CourtListener 10744964•In re K.C. CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 11/26/25 In re K.C. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re K.C., a Person Coming B342822
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 22CCJP00042
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ashley Price, Judge. Affirmed.
Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Father A.P. appeals from the juvenile court’s order
declining to place father’s son K.C. with his paternal aunt
at the December 11, 2024 relative placement hearing under
section 361.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.1 We find
no prejudicial error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 4, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of K.C., who was then two years old, based on the
history of domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend
R.B.—the father of K.C.’s yet to be born half siblings S.B. and
R.A.B.2 The petition listed K.C.’s father as unknown. DCFS
had removed K.C. from mother’s care on December 30, 2021 and
placed him with resource parent Ms. E.B. The detention report
stated mother said K.C.’s father’s name was Anthony C., and he
was 27 years old. She said father hadn’t had any contact with
K.C. since his birth, and he currently was incarcerated. DCFS
reported there were “no relatives to consider for placement . . . .”
Mother filed a parentage questionnaire on January 7, 2022,
through counsel. She alleged Anthony P.—not Anthony C.—as
K.C.’s father. She gave his birthdate as “12/25/2022.” Mother
indicated father was not present at K.C.’s birth nor named on the
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 The court declared S.B. (born February 2022) and
R.A.B. (born November 2022) dependents on March 21 and
December 16, 2022, respectively. S.B. and R.A.B. are not
the subject of this appeal. Mother and R.B. are not parties
to this appeal.
2
birth certificate. At the January 7 detention hearing, the court
found Anthony P. was K.C.’s alleged father. The court detained
K.C. and ordered DCFS “to present evidence of due diligence
in attempting to locate father.”
“Anthony P[.’s]” whereabouts were unknown. DCFS
initiated a due diligence search for him on January 12, 2022.
DCFS searched “Anthony P[.]; DOB: 12/25,” because mother
didn’t know father’s birth year. The search was unsuccessful.
The search sources—including the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the
County Jail—found no records, indicating “[n]eed [c]omplete
DOB to specifically identify.”
At the January 31, 2022 adjudication hearing, the court
(Commissioner Peter R. Navarro) found “due diligent efforts
ha[d] been made to locate” father, those efforts “were
unsuccessful,” and the due diligence as to father was complete.
The court sustained the petition and set the disposition hearing
for March 2, 2022. (The court also had DCFS search “Anthony
[C.].”) At the disposition hearing, the court declared K.C. to be
a dependent of the juvenile court, removed him from parents’
custody, and ordered him suitably placed. The court ordered
DCFS to provide mother with family reunification services. The
court bypassed reunification services for father under section
361.5, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), as he was an alleged father and
his whereabouts were unknown. At mother’s counsel’s request,
the court ordered DCFS to assess the caretaker of K.C.’s newborn
half sibling S.B. for K.C.’s placement.3 On August 30, 2022,
the court continued mother’s reunification services.
3 The caretaker couldn’t accept more children.
3
On January 31, 2023, K.C. was placed with a new
caregiver, Ms. A.B. Ms. E.B. had asked for K.C. to be re-placed
“due to the tumultuous relationship” she had with mother. K.C.’s
half sibling S.B. also was placed with Ms. A.B. R.A.B. was placed
with resource parent Ms. S. On February 28, 2023, the court
continued mother’s reunification services.
DCFS reported that, on July 19, 2023, paternal
grandmother had called the social worker. Paternal grandmother
told the social worker father was incarcerated, and she wanted
to establish paternity on his behalf. The social worker stated
she had been receiving calls from father, but they had dropped
when she tried to accept them. On August 24, DCFS informed
the court through a last minute information (LMI) that father
had reached the social worker on August 15. He told the
social worker his place of incarceration and that he wanted
his mother—paternal grandmother—to care, and provide
permanence, for K.C. Father stated he understood mother
wanted the siblings to stay together, but his family would take
only K.C. Father asked to complete a DNA test before DCFS
“proceed[ed] in having [K.C.] under his mother’s care.” Father
also told the social worker his sisters, paternal aunts A.P. and
P.T., could assist in K.C.’s care.
At the August 28, 2023 hearing, minors’ counsel reiterated
the LMI’s report, and father’s request that K.C. be placed with
paternal grandmother if he established paternity. Minors’
counsel asked the court to order the DNA test. DCFS’s counsel
noted a paternal aunt might also be available for placement.
Mother said she wanted her children to stay together. The
court ordered the DNA test and set a September 27 return
hearing date.
4
Meanwhile, an associate social worker had interviewed
paternal grandmother and paternal aunt P.T. on August 23,
2023, as part of DCFS’s concurrent planning assessment.
Paternal grandmother “ ‘want[ed] adoption’ ” and was open to
adopting K.C.’s two half siblings, as well. Paternal grandmother
had not yet met K.C. P.T. said, “ ‘If it came down to it, I’m
willing to offer adoption or legal guardianship but just for the
one child (K[.C.]). He is family and we have a responsibility to
him. If we are able to help, we will help.’ ” P.T. never had met
K.C., but she knew of him. The social worker also called paternal
aunt A.P. but she was getting on a plane. On August 25 and 29,
the social worker called and left a voicemail for A.P., and also
texted her, but as of September 20 A.P. had not contacted the
social worker. Earlier, the social worker had spoken to K.C.’s
and S.B.’s caregiver, Ms. A.B. She wanted to adopt the two boys
and was open to providing permanency for their sibling R.A.B.
Ms. A.B. said she was open to the boys having continued
visits with R.A.B. if she were unable to adopt him. DCFS
recommended the concurrent plan of adoption for K.C. and S.B.
by Ms. A.B.4
On September 14, 2023, the court terminated mother’s
reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26
hearing. The minute order noted father was not offered
reunification services. In its LMI for the September 27 hearing,
DCFS informed the court it had not received the DNA test
4 These interviews were documented in a concurrent
planning assessment report, completed on September 20, 2023.
DCFS filed the report on January 5, 2024, with its section 366.26
report.
5
results. The court confirmed the DNA samples had been
received, but the results were not in. The court continued the
matter to October 11 for a report on the results.
On October 10, 2023, DCFS still had not received father’s
DNA results. Counsel appeared as a friend of the court for
father. The court continued the matter to November 15 to
confirm appointment of father’s counsel. The court also ordered
DCFS to interview paternal grandmother and paternal aunts
A.P. and P.T. about K.C.’s placement. The matter was ordered
transferred—effective November 13, 2023—to a department
in a different courthouse.
The social worker spoke with paternal grandmother on
November 8, 2023 about possible placement for K.C. and his
two half siblings. Paternal grandmother said she was interested
in taking all three children—she did not want to separate the
siblings. The next day, the social worker spoke with A.P. She
also was interested in caring for K.C. and his half siblings.
The social worker could not reach P.T.
Counsel made a special appearance for father at the
November 15, 2023 hearing.5 Counsel anticipated her colleague
would file an Ansley motion for father.6
5 The original judicial officer (Commissioner Navarro)
presided over this hearing. The next hearing was before
the judge in the department to which the matter had been
transferred (Judge Ashley Price).
6 Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 481
(Ansley). An Ansley motion seeks to set aside jurisdictional and
dispositional orders based on a lack of due process notice of the
dependency petition. (Id. at pp. 481, 483.)
6
In its LMI for the December 14, 2023 hearing, DCFS
reported it was awaiting background results on paternal
relatives. DCFS recommended the court return the three
children to home of mother based on her progress. Father’s
counsel, making a special appearance, was continuing “to assess”
Ansley and Kelsey S. issues.7 The court continued the matter.
On January 4, 2024, father filed a parentage statement
asking the court to find he was K.C.’s presumed parent. He
stated he had lived with K.C. and mother at his sister’s home
from K.C.’s birth until February 2020, and he had told his family
and friends that K.C. was his child.
DCFS’s January 11, 2024 LMI recommended the court
order family maintenance services for the three children with
mother. On January 12, the court ordered the three children
released to mother’s custody and took the section 366.26 hearing
off calendar. Father’s counsel was appointed and generally
appeared. Counsel informed the court father wanted to litigate
the issue of paternity. The court was unsuccessful in having
father appear by Webex from prison. The court therefore set a
paternity hearing for February 9. The court noted for the record
that father’s relatives—paternal grandmother and paternal aunt
P.T.—were present in the courtroom. They had informed the
court they were interested in placement of K.C. should that
become necessary. Father’s counsel asked that DCFS attempt
to contact father about his relationship with K.C., as he was
7 Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 821
(constitutional right of unwed father to withhold consent
of child’s adoption).
7
seeking presumed father status. The court, which had inherited
the case from another department, discovered the DNA results
identified father as K.C.’s biological father. The court elevated
father from alleged to biological father. The court ordered DCFS
to interview father, and mother, about the length of time he
had spent with K.C., any financial resources he had provided
the child, and his involvement with the child since his birth.
The court also ordered DCFS to contact father’s prison
to arrange for his virtual attendance at the February 9 hearing.
The court ordered DCFS to speak to the liaison at both father’s
and father R.B.’s correctional facilities about the ability for
children to visit in person and whether a regular virtual
visitation schedule could be arranged. For the time being,
the two fathers were to have virtual visitation only. DCFS
filed an LMI on February 6, 2024 that referred to its inquiry
about visitation at R.B.’s facility. The LMI did not mention
father at all.
On February 7, 2024, DCFS received a report that S.B.
(then two years old) had bitten R.A.B. (then one year old) more
than a dozen times. Social workers went to mother’s home.
Mother said S.B. “need[ed] ‘anger management’ ” and had bitten
his brother on his face, nose, and arm. R.A.B.’s former caretaker
Ms. S. had picked him up and sent mother photographs of
bite marks she discovered on his back. Mother was “shocked”—
she hadn’t checked his back. The social workers went to Ms. S.’s
home. R.A.B. had been in her care since February 6. Ms. S.
stated that she had been caring for the child “most of the time”
since his release to mother. Ms. A.B. also had been helping
mother with K.C. and S.B.
8
At the February 9, 2024 hearing, the court again ordered
DCFS to interview mother and father and to inquire about
virtual visitation for father. The court ordered DCFS to facilitate
father’s virtual visits with paternal relatives acting as monitors.
On February 21, 2024, DCFS filed a section 342 petition
on behalf of all three children based on mother’s failure to
supervise R.A.B. properly, and her medical neglect of the child,
as well as mother’s failure to make an appropriate plan for the
children. The detention report filed February 21 stated there
were no relatives to consider for placement.
At the March 4, 2024 hearing, the court explained it was
continuing the paternity hearing to April 10. Father’s counsel
needed information from the social worker who was to interview
father, or father had to be present to testify to that information,
but father had not logged into the hearing. The court ordered
DCFS to communicate with father’s facility to set up his virtual
appearance on April 10, to interview father about his relationship
with K.C., and to interview mother about whether father ever
denied paternity. Father’s counsel also asked that DCFS address
visitation and paternal relatives as monitors. Counsel explained,
“All of these issues need to be explored [and] have been on the
table for a number of weeks. I would ask that they be addressed
forthwith.” On March 8, the court denied DCFS’s request that
the court remove the children from mother’s care.
Father appeared for the April 10, 2024 paternity hearing
by phone. Father’s counsel was not available. Accordingly, the
court trailed the paternity hearing to the April 22 adjudication
hearing on the subsequent petition. The court ordered DCFS
to follow the court’s earlier order to interview father about the
paternity issues. As the court had received evidence that R.A.B.
9
again had been bitten on his face (sometime before March 13),
the court detained R.A.B. from mother. The court ordered DCFS
to make unannounced visits at mother’s home to check on K.C.
and S.B.
The contested paternity hearing went forward on April 22,
2024. Father appeared by phone. Father testified he had
resumed his on- and off-again relationship with mother after
K.C.’s birth. He first met K.C. when the child was about a month
old. He told his family K.C. was his child. Father testified K.C.
was in his care about five days a week from about January until
March 23, 2020, when he was arrested. Father testified he
bought K.C. clothes, diapers, and formula, changed his diapers,
fed him, and woke up with him at night. Over mother’s objection,
the court found father was the presumed father of K.C. At
counsel’s request, the court ordered DCFS “to make best efforts”
to facilitate visitation between K.C. and paternal grandmother
and aunt.
A few days later, on April 25, minors’ counsel asked the
court to detain K.C. and S.B. from mother. Ms. A.B. had reported
mother continued to make inappropriate plans for the children
while in Ms. A.B.’s care, including leaving them with her
overnight. Mother appeared to be engaged in sex work. Counsel
did not believe K.C. and S.B. were safe with mother. Mother’s
counsel objected. Father’s counsel asked that, if the court
detained K.C., paternal grandmother be assessed as a relative
placement.
The court ordered the two children detained. Mother’s
counsel did not want the children to be placed with their former
caregiver Ms. A.B. Minors’ counsel argued the children had been
with Ms. A.B. for years and were bonded with her. Father’s
10
counsel asserted paternal relatives “didn’t really have an
opportunity or chance to assert this issue [placement] until very,
very late in the game . . . . There is still a relative preference
while we are getting this procedural posture of the case and
[I] would just ask the court to make even a more specific order
that my client’s mother’s home be assessed and we have
information about whether or not she can take placement at
an upcoming hearing.” Father’s counsel noted DCFS had had
paternal relatives’ information and communications with them
since the previous year.
The court set a section 361.3 relative preference placement
hearing for May 17, 2024. The court ordered DCFS to prepare
a report addressing placement with paternal grandmother and
paternal aunt, as well as the children’s bond and relationship
with Ms. A.B. Minors’ counsel asked the court to place the
children with Ms. A.B. pending the hearing and to make
a finding that K.C. and S.B. were a sibling set. The court
understood that, because the children were detained at the same
time, they were a sibling set by operation of law. The court found
it would be appropriate for the children to remain with Ms. A.B.
until the next court date. The court explained, “The children
have been bounced back and forth. The court wants to try and
minimize the amount of trauma that the children are going
through, and it might be that [father’s counsel] has strong
arguments for relative placement. However, at this time, the
court doesn’t feel it is appropriate for us to place the children
with somebody completely new understanding that we have
a pending placement hearing coming.”
The next day, minors’ counsel asked the court to re-order
DCFS to place the children with Ms. A.B. DCFS had placed the
11
children in a foster placement because an investigation was
pending as to Ms. A.B.8 DCFS and mother objected to the
children’s return to Ms. A.B. The court—noting “having to
change placements is very traumatic for the children”—found
it was in the children’s best interest to be with Ms. A.B. pending
the section 361.3 hearing, as she had an existing relationship
with and had been caring for them “for quite a period of time.”
In an LMI filed May 1, 2024, DCFS stated mother had
denied being involved in sex work. Mother did not want K.C.
and S.B. to be placed with father’s family members because they
hadn’t played an active role in K.C.’s life. Mother said paternal
grandmother had never met K.C. She said father had abandoned
her and K.C. and was incarcerated not long afterward. Mother
did not want the children to be separated. According to the
prison, father would not speak to the social worker and had
directed the social worker to contact his lawyer with any
questions.
On May 2, 2024, the court heard argument about the
earlier detention request. The court explained its decision was
“very difficult” and the court was left with making “somewhat
of a credibility decision as to whether the children were really
at risk.” The court affirmed its order removing K.C. and S.B.
from mother’s custody. Father’s counsel wanted the social
worker to report on all of DCFS’s efforts to locate father and to
contact paternal relatives to arrange visitation. DCFS’s counsel
8 Ms. A.B. had been over capacity in January, and there was
a complaint of physical abuse involving other children in her care
—putting Ms. A.B.’s home’s approval on hold.
12
objected. The court noted it had ordered virtual visitation for
father on January 12, 2024, when the court had elevated his
status to biological father; had ordered—on February 9—DCFS
to facilitate virtual visits with paternal relatives as monitors; and
also had ordered DCFS to call father’s facility about the process
for setting up virtual visits. The court ordered DCFS to follow up
with the earlier orders, to update the court on what the social
worker had learned about visitation options at the facility, and
to report on its efforts to facilitate father’s visits.
DCFS filed another LMI on May 9, 2024. On May 8, K.C.
and S.B. had been removed from Ms. A.B.’s care at her request.
She no longer wanted to be involved in the case due to mother’s
behavior toward her. She asked that the children be removed
immediately. The children had been placed in an approved
resource family home with Ms. G.
Father had called the social worker the day before and
asked that K.C. and his two half siblings be placed with paternal
family members. Earlier, on May 2, 2024, the dependency
investigator (DI) spoke with paternal aunt A.P. about placing
K.C. and S.B. in her care. A.P. wanted the children placed with
her, but she first had to discuss it with paternal aunt P.T. and
paternal grandmother, with whom she lived. On May 6, P.T.
sent the DI a text stating, “ ‘We are all on board for placing the
children with our family.’ ” However, P.T. did not respond to the
DI’s reply asking about the family’s availability. The DI tried to
call P.T. but got her voicemail. Neither aunt responded to calls
on May 7 and May 8.
The social worker reported he’d explored placing K.C., S.B.,
and R.A.B. with father’s relatives. The relatives told him that,
after speaking to R.A.B.’s caregiver Ms. S., they no longer wished
13
to have R.A.B. in their care. Paternal relatives wanted to start
visits with K.C. and S.B. before committing to their placement.
They also told the social worker they had not returned the DI’s
calls or responded to her texts because they didn’t know who she
was. Paternal relatives had a visit scheduled with the children
on the weekend of May 11.
Father appeared at the May 17, 2024 section 361.3 hearing
by Webex. The court continued the hearing to June 20 to give
DCFS more time to investigate the various relatives’ homes.
Father’s counsel said there had been “a disconnect in
communication” with paternal family members regarding
placement. Counsel had spoken to P.T. earlier that day, and
she was interested in having all three children. Father asked
that the social worker reassess P.T. for placement. Minors’
counsel asked that the court order DCFS to assess placement of
all three children with R.A.B.’s current caregiver Ms. S. Mother
objected. The court ordered DCFS to assess for placement:
R.B.’s mother, paternal aunt P.T., and Ms. S. DCFS’s report was
to state whether each would be willing to take all three children.
The court also ordered DCFS to facilitate virtual visits between
father and K.C. and to report on those efforts.
According to an LMI filed June 14, 2024, paternal aunts
P.T. and A.P. had had two visits with K.C. and S.B. They had
been unable to visit R.A.B. yet. Paternal relatives stated they
needed time to develop a relationship with the children before
committing to their care. Ms. S. wanted S.B. to begin therapy
and overnight visits before she committed to taking all three
children. Caregiver Ms. G. said S.B. no longer was biting but was
aggressive toward K.C. Both children had difficulty regulating
their emotions, were easily agitated, and often threw tantrums.
14
K.C. woke up every night frightened. Ms. G. acknowledged the
children “need[ed] a lot of love, support, and structure.” She said
father called K.C. every day.
DCFS also filed pre-release investigation reports assessing
the three placement options. The DI assessed paternal aunt
P.T.’s home on May 28, 2024. DCFS reported on each of the
section 361.3 enumerated factors. The report stated it was not
in K.C.’s and S.B.’s best interests to be placed with P.T. As for
the wishes of the parents and relatives, on June 12, mother told
the DI she agreed with placing the children with P.T. and would
like R.A.B. to be placed there too. Father wanted K.C. to be
released to his family members.
P.T.’s home was clean, well-organized, and safe. P.T.
was willing to provide the children with permanency by way of
adoption or legal guardianship. P.T. had not had a relationship
with father or mother until recently, so she did not know
the children. P.T. wanted to start with overnight visits so
the children could “cultivate a relationship with her,” without
disruption to their current placement and routines. P.T. wanted
“to care for the children and provide them with a loving and
stable home environment in which they can thrive and continue
to grow once the children have develop[ed] a relationship with
her.” P.T. did not feel comfortable monitoring visits for mother
and R.B. P.T., who is a wellness coach, stated she must maintain
a peaceful lifestyle. She acknowledged caring for children can
be stressful. She was “not willing to compromise her tranquility,
as she is aware that parents can be difficult to engage.” P.T.
agreed to facilitate visitation between the children and other
relatives and to monitor those visits if asked. P.T.’s family
members would help her care for the children while she worked,
15
but she planned to enroll them in daycare for “additional
stimulation.”
DCFS stated that, at the time, P.T. was not an appropriate
placement because she had asked for “additional time to develop
a relationship with the children prior to the children being placed
in her care.” DCFS reiterated P.T.’s statement about not being
willing to compromise her tranquility. DCFS stated it “does
not want to set up [P.T.] or the children for failure and therefore
placement would not be appropriate.” DCFS “implore[d] the
Court not to release the children as this would lead to failure for
all involved based on the assessment and information gathered.
[P.T.] is not ready to fully commit to care for the children and
work with the parents.” DCFS also found it was not in the
children’s best interest for K.C. and S.B. to be released to S.B.’s
paternal grandmother A.M.’s care at that time due to safety
issues.
Father was not present at the June 20, 2024 hearing—
the prison did not make him available. Mother’s counsel stated
mother preferred the children be placed with P.T. She asked
that DCFS ensure P.T. had visits with the children so they
could move safely to her home. Minors’ counsel wanted R.A.B.
to remain with Ms. S., with whom he had lived since birth.
Mother’s counsel noted, “It is always [DCFS’s] priority to place
with a family member.” Counsel believed Ms. S. was thwarting
visits between R.A.B. and P.T. Father’s counsel argued the
sibling set designation was “not absolute with respect to whether
all children need to be placed in the exact same home.” Counsel
argued for keeping “an open mind to the idea that perhaps
placement in the same home may not happen, but to the extent
we are trying to make that happen, I think the law requires that
16
relatives be preferred.” The court ordered DCFS to initiate visits
between P.T. and R.A.B. “forthwith.” The court continued the
hearing to July 16.
According to an LMI filed July 12, 2024, the DI
spoke with Dr. Ryan—the children’s mental health services
provider—on June 14. Dr. Ryan would not make a placement
recommendation. She was under the impression the children
were not placed together, however, due to S.B. having bitten
R.A.B. Dr. Ryan stated, “ ‘I thought it was just common sense
not to place together.’ ” Paternal relatives were to start overnight
visits with K.C. and S.B. on July 12. They didn’t feel comfortable
having all three children in their care. P.T. told the social worker
“she would only be interest[ed] in having her biological nephew
released to her.” She did “not want to overwhelm herself caring
for three small children.” Both Ms. G. and Ms. S. asked to have
no contact with mother.
For the July 16, 2024 hearing, father appeared
telephonically. Addressing the question of reunification services
on the supplemental petition, the court explained, “The best
interest for these children is to stop bouncing around to different
places, to different babysitters, to different caregivers. If the
children are doing worse now, it is because they have been
repeatedly moved. They don’t have consistent routines. They
don’t have consistent service providers.” The court declined
to order an additional, discretionary period of reunification
services for mother and found all parents were “out of time
for reunification.” The court found it was in the children’s best
interests “to move towards permanency” by setting a section
366.26 hearing. Due to the complexity of the placement decision,
the court continued the section 361.3 hearing to September 16.
17
Father’s counsel stated the LMI did not accurately reflect
what he understood to be P.T.’s availability to care for the
children. He asked that DCFS’s report include a direct interview
of her. Counsel noted father’s objection to the setting of the
section 366.26 hearing. The court ordered DCFS to interview
P.T. after the children had overnight visits with her.
In September, DCFS reported K.C. and S.B. had had
overnight weekend visits with P.T. during the weekends of
July 12 and August 16. On August 27, the social worker
interviewed P.T. She enjoyed the time with K.C. and S.B.
She “felt that there is a good connection with” K.C. P.T. felt
remorseful about the time that had passed and wanted to be a
source of support for the children. P.T. wanted “the opportunity
to adopt” K.C. She said she’d maintain K.C.’s connection with his
siblings S.B. and R.A.B. She explained that she at first “was told
that the only way she would be able to adopt her nephew was to
adopt [S.B.] as well.” P.T. “did not want to lose the opportunity
to care for her nephew so she felt obligated to say she would
also take on [S.B.].” Now that she had had “time to process the
information,” “she would love the opportunity to provide [K.C.]
with permanency.” P.T. stated she would build a relationship
with whomever adopted S.B. and R.A.B. The next day, P.T.
told the team “her goal was to adopt her nephew [K.C.] and if
the only way to have him was to adopt [S.B.] as well, she would
be willing to.”
P.T., Ms. S., and Ms. G. had agreed to rotate weekends
for overnight visits. P.T. was to take the children the weekend
of September 6. On September 5, she told DCFS she couldn’t
pick the children up that weekend. She had not yet called
to reschedule. DCFS stated P.T. “at this time” did not appear
18
“to be a good fit as the permanency plan would be to have all
three minors adopted together.”
DCFS reported father had remained in contact with DCFS.
He believed he would be released from prison in February 2025.
Father was not present for the September 16, 2024 hearing.
The court acknowledged the difficulty of the placement decision
given K.C. and S.B. had lived a significant part of their lives
together, but had different fathers, and R.A.B. had lived with
his caregiver since he was a newborn. The court believed
“it would be aided by additional information from Dr. Ryan.”
The court ordered DCFS “to interview Dr[.] Ryan about her
professional opinion as to the children’s existing sibling bond,
minimization of trauma regarding replacement, and any safety
concerns of placing the children together.”9 The court continued
the hearing to November 5.
DCFS determined the best option for the three children
would be adoption by Ms. G., as she had been open to adopting
the three children since DCFS started asking about permanency.
Ms. G. had maintained communication with the children’s
fathers. According to Ms. G., father called K.C. almost every
day and had video calls with him.
Father appeared at the November 5 hearing by Webex.
The court ordered DCFS to prepare a section 361.3 report
explaining its reasoning for its placement recommendation with
Ms. G. The court continued the matter. DCFS filed its report
on November 26. P.T. had not participated in the most recent
weekend visitation schedule. A social worker spoke with P.T.
9 It does not appear Dr. Ryan ever gave such an opinion.
19
on October 3, 2024. She did not want to restart the rotation
because she did not want all three children to come over. She
said she’d like to have the next visit with only K.C. P.T. was
willing to take in her nephew, but she believed S.B. and R.A.B.
belonged together. The social worker explained DCFS’s goal
was to keep siblings together. P.T. understood; she was
interested only in K.C. DCFS had not had contact with her
since October 17.
DCFS did not believe separating K.C. and placing him
with P.T. would be in his best interest. K.C. had been in Ms. G.’s
care since May 2024 along with his brother, where they both
were receiving “appropriate care, love, and support.” DCFS
reported R.A.B.’s weekend visits with K.C. and S.B. at Ms. G.’s
home were appropriate and without incident. DCFS “strongly
believe[d] that separating the children from each other would be
a disservice to the children as they ha[d] created a special bond
with each other.”
The children were aware they were brothers—the social
worker said K.C. was “nurturing” toward his brothers when
they cried. Another social worker had seen K.C. take R.A.B.’s
hand and say, “ ‘Don’t cry [R.A.B.], I’m right here.’ ” K.C. would
ask about R.A.B. if he and S.B. arrived at the DCFS office first
for their visit. S.B. shared snacks and played with his siblings.
R.A.B.—who cried when the social worker picked him up from
Ms. S.—now “appear[ed] to be comfortable” leaving with the
social worker. He seemed to know where he was going and
would get excited when he saw his siblings. DCFS recommended
R.A.B. be placed with Ms. G. DCFS also noted father continued
to have telephone and video calls with his son.
20
“After careful consideration,” DCFS believed it was “in
the best interest of the children to stay together as the children
have already created a sibling bond with each other. The
children deserve[d] to have the opportunity to grow up together,
as siblings, in an environment where they will be given the
opportunity to thrive. The children [had] demonstrate[d] love
and care for each other, and continuing to separate them [was]
doing a disservice to [them].” Ms. G. was willing to take in R.A.B.
and adopt the three children “so that they can grow together.”
The three children visited together with Ms. G. the most. She
was open to facilitating visits and calls with the parents.
The section 361.3 hearing finally took place on
December 11, 2024. Father appeared virtually. P.T. appeared
by Webex. She testified she was K.C.’s “auntie” and her visits
with him had started around July 2023. She couldn’t recall when
overnight visits began but testified she had had four overnight
visits with K.C. Her last overnight visit had been in August.
P.T. said the visits had stopped because mother was making
threatening phone calls. P.T. testified she “would love to
continue overnight visits with [K.C.] and [K.C.] only, . . . and
see how that builds.” She was “a hundred percent willing”
to provide him with permanency through adoption or legal
guardianship.
On cross-examination, P.T. testified she had known K.C.
was her nephew since father had received the DNA results.
Paternal relatives first met him at his four-year-old birthday
party. S.B. had spent the night at P.T.’s home. She had not
met R.A.B. The court clarified that P.T. had had about four
to five daytime visits with K.C. and about four overnight visits
with him.
21
Ms. S. also testified. She still was willing to take all
three children but wanted them all to have therapy first. She
had visited with all three children more than 30 times during
the case and had had two overnight visits with them.
Mother’s counsel argued the children should be placed with
Ms. G. Father’s counsel argued K.C. should be placed with P.T.,
relying on In re N.J. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 96 (N.J.). Counsel
noted Dr. Ryan “had even stated when interviewed on June 14[,
2024], that the separate placements made sense.” Counsel
argued it appeared “separate placement is in line with the
child’s best interest. Relative placement would allow the child
to continue his relationship with his family. That is certainly
something that is in the child’s best interest.” Minors’ counsel
asked the court to place all three children together with Ms. S.
Alternatively, counsel asked the court to place S.B. and R.A.B.
with Ms. S. and K.C. with P.T. Counsel argued the sibling
benefit at this time outweighed the relative placement
preference. DCFS’s counsel argued that, “[a]s [a] whole, it
seems as if Ms. [G.] is [the] most consistent and most reliable
person we can look towards with regard to permanency for
all three of the children together.” Counsel thus asked the
court to place R.A.B. with Ms. G.
Before issuing its ruling, the court agreed that “none of
these choices is perfect. None of these placements are perfect.”
The court noted it had “continued this case several times because
I just felt like I needed more information to be able to make this
lasting choice because . . . today’s decision could drastically
change the course of [the children’s] lives moving forward.” The
court also noted that the relative placement preference “simply
means that [DCFS] and the court must consider the relative first
22
before considering other placement options pursuant to 361.3
subsection (b)[,] subsection (1), and preferential consideration
does not mean a presumption that placement with a relative
is appropriate or in the child’s best interest.” The court went
through the section 361.3 factors.
The court stated paternal aunt P.T. was willing to take
only K.C., but K.C. was “very bonded” with S.B. because
they “essentially” had been raised together. The court found
particularly telling P.T.’s testimony that “she wanted to have
overnights with [K.C.] and [K.C.] only, to quote, ‘see how that
feels [builds].’ [¶] We are way past exploring how things feel with
[P.T.]. The court is deciding today for a long term and lasting
placement. [¶] When we ordered the [pre-release investigation]
originally on [P.T.] back in June, she wasn’t ready then either
and wanted to spend more time getting to know the children. [¶]
And so[,] based on her testimony today, the court is not confident
that she’s ready today and that she would be able to handle the
very complicated and sometimes very heated situations that
occur between parents and caregivers in this case. I do not
believe it is in the best interest of [K.C.] to be separated from
his brothers. I do find that placing the children in the same
home is a more important consideration here and . . . the nature
and duration of the relationship between [K.C.] and [P.T.] is
relatively brief. [¶] So on balance of the 361.3 factors, the court
is declining to place [K.C.] with [P.T.].”
The court then considered whether the boys should be
placed with Ms. G. or Ms. S. The court’s “main focus” was “where
are the children going to thrive and succeed long term without
threats of 14-day [removal] notices.” The court explained:
23
“One of the things that the court has
learned during the pendency of this case is that
these boys have a lot of energy and we have
heard through various reports about their
behaviors and their needs, not blaming the
children because they’ve been through an
extraordinary amount of things that would
cause acting-out behaviors, hyper behaviors,
unsettled behaviors.
“And what I think is telling and
compelling is that Ms. G[.] has had [K.C.] and
[S.B.] since [May] with no reported concerns
and they all do well, and when asked if there
[were] any issues when [R.A.B.] joined them—
because the court is concerned about the fact
that in the past [R.A.B.] has been bitten and
attacked—and Ms. G[.] reports that during the
overnights at her house . . . the boys do well
together and there are no concerns.
“The court believes that is a reflection of
a strong, experienced caregiver; that these boys
are finally settling down and that Ms. G[.] is
the caregiver that’s been able to support [K.C.]
and [S.B.] and has welcomed [R.A.B.] into the
overnights as well.
“I also think it’s important that [DCFS]
highlighted the bond between the siblings.
Between [K.C.] and [S.B.] is obvious—they
have been together essentially their whole lives
—but [R.A.B.] is now bonded to the older boys
24
as well. Even though he’s not verbal, he shows
excitement when he knows that he is going on
a sibling visit.
“And at the end of the day, the court is
trying to find the caregiver that is most solid,
most stable, without issue.”
The court explained the facts here were different from N.J.,
and that, if the reviewing court were to find “that the relative
placement efforts by [DCFS] were inadequate, the court is
holding, as the record reflects, a very robust relative placement
hearing today. I have gone through all of the 361.3 factors to
explain why the court is not placing the children with relatives.”
The court continued:
“The court does believe it is in the best
interest of the children to stay together. The
court believes that it is important to consider
the parent’s wishes. The court also has
considered all of the factors that I have gone
through previously—the nature and duration
of the relationship of the children and the
relatives—and the court finds that the most
stable and consistent placement for all three
children is with Ms. [G.], and that is the
recommendation by [DCFS].”
Father’s counsel objected to the denial of K.C.’s
placement with paternal aunt. Father filed a notice of appeal
from the court’s findings and orders made at the December 11,
November 5, September 16, July 16, and June 20, 2024 hearings.
25
DISCUSSION
Father essentially contends DCFS and the juvenile court
did not timely assess paternal relatives for placement under
section 361.3, and the juvenile court abused its discretion by
focusing almost exclusively on placing the siblings together.
DCFS contends father lacks standing to challenge the relative
placement issue, and father failed to show the court abused
its discretion in any event.
1. Standing
“[O]nly a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal.”
(In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236 (K.C.).) “Until parental
rights are terminated, a parent retains a fundamental interest
in his or her child’s companionship, custody, management, and
care.” (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1053
(Esperanza C.).) After reunification services are terminated,
however, “ ‘the parents’ interest in the care, custody and
companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather,
at this point, “the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability.” ’ ” (K.C., at p. 236.)
The parties dispute whether father—whose parental rights
remained intact, but whose reunification services had been
bypassed—has standing to appeal the court’s order declining
to place K.C. with paternal aunt. (Compare In re A.K. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 492, 499 [father whose reunification services
had been terminated could not “establish that his rights and
interest in reunification” were “injuriously affected by any failure
to consider the paternal grandmother for placement” and thus
had no standing to assert error under section 361.3] with K.C.,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 238 [parent has standing to appeal
placement decision if decision affected order terminating
26
parental rights]; Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1050–1051, 1053–1054 [mother whose parental rights had
been bypassed but not terminated at time of proceedings had
standing to appeal relative placement issue].) For purposes of
this opinion, we assume—without deciding—father has standing
to appeal.
2. Section 361.3
The section 361.3 relative placement preference requires
the court to give “preferential consideration” to a relative’s
request for placement of a dependent child who has been removed
from a parent’s custody. (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) “ ‘Preferential
consideration’ ” means “that the relative seeking placement
shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.”
(Id., subd. (c)(1).) By its terms, section 361.3 “provides for
preferential consideration of a relative’s request for placement
of a child with the relative early in dependency proceedings,
before the disposition order.” (In re J.Y. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
473, 477 (J.Y.); § 361.3, subd. (a).)
If the child’s placement must change after disposition,
relatives again must be given preference up until parental
rights are terminated. (§ 361.3, subd. (d) [“[s]ubsequent to [the
disposition hearing], whenever a new placement of the child
must be made, consideration for placement shall again be given
. . . to relatives who have not been found to be unsuitable and
who will fulfill the child’s reunification or permanent plan
requirements”]; J.Y., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 478; see also
Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032
[relative placement preference applies when a new placement
becomes necessary after reunification period but before
termination of parental rights].) As K.C. required a new
27
placement when he again was removed from mother in April
2024, the statute applied. (See N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 127 [agreeing with the court in In re Joseph T. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 787, 794 that “ ‘[n]othing in section 361.3,
subdivision (d), states or implies’ ” that the relative preference
post-disposition is limited “to instances where a new placement
[is] required”].)
“In assessing a relative’s request for placement, DCFS and
the court must consider the factors enumerated in section 361.3,
subdivision (a).” (N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 123.) Those
factors include, but are not limited to: (1) the best interests of
the children, (2) the wishes of the parents, (3) proximity of the
placement for visitation and reunification with the parents,
(4) placement of any siblings and half siblings in the same home,
(5) the good moral character of the relative, (6) the nature and
duration of the relationship between the child and relative, and
the relative’s desire to care and to provide legal permanency
for the child, (7) the relative’s ability to provide appropriate and
safe care of the child and facilitate visitation with the child’s
other relatives, and (8) the safety of the home. (§ 361.3, subd.
(a)(1)–(8).) “When considering whether to place the child with
a relative, the juvenile court must apply the placement factors,
and any other relevant factors, and exercise its independent
judgment concerning the relative’s request for placement.” (In re
Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.) “The linchpin of
a section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is
in the best interests of the minor.” (Alicia B. v. Superior Court
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862−863 (Alicia B.).)
Preferential consideration under section 361.3, however,
“ ‘does not create an evidentiary presumption in favor of a
28
relative, but merely places the relative at the head of the line
when the court is determining which placement is in the child’s
best interests.’ ” (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.)
“In other words, when a child is taken from his parents’ care
and requires placement outside the home, section 361.3 assures
an interested relative that his or her application for placement
will be considered before a stranger’s request.” (Ibid.)
We review the court’s placement decision for abuse
of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
We will not disturb the court’s placement determination
“ ‘ “unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘ “[t]he appropriate test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds
of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority
to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 318–319.) We will interfere only if, after viewing the evidence
favorably to the trial court’s decision, we find no judge reasonably
could have made the same order. (Alicia B., supra, 116
Cal.App.4th at p. 863.)
3. The court did not abuse its discretion
Father first contends the court abused its discretion “by
failing to conduct the relative placement hearing in a reasonable
and timely manner.” DCFS’s due diligence search to locate father
at the outset of the case admittedly was problematic. Father’s
place of incarceration likely could have been identified had DCFS
estimated his birth year based on his age. Father, however, does
not contend he did not receive due process notice. Accordingly,
29
we do not consider the delay in notifying him of the proceedings
in our review of the relative placement assessment.10
As father notes, he and paternal relatives had asked
DCFS to consider paternal grandmother and/or aunts for K.C.’s
placement when father first spoke with the social worker
in August 2023. However, as DCFS notes, father wanted to
establish paternity through a DNA test before DCFS proceeded
with placing K.C. “under [paternal grandmother’s] care.”
That same month, DCFS nevertheless interviewed paternal
grandmother and paternal aunt P.T. about providing permanency
for K.C. and his half siblings as part of its concurrent planning
assessment. Unfortunately, there was a delay in the
transmission of the DNA results. Nothing in the record, however,
indicates that delay was due to the fault of DCFS or the juvenile
court. By the time the DNA results were received establishing
father’s paternity, the court had ordered the return of K.C.
and his siblings to mother’s custody, obviating the need for an
out-of-home placement. Accordingly, we cannot fault DCFS
for not moving forward with assessing paternal relatives for
placement of K.C. before the DNA results were received.
But there is no question that, moving forward, some
of the delays in the case were attributable to DCFS and may
have contributed to paternal relatives being assessed for
K.C.’s placement later than they otherwise would have been.
10 In any event, as there is no indication in the record that
father ever filed an Ansley motion, he has forfeited review of the
issue. (See, e.g., In re Brian K. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 39, 42
[failure to raise due process issue in juvenile court forfeits review
of issue on appeal].)
30
For example, the hearing on father’s presumed father request—
originally set for February 9, 2024—had to be continued several
times until April 22, 2024, because DCFS had not complied with
the court’s order to interview father (and mother) about his
involvement with K.C. after his birth.11 Only once father was
deemed a presumed father would he have certain rights, such as
the entitlement to reunification services, for example. (In re D.M.
(2010) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 544 [“A biological father who is not
a presumed father may be granted services but it is not
mandatory.”].)12
Inexplicably, DCFS’s February 21, 2024 detention report—
filed with the section 342 petition after S.B. bit R.A.B.—stated
there were “no relatives to consider for placement.” But that
wasn’t true. More than a month earlier, at the January 12
hearing, paternal relatives had stated in court that they wanted
to be considered for placement. At the April 22 hearing, after
11 The continued March 4 hearing again was continued
because father was not present. As the social worker had not
yet interviewed father, counsel could not introduce evidence of
his presumed father status without his testimony. Similarly,
the court trailed the continued April 10 hearing date because
father’s counsel of record was not available. DCFS still had
not interviewed father, and the court had to re-order DCFS—
for the fourth time—to do so.
12 Although father objected to the court’s setting of the section
366.26 hearing in July 2024, there is no indication he ever asked
for reunification services after the court made its presumed
father finding. In any event, he likely would not have been
entitled to any as he remained incarcerated.
31
the court elevated father from biological to presumed father, his
counsel had to ask the court to order DCFS to facilitate visitation
between K.C. and paternal relatives.13
On April 25, 2024, when the court detained K.C. and S.B.,
father’s counsel specifically asked that paternal grandmother
be assessed for relative placement. Counsel had to ask the court
to make a specific order requiring DCFS to assess paternal
grandmother’s home, noting the relative placement preference
applied and DCFS had had paternal relatives’ information—
and had communicated with them about placement—since
the previous year. The court ordered DCFS to do so and set a
section 361.3 relative placement hearing, but the court did not
immediately place K.C. with paternal relatives. Rather, the court
ordered DCFS to place the two children—who were a sibling set
—with their former caregiver A.B., pending the upcoming
placement hearing set for May 17.
We cannot find the court abused its discretion in failing to
do so, however. The court understandably wanted to “minimize
the amount of trauma” for the children, acknowledging the
children had been “bounced back and forth”—i.e., they had
been placed with A.B., returned to mother, and now were being
removed from mother yet again. The court found that, pending
the hearing on relative placement, it was in the children’s best
interests to be placed with A.B.—with whom the children were
13 DCFS’s section 366.26 report filed much later—in October
2024—didn’t even acknowledge father’s presumed father status
or that he was K.C.’s biological father. It merely noted the court’s
initial finding that father was the alleged father of K.C.
32
familiar—rather than with someone completely new. Under
the circumstances, the court’s conclusion was not unreasonable.
Moreover, even if DCFS had assessed paternal relatives
by then—e.g., if DCFS had interviewed father when first ordered
to do so, the court could have made the presumed father finding
in February, which in turn could have facilitated visitation
between K.C. and paternal relatives sooner—it is not reasonably
probable that the court would have placed K.C. with paternal
relatives on his detention from mother. (In re Celine R. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60 [error is reversible only if a reasonable
probability exists that the court would have reached a decision
more favorable to the appellant].) The court made clear it
wanted to ameliorate the trauma the children undoubtedly would
suffer from the immediate, and unexpected, removal from mother
by placing them with the caregiver they knew, pending the
section 361.3 hearing. Even if—absent DCFS’s delays—paternal
relatives otherwise would have had some visits with K.C., we
cannot conclude it is reasonably likely the court would have opted
to place the children with paternal relatives over the caregiver
with whom they had had an existing relationship for “quite
some time.”
In any event, DCFS did not simply ignore or put off
paternal relatives as in N.J., where our colleagues in Division
Four reversed the court’s order denying mother’s section 361.3
motion—and order terminating her parental rights. There,
DCFS and the juvenile court “utterly failed to perform [their]
duties” to promptly, diligently, and fairly evaluate for placement
the aunt who had been asking to take the child since shortly after
the child’s birth. (N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 102–104.)
In May, after the court affirmed its orders removing K.C. and
33
S.B. from mother—and when K.C. and S.B. required a new
placement—DCFS contacted paternal relatives. There was
some kind of communication “disconnect,” however. P.T. had
sent a text to the DI stating the family was “on board” to take
the children, and father had called the social worker asking that
K.C. and his brothers be placed with his relatives. But neither
P.T. nor A.P. responded to the DI when she tried to determine
their availability. K.C. and his brother thus were placed with
Ms. G. P.T. also apparently had told the social worker that the
family wanted visits with K.C. and S.B. before committing to take
both children and, after speaking with R.A.B.’s caregiver Ms. S.,
they no longer wished to have him placed with them.
Father contends the juvenile court “pushed” the sibling
preference over the relative preference and “continued and
continued” the hearing “in order to effectuate a particular
outcome pertaining to the sibling factor.” In essence, father
argues the court focused on the sibling factor to the exclusion
of the other section 361.3 factors in abuse of its discretion.
The section 361.3 hearing was continued for seven months.
Although unfortunate that it took so long to resolve, we can’t say
the juvenile court unreasonably delayed the hearing. The record
establishes the continuances were for valid, rational reasons, and
not to further some pre-judged outcome: to give DCFS more time
to assess P.T.’s and the half siblings’ paternal grandmother’s
homes, as well as Ms. S.’s home—DCFS then filed pre-release
investigation reports of each placement by the next hearing;
to allow father to be present when his facility didn’t make him
available; to ensure P.T. had sufficient visits with all three
children so DCFS could “meaningfully interview[ ]” her “about
her ability to take all three children”; to order DCFS to interview
34
P.T. further—at father’s counsel’s request—after she had
overnight visits with the children; to order DCFS to gather
information from Dr. Ryan about the children’s existing sibling
bond and safety concerns to aid the court in its placement
decision; and to order DCFS to prepare a section 361.3 report
explaining its reasoning for recommending the three children be
placed with Ms. G. In any event, from what we can tell, father
did not object to the continuances of the section 361.3 hearings.
The court plainly was looking at the placement issue
from the standpoint that the children should remain together
if possible. The court did not exceed the limits of its discretion
under section 361.3 or act unreasonably in putting greater
importance on keeping K.C. with his brothers than on his
placement with a relative, however. Nothing in section 361.3
requires the court to weigh the enumerated factors equally.
“Balancing the benefits of maintaining extended family
relationships against the best interests of the child is a critical
element in the placement decision. [Citation.] . . . We realize the
importance of according relatives a ‘fair chance’ to obtain custody.
[Citation.] At the same time, however, the fundamental duty
of the juvenile court is to ‘assure the best interest of the child.’ ”
(Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.) The court
thoughtfully engaged in that process.
Contrary to father’s contention, the record supports the
court’s finding that K.C. was bonded with his siblings and those
relationships were important. The court found K.C. and S.B.
were a sibling set. The court found they were “very bonded,”
as they essentially were raised together, having lived with the
same caretaker since 2023—almost the entirety of S.B.’s life.
They also had been detained together. R.A.B. had not lived with
35
his brothers, but we can’t say the court acted outside the bounds
of reason in determining it was in the best interest of the children
for all three to stay together. When visiting with R.A.B., K.C.
acted as the big brother he was, nurturing R.A.B. when he cried.
K.C. knew S.B. and R.A.B. were his brothers. Unlike his sibling
relationships, K.C.’s relationship with P.T. was new—she didn’t
meet him until his four-year-old birthday party. P.T. told the
social worker she felt remorseful about the passage of time.
She wanted to be a source of support for K.C. and have the
opportunity to adopt him. Not unreasonably, P.T. testified she
was interested in providing permanency only for her nephew.
But she also testified she wanted to continue overnight visits
with him to “ ‘see how that builds.’ ” Remarking on P.T.’s
testimony, the court noted, “We are way past exploring how
things feel with [P.T.].” In its section 361.3 report, DCFS wrote
that the children had a sibling bond and “deserve[d] to have the
opportunity to grow up together, as siblings.” The court agreed,
finding it was not in K.C.’s best interest to be separated from
his brothers.
Father notes Dr. Ryan seemed surprised that DCFS was
planning to keep the children together given S.B.’s aggression
toward R.A.B. S.B.’s biting of R.A.B. is what led to R.A.B.’s
removal from mother and separate placement with Ms. S., his
former caretaker. S.B. had been aggressive with K.C. at times,
too. The court specifically noted its concern about the biting
incident. The court also found, however, that the children
had “been through an extraordinary amount of things that
would cause acting-out behaviors, hyper behaviors, unsettled
behaviors.” Indeed, S.B.’s biting occurred after S.B. had been
removed from his caregiver of the past year and returned to
36
mother. The court reasonably could find his aggressive behaviors
were a result of the trauma of having been, in the court’s words,
“bounc[ed] around.” As the three children spent more time all
together, however, they were acting appropriately with each
other.
Father argues the court placed too much emphasis on
maintaining the children in the same home and did not apply the
statute in a comprehensive manner. He argues P.T. otherwise
was “a highly viable placement candidate, . . . and she readily
passed muster” under the section 361.3 factors: she was willing
and able to provide K.C. permanency, father wished for K.C. to
be placed in her care, and she would facilitate visitation between
K.C. and his half siblings. Father essentially is asking us to
reweigh the factors to put less emphasis on placing the siblings
in the same home. We will not do so. (Alicia B., supra, 116
Cal.App.4th at p. 864 [job of court reviewing relative placement
decision is not to reweigh the evidence].)
Here, the court did not simply conduct “a generalized ‘best
interest inquiry.’ ” It independently assessed the relevant factors
under section 361.3. (N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 128.)
The court may not have discussed every factor on the record, but
the court made clear it carefully considered each one, as well as
the circumstances specific to this family. The court repeatedly
noted the complexity of the placement decision given K.C. had
a different father from his brothers and R.A.B. had been placed
with a different caretaker. The court considered the evidence
and weighed the factors, finding placing the children together
in the same home was “a more important consideration here,”
and “the nature and duration of the relationship” between K.C.
and P.T. was “relatively brief.” “[O]n balance of the 361.3
37
factors,” the court declined to place K.C. with paternal aunt P.T.
At the end of the day, the court put K.C.’s best interests first,
ordering him suitably placed with his sibling.
The court acted well within its discretion.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order and findings.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
HANASONO, J.
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