In re I.G. CA2/6

CourtListener 10741459Calctapp24 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/24/25 In re I.G. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re I.G., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B341580
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 24JV00182)
Law. (Santa Barbara County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

I.G., a minor, appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition
orders after the juvenile court found that he committed accessory
after the fact (Pen. Code, § 32) and declared him a ward of the
court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602).1 He contends there was

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the

Welfare & Institutions Code.
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings. He
also contends, and the People concede, that recent amendments
to section 730.6 apply retroactively, requiring that the restitution
fine imposed by the juvenile court be stricken.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that appellant committed a violation of Penal Code
section 32. However, we agree that section 730.6 applies
retroactively. We will therefore strike the restitution fine but
affirm the judgment in all other respects.
Facts and Procedural Background
In February 2024, James Watson, a competitive cyclist, was
riding his bicycle on Highway 246 when he was shot multiple
times with an airsoft or pellet gun by an occupant in the vehicle
driven by appellant. Watson sustained minor injuries and his
bicycle was damaged.
Santa Barbara County Sherrif’s Deputy Carlos Ochoa-
Castaneda investigated the incident. He collected surveillance
video near the area around the time of the shooting, which
showed a Camry matching Watson’s description. Deputy Ochoa-
Castaneda ran the Camry’s license plate and discovered that it
was registered to appellant’s father. When Deputy Ochoa-
Castaneda contacted the father, he said appellant had been
driving the Camry on the day of the incident and provided the
deputy with appellant’s phone number. Deputy Ochoa-Casteneda
then spoke with appellant. He explained why he was calling, and
asked if appellant was “involved” in the incident. Appellant
replied, “Yeah. I was driving the car, but that’s all I’ll say.”
In April 2024, a Juvenile Wardship Petition (§ 602, subd.
(a)) was filed. It alleged that appellant, who was 17-years old at
the time, committed the crime of accessory after the fact with

2
knowledge that the crime of assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury had been committed in violation of Penal Code
section 245, subdivision (a)(4). (§ 32.)
At the contested hearing on the petition, Watson testified
that he was riding his bicycle on the highway when he noticed a
white vehicle veer off to the right of the road and slow down
behind him. He recognized the vehicle as a pre-2009 Toyota
Camry because he used to own a 2009 Toyota Camry. The
windows of the vehicle were open, which Watson thought was
unusual because the weather was “precipitous” and cold, not
“commensurate with a nice day.”
As he rode, Watson heard a “staccato sound,” felt pain on
the left side of his body, and heard a “good number of pellets
strike [his] bicycle.” He believed he had been shot. He observed
the Camry’s “windows going up as [it was] speeding away.”
Watson studied the vehicle for approximately 15 to 20 seconds.
He later spoke with Deputy Ochoa-Castaneda and provided a
description of the suspect vehicle.
After listening to testimony and considering the evidence
presented, the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared
appellant a ward of the court, and ordered him home on
probation with a maximum confinement time of two years.
Standard of Review
When a minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s true findings of the criminal
allegations contained in the section 602 petition, we apply the
same standard of review that applies in adult criminal cases
where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (In
re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) We review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine

3
whether it discloses substantial evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re
Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371-1372; People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-578.)
We presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from
the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (In
re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) We resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Manibusan
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence that he
committed accessory after the fact because the evidence fails to
establish that he knew that a passenger in the vehicle he drove
shot at and hit a cyclist with a possible air gun. He also contends
the evidence fails to establish that by continuing to drive, he
intended to aid that passenger in escaping punishment. As we
shall explain, these contentions are meritless.
Penal Code section 32 provides, “Every person who, after a
felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal
in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having
knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has
been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an
accessory to such felony.”
“‘The crime of accessory consists of the following elements:
(1) someone other than the accused, that is, a principal, must

4
have committed a specific, completed felony; (2) the accused must
have harbored, concealed, or aided the principal; (3) with
knowledge that the principal committed the felony or has been
charged or convicted of the felony; and (4) with the intent that
the principal avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or
punishment.’” (People v. Moomey (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 850,
856 (Moomey); People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 866-867.)
Here, the alleged underlying crime to which appellant was
an accessory was the assault against Watson with an airsoft or
pellet gun. The evidence at the hearing, including Watson’s
testimony and appellant’s admission that he was “involved in the
shooting, i.e., he was driving the car from which the shooting
occurred, supports the juvenile court’s finding that appellant
committed accessory after the fact. Although, as the juvenile
court explained, the evidence was to a “great extent”
circumstantial, the “only reasonable inference” it could draw was
that appellant was driving the car involved in the shooting, he
knew what was happening, and he assisted in both the
commission of the offense and in helping the perpetrator escape.
Appellant disagrees and raises several contentions in
response. For example, he claims the evidence that his father’s
Camry was the vehicle involved in the incident was weak; the
evidence did not establish that he knew the principal had
committed a felony, as required; Watson’s description of some
events “appears improbable”; and the evidence did not establish
that he intended to help the principal avoid or escape arrest,
trial, conviction, or punishment. These contentions are meritless.
First, appellant admitted that he was driving his father’s
Camry when Deputy Ochoa-Castaneda contacted him and asked
if he was “involved” in the incident. Watson also testified that he

5
recognized the suspect vehicle as a pre-2009 white Toyota Camry
because he used to own a similar make and model. Watson
observed the vehicle for approximately 15 to 20 seconds after the
shooting and later identified appellant’s father’s Camry as the
one he saw when he was shot. Additionally, video surveillance
placed the Camry, registered to appellant’s father, in the area
around the same time of the shooting. This evidence was
sufficient for the juvenile court to conclude that appellant was
driving the vehicle involved in the shooting—and that vehicle
was his father’s Camry.
Second, the juvenile court believed it was “very clear” that
appellant knew what was happening and knew what to do to help
the perpetrator escape. As the juvenile court explained,
“[Appellant] admitted he was the driver of the car. It’s a rainy
day, the car slows down, pulls over to be closer to the alleged
victim, to Mr. Watson, windows are down, Mr. Watson testifies
shots are fired, he hears the noise, he feels the impact, and the
car speeds up and windows go up.” Given these facts, the
juvenile court concluded, “the only reasonable inference” that can
be drawn is that appellant “knew what was going to happen, he
knew what happened when it happened, and he knew what to do
after it happened, and he took off.”
Appellant claims “there is no evidence to show that
appellant knew that a passenger in the car had committed an
assault, much less a felony assault.” He argues that “even an
aggravated assault offense can be a misdemeanor,” noting that a
violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) is a wobbler
offense. But “the commission of a wobbler is a felony at the time
it is committed and remains a felony unless and until the
principal is convicted and sentenced to something less than

6
imprisonment in state prison (or the crime is otherwise
characterized as a misdemeanor).” (Moomey, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 857.)
We must accept logical inferences the juvenile court might
have drawn from the circumstantial evidence presented. (See
People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) Moreover, before
the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the
insufficiency of the evidence, “‘“it must clearly appear that on no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support the verdict . . . .”’” (People v. Conners (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 443, 453.) Given this standard and reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, appellant’s
insufficiency of the evidence claim fails.
Third, appellant’s contention that Watson’s testimony
“appears improbable” does not require reversal. “While an
appellate court can overturn a judgment when it concludes the
evidence supporting it was ‘inherently improbable,’ such a finding
is so rare as to be almost non-existent.” (People v. Ennis (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728; see also People v. Headlee (1941) 18
Cal.2d 266, 267 [where evidence is so improbable as to be
incredible, and amounts to no evidence, appellate court
authorized to set aside conviction].) “[T]he challenged evidence
must be improbable ‘“on its face.”’” (Ennis, at p. 729.) “The only
question is: Does it seem possible that what the witness claimed
to have happened actually happened?” (Ibid.)
Here, appellant challenges Watson’s description of the
events, including whether he observed the Camry before or after
the shooting, whether it was raining, and whether the windows
were down at the time. But the juvenile court credited Watson’s
testimony and made reasonable inferences after considering all

7
the evidence. We accord due deference to the juvenile court’s
findings and reject appellant’s attempt to reargue the evidence on
appeal.
In sum, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to find that
appellant committed accessory after the fact, that he knew the
passenger in his vehicle shot at and hit Watson with the pellet
gun, and by speeding off after the shooting, he intended to aid the
passenger in escaping punishment.
Restitution Fine
The juvenile court ordered appellant to pay direct victim
restitution of $9,431.81 and a restitution fine of $120. Appellant
contends the $120 restitution fine imposed by the juvenile court
should be stricken based on recent changes in the law.
While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended
section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a
restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now provides,
“The court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution
fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section
602.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
Appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this
amendment. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-746
[ameliorative legislation changes applicable to cases pending on
appeal].)
Disposition
The $120 restitution fine is ordered stricken. The juvenile
court is directed to amend the disposition order dated August 27,
2024, to reflect this fact. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Minor and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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