People v. Bell CA2/1

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Filed 11/26/25 P. v. Bell CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337354

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA350562)
v.

RONNIE O’NEIL BELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark Hanasono, Judge. Sentence vacated and
appeal dismissed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant and appellant
Ronnie O’Neil Bell to an aggregate term of 35 years to life in
prison after a jury convicted him of two counts of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),2 one count of assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of carjacking (§ 215,
subd. (a)). The sentence included a one-year enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b) for a prior prison term based on
Bell’s 1987 conviction on seven felony counts, including one count
of forcible rape (former § 261, subd. (2)).3
In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590), which eliminated the one-
year enhancement for prior prison terms under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) except in the case of defendants whose prior
prison term was imposed for a sexually violent offense. Two
years later, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75,4 which
declared all existing enhancements imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) invalid except when the enhancement was
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense, and
created a mechanism for eliminating the invalid enhancements

1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration,
section 8.1.
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 This provision has subsequently been recodified as section
261, subdivision (a)(2). (See People v. Franklin (2003) 105 Cal.
App.4th 532, 536 [“the language of current . . . [§] 261, [subd.]
(a)(2), tracks the language of former . . . [§] 261, [subd.] 2”].)
4 The law was originally codified at section 1171.1 (Stats.
2021, ch. 728, § 3).

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from sentences of defendants in custody. (Sen. Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3).)
In November 2023, Bell filed a petition requesting that the
superior court recall his sentence and resentence him under
section 1172.75. The court held a resentencing hearing at which
both sides agreed Bell was entitled to resentencing on the section
667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, and neither the court nor the
parties discussed the exception for defendants whose
enhancements were based on prior prison terms imposed for
sexually violent offenses. The court recalled Bell’s sentence,
struck the enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and
resentenced him to 34 years to life.
Bell appeals from the resentencing order. He argues the
superior court misapplied the law when it decided not to strike a
five-year serious-felony enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a) from his sentence because the court failed to
afford sufficient weight to certain mitigating factors (see § 1385,
subd. (c)(2)). He contends we must remand the case to the
superior court for a new resentencing hearing. The People argue
that Bell was ineligible for resentencing because his
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) was imposed
for a sexually violent offense, and that we must vacate the court’s
order recalling his prior sentence and resentencing him.
We conclude the superior court lacked jurisdiction to
resentence Bell; its order purporting to do so is therefore void.
“The general rule is that ‘once a judgment is rendered and
execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.’ ” (People v. King
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634.) The Legislature may create
exceptions to this rule by enacting a statute giving a defendant

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the right to petition for resentencing, and indeed has done so
several times. (Id. at p. 637, citing §§ 1170.126, 1170.18, former
§ 1170.95, subsequently recodified as § 1172.6.) But “section
1172.75 . . . does not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by
any individual defendant’s petition or motion.” (People v. Burgess
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 384; accord, People v. Newell (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 265, 268.) Instead, the Secretary of the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) or the county
correctional administrator initiates resentencing proceedings
under section 1172.75 by “identify[ing] those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
[invalid] enhancement . . . and . . . provid[ing] the name of each
person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant
case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that
imposed the enhancement.” (Id., subd. (b).) There is no
indication in the record that the CDCR took such action in this
case.
Because the execution of Bell’s sentence began years ago
and no statutory exception applied, the superior court lacked
jurisdiction to resentence him. This is “not merely another way
to say [the court] acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Rather, it
lacked fundamental jurisdiction, and its order was therefore void,
not simply voidable. [Citation.] Accordingly, we vacate the
order.” (People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 71, citing Doe
v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282,
292 [“courts have ‘inherent power to vacate void orders’ ”].)5

5 In People v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1118, review
granted October 1, 2025, S292637, the court held that the
superior court had jurisdiction to resentence a defendant who

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The CDCR had good reason not to initiate resentencing
proceedings in Bell’s case. Because his section 667.5, subdivision
(b) enhancement was imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violent offense, that enhancement remained valid and Bell was
not entitled to resentencing. Section 1172.75 disallows
resentencing for defendants whose enhancements were “imposed
for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in
subdivision (b) of [s]ection 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) At Bell’s original sentencing
hearing, the trial court stated that it was imposing the
enhancement “for the conviction of a [former section] 261.2.” This
was a reference to Bell’s 1987 conviction for forcible rape in
violation of then-section 261, subdivision (2). The definition of
“ ‘[s]exually violent offense’ ” in the Welfare and Institutions Code
includes violations of section 261. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600,
subd. (b).)
Bell argues he nevertheless remains eligible for
resentencing. He claims that “seven prior prison term

filed his own petition under section 1172.75, but in that case, the
CDCR had already “identified the defendant as serving a
sentence containing a now-invalid ‘prison prior’ but did not
timely notify the sentencing court of that identification.” (Cota,
supra, at p. 1124.) The Cota court concluded that the “CDCR’s
notification obligation is directory rather than mandatory or
jurisdictional.” (Ibid., italics added.) In addition, the primary
issue in Cota was timing. The CDCR did notify the trial court
that the defendant was potentially eligible, albeit not until after
the court had denied his petition. (Id. at p. 1125.) Nothing in
Cota stands for the proposition that the superior court has
jurisdiction to resentence under section 1172.75 in the absence of
any action at all by the CDCR.

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enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b) were alleged
and found true under the same case,” referring to his 1987
conviction on seven counts. Although the trial court at the
original sentencing hearing imposed a single enhancement based
on Bell’s conviction for rape, the court did not state that it was
striking any additional enhancements under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). Bell appears to suggest that the court must have
imposed but stayed the remaining enhancements. Three of Bell’s
1987 convictions were for offenses defined as sexually violent
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600: in addition to
the conviction for forcible rape under former section 261,
subdivision (2), Bell was convicted of forcible sodomy (former
§ 286, subd. (c), subsequently recodified as § 286, subd. (c)(2)) and
oral copulation (former § 288a, subsequently renumbered as
§ 287). But four of Bell’s convictions were for crimes that do not
fit the statutory definition of a sexually violent offense: robbery
(§ 211), burglary (§ 459), sexual battery (§ 243.4), and robbery in
an inhabited dwelling (former § 213.5).6 Defendants whose
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements were imposed for
these offenses remain eligible for resentencing under section
1172.75.
This argument misunderstands section 667.5.
Enhancements under the statute are not assessed per conviction,
but rather per “prior separate prison term.” (Id., subd. (b).) That
term is defined as “a continuous completed period of prison
incarceration imposed for the particular offense alone or in

6 Robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling is included
in section 212.5, subdivision (a) as part of the definition of first
degree robbery.

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combination with concurrent or consecutive sentences for other
crimes.” (Id., subd. (g).) In other words, if a defendant like Bell
has served a prior prison term following a conviction for several
offenses, a section 667.5 enhancement “can be imposed only once,
on the aggregate sentence.” (People v. Edwards (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060; accord, People v. James (1980) 102
Cal.App.3d 728, 733 [“a defendant who has served concurrent or
consecutive prison sentences on various commitments is deemed
to have served only one prior prison term for the purpose of the
enhancement provisions of . . . [§] 667.5”].) Although the
resentencing court used the plural form in referring to “prior
prison term enhancements under section 667.5[, subdivision]
([b]),” the court at the original sentencing hearing correctly
referred to only a single enhancement allegation based on Bell’s
single prison term for seven convictions in 1987.
This case is not like People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
365, where the court held the defendant was eligible for
resentencing despite his prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense because “the People did not plead or seek to impose the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement based on” that
offense. (Green, supra, at p. 370.) In this case, the People alleged
all seven prior convictions, and the trial court explicitly stated on
the record that it was imposing the enhancement based on Bell’s
rape conviction. As the Green court noted, when interpreting a
statute, “[w]e first look to the ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘plain and commonsense
meaning’ ” ’ ” ’ of the words of the statute, keeping the purpose of
the statute and the ‘ “ ‘ “context of the statutory framework” ’ ” ’
in mind.” (Ibid.) Under that standard, one cannot avoid the
conclusion that Bell’s enhancement was “imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

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It would be absurd to reach a different result because Bell’s
prior prison sentence was imposed in part for his commission of
non-sexually violent offenses. It would mean that a defendant
who was convicted only of rape was ineligible for relief, but a
defendant like Bell, who raped his victim after breaking into her
house, would be eligible for resentencing because he was
convicted of burglary and other offenses in addition to rape.
There is no reason to believe the Legislature intended such a
result.
DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order recalling Bell’s sentence and
resentencing him is vacated, and the appeal is dismissed. The
superior court is directed to reinstate Bell’s original sentence and
provide a corrected abstract of judgment to the CDCR.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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