CourtListener 10740564•People v. Rice CA2/4
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Filed 11/21/25 P. v. Rice CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B337626
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XEAKA124451
RAYMOND LEONARD RICE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge. Vacated in part,
remanded with instructions.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay
Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2023, a jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Raymond
Leonard Rice of first degree murder and other offenses, and found
gun use allegations true. Then, in a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial court found that Rice sustained two prior strike convictions.
The trial court sentenced him to 100 years to life in state prison
under the Three Strikes law.
On appeal, Rice raises two arguments regarding his
sentence. First, he contends that the trial court erroneously
failed to make a finding that his prior convictions constituted
strikes. We reject this contention because it is belied by the
record.
Second, Rice argues the trial court erroneously used his
2012 prior conviction to sentence him under the Three Strikes
law without first determining whether that gang-enhanced felony
could have been obtained after amendments enacted by Assembly
Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699) (AB
333). We agree.
Two weeks after Rice filed his reply brief, our Supreme
Court issued an opinion that squarely supports Rice’s position.
In People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576 (Fletcher), the court
held that “where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the
prior version of [Penal Code1] section 186.22, [AB 333] applies to
the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior
serious felony conviction under subdivision (c)(28) of section
1192.7 for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious
felony enhancements.” (Fletcher, at p. 583.) Following Fletcher,
we vacate the trial court’s true finding that Rice’s 2012 conviction
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
qualifies as a strike, and we remand the matter to the trial court
for any retrial of that prior conviction allegation, applying the
elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333. (See Fletcher,
at p. 608.)
Rice lastly asks this court to independently review
the trial court’s examination of confidential police officer files
potentially disclosable to the defense under Brady v. Maryland
(1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady). The trial court conducted an in-
camera examination of materials contained in the confidential
files using the method first provided for in Pitchess v. Superior
Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) and codified in Evidence
Code sections 1043 through 1045. We have independently
reviewed the trial court’s examination. We perceive no
procedural or substantive error.
BACKGROUND2
The jury convicted Rice of murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count
one), shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count two),
shooting at an inhabited house (§ 246, subd. (a); count three), and
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800; count four).
On counts one and two, the jury found several gun use
allegations true, including that Rice personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm proximately causing death under section
12022.53, subdivision (d). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found that Rice had sustained two prior convictions that
2 We omit the facts underlying Rice’s convictions because
they have no bearing on the issues presented in this appeal.
3
constituted serious felonies and strikes. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1),
(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)3
The court sentenced Rice to 100 years to life in state prison,
consisting of 25 years to life on count one, tripled under the Three
Strikes law, plus a consecutive 25-years-to-life enhancement
imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).4 Rice timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Rice raises two contentions that the trial
court erred in sentencing him to 100 years to life under the Three
Strikes law. We will discuss each argument in turn, then we will
address Rice’s request that we examine the sealed record of his
in-camera hearing.
I. The trial court specifically found that Rice’s prior
convictions constituted strikes
First, Rice argues that the trial court erred by not making
“a specific finding that [his] prior convictions constituted strikes
under the Three Strikes law.” This contention is refuted by the
record. In the amended information, the prosecution alleged that
Rice’s prior convictions were strikes under the Three Strikes law.
Relying on exhibits introduced by the prosecution that
documented Rice’s prior convictions, the trial court found beyond
3 Significantly for purposes of this appeal, as noted above,
and as discussed in greater detail below, Rice’s 2012 prior
conviction was a gang-enhanced felony under section 186.22.
4 On counts two through four, the trial court stayed
sentencing under section 654. The court also struck two five-year
prior serious felony enhancements. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).)
4
a reasonable doubt that both prior convictions were “true as
alleged,” i.e., as strikes. At sentencing, the trial court reiterated
that the “prior offenses qualified as strikes.” We therefore reject
Rice’s argument that the trial court erred by not making a
specific finding that the prior convictions were strikes.5
II. Remand is warranted under Fletcher
Rice next argues that the prosecution “failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [his] 2012 conviction, which
included a section 186.22 enhancement, qualifies as a strike”
because the prior conviction predated the Legislature’s
enactment of AB 333 in 2021. We agree with Rice and, following
Fletcher, we remand the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.
A. Background
“The ‘Three Strikes’ law is a sentencing scheme that
requires a court to double or sometimes triple the punishment for
a felony offense if the defendant was previously convicted of a
crime that qualifies as a ‘serious’ or ‘violent’ felony. (Pen. Code,
§§ 667, subd. (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)[ ].) The ‘serious’ or ‘violent’
felonies that trigger this sentencing scheme, commonly referred
to as ‘strikes’ or ‘strike priors,’ are enumerated by statute.
(§§ 1192.7, subd. (c), 667.5, subd. (c).) If a defendant’s current
offense is a serious felony, the defendant is also subject to a five-
year prior serious felony enhancement — a so-called ‘nickel
prior’ — in addition to any strike. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) The list of
5 Because we reject Rice’s argument on the merits, we need
not address the Attorney General’s contention that Rice forfeited
it by not raising it in the trial court.
5
‘serious’ felonies includes ‘any felony offense, which would also
constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.’ (§ 1192.7, subd.
(c)(28).) Section 186.22 defines substantive gang offenses and
gang enhancements.” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 582.)
In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the
passage of Assembly Bill No. 333. Among other things, AB 333
changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by
narrowing the definitions of “criminal street gang,” “pattern of
criminal activity,” and “what it means for an offense to have
commonly benefitted a street gang.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1169, 1206.)
The Supreme Court granted review in Fletcher to resolve a
split in authority among Courts of Appeal concerning “whether
Assembly Bill 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination
of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of
section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for
purposes of prior serious felony enhancements and the Three
Strikes law and, if so, whether its application constitutes an
improper legislative amendment of a ballot initiative.” (Fletcher,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 583.) The Court held: “Although the
relevant statutes are not paragons of clarity, we conclude that
where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior
version of section 186.22, [AB 333] applies to the determination of
whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony
conviction under subdivision (c)(28) of section 1192.7 for purposes
of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.”
(Fletcher, at p. 583.) The Court further held that “such
application of [AB 333] does not unconstitutionally amend any
ballot initiative.” (Ibid.)
6
Rice’s 2012 prior conviction was for committing a gang-
enhanced felony under section 186.22.6 In the amended
information, the prosecution alleged that this 2012 conviction
was a prior strike under the Three Strikes law and a prior
serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision
(a)(1). The trial court found those allegations true, struck the
five-year prior serious felony enhancements, and sentenced Rice
under the Three Strikes law.
B. Analysis
As noted above, after briefing concluded in this case, in
Fletcher, our Supreme Court resolved a split in the Courts of
Appeal regarding the issue currently presented and agreed with
Rice’s position. Fletcher concluded that “with regard to prior
convictions like [Rice’s] that are premised on violations of section
186.22, current law applies in determining whether they qualify
as prior serious felony convictions under section 1192.7,
subdivision (c)(28).” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 587.)
6 Although the amended information alleged that the 2012
prior conviction was a substantive gang offense in violation of
section 186.22, subdivision (a), the documentary evidence
introduced by the prosecution to prove the 2012 conviction
clarified that it was for a violation of section 29800, subdivision
(a)(1) (possession of a firearm by a felon) that included a gang
enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). We
grant Rice’s motion to augment the record to include People’s
Exhibit 82, which is a section 969b packet documenting Rice’s
prior convictions, and includes the abstract of judgment of his
2012 conviction showing that it was a gang-enhanced felony.
Because we grant Rice’s attorney’s motion to augment the record
to include People’s Exhibit 82, we need not rule on her separate
request for late transmission of that exhibit.
7
Following Fletcher, we vacate the trial court’s true finding that
Rice’s 2012 conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony
conviction, and we remand the matter to the trial court for any
retrial of that prior conviction allegation, applying the elements
of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333. (See Fletcher, p. 608.)7
To the extent the Attorney General suggests that Rice has
forfeited his AB 333 argument because he did not raise it in the
trial court, we reject this contention.8 By treating Rice’s 2012
conviction as a prior strike conviction, the trial court imposed a
sentence that is unauthorized by law under Fletcher. Rice’s
argument is therefore not forfeited. (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27
Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 7 [forfeiture principles do not apply to legal
error resulting in an unauthorized sentence]; People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751 [“The unauthorized sentence rule is an
exception to the [forfeiture] doctrine. It permits a challenge to an
unauthorized sentence on appeal even if the defendant failed to
object below”].)
III. Brady/Pitchess Review
Rice requests that we independently review his sealed in-
camera hearing to “determine whether the trial court made an
adequate record, and if the court abused its discretion by
concluding the records reviewed did not contain any discoverable
information.” The Attorney General does not oppose that
7 Because Rice’s judgment is not yet final, he is entitled to
the retroactive benefit of AB 333. (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 583.)
8 We address forfeiture out of an abundance of caution as it
is not totally clear whether the Attorney General has raised it
specifically in relation to Rice’s AB 333 argument.
8
request. We have conducted such an independent review, and we
discern no procedural or substantive error.
A. Governing Principles
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at
p. 87.) “ ‘For Brady purposes, evidence is favorable if it helps the
defense or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching a prosecution
witness.’ [Citations.] Evidence is material ‘ “if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” ’ ” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 40.) “ ‘A reasonable
probability does not mean that the defendant “would more likely
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,” only
that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to
“undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Because of the confidentiality afforded to law enforcement
officer personnel files, when a party in a criminal case receives
notice that material disclosable under Brady is potentially
contained within a law enforcement officer’s file, the party must
first ask the trial court to review that file in camera, outside the
presence of the parties, using the method first approved in
Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531. (Serrano v. Superior Court (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 759, 774 (Serrano).) An indication from the
prosecution that an officer file contains Brady material, and some
indication that the officer’s credibility will be at issue at trial, is
generally enough for entitlement to in-camera review. (Serrano,
9
at p. 774.) The trial court will then review the material to see if
any materials must be disclosed under Brady. (Serrano, at p.
774; see also Eulloqui v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
1055, 1067-1068 (Eulloqui).)
Beyond Brady, the Pitchess procedure may also be used to
obtain other materials relevant to the defense of a criminal case.
A non-Brady Pitchess motion must include a declaration that
“ ‘propose[s] a defense or defenses to the pending charges’ ” and
“ ‘articulate[s] how the discovery sought may lead to relevant
evidence or may itself be admissible [through] direct or
impeachment evidence [citations] that would support those
proposed defenses.’ ” (Eulloqui, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1063-1064.) The defendant seeking ordinary, non-Brady,
Pitchess discovery must present “ ‘a specific factual scenario of
officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the
pertinent documents’ ” and explain how that specific factual
scenario is relevant to a defense at trial. (Elloqui, at p. 1064.)
“Materials from an officer’s personnel file reflecting dishonesty or
nonfelony acts of moral turpitude do not become discoverable
simply because a defendant argues that the officer will testify
and might testify falsely.” (Ibid.) However, once those threshold
requirements have been met, to obtain disclosure of non-Brady
Pitchess materials, the defendant then need show only that
information contained in personnel files meets a “relevance
standard,” i.e., is material to the “ ‘ “subject matter involved in
the pending litigation,” ’ ” a lower standard than the “reasonable
probability” constitutional materiality standard set forth in
Brady. (Elloqui, at pp. 1064-1065.) Thus, “Pitchess ‘creates both
a broader and lower threshold for disclosure than does [Brady].’ ”
(Eulloqui, at p. 1064.)
10
Regardless of whether the materials sought are Brady
materials or “pure” Pitchess materials, at the in-camera hearing,
“[t]he trial court should . . . make a record of what documents it
examined before ruling on the Pitchess motion[,]” such as by
“prepar[ing] a list of the documents it considered, or simply
stat[ing] for the record what documents it examined.” (People v.
Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.) The appellate court
independently examines the record made by the trial court “to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a defendant’s motion for disclosure of police personnel
records.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285.)
B. Analysis
We discern no procedural or substantive error in the trial
court’s review. Procedurally, the trial court correctly provided
clear descriptions of each document it reviewed. In addition, it
adequately explained its reasons for concluding the information
contained in those documents was not discoverable. We further
conclude the matter need not be remanded for additional
proceedings for purposes of augmenting the record. Where, as
here, “the court ‘state[d] for the record what documents it
examined,’ ” the transcript of the Pitchess hearing alone “is
adequate for purposes of conducting a meaningful appellate
review.” (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1209.)
Substantively, applying both the Brady disclosure
standards and the non-Brady Pitchess review standards, we see
no error in the trial court’s failure to order further discovery.
Having reviewed the trial court’s in-camera proceeding, none of
the records at issue would, if disclosed, have had any reasonable
probability of affecting the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the
records were not disclosable under Brady. Similarly, none of the
11
records were relevant under the Pitchess standards. The trial
court therefore did not err, and did not abuse its discretion, by
not ordering further discovery.
DISPOSITION
Consistent with Fletcher, we vacate the trial court’s true
finding that Rice’s 2012 conviction qualifies as a prior serious
felony conviction, and we remand the matter to the trial court for
any retrial of that prior conviction allegation, applying the
elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333. We affirm the
judgment in all other respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
MORI, Acting P. J.
VAN ROOYEN, J.*
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
12
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