People v. Ortega CA2/4

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Filed 11/21/25 P. v. Ortega CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337138

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XCNBA223548
JUAN MANUEL ORTEGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Reversed and
remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Chelsea
Zaragoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 2004, a jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Juan
Manuel Ortega of three counts of carjacking, two counts of
kidnapping, and two counts of murder. The evidence adduced at
Ortega’s trial indicated that Ortega and his co-perpetrators
committed these offenses during and shortly after an arranged
drug deal. Years later, Ortega petitioned the trial court for relief
under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
Ortega relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (d), concluding,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is still guilty of murder under
current law (1) as a direct aider and abettor in the murders who
harbored express malice; and (2) as a major participant in the
underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
On appeal, Ortega argues that the trial court’s ineligibility
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. He also
contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
improperly considering inadmissible gang evidence. He lastly
argues that his case must be remanded for a new evidentiary
hearing because the trial court misunderstood the scope of its role
as independent factfinder.
We agree with Ortega’s latter contention. It appears the
trial court, in finding that Ortega is guilty of murder under
current law, misunderstood that its role as independent fact
finder entailed weighing witness credibility. We therefore
remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d). At that evidentiary hearing, Ortega may

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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again raise any contention regarding witness credibility, which
the trial court must then rule on in deciding whether Ortega is
guilty of murder under current law.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, a jury convicted Ortega of two counts of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)); three counts of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)); and
two counts of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)). The jury also found
true special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3) &
(a)(17)), allegations that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.52, subds. (b)-(d),
(e)(1)), and criminal street gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Ortega to life without the
possibility of parole plus 165 years to life in state prison. In
2006, on direct appeal, a different panel of this court reversed
and ordered stricken the gang enhancements imposed under
section 186.22, subdivision (b), revised the abstract of judgment
in various ways, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
(People v. Ortega (Mar. 30, 2006, B173836) [nonpub. opn.] (Ortega
I).)2
In 2019, Ortega filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied Ortega
relief, concluding that the jury’s true findings under the felony-

2 The court struck the enhancements because they required a
finding that the defendant personally used a firearm, but at trial,
the prosecution had conceded that the evidence was insufficient
to put personal use allegations before the jury, and the jury had
only found that a principal used a firearm. (Ortega I, supra,
B173836.) We take judicial notice of our opinion in Ortega I.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

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murder special circumstance statute (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17))
rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. On appeal, a
different panel of this court remanded the case to the trial court
with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (People
v. Ortega (June 17, 2022, B311073) [nonpub. opn.] (Ortega II).)3
On remand, as mentioned above, after holding an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Ortega relief,
concluding that he is still guilty of murder under current law
(1) as a direct aider and abettor in the murders who harbored
express malice; and (2) as a major participant in the underlying
felonies who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Ortega timely appealed.

TRIAL COURT’S RULINGS
For the sake of brevity, rather than providing a full
recitation of the factual background, we instead provide the trial
court’s stated reasons for denying Ortega relief, which contain a
concise summary of the relevant facts necessary to resolve this
appeal. We note at the outset, that from our review of the record,
it appears much of the evidence the trial court relied on in

3 The basis for this court’s decision was its conclusion that a
jury’s true finding under the felony-murder special circumstance
statute, made before the Supreme Court decided People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522 (Clark), cannot preclude eligibility for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. Shortly after this court issued its
decision in Ortega II, our Supreme Court reached that same
conclusion in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698. We need
not take judicial notice of our opinion in Ortega II because it is
contained in the current appellate record.

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denying Ortega relief came directly from the testimony of witness
Ivan Sanchez.4 And, as discussed in greater detail below, the
trial court declined to consider the issue of Sanchez’s credibility
in exercising its role as independent factfinder under section
1172.6, subdivision (d).
The trial court explained its reasons for concluding Ortega
is guilty of murder under current law as follows:

As an independent fact finder, I find the People have met
their burden of proof by establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Ortega] is a direct aider and abettor . . . to the
murders of Pleitez and Nolasco and that he harbored
express malice.

I find [Ortega] was involved in every stage of the
commission of the murders including the following:

[Ortega] was part of a group of supposed drug dealers that
were going to engage in a drug sale but rather planned to
rob the buyers of their money;

In the course of that plan, [Ortega], along with his
codefendants,[5] met with the victims in one location and

4 Sanchez initially told police that his name was Juan Perez.
The parties also referred to him as Juan Perez throughout
Ortega’s trial. In keeping with the practice adopted by this court
in Ortega II and by the trial court on remand, we will refer to him
as Ivan Sanchez.
5 As the parties note, Ortega was prosecuted alone.

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lured them to a second location more isolated to facilitate
the crimes of conviction;

[Ortega], at the more isolated location, directly accosted,
carjacked, and kidnapped the victims. [Ortega] did so in
planned coordination with his codefendants evidenced re
[sic] planning and sophistication, and he did so while
personally armed. He did so while directly placing his gun
to Sanchez’s head and threatening to kill him and, thus,
directly established his express malice to aid and abet the
murders of the potential buyers.

[Ortega] further physically and personally put his hands on
Sanchez’s body to check him for weapons to ensure the
success of the plan of [Ortega] and codefendants and while,
at the same time, he was armed and threatening to kill
Sanchez.

[Ortega], in coordination with the second armed individual,
got into the victim’s car and kidnapped Nolasco and Pleitez,
a fact that is corroborated by [Ortega]’s print present in
Sanchez’s car.

[Ortega] was the driver to commit the carjacking and the
kidnapping.

The codefendant’s car followed behind. All of these actions
were taken without [Ortega] and codefendants giving
orders to each other or communicating what they were
doing to each other, thus, establishing that all of these

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actions were preplanned and were contemplated by all
involved in a scheme to rob the potential buyers.

Thus, I find [Ortega] attacked the victims, kidnapped the
victims, carjacked the victims knowing his codefendants
were going to kidnap, carjack, and rob the victims and
knowing . . . he and at least one of his codefendants had
multiple guns on scene, planned to and threatened to use
the guns to kill the victims, and, furthermore, [Ortega] had
a specific role in this preplanned drug sale/rip-off of
disarming the victims, threatening to kill the victims to get
their compliance, isolating the victims to ensure their
success, and driving away with the victims’ car to complete
their crimes followed by the co-defendant.

Alternatively, as an independent fact finder, I find beyond
a reasonable doubt that [Ortega] was a major participant
under the Banks factors who acted with reckless
indifference to human life under the Clark factors.

[Ortega] was an integral member of the drug sale rip-off,
carjacking, and kidnapping. He was present at most if not
all stages of the drug rip-off, carjacking, and kidnapping; he
was armed, he stole the victims’ car, and he kidnapped the
victims. His actions were necessary and an integral [part]
of all of the crimes of conviction including the murders.

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DISCUSSION
I. Remand for a new evidentiary hearing is warranted
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Ortega’s trial counsel filed
a brief raising various contentions that Ortega is not guilty of
murder under current law. One of those arguments was that
Sanchez was an unreliable witness, and accordingly, his
testimony should be given little weight. In support of this
position, trial counsel noted, among other things, that Sanchez
used a false name when reporting his abduction to the police, and
did not tell the police that he had been participating in a drug
deal when the incident occurred.6 Trial counsel thus argued that,
because Sanchez was the prosecution’s primary witness, and
because he was not credible, the evidence tying Ortega to the
murders was “attenuated at best.”
At the evidentiary hearing, although the trial court stated
it was “sitting as an independent factfinder,” the court also
indicated that it did not believe this role encompassed weighing
witness credibility. It said: “With regard to . . . challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence and/or asking this court to re-weigh
the credibility of witnesses, this is not a retrial. And this case,
because it’s pending an OSC evidentiary hearing, the OSC
evidentiary hearing is limited to the inquiry of whether or not
defendant could still be prosecuted under a viable theory of
liability.” Quoting People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947, the trial court added that filing a section 1172.6 petition

6 Ortega’s trial counsel likewise raised other arguments
regarding Sanchez’s credibility, as does Ortega’s appellate
counsel, but we need not recount all those arguments now. On
remand, Ortega’s trial counsel may again raise any arguments
regarding Sanchez’s credibility at the new evidentiary hearing.

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“does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims
of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury’s findings.” The court thus concluded that Ortega could
not “attack the credibility of witnesses” in a subdivision (d)(3)
proceeding to obtain “a do-over on factual disputes that have
already been resolved.”
It is not entirely clear to this court what the trial court
meant when it stated that the question of Sanchez’s credibility
had already been resolved by the jury at Ortega’s initial trial.
The record of Ortega’s murder trial contains no express
indication of the exact extent to which the jury found Sanchez’s
testimony credible or not credible in convicting Ortega of murder
in 2004. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred by
declining to assess Sanchez’s credibility in finding Ortega guilty
of murder under current law.
The trial court’s role at the evidentiary hearing “is to act as
an independent fact finder and determine, in the first instance,
whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 112, 123.) The statute’s “plain language shows the
People are required to establish the defendant is guilty under
current law as a matter of fact and beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 296 (Clements).)
“[A] fact finder tasked with holding the People to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, “must impartially compare
and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the
entire trial ’ and determine whether that ‘proof . . . leaves [it]
with an abiding conviction that the charge is true.’ ” (Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 294-295, quoting CALCRIM No. 220,
italics added; see also § 1096.) Unlike the prima facie stage

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where “[t]he trial court should not decide unresolved factual
issues [ ] that involve credibility determinations or weighing of
evidence,” the court “should decide such issues . . . after issuing
an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.”
(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51, italics added.)
Although it is “unusual to ask the trial judge to sit as the
fact finder and (in some cases) make factual determinations on a
cold record,” the Legislature adopted the subdivision (d)(3)
hearing procedure as an imperfect but adequate compromise
between the impracticality of affording qualifying offenders a
new trial and the undesirable alternative of not making the
“[ameliorative] benefits of the new law available to people already
validly convicted under the old law.” (Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 297.) By expressly allowing either party “to put
on live testimony[,]” the subdivision (d)(3) procedure “allow[s] the
trial judge to make credibility determinations based on cues other
than consistency and plausibility[.]” (Ibid.) If, however, the
parties do not put on live testimony, the trial court may
nonetheless make credibility determinations by relying on cues
such as consistency and plausibility when examining a cold
record such as Ortega’s. That is what the trial court should have
done here given that, as discussed above, it is unclear from the
record exactly which aspects of Sanchez’s testimony the jury
found credible in convicting him of murder under homicide law as
it stood in 2004.
The trial court’s reliance on Farfan, supra, in deciding not
to rule on Sanchez’s credibility was misplaced. That case
involved an appeal from the summary denial of a former section
1170.95 petition. (Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 946.) The
Farfan court concluded the record of conviction demonstrated

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that the petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because the jury found he was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life after Banks and Clark
were decided. (Farfan, at pp. 947, 955.) The court then rejected
Farfan’s claim that he had “a constitutional right to a new jury
determination that he was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life[,]” noting that the court had
already rejected Farfan’s substantial evidence argument on direct
appeal challenging the jury’s Banks and Clark findings. (Farfan,
at p. 947.) On this point, the court noted: “The mere filing of a
section 1170.95 petition does not afford the petitioner a new
opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings.” (Farfan, at p.
947.) Farfan is thus inapplicable because it does not address the
extent to which trial courts should assess and rule on witness
credibility at subdivision (d)(3) hearings.
The Attorney General raises two arguments why we should
affirm the trial court’s order denying Ortega relief
notwithstanding the court’s lack of a ruling on Sanchez’s
credibility. First, he contends that the trial court did not err, and
indeed, explicitly stated that it was acting as independent fact
finder when denying Ortega relief. Relatedly, he argues that the
trial court reasonably interpreted Ortega’s credibility argument
as a “ ‘fundamental challenge[ ] to the sufficiency of the
evidence’ ” rather than a challenge to “a viable theory of liability
that still exists today.” We reject these arguments. As explained,
in our review of the record, the trial court did not perform its role
as independent fact finder by weighing Sanchez’s credibility.
Second, the Attorney General contends that, even assuming
the trial court erred by not deciding the issue of Sanchez’s

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credibility, that purported error was harmless under People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. Specifically, the Attorney
General argues that the record shows Sanchez was indeed
credible, and the record contains other circumstantial evidence
corroborating Sanchez’s testimony and supporting the trial
court’s conclusion that Ortega is guilty of murder under current
law. We are concerned, however, that if we were to weigh these
factual matters on appeal now, we would improperly bypass the
procedures enacted by the Legislature under subdivision (d)(3),
which afford Ortega the right to a proper trial court evidentiary
hearing in the first instance. We therefore conclude that the
proper remedy is a remand for a new evidentiary hearing under
subdivision (d)(3). At that hearing, Ortega may again raise
arguments concerning Sanchez’s credibility, which the trial court
is directed to rule on in determining whether Ortega is guilty of
murder under current law.7
Because we conclude that remand for a new evidentiary
hearing is warranted, we need not address Ortega’s arguments
that the trial court’s ineligibility findings are unsupported by
substantial evidence.

7 To the extent Ortega implicitly asks this court to direct the
trial court to weigh the credibility of Sanchez’s testimony
unrelated to whether he is guilty of murder under current law,
we decline that request. As the trial court correctly noted, this is
not a retrial of the entire case. The trial court is not charged with
determining whether Ortega is guilty of carjacking or
kidnapping, the felonies underlying his murder convictions. It is
only charged with determining whether Ortega is guilty of
murder under current law. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

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II. The trial court’s alleged consideration of gang
evidence
Ortega argued in the trial court that various gang evidence
admitted at his 2004 trial should be deemed inadmissible at his
subdivision (d)(3) hearing. The trial court rejected Ortega’s
arguments and concluded that it could consider the gang
evidence in deciding whether Ortega is guilty of murder under
current law. In particular, the court concluded that Ortega’s
membership in the Lincoln Heights gang, a gang that was
apparently involved in narcotics sales, was relevant and
admissible to prove his motive, intent, and identity. On appeal,
the parties dispute whether the trial court’s ruling on the
admissibility of the gang evidence was erroneous. In its actual
stated reasons for denying Ortega relief, however, the trial court
makes no mention of the gang evidence. Instead, the court relied
almost entirely on Ortega’s conduct in the commission of the
carjackings/kidnappings/murders as described by Sanchez’s
eyewitness testimony. It thus does not appear that the trial court
actually relied on the gang evidence in denying Ortega section
1172.6 relief. Given that the trial court apparently did not rely
on the gang evidence in denying relief, and because we are
remanding the case for a new evidentiary hearing, we decline at
this juncture to comment on which of the gang evidence should or
should not have been admitted. On remand, the parties may
again raise arguments concerning the admissibility of any gang
evidence, then, if the trial court intends to rely on any gang
evidence, it should rule on which of the evidence is relevant and
admissible under current law. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

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DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Ortega relief and remand the
matter for a new evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). We express no opinion on the ultimate outcome
of those proceedings.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

VAN ROOYEN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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