CourtListener 10739994•Blum v. Markusic CA1/5
Testo completo
Filed 11/20/25 Blum v. Markusic CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
MICHAEL BLUM et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. A171727
THOMAS MARKUSIC et al., (San Mateo County Super. Ct.
No. 19CIV05852)
Defendants and Respondents.
The plaintiffs (collectively “Blum,” after lead plaintiff
Michael Blum) in this shareholder action were investors in a
multi-million dollar aerospace startup that ultimately went
bankrupt. Blum alleges that the defendants (collectively
“Markusic,” after defendant Thomas Markusic) schemed to loot
the company of its assets and transfer them to a new company in
which Blum had no ownership interest, depriving Blum’s shares
in the original company of any value. Blum now appeals from the
trial court’s decision to sustain Markusic’s demurrer. We
conclude that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer.
However, because Blum should be given an opportunity to amend
his complaint to plead a holder’s cause of action (see Small v.
Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 171, 184 (Small)),
we reverse the judgment.
1
BACKGROUND
A.
Depending on the circumstances, a corporate shareholder
may bring one of two types of actions: a direct action or a
derivative action. (Schuster v. Gardner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
305, 311-312 (Schuster).) A direct action is brought on behalf of
the shareholder for injury to the shareholder’s own interests. (Id.
at pp. 311-312.) A derivative action is brought on behalf of the
corporation for an injury suffered by the corporation, and it
provides a way for a stockholder to enforce a corporation’s rights
when its board of directors declines to do so. (Id. at p. 312;
Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1114 (Grosset).)
Where, as here, a company is in bankruptcy, however, a
shareholder lacks standing to bring a derivative action because
the action is an asset of the corporation that belongs to the
bankruptcy estate. (See Pepper v. Litton (1939) 308 U.S. 295,
307; Schuster, at p. 312; 11 U.S.C. § 541.)
B.
The following factual allegations are taken from Blum’s
third amended complaint (hereinafter “complaint”).
Markusic was “one of the world’s foremost experts in rocket
propulsion and launch vehicle development.” In 2013, Markusic
came up with the idea for an aerospace company that would be
called Firefly Space Systems, Inc. (“Original Firefly”), and he
approached potential investors, including Blum. Markusic
promised Blum that they “were a team, that he would always use
his power and influence to act in furtherance of [the] team’s best
interests, that he would do whatever was necessary to make the
company succeed for them all, and that he would never work for
or create a competitor.” Blum “invested in Original Firefly
because of [his] belief in those promises and trust in [Markusic].”
2
In total, Blum owned about 38 percent of the stock of Original
Firefly.
From 2014 to 2016, with Markusic as its Chief Executive
Officer, Original Firefly was highly successful, attracting millions
of dollars in funding and winning contracts with NASA and other
aerospace entities. Blum contributed to this success, serving as
unpaid Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and
Board Member. By the summer of 2016, Original Firefly had an
expanding team of 180 technical professionals and an internal
valuation of $110 million. However, in late 2016, Original Firefly
needed additional funding to complete its initial “Series A”
funding round.
In the fall of 2016, a potential investor named Maxym
Polyakov approached Markusic about investing in Original
Firefly. Polyakov was the Chief Executive Officer and owner of
Noosphere Venture Partners LP, an investment firm focused on
space and satellite technologies. Although Markusic initially had
misgivings about working with Polyakov due to various alleged
scandals concerning his other business interests, Markusic
actively negotiated and communicated with Polyakov as well as
Polyakov’s Noosphere colleague, Mark Watt.
Rather than invest in Original Firefly, however, Markusic,
Polyakov, and Watt developed a plan to loot Original Firefly of its
assets and relaunch it as a new company controlled by them.
In late 2016, Markusic, Polyakov, and Watt presented a
financing proposal to “Original Firefly’s investor-shareholders.”
The proposal would exchange existing Original Firefly shares for
a total 10 percent stake in a new successor company, without any
dilution protections. Among other problems, “these terms
substantially undervalued the investments that [Blum] had made
in Original Firefly, ignored the value of the intellectual property
that had been developed, and clearly would deprive [Blum] of the
benefit of [his] commitment and contribution to Original Firefly.”
3
When investors raised their concerns about the proposal to
Markusic, he promised to try to get them a better deal. Blum
“discussed [his] concerns with Markusic that [he] did not want to
lose the value of [his] financial and work investment in Original
Firefly, and wanted Markusic to look out specifically for [him]
and [his] interests.” Blum told “Markusic that [he] wanted him,
in his personal capacity, to represent [Blum], in [his] individual
capacit[y] and not merely as [one] of the investors in Original
Firefly, in negotiations with Polyakov, Watt, and Noosphere.”
Markusic “agreed to act as [Blum’s] agent in those negotiations”
and told him he “would refuse any deal that would not preserve
or benefit [his] investment.” Markusic also urged Blum to reject
the “low-ball offer,” promised to negotiate a better deal, and
represented that he would continue to work on identifying other
financing options for Original Firefly.
But “[i]n reality, . . . Markusic was stringing [Blum] along
while he and his co-defendants developed” and executed “their
plan to loot Original Firefly of its assets and deprive [Blum] of
any value in [his] investments” in Original Firefly. Markusic
incorporated a new successor company (“New Firefly”), helped
Noosphere acquire Original Firefly’s senior secured debt, and
helped Noosphere foreclose on that debt. The foreclosure
triggered a financial crisis at Original Firefly, enabling New
Firefly to acquire Original Firefly’s assets after they were sold at
a “fire sale.” Stripped of its assets, Original Firefly was forced to
go into bankruptcy.
Markusic had promised Blum that he would stop
negotiating with Polyakov if they were unable to reach a
favorable deal, that he would continue to look for other potential
investors for Original Firefly, and that he would not make any
decisions without obtaining a majority vote of Original Firefly’s
shareholders. In reliance on Markusic’s representations, Blum
“forbore from taking any action that might have disrupted the
4
execution of [Markusic’s] scheme” and did not “tak[e] any action
that would have avoided or mitigated the destruction of the value
in [his] ownership interests in Original Firefly.” “On information
and belief, Markusic did not intend to follow through on any of
these representations at the time he made them. . . . but instead
was pursuing the plan . . . to loot Original Firefly and use its
assets for [New Firefly’s] benefit, leaving Plaintiffs with
worthless shares.”
Based on these allegations, Blum’s complaint alleges that
Markusic defrauded him when he falsely promised to negotiate in
his best interests, thereby preventing Blum “from being able to
protect the value of [his] investment in Original Firefly” and from
“receiv[ing] any ownership interest in the virtually identical New
Firefly” (first cause of action). The complaint also alleges that
defendants Polyakov, Watt, Noosphere, and New Firefly aided
and abetted Markusic’s fraud (second cause of action). In
addition, the complaint alleges that Markusic breached his
fiduciary duty of loyalty to Blum (third cause of action) as well as
his fiduciary duty of care to Blum (fourth cause of action), and the
other defendants aided and abetted these breaches (fifth cause of
action). Further, Markusic fraudulently concealed his scheme to
loot Original Firefly and start New Firefly in its place, causing
Blum to “los[e] the value of [his] investments in Original Firefly
and have no ownership interest in the virtually identical New
Firefly” (sixth cause of action); and the other defendants aided
and abetted Markusic’s fraudulent concealment (seventh cause of
action). In addition, Markusic’s actions, including urging Blum
to reject the offer to exchange Original Firefly shares for an
interest in New Firefly, tortiously interfered with Blum’s
prospective business relationship with New Firefly (eighth cause
of action). Finally, the complaint alleges that the foregoing
conduct violates the Unfair Competition Law (ninth cause of
action). (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.)
5
C.
Blum filed this litigation in 2019, shortly after Markusic
sought declaratory relief in Delaware state court based on the
same surrounding circumstances.1 The trial court stayed this
case while the Delaware action was pending. In 2022, after the
Delaware case was resolved,2 the trial court lifted the stay in this
case pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
1 Markusic filed suit in Delaware based on a forum
selection clause in Original Firefly’s certificate of incorporation,
which designated the Delaware Court of Chancery as the sole and
exclusive forum for claims that the officers or directors of the
corporation breached a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation or
its shareholders.
2 In the Delaware action, Markusic, Polyakov, Noosphere,
and New Firefly sought a declaration that Markusic did not
breach any fiduciary duties owed to Blum and that Polyakov,
Noosphere, and New Firefly did not aid any breaches. (See
Markusic v. Blum (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2020, C.A. No. 2019-0753-
KSJM) [nonpub. opn.] (Markusic), affd. (Del. Sept. 23, 2022, 284
A.3d 1017) [Supreme Court of Delaware affirming the decision of
the Delaware Court of Chancery].) Blum then filed counterclaims
based on breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, tortious
interference with contract, and tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage. (See Markusic, supra, C.A. No.
2019-0753-KSJM.) The Delaware Court of Chancery held that
Blum’s claim for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage did not state a claim for which relief may be granted,
and it dismissed the remaining counterclaims based on Blum’s
lack of standing to bring derivative claims. (Ibid.) Subsequently,
the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to issue a declaratory
judgment in favor of Markusic and the other Delaware plaintiffs,
holding that its order dismissing the counterclaims resolved the
dispute over whether those claims were derivative and that the
court could not properly opine on the nature of claims pending in
another court. (See Markusic v. Blum (Del. Ch. Jun. 16, 2021,
C.A. No. 2019-0753-KSJM) [nonpub. opn.], affd. (Del. Sept. 23,
2022, 284 A.3d 1017).)
6
Markusic demurred to the operative complaint, asserting
that Blum lacked standing because his claims were derivative.
Blum argued that his claims were not derivative because they
were based on personal duties owed to him and that claims of
fraud in connection with buying or selling stock are direct claims.
Sustaining the demurrer, the trial court held that Blum lacked
standing because his causes of action were derivative under both
Delaware and California law, reasoning that “[a]lthough the
causes of action in the [complaint] address the actions of
Markusic as personal betrayals (e.g. sending emails saying they
would all work together as a team; telling Plaintiffs that he
would be their agent), ultimately what the [complaint] seeks to
recover is the value of Plaintiffs’ investments into the company,”
which is an injury to the corporation. In so holding, the trial
court also concluded that Blum had failed to adequately plead
any claims (1) that Markusic’s misrepresentations had caused
him to hold onto his Original Firefly shares rather than sell them
(a “holder’s” action); or (2) that Markusic fraudulently induced
Blum to invest in Original Firefly at the outset by making false
promises. The trial court denied leave to amend, reasoning that
“[t]he pleadings here and in Delaware have been heavily revised
and edited numerous times over 4+ years” and “it is clear
Plaintiff cannot plead any direct causes of action.”
DISCUSSION
A.
Blum contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his
fraudulent inducement and holder’s claims on the ground that,
although they would be direct claims if adequately pled, the
complaint failed to state a claim on these theories. According to
Blum, Markusic did not demur on these grounds, and, in any
event, his pleading was sufficient. Reviewing the adequacy of the
complaint de novo (see Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa
7
Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42), we
disagree.
As an initial matter, as to each cause of action in the
complaint, Markusic demurred on the ground that the complaint
“fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against Defendants.” Blum is thus incorrect that the trial court’s
conclusion that the complaint failed to state a claim for a direct
cause of action, either as to his holder theory or his fraudulent
inducement theory, was not based on a ground raised in the
demurrer. Further, the question whether a claim is direct or
derivative requires assessing the nature of the wrong alleged.
(See, e.g., Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc. (Del.
2004) 845 A.2d 1031, 1036, 1038 (Tooley).) Where a cause that
would otherwise be direct is not properly plead, then the
complaint fails to state a direct cause of action. (See id. at p.
1039 [explaining that a complaint does not “state[] a direct,
individual claim” if “in reality, it states no claim at all”]; see also
Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 184-185; Schuster, supra, 127
Cal.App.4th at p. 315.)
We therefore proceed to consider whether the complaint
adequately pled a holder’s or fraudulent inducement action.
1.
A holder’s action is a suit by a shareholder who alleges that
the corporation’s officers or directors fraudulently induced the
shareholder to refrain from selling the shareholder’s stock.
(Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 171.) In support of his tortious
interference cause of action (eighth cause of action), Blum argues
that Markusic’s alleged actions “fraudulently induced [him] to
hold, rather than sell, [his] shares in Original Firefly.” Blum
asserts that this cause of action amounts to a “ ‘holder’s action,’ ”
which the California Supreme Court has recognized is not
derivative when properly pled. (See Small, at pp. 184-185.)
8
As Small explained, what distinguishes a holder’s action
from a derivative suit is the requirement in a holder’s action that
the “plaintiff . . . allege specific reliance on the defendants’
representations.” (Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 184.) This
requirement could be met by alleging, for example, “that if the
plaintiff had read a truthful account of the corporation’s financial
status[,] the plaintiff would have sold the stock, how many shares
the plaintiff would have sold, and when the sale would have
taken place.” (Ibid.) Further, “[t]he plaintiff must allege actions,
as distinguished from unspoken and unrecorded thoughts and
decisions, that would indicate that the plaintiff actually relied on
the misrepresentations.” (Ibid.) Merely alleging that the
plaintiff relied on a defendant’s misrepresentations is
insufficient. (Ibid.)
Under Small, Blum had to specifically allege that his
personal reliance on Markusic’s representations caused him to
hold onto his stock. (See Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 184.) His
complaint contains general allegations that Blum “relied on
Markusic’s repeated representations,” he “forbore from taking
any action that might have disrupted the execution of the
Defendants’ scheme,” and he “forbore from taking any action that
would have avoided or mitigated the destruction of the value in
[his] ownership interests in Original Firefly.” But the complaint
nowhere alleges that Markusic’s misrepresentations caused Blum
to hold on to his shares. (See Schuster, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at
p. 315.) Further, the complaint does not allege that had
Markusic told the truth, Blum would have sold his shares of
Original Firefly, nor does it specifically allege how many shares
he would have sold or when. (See Small, at p. 184.)
Instead, the complaint suggests that Blum would have
rejected the November 2016 offer regardless. According to the
complaint, the offer was seriously flawed: among other problems,
the terms of the deal “substantially undervalued the investments
9
that Plaintiffs had made in Original Firefly, ignored the value of
the intellectual property that had been developed, and clearly
would deprive Plaintiffs of the benefit of their commitment and
contribution to Original Firefly.” Because the terms were so
unfavorable, “[i]nvestors’ concerns with the proposal were raised
to Markusic” and, rather than sell their shares, a group of
shareholders, including some of the plaintiffs here, instead
proposed injecting additional capital into Original Firefly. And
although Noosphere made another offer in December 2016, the
complaint describes it as “another low-ball offer.”3 These
allegations pose some tension with Blum’s argument on appeal
that Markusic’s representations induced him to reject the offer
from Polyakov, Watt, and Noosphere. Given the absence of
detailed allegations of Blum’s personal reliance on Markusic’s
misrepresentations, the trial court correctly determined that the
complaint fails to sufficiently plead a direct holder’s action under
California law. (See Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 184; see also
Schuster, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 315.)
2.
Although none of the nine causes of action in his complaint
purport to be based on such a theory, Blum contends that his
complaint alleges a fraud cause of action based on “Markusic’s
fraudulent inducement of Plaintiffs to invest in Original Firefly
in the first instance.” According to the complaint, when Markusic
initially sought Blum’s investment in Original Firefly, Markusic
promised that “they each were a part of the team,” “he would
always act to further the team’s best interests,” “he would do
whatever was necessary to make the company succeed for them
all,” and “he would never work for or create a competitor.” Blum
relied on these representations when he agreed to invest in
3 As Blum’s counsel described the situation in the trial
court, the “Plaintiffs looked at the deal, and they said, ‘Look, we
don't think this is a very good offer.’ ”
10
Original Firefly. We agree with the trial court that Blum’s
allegations of fraudulent inducement are legally insufficient.
As Blum recognizes, a claim of fraudulent inducement
requires a showing that “the defendant did not intend to honor
[his] . . . promises” at the time they were made. (Food Safety Net
Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1118, 1131 (Food Safety); see also Civ. Code, §§ 1709, 1710, subd.
4.; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)
Nonperformance, without more, is insufficient to show that the
defendant knew that his promises were false when he made
them. (Food Safety, at p. 1131.) Here, the complaint alleges that
Markusic made promises at the time Blum originally invested in
Original Firefly, and it alleges facts indicating that the initial
promises ultimately were not kept. But nowhere does the
complaint allege that Markusic did not intend to honor his initial
representations—i.e., that he would always work in the best
interests of Original Firefly and he would never work for a
competitor—at the time that he made them. Indeed, the
allegations support the opposite conclusion, asserting that from
2014 through 2016, Original Firefly “quickly achieved success,”
attracting millions of dollars in funding, winning contracts, and
developing many of the key components of its first launch vehicle.
In sum, the trial court did not err when it concluded that
Blum’s complaint failed to state a claim based on either a holder’s
theory or fraudulent inducement.
B.
We next consider de novo Blum’s challenge to the trial
court’s determination that his remaining claims are derivative
under both California and Delaware law. (See Schrage v.
Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 150 (Schrage).) We affirm
the trial court’s determination.
11
The parties dispute whether California or Delaware law
applies in assessing whether Blum’s claims are derivative or
direct. As a result, our first question is whether there is a
material conflict between the two states’ laws on this question.
(See Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1107.) If the result is the
same under either state’s law, then there is no conflict of law to
resolve. (Ibid.; see also Schuster, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p.
312.) We therefore turn to assessing whether Blum’s claims are
derivative under each state’s law.
1.
An action is derivative under California law “ ‘ “if the
gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the
whole body of its stock and property without any severance or
distribution among individual holders, or it seeks to recover
assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its
assets.” ’ ” (Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1108; see also
Schuster, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 313.) The corporation is
the only party that directly benefits from a successful derivative
action. (Grosset, at pp. 1108, 1114; see also Schuster, at pp. 311-
314 [holding that injury to shareholders through diminution in
stock value is incidental to injury to the corporation, so an action
seeking redress for that injury is derivative].)
For example, an action alleging that mismanagement of the
corporation by its officers injured the corporation (such as by
reducing its assets or net worth) is a derivative one; a stockholder
may not bring an individual action for the resultant decrease in
value of the company’s stocks. (See Schrage, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 153; Schuster, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp.
311-312.) Similarly, an action is derivative where it seeks
redress for injury based on the allegedly fraudulent transfer of
the corporation’s assets to another company without adequate
consideration. (See PacLink Communications Internat., Inc. v.
Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 958, 964; see also Avikian
12
v. WTC Financial Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1111
(Avikian) [holding that an action was derivative where it alleged
that officers and directors injured the corporation by looting or
mismanaging its assets, resulting in liquidation of the company].)
In contrast, if the suit seeks to enforce a right belonging to
the plaintiff individually and not to the corporation, then it is not
derivative. (Schrage, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 150.) An action
for redress of an injury to the plaintiff individually and not to the
corporation is a direct or individual action. (See ibid.; Schuster,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 312-313; see also Sutter v. General
Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530.) So long as “the
injury is not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an
individual cause of action exists.” (Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson &
Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 107; see also Schrage, at p. 150.)
Examples of direct actions include suits to compel declaration or
payment of a dividend or to enforce shareholder voting rights.
(Schuster, at p. 313.) A suit to enforce a contract to which the
shareholder is a party, or to obtain redress for a fraud
perpetrated on the shareholder directly, is also a direct action.
(Schrage, at p. 150.)
Applying the foregoing principles, the trial court correctly
determined that Blum’s remaining claims are derivative rather
than direct under California law. Blum’s causes of action based
on fraud (his first, second, sixth, and seventh causes) and breach
of fiduciary duty (his third, fourth, and fifth causes) sought to
recover the lost value of his investment stemming from
Markusic’s alleged scheme to loot Original Firefly and transfer
its assets to New Firefly at a steep discount. As Blum’s
complaint alleged, “Markusic, who pretended to Plaintiffs that he
was their agent acting to protect their investment, hatched and
carried out a fraudulent plan . . . to eviscerate Original Firefly
and loot its assets, thereby depriving Plaintiffs’ investments of
any value.” Markusic’s misrepresentations and failure to act in
13
good faith kept Blum “from taking steps to prevent Defendants
from looting Original Firefly, which would have preserved the
value of [his] monetary and time investments.” The result of the
alleged scheme was that Blum’s “investment was rendered
worthless.”
In particular, Blum’s fraud causes of action allege that
Markusic misrepresented that “he would protect the value of
their financial and time commitment to Original Firefly.”
Markusic acted “with the sole purpose of misleading Plaintiffs
into not taking any action to protect their investment in Original
Firefly and its value.” As a result of Blum’s reliance on
Markusic’s false representations, he was “prevented from being
able to protect the value of [his] investment in Original Firefly”
and “lost the value of [his] investment in Original Firefly.” The
result was that Blum “obtain[ed] little or no value for [his]
investment in Original Firefly.”
Thus, although Blum emphasizes that his fraud and
fiduciary duty claims are based on misrepresentations made and
duties owed to him personally, the injury is the destruction of the
corporation and corresponding diminution in the value of its
stock—that is, an injury to the corporation itself. (See Schrage,
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 153; Schuster, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 311-312.) The injury to Blum—being left with “worthless”
stocks—was incidental to the corporation’s injury. (See Avikian,
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116 [holding that the “loss in value
of [the plaintiffs’] investments” due to corporate mismanagement
was “merely incidental to the alleged harm inflicted upon [the
corporation] and all its shareholders.”)
The only other injury to which the complaint alludes is
that, as a result of Markusic’s actions, Blum failed to gain a
valuable ownership interest in New Firefly, which is the basis of
the holder’s action he seeks to assert. But as we have explained,
the complaint fails to state a direct holder’s action.
14
Because Blum’s Unfair Competition Law cause of action is
predicated on the same underlying causes discussed above, it too
is derivative. (See Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185.)
In sum, under California law, to the extent they are legally
sufficient, Blum’s causes of action are derivative.
2.
Our conclusion is no different under Delaware law.
To distinguish between direct and derivative stockholder
claims, including claims based on corporate fiduciary duty,
Delaware courts apply a two-part test under Tooley, supra, 845
A.2d 1031. (See In re Fairpoint Ins. Coverage Appeals (Del. 2023)
311 A.3d 760, 767 (Fairpoint); Brookfield Asset Mgmt. v. Rosson
(Del. 2021) 261 A.3d 1251, 1262-1263 (Brookfield); Morris v.
Spectra Energy Partners (DE) GP, LP (Del. 2021) 246 A.3d 121,
130-131 (Morris).) Under Tooley, whether a claim is derivative
turns on two questions: (1) whether the corporation or the
individual stockholder suffered the alleged harm; and (2) whether
the corporation or the individual stockholder would receive the
benefit of any recovery. (Fairpoint, at pp. 767-768; Brookfield, at
p. 1263; Tooley, at pp. 1036, 1039.) The answer to the second
question “should logically follow” from the answer to the first.
(Tooley, at p. 1036.) In answering these questions, we look to the
complaint and consider the nature of the alleged wrong and the
requested relief. (Ibid.) A derivative action is one seeking to
redress “harm done to the business entity, with any recovery
going to the entity.” (Fairpoint, at p. 768.) In contrast, the claim
is direct if “ ‘the duty breached was owed to the stockholder’ ” and
the stockholder “ ‘can prevail without showing an injury to the
corporation.’ ” (El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff
(Del. 2016) 152 A.3d 1248, 1260 (El Paso Pipeline); see also
Brookfield, at p. 1263.)
15
For example, a claim that a corporation’s funds have been
wrongfully dissipated is derivative because the wrongdoing
harms the corporation directly and “ ‘harms the stockholders only
derivatively so far as their stock loses value.’ ” (El Paso Pipeline,
supra, 152 A.3d at p. 1266.) Similarly, a claim that corporate
mismanagement diminished the company’s stock value is
derivative because it is a wrong “shared collectively by all the
shareholders, rather than independently by . . . any . . .
individual shareholder.” (Kramer v. Western Pacific Industries,
Inc. (Del. 1988) 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Kramer); see also Tooley,
supra, 845 A.2d at p. 1038.) A claim alleging that company
management issued shares to a controlling stockholder for
inadequate consideration is also derivative because the
wrongdoing constitutes “harm to the corporation for which it has
a claim to compel the restoration of the value of the
overpayment.” (Brookfield, supra, 261 A.3d at p. 1266; see also
El Paso Pipeline, at pp. 1260-1261.) On the other hand, a claim
by creditors that a company fraudulently transferred its assets to
defraud its creditors is a direct claim “because the creditors
suffered the harm caused by the fraudulent transfer, and the
remedy benefits the creditors, not the business entity.”
(Fairpoint, supra, 311 A.3d at p. 768.)
As Blum contends, however, some cases of the Delaware
Supreme Court have stated that, before applying Tooley, courts
should ask an “initial question”: is the plaintiff asserting a claim
based on the plaintiff’s own right, rather than enforcing a right
that belongs to the corporation itself? (See NAF Holdings, LLC v.
Li Fung (Trading) Ltd. (Del. 2015) 118 A.3d 175, 180 (NAF
Holdings); see also El Paso Pipeline, supra, 152 A.3d at p. 1259;
Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P'ship (Del. 2016) 140 A.3d 1125,
1127 (Citigroup).) If “a plaintiff asserts a claim based upon the
plaintiff's own right,” the claim is direct and Tooley does not
apply. (El Paso Pipeline, at p. 1259; see also Citigroup, at p.
1127.)
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More recently, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has
reaffirmed that the Tooley test applies to “the determination of
whether a stockholder’s claim is direct or derivative.”
(Brookfield, supra, 261 A.3d at p. 1263; see also Morris, supra,
246 A.3d at pp. 130-131 [describing Tooley’s “two-part test for
drawing a line between direct and derivative claims”]; Fairpoint,
supra, 311 A.3d at p. 767 [explaining that Tooley “instruct[s] on
how to distinguish direct from derivative claims”].) In addition to
claims based on corporate fiduciary duty, Delaware courts have
since applied Tooley to assess whether fraud claims were
derivative or direct, without separately asking the “initial
question” posed in earlier cases like NAF Holdings, supra, 118
A.3d at page 180, and Citigroup, supra, 140 A.3d at page 1127.
(See Fairpoint, at pp. 767-768 [applying Tooley to assess
fraudulent conveyance claim; In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative
& Class Action Litig. (Del. Ch. 2017) 160 A.3d 484, 488, 501-503
(Massey) [applying Tooley to determine whether a claim for fraud
in connection with a merger is direct or derivative].)
Applying Tooley to Blum’s claims for breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud (see Fairpoint, supra, 311 A.3d at pp. 767-768; El
Paso Pipeline, supra, 152 A.3d at p. 1259; Massey, supra, 160
A.3d at pp. 501-503), they are classic derivative claims. As we
have discussed, they are premised upon corporate malfeasance
and mismanagement that injured Original Firefly and
diminished the value of its stock. (See Kramer, supra, 546 A.2d
at p. 353; Tooley, supra, 845 A.2d at p. 1038.) The duty “to
manage the affairs of [the company] . . . was owed to the
[c]ompany and not any stockholder individually, and the harm
that allegedly resulted was to the [c]ompany and not any
stockholder separately.” (Massey, at pp. 505-506.) Any recovery
would be owed to the corporation and benefit its stockholders
only indirectly. (Id. at p. 503; see also El Paso Pipeline, supra,
152 A.3d at p. 1261 [“ ‘Where all of a corporation’s stockholders
are harmed and would recover pro rata in proportion with their
17
ownership of the corporation’s stock solely because they are
stockholders, then the claim is derivative in nature.’ ”].)
Further, although Blum argues that his claims of fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of stock are not derivative,
as we have already explained, his fraudulent inducement and
holder allegations are not sufficient to state a claim.
For the reasons explained above, Blum’s Unfair
Competition Law cause of action is likewise derivative.
In sum, there is no conflict of law for us to resolve: we agree
with the trial court that under both California and Delaware law,
Blum’s claims, to the extent they are sufficiently pled, are
derivative rather than direct. (See Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at
p. 1107.) Because Blum lacked standing to bring a derivative
action, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
C.
Finally, Blum argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying him leave to amend his complaint. Based
on Blum’s representations at oral argument, we will direct the
trial court to grant leave to amend.
The grant or denial of a motion for leave to amend a
complaint is generally entrusted to the trial court’s discretion.
(Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235,
242 (Branick); Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) However,
leave to amend may be granted on appeal, even if the appellant
did not request leave in the trial court and even if the appellant
advances an eleventh-hour legal theory. (See Code Civ. Proc., §
472c, subd. (a); Eghtesad v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 406, 411 (Eghtesad); Economic Empowerment
Foundation v. Quackenbush (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 677, 684, fn. 5;
Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222
Cal.App.3d 1371, 1386-1387 (Careau).) It is the plaintiff’s burden
to show a reasonable possibility that any defect in the complaint
18
can be cured through amendment. (See Zelig v. County of Los
Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
It is true that Blum has had multiple opportunities to
amend his complaint, as his operative complaint is the fourth
version. From our review of the record, however, it appears that
Blum did not advance his holder’s theory until his opposition to
the demurrer to the instant complaint. As a result, although we
agree with the trial court that Blum’s attempts to plead a direct
holder action are inadequate, we believe he should be given the
opportunity to try again, particularly given the representations
he has made to this court about allegations he would add. (See
Careau, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1405 [holding that leave to
amend was required where the plaintiffs had first asserted the
claim at issue in their operative second amended complaint, and
were therefore never given an opportunity to cure the specific
defects identified by the court].) At oral argument, Blum
asserted that, given the opportunity, he would amend his
complaint to allege that he would have accepted the offer to
exchange his shares for an interest in New Firefly, despite the
significant flaws in the offer, if he had known Markusic’s real
intentions. (See Eghtesad, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 414 [“an
appellant may rely on statements made for the first time on
appeal to show that there is a reasonable possibility that the
complaint can be amended to state a cause of action”]; Kong v.
City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108
Cal.App.4th 1028, 1043 [concluding plaintiff should be granted
leave to amend her first amended complaint based in part on her
representations at oral argument].) Although we cannot (and do
not) say that Blum will be successful, we conclude that he should
be permitted to try again. We will direct the trial court to allow a
further amendment.
In contrast, with respect to Blum’s claim that Markusic
fraudulently induced him to make his initial investment in
19
Original Firefly, it is not reasonably possible to cure the defects
in his pleading. The complaint’s allegations indicating that,
under Markusic’s leadership, Original Firefly developed into a
successful startup from 2014 to 2016 undercut any notion that
Markusic had no intent to keep his initial promises when he first
made them.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The matter is
remanded with instructions to vacate the order sustaining the
demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order
sustaining the demurrer with leave for Blum to amend his
complaint to allege a holder’s cause of action. The parties shall
bear their own costs on appeal.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
Blum et al. v. Markusic et al. (A171727)
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