol content of .17, .15, or .11 percent would be
too impaired to drive. Fogelberg testified that the presence of cocaine, while a stimulant,
would not counteract the depressant effects of alcohol: “instead, what you have is just an
alert drunk.”
The parties stipulated that in September 2012 defendant was convicted of violating

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Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), and certified records of defendant’s
conviction were admitted in evidence. As required by Vehicle Code section 23953, an
advisement below defendant’s signature on the plea form read: “ ‘You are hereby
advised that being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, impairs your ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to human life to
drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. If you continue to drive
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and as a result of that driving
someone is killed, you can be charged with murder.’ ” (People v. Watson (1981)
30 Cal.3d 290, 296 (Watson) [a defendant who proximately causes a death while driving
under the influence of alcohol may be charged with implied malice murder where the
defendant, “knowing that his [or her] conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless
acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life”].)
In December 2021, defendant pleaded no contest to a charge of violating Vehicle
Code section 23103.5, referred to on the plea form as a “wet 2nd.” Certified records of
defendant’s prior conviction were admitted in evidence. The trial court suspended
sentence and placed defendant on informal probation for one year. The parties stipulated
defendant was on probation on May 15, 2022. The trial court’s order in 2021 stated:
“Do not drive a motor vehicle with any drugs or any measurable amount of alcohol in
your system. Do not refuse to complete [a] blood alcohol chemical test when offered by
any peace officer with reasonable cause to do so.” The court also ordered defendant to
enroll in the “SB-38” program. (People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 110 & fn. 3
[SB-38 is a mandatory program, whose name is derived from legislation requiring
multiple drunk-driving offenders to attend classes on the dangers of drinking and
driving].)
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. He admitted pleading no contest to
a DUI in 2012 and having to take classes. Defendant testified that he did not read the
advisory below his signature on the 2012 plea form, and his lawyer did not go over it

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with him. Defendant also admitted to pleading no contest to a “wet reckless charge” in
2021. He testified the plea hearing was over Zoom, and he had some problems with his
connection. Defendant said he did not understand his plea but knew his license would be
suspended. Defendant said he was not required to take any classes as a result of this plea.
Regarding the May 2022 collision, defendant testified he took his 11-year-old
daughter to a quinceanera at 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. the previous night. He stayed an hour or
two and had one beer. He went home but came back to help clean up the hall, arriving
about 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 a.m. He stayed an hour or two but did not drink. He went to
the house of Phil, the friend who invited him to the quinceanera, arriving at about
1:00 a.m. They went to a bar at about 1:30 a.m., had a beer, and left right away with a
friend Michael and his wife, whom they met there. They arrived at Michael’s house at
about 2:00 a.m. Defendant drank beer and Crown Royal. Defendant only drank three
shots of whiskey because he does not like liquor. Defendant testified he might have done
cocaine, but it must have been a small amount because he did not remember it.
Defendant tried to go to sleep but he was tossing and turning. He got up around 5:00 or
6:00 a.m. Defendant told Phil he was ready to go home and dropped him off at his home
in South Sacramento on Florin Road
Defendant was not feeling the effects of alcohol and thought it was safe to drive
his car. He drove on Florin Road to Florin Perkins Road to go home. Defendant
remembered approaching the intersection and seeing a yellow light; after that he was
knocked out. When he regained consciousness, he could not breathe because of the
airbags. He tried to open the door and realized his wrist was broken. Defendant opened
the door and fell out due to a hip injury.
On cross-examination, defendant testified that, after his 2012 conviction, he
attended a first offender DUI class for three months. Defendant did not remember what
he learned in class. Defendant agreed that driving under the influence of alcohol is
dangerous “to a certain point,” depending on the level of intoxication. Defendant agreed

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that driving over the legal limit for alcohol is dangerous, and he knew driving under the
influence was dangerous at the time of his 2012 plea. Defendant testified that he did not
know he was ordered to take classes after his 2021 plea and did not take any classes.
Defendant thought that the trial court’s order not to drive with any measurable amount of
alcohol in his system meant his blood-alcohol content had to be below .08 percent. He
was not aware he was ordered not to drive with “any measurable” amount of alcohol in
his system.
The trial court instructed the jury on murder with CALCRIM No. 520, which
states in relevant part: “The defendant, Angel Bahena, is charged in Count One with the
murder of Marilyn [P.], in violation of Penal Code Section 187. To prove that the
defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that, one, the defendant
committed an act that caused the death of another person, Marilyn [P.], and two, when
the defendant acted he had a state of mind called malice aforethought.
“There are two kinds of malice aforethought – express malice and implied malice.
Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder. The
defendant had express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill.
“The defendant had implied malice if, one, he intentionally committed the act;
two, the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life;
three, at the time he acted he knew his act was dangerous to human life; and four, he
deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found all alleged enhancements
true. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life plus six years in
state prison comprised of: 15 years to life on count one, 15 years to life on count two
(stayed under section 654), the middle term of two years on count four as the principal
determinate term with an additional three years for the allegation of bodily injury of
Nelson and one year for bodily injury to another victim, Mycajoy, and the midterm of

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two years on count three with additional four years for injury to the same victims (stayed
under section 654).
Defendant appealed.

DISCUSSION

I

Implied Malice Murder Jury Instruction

Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on
implied malice. But as the People point out defendant did not object to the malice
instruction at trial or request additional, clarifying language. “Failure to object to
instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects [the] defendant’s
substantial rights.” (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927; see also
People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 923.) “[I]n general, a defendant may raise
for the first time on appeal instructional error affecting his or her substantial rights.
[Citations.] But ‘[a] party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in [the] law
was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first requesting such
clarification at trial.’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428.)
Defendant acknowledges that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes—
which defendant argues adopted “a high degree of probability of death” standard for
implied malice—was issued in June 2023, several months before his trial. Defendant
counters, however, that a claim of instructional error may be raised for the first time on
appeal where the trial court failed to instruct on an essential element of the charged
offense (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409) or misstated the elements of a crime
(People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 543). Defendant also asserts the error affected
his substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.)
Assuming defendant’s claim was preserved for appeal, we reject it on the merits.

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The jury was instructed on second-degree murder with a version of CALCRIM
No. 520 current at the time (though subsequently amended, as we will discuss). That
instruction informed the jury that defendant harbored implied malice “if, one, he
intentionally committed the act; two, the natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life; three, at the time he acted he knew his act was dangerous
to human life; and four, he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
This formulation of implied malice is a correct statement of the law. (People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 (Knoller); People v. Fay (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 767, 774
[CALCRIM No. 520 defines implied malice correctly].)
Defendant, however, argues the jury should have been instructed with the test
articulated in People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470 (Thomas). Under that test, implied
malice exists where “ ‘the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton
disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.’ ” (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 782 (Washington)
[quoting Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Thomas, at p. 480].)
Defendant acknowledges that the California Supreme Court held in People v.
Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 (Phillips) that malice is implied where a killing
“proximately resulted from an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at
p. 587; Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152 [this definition of implied malice is known as
“[t]he Phillips test”].) The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the two
linguistic formulations—‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life’
and ‘an act [committed] with a high probability that it will result in death’ are equivalent
and are intended to embody the same standard.” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992)
4 Cal.4th 91, 111 (Nieto Benitez); see also Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300; People v.
Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219 (Dellinger) [Watson “made it abundantly clear

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that the two definitions of implied malice” in the Phillips test and the Thomas test
“articulated one and the same standard”]; Knoller, supra, at p. 152 [same but endorsing
the Phillips test].)
Nonetheless, defendant argues that, after the California Supreme Court’s decision
in Reyes, “only an act carrying a high degree of probability of death is sufficient for
implied malice.” Defendant thus asserts “the jury . . . was not correctly instructed
concerning the fact that the danger to human life required a high degree of probability
that the act would result in death, and there was nothing that informed jurors they had to
make that factual finding.” We disagree.
In Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981, the Supreme Court clarified the term “dangerous
to human life”: In order “to suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must
not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a
high degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 989.) The Reyes
decision, however, did not involve a jury instruction but the trial court’s denial of petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6. (Reyes, supra, at p. 984.) The Supreme Court’s
discussion of the elements of implied malice was in the context of its conclusion that the
defendant’s conduct of traveling into rival gang territory with other gang members, one
of them armed, was insufficient to give rise to a high probability that death would result.
(Id. at p. 989.) The court provided no indication that its ruling abrogated or questioned
the validity of its prior decisions in Watson, Nieto Benitez, Dellinger, and Knoller
concluding that the “high probability” and “natural consequences” implied malice
standards are one and the same. Indeed, as noted, in Dellinger, the high court specifically
approved the language in CALJIC No. 8.11 that was subsequently adopted in the version
CALCRIM No. 520 given at defendant’s trial. (Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1221-
1222.) Moreover, the Reyes court quoted with approval the language from Knoller
reaffirming that “under the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to
life’ ” ’ means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in question

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‘ “will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 152.) In short, the language quoted in Reyes from the Thomas test correctly states the
law, but so does the Phillips test language in the version of CALCRIM No. 520 given the
jury in this case. (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300.)
Separately, defendant argues that a correct instruction after Reyes “would require
the jury to find that the defendant knew his act carried a high degree of probability that it
would result in death.” As defendant acknowledges, however, in Knoller, supra,
41 Cal.4th 139, the California Supreme Court held that subjective knowledge of the high
probability of death in the Thomas test is not an element of implied malice: high
probability of death is the objective, not the subjective, component of implied malice.
(Id. at p. 157.)
To be sure, as defendant notes, in March 2024, the Judicial Council modified
CALCRIM No. 520 after the Reyes decision to add language defendant contends should
have been given to the jury. The instruction now provides in relevant part: “The natural
and probable consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life
in that the (act/ [or] failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would
result in death. . . .” (CALCRIM No. 520 (Mar. 2024 rev.).) Even if this addition to the
instruction better articulates the implied malice standard for the jury, it remains true that
the trial court did not err in giving the jury a legally correct instruction on implied malice,
approved by California Supreme Court in Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages 103-
104; Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 1221-1222; and Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
page 152.
The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on implied malice.

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II

Gross Vehicular Manslaughter Sentencing

Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the allegation that he
suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of section 191.5, subdivision (d), requiring
imposition of a life term. He argues his 2012 conviction for violation of Vehicle Code
section 23152, subdivision (b) was not one of the enumerated Vehicle Code sections
punishable in section 191.5, subdivision (d). The People concede the issue and we agree.
The evidence is undisputed that defendant’s 2012 conviction under Vehicle Code section
23152, subdivision (b) alleged in the information was his first DUI offense and therefore
not punishable under section 191.5, subdivision (d). Accordingly, there was insufficient
evidence to impose a 15-years-to-life-sentence under section 191.5, subdivision (d).
Defendant was charged with a life-term sentence enhancement in count two of
having suffered a prior DUI conviction in 2012 within the meaning of section 191.5.
subdivision (d). As discussed above, at trial the parties stipulated that defendant was
convicted in 2012 of a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) for
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The People introduced evidence
of defendant’s order of informal probation and minute order in that case, in which a box
was checked describing the violation as “23152(b) VC – First Offense.” Defendant was
also ordered to complete a three-month “1st Offender DUI Program.” Defendant testified
on cross-examination that he attended a first offender DUI class after his 2012 conviction
and this was his first experience with the criminal court. In closing argument, the
prosecutor twice referred to defendant’s 2012 conviction as “his first offense.”
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 3100 on this charge, in pertinent
part: “If you find the defendant guilty of the crime in Count Two, vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated with gross negligence, you must also decide whether the
People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was previously convicted

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of another crime. It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named
in Exhibit 6. You must decide whether the evidence proves the defendant was convicted
of this alleged crime. [¶] The People allege that the defendant was convicted of, one, a
violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(b), for which judgment was entered on
September 5, 2012, in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Sacramento in case number 12T04139.”
The jury found the enhancement true. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15
years to life on count two and stayed the sentence under section 654.
“In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) “The standard of
appellate review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an
enhancement is the same as that applied to a conviction.” (People v. Weddington (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 468, 483.)
Section 191.5, subdivision (a), defines the crime of gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated for which defendant was convicted in count two. Subdivision (d) of
section 191.5 provides, “A person convicted of violating subdivision (a) who has one or
more prior convictions of this section or of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section
192, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 192.5 of this code, or of violating Section 23152
punishable under Sections 23540, 23542, 23546, 23548, 23550, or 23552 of, or convicted
of Section 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for a term of 15 years to life.” (Italics added.)
Vehicle Code section 23540, subdivision (a), provides “If a person is convicted of
a violation of Section 23152 and the offense occurred within 10 years of a separate
violation of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, 23152, or 23153, that

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resulted in a conviction, that person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail
for not less than 90 days nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than three
hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). The person’s
privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended by the department pursuant to
paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 13352. The court shall require the person to
surrender the driver’s license to the court in accordance with Section 13550.” Vehicle
Code section 23546 has similar language when a defendant has two convictions, and
Vehicle Code section 23550 involves three or more convictions. Vehicle Code sections
23542, 23548, and 23552 require mandatory jail sentences or fines where probation is
granted when a defendant had prior DUI convictions.
A Vehicle Code section 23152 conviction does not subject a defendant to
increased punishment under Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (d), unless the prior
conviction is punishable under one of the enumerated code sections, e.g., Vehicle Code
section 23540. (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d).) Here, the prosecution needed to prove
for the section 191.5, subdivision (d), enhancement that defendant (1) had suffered a prior
conviction of violating Vehicle Code section 23152; and (2) within the prior 10 years he
had been convicted of one or more violations of Vehicle Code section 23152, 23103.5, or
23153 for which he was punished pursuant to Vehicle Code sections 23540, 23542,
23546, 23548, 23550, or 23552. Thus, in this instance, there must be multiple prior
convictions for driving under the influence to qualify for punishment under section 191.5,
subdivision (d) for a prior violation of Vehicle Code section 23152. The Legislature
enacted section 191.5, subdivision (d), to increase the punishment for anyone convicted
of gross vehicular manslaughter who had a history of driving under the influence. (See
Stats. 1996, ch. 645, § 1) [“This act shall be known and may be cited as ‘Courtney’s
Law’ in memory of Courtney Cheney of Roseville, who was killed by a drunken driver
with a long history of driving under the influence”].)
Since it is undisputed that defendant’s 2012 conviction was his first DUI, he could

14
not have been punished under Vehicle Code sections 23540, 23542, 23546, 23550, or
23552. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s true finding on
the enhancement to count two under section 191.5, subdivision (d).
We will order stricken the enhancement under section 191.5, subdivision (d)
stayed under section 654 and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
conduct a full resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of
a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances’ ”].)

DISPOSITION
The enhancement under section 191.5, subdivision (d) is stricken and the sentence
vacated. We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a full
resentencing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

____/s/__________________
HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_____/s/_________________
DUARTE, J.

_____/s/_________________
MESIWALA, J.

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