People v. Williams CA2/6

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Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Williams CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B340087
(Super. Ct. No. 24CJCF01313)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

ANTHONY DAVIS
WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Anthony Davis Williams appeals from the judgment after
he pleaded no contest to one count of being a felon in possession
of a firearm. (Pen. Code § 29800, subd. (a)(1).)1 He contends the
trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the
evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 because the officer who
conducted a “pat-down” search lacked reasonable suspicion that
he was armed and dangerous. We affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
1

unless otherwise indicated.
Facts and Procedural Background2
In February 2024, Los Angeles Police Department Officers
Felipe Mata and Julia Varela were working in the Vice Unit.
They were responsible for monitoring the Figueroa corridor, an
area notorious for pimping, prostitution, and human trafficking.
At approximately 12:25 a.m., Officer Mata was driving down
Figueroa Street in an undercover vehicle when he observed a
series of vehicles parked in the middle of a two-way street,
blocking traffic in violation of Vehicle Code section 22500. The
area was “congested” with numerous women “dressed in
provocative clothing.” Officer Mata believed the women to be
commercial sex workers.
Officer Mata saw appellant exit his vehicle from the
driver’s side. He was the sole occupant. Appellant, along with
several other men, “aggressively” approached the women,
“circling” them. Officer Mata believed the men were trying to
commit a robbery or pander the women. Based on his
observations and based on the vehicle code violation, he called for
marked patrol vehicles to initiate a stop.3
Officer Varela, who was in uniform and driving a marked
patrol vehicle, responded to the call. Upon arrival, she observed
a group of men shouting at the women, acting aggressively, and
trying to get their attention. Appellant was standing outside his
vehicle and appeared to be reaching for one of the women’s arms,

2 We summarize these facts from the preliminary hearing
transcript.

3 CALCRIM No. 1151 defines “pandering” alternatively as

persuading, procuring, arranging, encouraging, or inducing a
person to become a prostitute.

2
“as if he was trying to tell her to like come.” Officer Varela
believed appellant was attempting to pander the woman and
activated her patrol lights. When appellant saw Officer Varela,
he tried to get back into his vehicle. Officer Varela told
appellant, “‘No, you have to step out,’” that he was being detained
for the traffic violation and possible involvement in “pimp[ing]
and pandering.” Appellant appeared nervous, fidgety, scared,
and “a little bit uncooperative.” Based on Officer Varela’s
training and experience, individuals who are uncooperative,
fidgety, and nervous “have a weapon on them.”
Officer Varela placed appellant in handcuffs, conducted a
pat down search of his waistband area and front right thigh area,
where she recovered an unloaded nine-millimeter handgun. The
detention and pat-down search lasted approximately 40 seconds.
Section 1538.5 Motion to Suppress
Appellant filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress the
evidence recovered during the detention, including the firearm.
The suppression motion was heard concurrently with the
preliminary hearing.
The magistrate denied the suppression motion and
explained her reasoning as follows:
“[I]n taking the totality of both officers’ testimony and
observations, it’s clear that there was reasonable suspicion to not
only detain, but to arrest the defendant. His vehicle, along with
two others, were parked in the middle of the road and appeared
to be circling women that were identified as being possible sex
workers. But that’s not the crux of it. Their safety was
apparently [of] paramount concern . . . [to] Officer Mata, the
undercover officer that testified to seeing this to begin with. The
defendant was clearly in violation of a vehicle code section by

3
blocking the vehicles, Vehicle Code 22500[,] and being outside of
his vehicle. No vehicles had the ability to pass in either
direction. . . . He was subject to arrest because of that vehicle
violation. And . . . taking into consideration all of the
observations that were made, it appears that there was
reasonable suspicion to . . . arrest and subject to the arrest,
finding the gun did not violate the unlawful detention of time and
did not violate the defendant’s right.”
Appellant renewed the motion to suppress pursuant to
section 1538.5 in superior court. He did not present any new
evidence. This time, defense counsel acknowledged that
appellant “may have been justifiably detained” because his
vehicle was blocking the road. However, counsel argued, “a
traffic stop, without more, does not warrant a pat down search.”
Counsel further argued that appellant “may have been talking to
a prostitute, but the officers did not establish any reason or
suspicion that [he] was armed and dangerous.”
The People argued that the Vehicle Code violation was not
the only basis for Officer Varela’s reasonable suspicion. She also
relied on appellant’s potential involvement in “pimping and
pandering commercial sex workers.”
Defense counsel argued that appellant “may have been
there in an area of high prostitution,” but there was “nothing to
indicate that he might have been, or he was even involved in any
sort of crime of prostitution.”
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning
that based on the preliminary hearing transcript and the officers’
knowledge of the area, there was a rational suspicion to conduct a
pat-down search.

4
Discussion
Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that
Officer Varela had a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and
dangerous when she patted him down.
In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry), the United
States Supreme Court held that an officer may pat down a
suspect for weapons if that officer has reason to believe a suspect
is armed and dangerous, regardless of whether probable cause
exists to arrest the individual for a crime. (Id. at p. 27.)
“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
[person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that [their] safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, supra,
392 U.S. at p. 27.) An inchoate, unparticularized suspicion or
hunch is insufficient. (In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
299, 305.) Instead, the officer must point to “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, warrant that intrusion.” (Terry, at p. 21; People
v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176.)
Because the initial motion to suppress was made during
the preliminary hearing, and the renewed motion was submitted
on the transcript of that hearing, we disregard the findings of the
trial court and review the determination of the magistrate who
ruled on the initial motion to suppress. (Blakes v. Superior Court
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904, 910.) We review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the magistrate’s ruling and will uphold
the magistrate’s express or implied findings if supported by
substantial evidence. (Ibid.) In determining whether, on the
facts presented, the pat-down search was reasonable, we exercise
our independent judgment. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th

5
824, 830.) “In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation.
Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture.”’” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043
(Flores).)
Here, the pat down search of appellant was lawful based on
the totality of the circumstances. Appellant was parked in the
middle of the street, blocking traffic, and standing outside of his
vehicle, a violation of Vehicle Code section 22500. It was after
midnight. The area was “notoriously known” for human
trafficking, prostitution, pimping and pandering. Appellant was
shouting and behaving “aggressively” toward the women, who
were believed to be commercial sex workers. When Officer
Varela activated her patrol lights, appellant attempted to get
back into his vehicle, he appeared “very nervous,” “fidgety,” and
was “uncooperative.”
These factors, taken together, are sufficient to support a
reasonable suspicion that appellant was armed and dangerous.
Indeed, Officer Varela testified that in her experience,
individuals who exhibit these indicators usually have a weapon
on them, as was the case here. (See Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 1046 [a trained police officer could draw inferences “‘that might
well elude an untrained person’”].)
Notwithstanding these facts, appellant contends Officer
Varela lacked the “requisite reasonable suspicion” that he was
armed and dangerous. For example, he contends that because he
was already in handcuffs when Officer Varela patted him down,
he no longer posed a threat to officer safety. He claims “[a]
reasonably prudent person would not believe that a handcuffed
individual poses a threat to his or her safety” because he was

6
physically restrained and unable to “easily escape” or use his
hands to reach for weapons.
Although handcuffs may temporarily restrain a person,
there is still a risk that a suspect will flee or do an officer harm.
When an officer reasonably suspects that an individual that he or
she is investigating at close range is presently armed and
dangerous, it would be “unreasonable to deny an officer the power
to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24.) As we have previously
stated, “The judiciary should not lightly second-guess a police
officer’s decision to perform a patdown search for officer safety.
The lives and safety of police officers weigh heavily in the balance
of competing Fourth Amendment considerations.” (People v.
Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 957.)
Appellant also attempts to examine the factors in isolation
to conclude each is insufficient alone to justify the pat down
search. For example, he contends his presence in a high crime
area is not enough to justify the weapons search, pandering is not
an inherently violent crime, and nervousness or uncooperative
behavior alone are not sufficient to warrant a pat down search.
“But looking at ‘factors in isolation from each other does not take
into account the “totality of the circumstances.”’ [Citation.]
Instead, it employs a segmented analysis that Terry precludes.”
(People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1092; see also
Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The trial court
therefore properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress the
evidence resulting from the pat down search.

7
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

8
Mildred Escobedo, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
_____________________________

Jennifer Peabody, Executive Director, Monique Hemli-
Munoz, Staff Attorney, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Chelsea Zaragoza, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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