CourtListener 10740561•People v. White CA2/1
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Filed 11/21/25 P. v. White CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B338087
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSCTA139142)
v.
JEREMIAH WHITE et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Patrick Connolly, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with instructions.
Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jeremiah White.
Matthew Barhoma, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Armando Felix.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stacy S. Schwartz and Colleen M. Tiedemann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
This is codefendants’ Armando Felix’s and Jeremiah
White’s second appeal. The first appeal followed each defendant’s
judgment of conviction and resulting 90-year-to-life aggregate
sentence. In the prior appeal, we affirmed Felix’s and White’s
conviction for the murder of Vance Byrd and Felix’s conviction for
the attempted murder of Randall Byrd. We vacated certain gang
and related firearm enhancements because of a change in the law
and reversed White’s conviction for the attempted murder of
Randall Byrd. After remand, the prosecution chose not to retry
the gang allegations, and the trial court resentenced defendants.
This appeal is from that resentencing.
We agree with White that the trial court must correct
White’s abstract of judgment to reflect that the court never
imposed fines or fees other than restitution to the Victim’s
Compensation Board, and must recalculate his actual custody
credits. With instructions to modify the judgment to reflect no
fines or fees were imposed and the actual custody credits, we
affirm the judgment as to White.
We reject Felix’s arguments the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to strike the firearm enhancements and to
impose concurrent sentences on the murder and attempted
murder convictions. With instructions to modify the judgment to
reflect actual custody credits, we affirm the judgment as to Felix.
BACKGROUND
In 2015, with White as his driver, Felix shot and killed
Vance Byrd and shot, but did not kill, Vance’s father, Randall
2
Byrd. (People v. Felix et al. (Feb. 8, 2023, B302339) [nonpub.
opn.] at pp. 4, 6.) “Randall Byrd testified the shooter . . . . stood
about 10 to 15 feet away from Randall Byrd and shot multiple
times, hitting Vance Byrd. Randall Byrd was surprised the
shooter did not hit him because the shots were fired in his
direction. Vance fell down on the driveway, in front of the Byrds’
house.” (Id. at p. 4.) A person who knew Felix and White told
police Felix and White would “ ‘drive around and . . . look for
innocent person[s]’ to shoot,” and on the day of the shooting of
Vance Byrd, were looking for a member of their rival gang to
kill.1 (Felix, at pp. 7–8.)
“The jury convicted Felix of the murder of Vance Byrd, the
attempted murder of Randall Byrd, and conspiracy to commit
murder. With respect to each crime, the jury found true gang
and firearm enhancements, including that Felix personally used
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death to Vance
Byrd and that a principal personally used and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing death to Vance Byrd. The jury
found that the murder and the attempted murder were
committed willfully and with premeditation and deliberation.”
(People v. Felix et al., supra, B302339 at pp. 14–15.) Except for
“the personal use and discharge firearm enhancements, the
jury convicted White of the same offenses and the same
enhancements. White admitted he suffered a prior conviction for
1 This claimed acquaintance of Felix and White recanted at
trial. (People v. Felix et al., supra, B302339 at pp. 8–11.)
3
robbery and that it was a serious and violent felony within the
meaning of the ‘Three Strikes’ law.”2 (Felix, at p. 15.)
1. Information related to resentencing Felix
In 2023, upon remand from the first appeal, Felix filed a
sentencing memorandum requesting that the trial court sentence
him to 25 years to life. Felix argued he was entitled to a “full
resentencing,” and under section 1385, subdivision (c), the court
had to strike the firearm enhancements imposed pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Felix also maintained the court
had to run the sentences on his murder and attempted murder
convictions concurrently because those convictions involved a
“single shooting,” and not separate acts. Finally, he claimed a
25-year-to-life sentence was consistent with an internal policy of
the Los Angeles District Attorney. According to Felix, pursuant
to that policy, the District Attorney’s Office would “no longer
pursue” certain firearm allegations.
The People requested an indeterminate sentence of
82 years to life. The People requested the court impose the
firearm enhancements on the murder and attempted murder
counts and also requested the court order Felix to serve the
sentences on his murder and the attempted murder convictions
consecutively. The probation report indicated Felix’s criminal
convictions began in 2011, when he was convicted of driving
while unlicensed, a misdemeanor. The next year, he was
convicted of the same offense. In 2013, Felix was convicted of
possession of a controlled substance with a firearm. Felix was on
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
The Three Strikes Law is codified in section 667,
subdivisions (b)–(i) and section 1172.12.
4
probation when he murdered Vance Byrd and attempted to
murder Randall Byrd.
2. Information related to resentencing White
White argued he was entitled to a full resentencing and it
was in the interest of justice to dismiss his prior strike conviction.
The People requested the trial court sentence White to an
indeterminate term of 50 years to life and a five-year-
determinate term for the section 667, subdivision (a) serious
felony enhancement. The probation report indicated White’s
criminal history dated back to 2008, when he was convicted of
driving with a suspended license. In 2010, he was convicted of
second degree robbery, and in 2010, 2011, and 2013, of driving
with a suspended license.
3. The trial court resentences Felix to 57 years to life
and White to 30 years to life
At the May 7, 2024 resentencing hearing, the prosecutor
informed the court the People would not retry the gang and
related firearm enhancements. Consistent with their prehearing
brief, the People requested the court sentence Felix to 82 years to
life, and White to 50 years to life plus a five year determinate
sentence. To argue that this sentence was in the interest of
justice, the prosecutor relied on the facts underlying the
convictions, specifically, that Felix and White “hunt[ed]” a rival
gang member to kill. According to the prosecutor, a witness
testified at trial, “[T]his was not the first and only time, but that
this has happened over and over and over again . . . .” The
prosecutor did not elaborate, but we assume the prosecutor was
relying on the evidence quoted above that a person who knew
Felix and White told police that Felix and White would
5
“ ‘drive around and . . . look for innocent person[s]’ to shoot” and
on the day Vance Byrd’s shooting, were looking for a member of
their rival gang to kill. (People v. Felix et al., supra, B302339 at
pp. 7–8.)
Felix’s counsel reminded the court Felix was “entitled to a
full resentencing”; the court responded, “I understand that.” The
prosecutor agreed Felix was entitled to a full resentencing and
noted the court was not bound by prior sentencing choices.
Felix’s counsel contended Felix was entitled to the benefit
of ameliorative sentencing laws, specifically, that the court had to
consider whether imposing the firearm enhancements was in the
interest of justice. Felix’s counsel requested the court strike the
enhancements on his murder and attempted murder counts.
Felix’s counsel also requested the court run the murder and
attempted murder sentences concurrently. Counsel stated,
“[T]here are numerous duplicative enhancements in this case,
that if the court [were] to add as to each count, I think it wouldn’t
further the interest of justice” and would not further public
safety. The court asked counsel to elaborate why it was in the
interest of justice to refrain from imposing the firearm
enhancements. Counsel responded that it did not “aid” justice to
impose a term greater than 25 years to life.
White’s counsel requested a sentence of 25 years to life.
White’s counsel then “echo[ed]” Felix’s counsel’s arguments.
White’s counsel stipulated White’s admission of his prior robbery
conviction was also an admission of a violation of section 667,
subdivision (a).
For the murder, the court sentenced White to 25 years to
life. The court struck the prior strike offense for purposes of the
Three Strikes Law. The court sentenced White to five years for
6
the section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony conviction.3
The court sentenced White to 30 years to life on the conspiracy
and stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654. White’s counsel
represented that White “cannot afford to pay,” and the court
found, “[T]here is good cause to waive those fees and fines”
without specifying what fines or fees were being waived. The
abstract of judgment, however, reflects a $300 restitution fine
pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b); a $300 fine pursuant
to section 1202.45 (suspended unless parole is revoked); an $80
court security fee pursuant to section 1465.8; and a $60 criminal
conviction assessment under Government Code section 70373.
Finally, the court ordered White and Felix to pay $8,631.47 in
restitution to the California Victim Compensation Board
pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f).4
The court sentenced Felix to 25 years to life for the murder
and added 25 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
firearm enhancement. The court imposed the enhancement
because Felix discharged the gun multiple times and the court
“believe[d] that in the interest of justice that that should and will
be imposed . . . .” For the attempted murder the court sentenced
3 Section 667, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “A person
convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of
a serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in
another jurisdiction that includes all of the elements of any
serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed
by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for
each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried
separately. The terms of the present offense and each
enhancement shall run consecutively.”
4 On appeal, defendants do not challenge this payment to
the California Victim Compensation Board.
7
Felix to a consecutive seven-year-to-life sentence. The court
indicated Randall Byrd testified Felix fired “at him.” The court
stated, “I do recall the testimony of Mr. Byrd that the first thing
he did check, believing that his son was still inside the house,
was to check to see if he had been hit. And he had not been hit.
And his testimony was that that gun was fired at him.” The
court stayed the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement
on the attempted murder conviction. The court sentenced Felix
to 50 years to life for the conspiracy conviction and stayed that
sentence pursuant to section 654.
The trial court did not address Felix’s custody credits.
Felix’s 2024 abstract of judgment shows 1,393 custody credits,
the same number imposed at the original sentencing. Similarly,
White’s 2024 abstract of judgment reflects the amount—1,393
custody credits—from his original sentencing.
DISCUSSION
We first discuss White’s arguments and then address
Felix’s contentions.
A. The Trial Court Must Correct White’s Abstract of
Judgment To Reflect No Fines and Recalculate His
Actual Custody Credits
White argues that the trial court should have recalculated
his actual custody credits when it resentenced him and that the
abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects fines and fees the court
waived. Respondent agrees with White, but argues under
section 1202.4, subdivisions (b) and (c), imposition of a restitution
fund fine is mandatory unless the trial court finds on the record a
“compelling and extraordinary reason” for not imposing the fine,
which does include inability to pay.
8
Our Supreme Court has held the People forfeit imposition
of the restitution fund fine when the prosecution did not object
below to the trial court’s failure to impose that fine. (People v.
Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303.) Accordingly, here too,
respondent has forfeited imposition of the restitution fund fine.
On remand, the trial court is ordered to correct the abstract
of judgment to reflect no fines and fees. Additionally, the trial
court shall recalculate White’s actual custody credits. (§ 2900.1
[“Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under
a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is
subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the
term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any
subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for
the same criminal act or acts.”].)
B. Felix Demonstrates No Abuse of Discretion in His
Sentence Except the Trial Court Must Correct the
Abstract of Judgment To Reflect His Actual Custody
Credits
Felix repeats the arguments he made in the trial court,
that is, the court should have dismissed the firearm
enhancements and sentenced him to concurrent terms for the
murder and attempted murder convictions. Felix also argues the
sentence he requests is consistent with the sentencing policy of
the former Los Angeles District Attorney. We review the trial
court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874.)
9
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
not striking the firearm enhancements for his
murder and attempted murder convictions
Felix argues that as of January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81
creates a “statutory presumption” in favor of dismissal where
multiple enhancements are alleged or the enhancement could
result in a sentence exceeding 20 years. According to Felix, this
presumption applies unless the trial court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety. Felix points out,
“[T]here is no indication that the trial court made any express
finding that ‘dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety . . . .’ ” Felix then concludes, “Because Felix’s case
falls squarely within the type of circumstances identified by this
ameliorative legislation as qualifying for relief, the trial court
erred by not dismissing the enhancements under . . . section
12022.53, subdivision (d) when it did not specifically find that
there would elevated risk to public safety if the [sic] were not
applied in Defendant’s case.”
“Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) added
subdivision (c) to section 1385, effective January 1, 2022,
allowing the trial court to dismiss any enhancement ‘in the
furtherance of justice’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) unless otherwise
prohibited, and providing that nine enumerated mitigating
circumstances . . . ‘weigh[ ] greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ [Citation.]”5
(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1030–1031 (Walker).)
5 The mitigating circumstance are as follows:
10
Felix’s arguments are not consistent with our high court’s
description in Walker of a trial court’s discretion to strike or
impose enhancements. Walker counsels that under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), “[a]bsent a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value
to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.
In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
or childhood trauma.
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that
is over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
was inoperable or unloaded.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
11
dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1029.) Walker also rejected Felix’s assertion of a “statutory
presumption” when it held there is not a “rebuttable presumption
in favor of dismissal that can only be overcome by a finding that
dismissal endangers public safety.” (Id. at p. 1033.)
The record, taken as a whole, indicates the trial court
understood the scope of its discretion and the court specifically
questioned counsel about the meaning of the “interest of justice.”
(See Background, part 3, ante.) The only argument Felix levels
against the trial court’s exercise of that discretion is that the
court failed to make a finding of endangerment to public safety.
Walker, however, held such a finding is not a sine qua non to
exercising discretion not to strike enhancements. Felix makes no
attempt to discuss mitigating factors (see fn. 6, ante) or
“neutraliz[ing]” “countervailing factors” (Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1036) in support of his contention the trial court
abused its discretion. Finally, although the information alleged
multiple enhancements, the court imposed the firearm
enhancement only on the murder count. The court stayed the
enhancement on the attempted murder count. Additionally, as in
People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, Felix’s sentence
“already exceeded 20 years without any enhancement, so
application of the firearm enhancement” did not result in a
sentence of over 20 years. (See id. at p. 93.) In sum, Felix fails to
12
satisfy his burden to show the trial court’s refusal to strike the
firearm enhancements was arbitrary or irrational. (People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637 [“ ‘[A] trial court does
not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ”].)
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
running the seven-year-to-life sentence for
attempted murder consecutive to Felix’s murder
sentence
Felix acknowledges the “broad discretion” afforded trial
courts as to whether to impose consecutive sentences. He also
acknowledges that California Rules of Court, rule 4.425 “outlines
the circumstances a court should consider in exercising such
discretion.” He relies on an excerpt from the People’s recitation
of the facts in their resentencing brief to argue, “[T]he facts
do not support consecutive sentences because the crimes and
their objectives were not independent of each other, did not
involve separate acts, and did not occur at different times [and]
places.”
We agree that California Rules of Court, rule 4.425
provides guidance as follows to trial courts in considering
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences:
“(a) Facts relating to crimes
“Facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not:
“(1) The crimes and their objectives were
predominantly independent of each other;
“(2) The crimes involved separate acts of violence or
threats of violence; or
“(3) The crimes were committed at different times or
separate places, rather than being committed so closely in
13
time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant
behavior.
...
“(b) Other facts and limitations
“Any circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, whether
or not the factors have been stipulated to by the defendant or
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the
judge in a court trial, may be considered in deciding whether to
impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, except:
“(1) A fact used to impose the upper term;
“(2) A fact used to otherwise enhance the defendant’s
sentence in prison or county jail under section 1170(h); and
“(3) A fact that is an element of the crime.”
Contrary to Felix’s argument, the category of facts in
California Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a) are not the only facts a
trial court may consider when deciding whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences. Trial courts may consider
whether there are multiple victims. (People v. Calhoun (2007)
40 Cal.4th 398, 408.) Here, the trial court emphasized that Felix
shot at Randall Byrd and Vance Byrd. These were two separate
crimes against two different victims. Those facts support the
trial court’s exercise of discretion to impose consecutive
sentences.
14
3. Felix fails to demonstrate the relevance of
former Los Angeles District Attorney internal
sentencing policy directives, which are now
moot
Felix argues the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office’s special directives6 “must . . . be given judicial
consideration” and the trial court erred in failing to do so. Felix
relies principally on Nazir v. Superior Court (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 478 (Nazir) to support this argument.
In Nazir, based on the policy of the then Los Angeles
County District Attorney (special directive 20-08), the prosecutor
moved to dismiss firearm allegations under section 12022.5 and
12022.53. (Nazir, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) Nazir
described this policy as providing, “ ‘sentence enhancements or
other sentencing allegations . . . shall not be filed in any cases
and shall be withdrawn in pending matters.’ ” (Id. at p. 486.)
When the trial court denied the prosecutor’s motion, the
defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition
arguing, among other points, that the trial court erred in denying
the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss. (Id. at p. 489.) The appellate
court held the trial court “misunderstood the scope of its
discretion” when it refused to consider the district attorney’s
policy, but that the trial court retained discretion to deny the
motion to dismiss the firearm allegations notwithstanding the
prosecutor’s dismissal request. (Id. at p. 486.)
6 In his resentencing brief below, Felix references District
Attorney special directives Nos. 20-14 and 20.08. He did not
attach either directive to his resentencing brief nor are the
directives in our record.
15
Nazir is not on point. Here, the prosecution did not request
dismissal of the firearm enhancements. To the contrary, the
prosecution requested the trial court impose them. Also, in
contrast to Nazir, the record demonstrates the trial court
understood the scope of its discretion (see Background, part 3,
ante). Felix does not argue otherwise.
Finally, as respondent argues, Felix’s argument is moot. It
is undisputed that in December 2024, the new District Attorney
rescinded directive 20-08. Felix identifies no relief this court may
provide based on a now revoked policy of the former Los Angeles
District Attorney.7 (See People v. Gregerson (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321 [a case is moot where ruling cannot
provide the parties with effective relief].)
4. Felix’s actual custody credits must be
recalculated
Although Felix does not raise the issue, respondent points
out the trial court did not recalculate Felix’s actual custody
credits. We agree. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court should
recalculate Felix’s actual custody credits.
7 In his reply brief on appeal, Felix emphasizes that the
former policy was in effect when the case previously was before
the trial court for resentencing. Felix, however, does not dispute
that the policy is no longer in effect and fails to identify any relief
this court could provide based on the former Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s policy directive.
16
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded for the trial court to recalculate
Armando Felix’s and Jeremiah White’s actual custody credits and
to correct White’s abstract of judgment insofar as it requires him
to pay a $300 fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (b); an $80 court security fee pursuant to
section 1465.8; a $60 criminal conviction assessment under
Government Code section 70373; and a $300 parole revocation
fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45. In all other
respects, the judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
17
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