People v. Henson CA3

CourtListener 10742814Calctapp26 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/26/25 P. v. Henson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, C101483

v. (Super. Ct. Nos. CRF-20-
01212-01, CRF-19-01962,
WILLIAM JOSEPH HENSON, CRF-19-01963)

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2017, a jury convicted defendant William Joseph Henson of attempted vehicle
theft. The trial court placed him on probation for five years. In 2018, defendant pleaded
no contest to child endangerment, and the trial court again placed defendant on probation
for five years. Defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to second degree murder and
assault with a firearm, and admitted that the murder violated the terms of his probation.

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Under the plea agreement, sentences in the attempted vehicle theft case and child
endangerment case would run concurrent to the murder case.
Consistent with the plea agreement, in 2021 the trial court terminated probation
and sentenced defendant in the various cases to an aggregate 15 years to life in prison,
including concurrent upper term sentences for assault with a firearm and attempted
vehicle theft. This court remanded for resentencing in light of changes in the law (People
v. Henson (Dec. 15, 2022, C093776) [nonpub. opn.] (Henson)), and on remand the trial
court reimposed the same sentence.
Defendant now contends (1) that based on a change in the law, his probation in the
attempted vehicle theft case terminated by operation of law after two years, and the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to subsequently terminate probation and impose a prison
sentence; (2) the trial court failed to comply with the constitutional and statutory
limitations applicable to the imposition of upper term sentences; and (3) the abstract of
judgment must be updated to reflect resentencing.
Finding merit in defendant’s contentions, we will reverse the trial court’s order
terminating defendant’s probation in the attempted vehicle theft case and direct the trial
court to enter an order terminating that probation nunc pro tunc as of December 15, 2019.
We will also vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court on June 10, 2024, and remand
the matter for a resentencing hearing. Amendment and/or correction of the abstract of
judgment can be addressed by the trial court on remand.
BACKGROUND
In 2017, a jury convicted defendant of attempted theft of a Jeep Cherokee (Pen.
Code,1 § 664, Veh. Code, § 10851) in Sacramento County case No. 16FE010015. The
trial court suspended defendant’s sentence and placed him on probation for five years

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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with various terms and conditions. Also in 2017, a Sacramento County complaint
charged defendant with two counts of felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)) in
case No. 17FE013490. On February 14, 2018, defendant pleaded no contest to one count
of child endangerment. The trial court dismissed the remaining count and placed
defendant on probation for five years. The attempted vehicle theft case and child
endangerment case were subsequently transferred to Yuba County for probation
supervision, and the cases were assigned new case numbers.2
On July 16, 2020, a Yuba County complaint charged defendant with murder
(§ 187, subd. (a) -- count I), attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a) -- count II), and hit
and run resulting in death or serious injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2) -- count III)
in case No. CRF20-01212-01. The complaint further alleged that defendant personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the attempted murder. The
probation department filed petitions to revoke defendant’s probation in the attempted
vehicle theft case and child endangerment case.
The People amended the complaint in the murder case to add a count for assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) -- count V), and defendant resolved the matter by
pleading no contest to second degree murder and assault with a firearm. In exchange,
defendant would receive a sentence of 15 years to life for the murder and an
undetermined concurrent sentence for the assault. Defendant admitted that the murder
violated the terms of his probation. Under the plea agreement, the sentences to be
imposed for the attempted vehicle theft case and the child endangerment case would run
concurrent to the murder case. The factual basis for the plea was that in June 2020,
defendant was involved in a dispute at a motel, retrieved an AR-style rifle, and fired a
shot from his vehicle at or toward L.R., who received shrapnel wounds. Defendant then

2 Case No. CRF-19-01962 was assigned to the attempted vehicle theft case, and case
No. CRF-19-01963 was assigned to the child endangerment case.

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drove from the scene at high speeds and struck and killed Michael Sanchez, who was on
a motorcycle stopped at a red light.
On February 19, 2021, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for
the murder and a concurrent upper term of 4 years for the assault with a firearm. In the
attempted vehicle theft case, the trial court terminated probation and sentenced defendant
to the upper term of 18 months, concurrent to the murder case. And in the child
endangerment case, the trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of two years,
concurrent to the murder case. Defendant appealed, and this court vacated defendant’s
sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing in light of changes brought about by
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). (Henson, supra, C093776.)
On remand, the People urged the trial court to resentence defendant to the same
terms previously imposed, arguing, among other things, that the upper terms were
appropriate based on factors the trial court could determine from defendant’s record of
conviction as recognized in People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63. Defendant focused on
the murder conviction and sentence, arguing the trial court should exercise its discretion
under section 1385, subdivision (a) to either dismiss the 15-year-to-life sentence or
impose a lesser-included offense of voluntary or gross vehicular manslaughter based on
defendant’s childhood trauma, history of mental illness, and post-incarceration conduct.
Defendant stated that although he was eligible for low term determinate sentences, a low
term concurrent sentence would not impact his release date and he was requesting
modification of the indeterminate term.
The trial court declined to modify the murder conviction and sentence, noting that
while defendant was on probation, he shot at someone, ran away, and killed someone.
Addressing the concurrent term for assault with a firearm, the trial court stated the upper
term of four years was appropriate because the factors in aggravation exceeded those in
mitigation. There was a discussion about whether defendant had stipulated to the upper
terms, after which the trial court said that in any event it was considering all of the

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factors, whether or not defendant had stipulated to them, and in resentencing defendant
the trial court was not modifying the sentence. The trial court resentenced defendant as
follows: 15 years to life for murder; a concurrent upper term of four years for assault
with a firearm; a concurrent upper term of 18 months for attempted vehicle theft; and a
concurrent lower term of two years for child endangerment. The trial court awarded
updated custody credit.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends that under Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 1950), his probation in the attempted vehicle theft case ended by
operation of law after two years, and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
subsequently terminate probation and impose sentence.
In People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199 (Faial), the Supreme Court held that
Assembly Bill 1950 can be applied retroactively to shorten a defendant’s period of
probation. (Id. at p. 205.) In that case the defendant had been placed on four years’
probation on May 4, 2017. (Ibid.) Approximately two years later the trial court
summarily revoked the probation and imposed a 12-year prison sentence. (Id. at p. 206.)
The Supreme Court explained that Assembly Bill 1950 shortened the length of time most
individuals could be supervised on probation. (Faial, at p 207.) “[S]ince January 1,
2021, section 1203.1 has prohibited courts from imposing a probation term exceeding
two years unless the underlying offense is a violent felony listed in section 667.5,
subdivision (c); is subject to a specified probation length; or is specifically excluded from
the statute’s two-year limit.” (Ibid.) According to the Supreme Court, Assembly Bill
1950 applied retroactively under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and People v.
Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671 because the defendant had appealed from the revocation
of probation and the imposition of the suspended sentence. (Faial, at pp. 210-211.) The
Supreme Court determined that in amending section 1203.1, the Legislature authorized a

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court to retroactively shorten a probation term exceeding two years when an order
terminating probation and executing a prison sentence is not yet final. (Faial, at p. 220.)
According to the Supreme Court, when a probation term is shortened to two years under
amended section 1203.1, conduct that would have constituted a probation violation but
now falls outside the probation term may not be the basis for terminating probation.
(Faial, at p. 220.)
Applying Faial to the attempted vehicle theft case, we conclude defendant is
entitled to relief. The People agree. Because of his appeals, defendant’s judgment is not
yet final, allowing for the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 1950 to his case.
(Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 210-211.) Defendant’s probation in the attempted vehicle
theft case began on December 15, 2017 and terminated by operation of law two years
later on December 15, 2019. (Faial, at pp. 213, 218.) The trial court could not use
defendant’s 2020 conduct to revoke that probation or impose a prison sentence in the
attempted vehicle theft case. (Id. at p. 220.) We will reverse the trial court’s order
revoking and terminating defendant’s probation in the attempted vehicle theft case and
direct the trial court to enter an order terminating that probation nunc pro tunc as of
December 15, 2019. (See People v. Jackson (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 207, 218.)
II
Defendant next argues the trial court failed to comply with the constitutional and
statutory limitations applicable to the imposition of upper term sentences.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides that, in selecting a term of
imprisonment, a trial court “may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when
there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” Notwithstanding this rule, a
“court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based

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on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
“[W]ith the exception of prior conviction allegations, ‘under the Sixth
Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must
be found by a jury’ and ‘established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747 (Lynch), citing Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.
270, 281.) In Lynch, the California Supreme Court explained that, under section 1170,
subdivision (b), “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on
unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other
aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch, at p. 768.)
In Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), the Supreme Court of
the United States rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth
Amendment “permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past
offenses.” (Id. at p. 837.) Rather, “a judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was
convicted of.’ ” (Id. at p. 838.)
The California Supreme Court applied Erlinger to California’s determinate
sentencing scheme in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley). In Wiley, the
California Supreme Court overruled previous decisions finding it constitutionally
permissible for a trial court to determine whether a defendant’s crimes were of increasing
seriousness or whether the defendant’s performance on probation was unsatisfactory.
(Id. at pp. 1076, 1084-1085 [expressly overruling People v. Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th 63
& People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799].) A trial court’s determination of those
aggravating factors without defendant’s consent violated section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
(Wiley, at pp. 1085-1086.)
A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with
the jury trial requirement is “prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a

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reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied
upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were
otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the
reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman [v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18] standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.”
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the
proper inquiry is “ ‘whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite
conclusion.’ ” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.)
Here, the appellate record is not clear as to the specific factors relied upon by the
trial court to reimpose the upper term sentences on the assault with a firearm and
attempted vehicle theft convictions. It does appear, however, that aggravating factors
were not established as required by current law, and the error was not harmless under the
Chapman standard. We decline to find that no rational fact finder could have concluded
otherwise. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1091.)
Accordingly, we will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for a
resentencing hearing.
III
In addition, defendant contends the abstract of judgment must be updated to reflect
resentencing. The People agree. But because we will vacate defendant’s sentence and
remand for a resentencing hearing, we need not address this issue. Amendment and/or
correction of the abstract of judgment can be addressed by the trial court on remand.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order revoking and terminating defendant’s probation in
case No. CRF-19-01962 (the attempted vehicle theft case) is reversed, and the trial
court is directed to enter an order terminating that probation nunc pro tunc as of
December 15, 2019. The sentence imposed on June 10, 2024, is vacated, and the matter
is remanded for a resentencing hearing. Following the resentencing hearing, the trial

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court shall prepare an amended and/or corrected abstract of judgment and forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/S/
MESIWALA, J.

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