In re A.C. CA2/2

CourtListener 10741460Calctapp24 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/24/25 In re A.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.C. et al., Persons Coming B345237
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP03937A-B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Syna N. Dennis, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, R.C. (father) challenges
dispositional orders made by the juvenile court. In particular,
father, a nonoffending parent, argues substantial evidence does
not support the court’s order denying his request to place his son
and daughter in his care. Father also argues the juvenile court
abused its discretion when it ordered monitored visits with his
children and required him to enroll in a parenting class.
We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Family
Father and A.F. (mother) have four children together. Only
two of their children—A.C. (son) and G.F. (daughter)—are
involved in this appeal. When the underlying proceedings began,
son was 14 years old and daughter was almost 12. They both
lived with mother, who had sole legal and physical custody of
them. Mother and father’s older children, S.F. (sister) and R.C.,
are adults. Mother and father do not live together and are no
longer in a relationship. Father has two younger children from a
different relationship.
Father has a significant criminal history, including arrests
for domestic violence against mother and being under the
influence of a controlled substance. He spent eight years in

2
prison for shooting a gun in the air. He was released in 2018.
Mother has a long history of substance abuse.
The family has two previous dependency cases, involving
similar allegations as those at issue here (e.g., neglect, substance
abuse, failure to provide). The most recent dependency case
ended in 2016 with a final custody order granting mother sole
physical and sole legal custody of the four children and monitored
visitation for father.
2. Events Preceding Petition
In December 2024, the children were detained from mother
after law enforcement found drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons
and ammunition at mother’s home, all of which were accessible to
the children. The Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (Department) opened an investigation.
At the time, father reported he had not had contact with
the children for two years. He explained mother no longer
allowed him to visit the children after he fathered a child with
another woman. Once father learned the children had been
detained, he met with a Department social worker, a maternal
great aunt, and the children. He said he was “able and willing to
have custody of the children,” and the children asked to be
released to father. Father tested negative for substances. The
Department reported no problems or concerns with father’s home.
Nonetheless, because father had been unable to reunify with the
children after the last dependency case, did not have custody of
the children, and could not demonstrate he had rectified the
reasons for losing custody of the children, the Department could
not recommend placement with father. The children were placed
with A.S., their maternal great aunt (maternal great aunt).

3
Sister, who was 20 years old at the time, lived with father
in a two-bedroom home on a property with three other homes all
occupied by paternal relatives. Sister reported she did not have a
positive relationship with mother and enjoyed living with father
and paternal relatives, where she found needed structure and
support. Over the past couple of years, sister had rebuilt her
relationship with father and believed he had improved as a
parent. When sister first moved in with father, she told him he
had not been involved with the children’s lives. Nonetheless, she
believed he could care for them. Similarly, neither paternal
grandfather nor a paternal aunt had concerns about father’s
ability to care for the children. The paternal aunt indicated
father had strong family support because paternal relatives were
“very united.”
3. Petition
In December 2024, the Department filed a two-count
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of
son and daughter.1 The two counts of the petition were identical
and brought under subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300. They
alleged mother put the children at risk of harm by creating a
detrimental and dangerous home environment, which included
visible and accessible drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons and
ammunition, as well as by allowing maternal relatives with
known histories of substance abuse to live in the home with the
children. Father was nonoffending.
At the initial hearing on the petition held the following day,
the children indicated they wanted to return to mother’s care. If
that was not possible, they wanted to stay with maternal great

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

4
aunt or, in the alternative, to be placed with a paternal aunt who
lived on the same property as father, but not with father. The
children did not want to be separated. Father asked that the
children be released to him. He was willing to cooperate with the
Department and had family support at home.
The juvenile court indicated it was prepared to release the
children to father, but because at the time father’s parental
status as to daughter was only as her biological father, the court
could not release daughter to father. Therefore, the court stated
it would release the children to the paternal aunt mentioned by
the children, which would allow father to visit the children
frequently and conveniently. However, after an off the record
discussion, the court concluded it would detain the children from
both mother and father, continue the children’s placement with
maternal great aunt, order unmonitored visitation for father, and
continue the hearing for further consideration of the children’s
placement. The court stated, “I do believe that the father is
entitled to custody of his children.” Although the children
preferred not to be placed with father, the court explained it was
required to release the children to their parents “unless there is a
safety risk.” If at the continued hearing the court determined
father was daughter’s presumed father, the court intended to
release the children to father’s care.
At the continued hearing held two days later, the juvenile
court found father was daughter’s presumed father. The court
based its decision on family law documents provided by the
parties. Nonetheless, and despite its intentions stated at the
hearing held days earlier, the court continued the detention of
the children from both mother and father. The court explained
that although the family law documents assisted in its parentage

5
finding, those documents “only raise[d] more questions” as to the
custody issue. The documents showed father was entitled to
monitored visits only, one day a week. Because it remained
unclear why father’s visits were restricted to monitored and
because it was undisputed father had not visited the children for
two years, the court found, “as a whole, that it would be in the
best interest of the children to remain” placed with the maternal
great aunt. The court did, however, maintain its previous order
of unmonitored visits for father.
4. Further Investigation
In January 2025, a Department social worker spoke with
the children. Although both son and daughter stated they were
not afraid of father, they rarely saw him and neither had a close
relationship with him. Son said he had “no relationship” with
father and it was “awkward” to visit him. Son and daughter
reported the last time they saw father was Christmas Day 2024,
after the court had granted father unmonitored visits. However,
son and daughter explained they were with paternal
grandmother that day at her home and father, who lived in a
separate house next door, mostly stayed in his home and “would
just check on them.” Daughter said she would visit father as long
as son also visited; son said he “might” visit father.
The social worker also spoke with sister. Sister provided
the Department with photographs she took at the house where
she lived with father. One photograph showed several containers
of marijuana on the dining room table. Another showed beer
cans stacked in a pyramid shape. Sister stated father had called
her the day the children were detained and asked her “to get rid
of his marijuana” because a social worker would be coming by the
house. Sister acknowledged she also smoked marijuana but

6
noted the marijuana in the photographs belonged to father.
Sister said father drank alcohol every day, which led to
arguments between them. She said father was verbally
aggressive with her when he drank. One time, father had driven
while intoxicated and almost ran her over while backing up.
Sister expressed concerns with father’s parenting. Sister
believed father gave her mixed messages and did not know how
to parent or provide structure. For example, on the one hand,
father would get angry with sister if she stayed out late, drank
alcohol, or smoked marijuana. On the other hand, father invited
sister to stay out late and drink with him and his girlfriend at
bars, despite the fact sister was under 21 years old. Sister said
she had changed the lock on her bedroom door because father
used to “barge in her room without permission.” Father did not
like that she had changed the lock. One night father came home
intoxicated and kicked sister’s bedroom door, leaving a large hole
in the door. Sister provided the Department with a photograph of
the hole in her door. Sister said neither son nor daughter had a
close bond with father, who used to bribe them to visit him.
Sister explained son and daughter did not want to visit father in
the past because he used to bring his daughter from a different
relationship and he would focus on her. Son and daughter “felt
ignored.”
In January 2025, the social worker also spoke with
maternal great aunt. Maternal great aunt stated son and
daughter were very close with mother, but not with father.
Maternal great aunt said she had encouraged father to visit the
children while they were living with her, but he had only seen
them on Christmas. Since then, father had not tried to visit or
call the children.

7
The social worker also spoke with father. He stated, prior
to Department involvement, the children visited him on holidays
and birthdays. Although under the most recent family law order
father had monitored visits only, he explained when he and
mother “got along” she allowed him to visit the children
unmonitored. Two years earlier, however, mother “cut him off”
after she discovered he fathered a child with another woman.
Since then, father had “minimal visits and communication with
the children.” Nonetheless, father believed he had a good
relationship with the children. He stated they had grown apart
as they got older, which he suspected was a result of mother
telling the children he had a new family with the mother of his
other children. Although the children and maternal great aunt
all reported the last time the children had visited or seen father
was Christmas 2024, father told the social worker the children
visited on January 11, 2025, which was the day after the social
worker spoke with the children and maternal great aunt. No
information regarding a January visit was provided.
Although father knew son had ADHD, father generally was
unaware of the children’s medical histories and did not know who
their pediatrician was. When shown the photographs sister had
taken, father denied the marijuana was his, instead stating it
could have belonged to sister. He said the stacked beer cans were
his and laughed. As to the hole in the bedroom door, father
stated sister had installed a doorknob backwards and became
stuck in her room. He kicked the door to free her. He also said
he was reprimanding sister at the time for staying out late and
not working or going to school.
In late February 2025, the Department reported father had
“made no effort to visit the children even after caregiver

8
[maternal great aunt] encouraged” him to do so. The children
were not sure they wanted to visit father. A Department social
worker indicated, “it appears mother and [sister] speak
negatively about the father which influences the children’s
decision.”
Also in late February 2025, in advance of adjudication, the
final Multidisciplinary Assessment Team (MAT) report was
provided to the court. In the report, daughter reiterated she did
not have a relationship with father and had seen him only
“sporadically” during her life. She did not like talking about it
and felt “weird and awkward” seeing father more recently. She
did not “feel comfortable when in visits with her father since she
does not really know him.” Similarly, son stated father was
“nonexistent to him” and he did not remember seeing him most of
his life. Son also felt “awkward” and “not happy about” visiting
with father “since he is a stranger to [son]” and they did not have
a relationship. Son also expressed anger and resentment toward
father. Father did not respond to calls and text messages to be
interviewed for the MAT report.
5. Adjudication and Disposition
A combined adjudication and disposition hearing was held
on March 5, 2025. The juvenile court accepted mother’s waiver of
rights and no contest plea to the petition as amended. The
juvenile court dismissed the subdivision (j) count and sustained
the subdivision (b) count as amended. Father was nonoffending.
The court declared son and daughter dependents of the court
under subdivision (b) of section 300.
Counsel for father asked the court to place the children
with father. Counsel argued the juvenile court could modify the
standing custody order, which granted father monitored visits

9
only, “especially if [father] was the noncustodial parent under . . .
section 361.2(a).” Counsel stated the Department had failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that placement with
father would be detrimental to the children’s safety or physical
and emotional well-being. Counsel believed the children were
uncomfortable with father because mother made disparaging
remarks about him and it had been difficult for father to visit the
children through no fault of his own. Emphasizing father was
nonoffending, counsel also disagreed with father’s case plan,
arguing it was not “narrowly tailored.”
Counsel for the children, on the other hand, argued the
children should remain placed with maternal great aunt. The
children said they did not want to be in father’s care and would
not feel comfortable in his care. Counsel noted sister’s concerns
about father’s ability to care for the children as well as the lack of
bond between father and the children.
Counsel for the Department argued clear and convincing
evidence supported the Department’s position that the children
be removed from father’s custody and care. Counsel stated father
had not filled a parental role in the children’s lives and, on
previous occasions, the children had been removed from him.
Counsel for the Department argued it would be detrimental to
place the children with father, noting in part that father drank
alcohol every day, drove under the influence, and had no
relationship, let alone a parental relationship, with the children.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court removed the
children from both mother and father. The court found “by clear
and convincing evidence that there is a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical and emotional
well-being of the children and there are no reasonable means to

10
protect the children’s physical or emotional health without
removing them from the physical custody of the parents.” The
court stated it considered all the circumstances and, although
father was nonoffending, the court gave “a lot of weight” to the
children’s wishes that they not be placed with father. Noting the
lack of a bond or relationship between father and the children,
the court ordered father to enroll in a parenting class. The court
stated, “[I]t would be in the best interest of the children for the
father to get any additional tools that he can to help him work on
the bond with his children and building a strong relationship
with them.” Although at the initial hearings the court ordered
unmonitored visits for father, the court changed father’s visits to
monitored because few unmonitored visits had occurred and the
children were resistant to those visits.
Father appealed the juvenile court’s March 5, 2025, orders.
DISCUSSION
1. Placement
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a noncustodial parent seeks placement of a
dependent minor who was removed from the custodial parent, the
applicable statute is section 361.2, subdivision (a). (In re A.T.
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 722, 733–735; In re D’Anthony D. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 292, 303 [“placement with a noncustodial parent
is to be assessed under section 361.2”].) That provision provides
in pertinent part, “If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to
Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a
parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the
time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child
within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume
custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court

11
shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that
placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
(§ 361.2, subd. (a) (section 361.2).) The juvenile court must
explain in writing or on the record the basis of its determination
under section 361.2. (§ 361.2, subd. (c).)
Here, after the juvenile court removed the children from
mother, who had sole physical and legal custody of the children,
father sought placement of the children with him. Accordingly,
section 361.2 applies.
“Section 361.2 ‘evinces the legislative preference for
placement with the noncustodial parent when safe for the child.’
[Citation.] In making a finding of detriment, the juvenile court
‘weighs all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer
net harm.’ [Citation.] In making this assessment, the court
‘ “may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present
circumstances.” ’ [Citation.] The burden is on the party opposing
placement to show the child will be harmed if the noncustodial
parent receives custody.” (In re A.T., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 735–736.)
We review a section 361.2 detriment finding for substantial
evidence. (In re A.T., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.) In
making its ruling, the juvenile court considers all the evidence,
both for and against placement with the noncustodial parent.
(See In re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1088; In re
Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262–1263.) “The
juvenile court must make findings of detriment by clear and
convincing evidence. [Citation.] In applying this heightened
standard of review, the question before us is ‘ “whether the record
as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable

12
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true.” [Citation.] We view the record in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved
conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from
the evidence.’ ” (In re A.T., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.)
b. Substantial evidence supports a section 361.2
detriment finding and the court’s refusal to
place the children with father.
As an initial matter, we address father’s concern that the
juvenile court may not have applied the correct law (i.e., section
361.2) when considering father’s request to have the children
placed with him. In its March 5, 2025 rulings, the court
employed the detriment language of section 361.2 (discussed
above) as well as the “substantial danger” language of section
361, which also addresses the removal and placement of
dependent children.2 Although on the record at the March 5,
2025 hearing counsel for the Department and counsel for father

2 Section 361 provides in part, “A dependent child shall not
be taken from the physical custody of their parents, guardian, or
Indian custodian with whom the child did not reside at the time
the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear
and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger
to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child for the parent, guardian, or Indian
custodian to live with the child or otherwise exercise the parent’s,
guardian’s, or Indian custodian’s right to physical custody, and
there are no reasonable means by which the child’s physical and
emotional health can be protected without removing the child
from the child’s parent’s, guardian’s, or Indian custodian’s
physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (d).)

13
argued the section 361.2 detriment language, the court used the
“substantial danger” language from section 361 and not the
detriment language.
We agree it is not clear whether the juvenile court correctly
applied section 361.2 or incorrectly applied section 361.
Nonetheless, because the relevant language in both statutes is
substantially the same for present purposes, we conclude this is
immaterial. Section 361 allows removal of a child from a
custodial parent if residing with the parent poses “a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being” of the child. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1) and (d).)
Section 361.2 permits the court to refuse placement of a child
with a previously noncustodial parent if such placement “would
be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) “Courts have
concluded the two statutes are ‘fundamentally the same’ with
regard to their respective ‘substantial danger’ (§ 361(d)) and
‘detriment[]’ (§ 361.2(a)) requirements.” (In re A.T., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 736.) Thus, even if the juvenile court
incorrectly applied a “substantial danger” standard instead of the
“detrimental” standard, any such error would be harmless here.
Turning to the merits of father’s argument, we consider
whether substantial evidence supports a section 361.2 detriment
finding such that the juvenile court properly denied father’s
request to have the children placed with him. In its remarks on
the record, the juvenile court stated, “I have to consider all of the
circumstances,” and highlighted the children’s sentiments about
being placed with father. The court indicated it had “to give that
a lot of weight given their ages.” On appeal, father argues these

14
facts do not constitute substantial evidence and, therefore, the
court’s ruling must be reversed. We are not persuaded.
It is undisputed a dependent minor’s preference regarding
placement is not dispositive. (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
38, 43.) Nonetheless, and similarly undisputed, the minor’s
preference is relevant and correctly considered by the juvenile
court. (Ibid.) Thus, here, the juvenile court was correct to
consider the children’s clear desire not to be placed with father.
Importantly, however, the children’s express desire was not
the only evidence supporting the court’s ruling. Although the
juvenile court did not list additional facts supporting its decision,
it stated it had “to consider all of the circumstances.” We
presume the court did as it said. Other facts supporting the
court’s ruling include sister’s concern about father’s parenting
skills. Father kicked in sister’s bedroom door and used to barge
into her bedroom without permission. Sister also revealed father
drank every day (which led to him being verbally aggressive),
sometimes drove while intoxicated, and used marijuana.
Moreover, at the conclusion of the family’s last dependency
proceedings, father was denied both legal and physical custody of
the children and granted monitored visitation only. Although
during the proceedings below father cooperated with the
Department, he made little if any effort to see or spend time with
the children. He did not respond to calls and text messages
inviting him to participate in the MAT report. Finally, it was
undisputed the children and father had not seen each other for
two years prior to the underlying proceedings and had a fragile, if
any, relationship. It is telling that the juvenile court changed its
mind from initially indicating it would place the children with
father to denying father’s request for placement. As more facts

15
were provided, the court was persuaded its initial inclination was
incorrect and release to father would in fact be detrimental to the
children.
On appeal, father highlights facts showing it would not
have been detrimental to place the children with him. For
example, father points to the Department’s positive assessments
of his home, his cooperation with the Department, and sister’s
initial comments that she liked living with father and received
support from paternal relatives. In addition, at the start of the
underlying proceedings, sister stated she believed father could
provide appropriate care for the children. Other family members
stated the same. There was evidence that mother and sister
spoke poorly of father to the children thus influencing their
perception of him. In essence, father invites us to reweigh the
evidence, which is an invitation we cannot accept. (In re A.T.,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.) “ ‘The power of the appellate
court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there
is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.’ ”
(In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289.)
Father also argues sister’s statements regarding his alcohol
and marijuana use were unsubstantiated and unpersuasive.
However, sister provided photographs not only of marijuana and
empty beer cans at father’s home, but also a photograph of the
large hole father put in her bedroom door when he was
intoxicated. Father also explains lack of a parental relationship
on its own cannot support the court’s order. As discussed above,
however, lack of a relationship with father is not the sole piece of
evidence supporting the court’s refusal to place the children with
father. Finally, father relies on In re C.M. (2014) 232

16
Cal.App.4th 1394 and In re Patrick S., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th
1254 to support his position. For the reasons stated in the
Department’s respondent’s brief, we find those cases
unpersuasive here.
On the record before us, which includes the children’s
express desire not to be placed with father, father’s general
disinterest in the children, father’s alcohol and marijuana use,
and the absence of a bond between father and the children, we
conclude substantial evidence supports a finding that placement
of the children with father would have been “detrimental to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child[ren].” (§ 361.2.)
2. Monitored Visitation and Parenting Class Orders
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
In determining the proper disposition for a dependent child,
the juvenile court considers all relevant and material evidence,
including the Department’s social studies and assessments of the
child. (§ 358, subd. (b)(1).) Under Section 362, the court “may
make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision,
custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child” and
“may direct any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of
the child . . . as the court deems necessary and proper to carry out
this section.” (§ 362, subds. (a), (d).)
“ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine
what would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to
fashion a dispositional order accordingly.’ ” (In re Briana V.
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) “The problem that the juvenile
court seeks to address need not be described in the sustained
section 300 petition. [Citation.] In fact, there need not be a

17
jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom the
court imposes a dispositional order.” (Ibid.)
As the parties agree, we review the juvenile court’s
disposition orders under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re
Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.) We will uphold the
order unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319; In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
840, 851.) “ ‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to
substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ” (In re
Stephanie M., at p. 319.)
b. Monitored Visitation
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering his visits with the children be monitored. We are not
persuaded.
Although initially the juvenile court ordered unmonitored
visits for father, the children had been extremely reluctant to
visit with him and consistently expressed unease at the prospect
of visits. Additionally, during the time he was allowed
unmonitored visits, father did not make any real effort to see or
even contact the children. Given the children’s evident
uneasiness and lack of a relationship with father, combined with
father’s corresponding lack of initiative in visiting the children, it
was not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to order
monitored visits. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable to
consider that visits might be easier to achieve with a monitor
present.
c. Parenting Class
Similarly, we are not persuaded by father’s argument that
the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ordered father to

18
enroll in a parenting class. Citing section 362, father argues the
juvenile court’s parenting class order was an abuse of discretion
because it was not “designed to eliminate those conditions that
led to the court’s finding that the [children are persons] described
by Section 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) Father notes the court
exercised jurisdiction over the children based solely on mother’s
conduct, while he was nonoffending. Father claims, therefore,
the parenting class requirement for him was improper and
unnecessary.
Father’s argument reflects an overly narrow view of the
statutory language. As noted above, the juvenile court has broad
discretion to make orders with the children’s best interests in
mind, even if those orders apply to nonoffending parents and
even if the problem addressed is not described in the sustained
petition. (In re Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.)
“There need only be a nexus between the services ordered and the
conditions that gave rise to the finding that the children come
within section 300.” (In re A.F. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 778, 785.)
Here, there is a nexus between the court’s parenting class
order and the conditions that gave rise to dependency
jurisdiction. Father correctly notes he was nonoffending such
that he is not mentioned in the sustained petition. Nonetheless,
father’s extended absence from the children’s lives and his
general failure to parent them were part of the broader
conditions that gave rise to dependency jurisdiction in this case.
Since the last custody order issued in 2016 (which granted
mother sole physical and legal custody of the children and father
monitored visitation), there is no indication father made any
effort to regain custody of the children, to obtain unmonitored
visits from the family court, to foster a relationship with the

19
children, or even to ensure they were safe with mother. Father
did not fill a parental role, or any role, in the children’s lives,
which presumably lead to him being ignorant of the children’s
circumstances at home with mother. Had father known how to
foster and maintain a parental relationship with the children, he
likely would have been in a better position to ensure their safety
or, at the least, be aware of their circumstances.
On this record, it was not unreasonable and not an abuse of
discretion for the court to determine father and, by extension, the
children would benefit from father’s participation in a parenting
class.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s March 5, 2025 orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

SIGGINS, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First

Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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