In re M.A. CA2/4

CourtListener 10739990Calctapp20 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/20/25 In re M.A. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re M.A., a Person Coming B341383
Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
22CCJP04164,
22CCJP04164A )
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
E. A.,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant E.A. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s
order terminating her parental rights with respect to her
daughter, M.A. Her sole contention is that the juvenile court and
respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. We agree and
conditionally reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
ICWA and related California law2 reflect “a congressional
determination to protect Indian children and to promote the

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural
background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties
are familiar with the facts of the case and its procedural history.
(People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished
opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision
“does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 The Legislature incorporated ICWA’s requirements into
California law in 2006. (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83,
91.)

2
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by
establishing minimum federal standards a state court must
follow before removing an Indian child from his or her family.”
(In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287; see also 25 U.S.C.
§ 1902.) Both ICWA and California law define an “Indian child”
as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); see § 224.1, subd. (b)(1).)
Federal regulations and state law impose on the juvenile
court and DCFS “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire
whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may
be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(a); see also In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77.) This duty of
inquiry, the only one at issue here, “‘begins with the initial
contact’ (§ 224, subd. (a)) and continues throughout the
dependency proceedings.” (In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p.
77.) To discharge this initial inquiry duty, DCFS must ask “‘the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian child
is domiciled.’” (Ibid; see also § 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) “Extended
family member” generally means “a person who has reached 18
years of age and is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
“Despite its broad terms, section 224.2, subdivision (b) does
not require inquiry with every living adult family member.” (In
re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) The statute “is not

3
intended to obligate county welfare departments to search for
possible Indian ancestry without regard to cost or other practical
considerations. Rather, it is intended to ensure social workers
‘ask an added question of extended family members whom [they]
often already are investigating in their usual course of work.’”
(Ibid.) “‘The operative concept is those people who are reasonably
available to help the agency with its investigation into whether
the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’” (In
re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th. 1112, 1140 (Dezi. C.).)
The juvenile court’s determination that an inquiry is
adequate, proper, and duly diligent is fact-specific and thus
subject to a deferential standard of review. (Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the
more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.”’” (Ibid.) Thus,
where an implied finding of adequacy rests on a cursory record
and a patently insufficient inquiry, ‘“‘the only viable conclusion is
that the finding is unsupported by substantial evidence and the
court’s conclusion to the contrary constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion.’”’ (Ibid.) In such a case, “conditional reversal to
undertake the simple task of inquiry balances the weighty
interest of Indian children and tribes under ICWA on the one
hand, and the interests of dependent children in permanency and
stability on the other.” (Id. at p. 1143.)

4
II. Analysis
Mother predominantly challenges the adequacy of the
inquiry into M.A.’s paternal lineage.3 She contends “the evidence
showed there were paternal extended family members available
for Indian ancestry inquiry during the proceedings,” and “no
evidence father was asked for contact information of the paternal
relatives he referred to” during the case. We agree.
The record indicates that father denied Native American
heritage when he appeared at the detention hearing on October
24, 2022 and filed an ICWA-020 form indicating that none of the
categories listed under the heading “Indian Status” applied to
him or his family. Father’s denials did not relieve DCFS of its
inquiry duty. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 554.)
Indeed, the record reflects that DCFS raised the issue at least
twice more with father, and he denied Native American heritage
on November 29, 2022 and May 8, 2023.
However, the record does not reflect that DCFS ever asked
father for the names or contact information of any paternal
relatives who could potentially shed light on the issue. During

3 She also asserts that “there was no evidence the
Department made ICWA inquiry of the person reporting child
abuse, or any other person which the ICWA inquiry is not limited
to, prior to filing the section 300 petition.” The record does not
support this assertion. An ICWA-010(A) form attached to the
petition states that DCFS asked mother about M.A.’s “Indian
status” on September 29, 2022, several weeks before the section
300 petition was filed on October 21, 2022. The detention report
dated October 20, 2022, contains the same information.
Additionally, the final section 366.26 report states that “[o]n
10/10/2022, the Reporting Party was questioned by the Child
Protection Hotline, as to the Native American Indian heritage of
the family,” and no heritage was reported.

5
the November 29, 2022 interview, father informed DCFS that he
had a happy childhood with two present parents and three
siblings. There is no indication that DCFS asked father for the
names or contact information of any of these relatives. In its
response brief, DCFS points out that the report states “[n]o
names or information were provided” when it asked father
specifically about potential placement options for M.A. Aside
from the separate context of that inquiry, the passive language
makes it unclear whether father refused DCFS’s requests for
information about his relatives, or whether DCFS failed to ask
him. DCFS is obligated to “include in its filings a detailed
description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has
undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s
Indian status.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.841(a)(5).) The
ambiguous, passively worded language here does not meet that
standard.
Before father’s participation in the case waned, DCFS
documented at least five contacts with him – but no inquiry about
his relatives.4 Father appeared virtually at a July 13, 2023,
review hearing and testified that he had struggled to find
monitors for weekend visits with M.A.: “My mom has passed
away. My dad has dementia. My sister has broke her back. I
had nobody until recently.” Though counsel for all parties cross-
examined him, neither counsel nor the court asked father for

4 Due to the circumstances of the case, DCFS had much more
frequent contact with mother. The record reflects that it asked
mother about her and her family’s heritage on numerous
occasions. There is no indication that DCFS ever asked mother
for any information about father’s relatives, even though she and
father were married.

6
further information about his surviving local relatives, such as
their names or contact information. While “we cannot ask the
agency to intuit the names of unidentified family members or to
interview individuals for whom no contact information has been
provided” (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082), ICWA
requires that the agency make at least some effort to obtain those
names during contacts with parents. It is “well established that
the duty to develop information bearing on whether a child is an
Indian child ‘rests with the court and the Department, not the
parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (Ibid.)
DCFS asserts that father “did not make himself available
to DCFS nor did he appear in the juvenile court” for much of the
case, and did not respond to its specific attempt to ask about
ICWA in late April 2024, in connection with the section 366.26
report. Quoting In re Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082,
DCFS argues that its “ability to conduct an exhaustive ICWA
inquiry necessarily is constrained” due to father’s failure to
cooperate or provide it with names. While that is true as a
general matter, in this case there is no evidence that DCFS made
any inquiry about paternal family members during the numerous
encounters it had with father during his participation in the case.
Although inquiry deficiencies generally may be resolved
throughout the course of ongoing dependency proceedings (J.J. v.
Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447,461), on the facts and
sparse inquiry record of this case we agree that DCFS’s belated
request amid father’s prolonged absence from the case was
insufficient. Nothing suggests that father was uncooperative at
the outset of the case, yet DCFS made no inquiry about his family
when it had the opportunity to do so.

7
On this record, the inquiry fell well short of complying with
the plain language of section 224.2, subdivision (b). The outcome
may have been different if father had no other relatives or DCFS
could not locate them, and that information was documented in
the record. However, beyond father’s denials and ICWA form,
there is no evidence of inquiry into any of the family members he
mentioned, which left the juvenile court without a sufficient
factual basis upon which to exercise its discretion. Consequently,
the juvenile court’s implicit finding of proper and adequate
further inquiry and due diligence is not supported by substantial
evidence, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
(In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 605.) In accordance with
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141, “conditional reversal is
required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard
the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.”

DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally
reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with
instructions to order DCFS to make reasonable efforts to
interview paternal relatives about the possibility of M.A.’s Indian
ancestry and to report to the court on the results of those efforts.
Based on the information reported, if the juvenile court
determines that no additional inquiry or notice to tribes is
necessary, the order terminating dependency jurisdiction is to be

8
reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is warranted, the court
shall make all necessary orders to ensure compliance with ICWA
and related state statutes.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

9

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.