CourtListener 10739959•In re M.B. CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 11/20/25 In re M.B. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re M.B., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. B340235
________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03702B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TANYA V.,
Defendant and Appellant,
MARTIN B.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner.
Affirmed.
Cindy J. Shin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Appellant Mother.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent Father.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Tanya V. (mother) appeals from a dependency court
judgment awarding mother and Martin B. (father) joint legal
custody of M.B. (child). Mother contends that the court abused
its discretion in awarding joint custody because (1) the court
improperly presumed that joint legal custody was favored over
sole custody; (2) father had not complied with his case plan; and
(3) the court failed to inquire about a criminal protective order
that may have been in effect and that could have affected the
court’s custody ruling. We conclude the juvenile court applied the
correct “child’s best interest” legal standard and did not abuse its
discretion in granting joint legal custody to the parents.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Domestic Violence Incident
On August 27, 2023, law enforcement arrested father and
charged him with inflicting corporal injury to, and false
imprisonment of, mother. According to the police report, mother
was about to leave the house with child when father put her in a
headlock, slammed her to the ground, and began assaulting her.
Law enforcement observed redness on mother’s neck, a scratch on
mother’s forearm, and a scratch on father’s face. Nine-month-old
child, who was present in a walker, was not harmed.
2
Two days later, the criminal court issued a pretrial
Criminal Protective Order (CPO) restraining father from certain
contact with mother.1 The CPO included a no-contact order and a
stay-away order from mother, her house, and her vehicle.
The CPO did not include child.
2. The Department’s Initial Investigation
Over the next two months, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (department)
investigated father’s domestic violence.2 Mother reported
additional information about the incident, including that father
had punched her in the face “a few times.” Father denied choking
and hitting mother, claiming his conduct was more of a “bear
hug,” but acknowledged his desire to learn from this incident.
Mother told the department this was the first time one of
their arguments had led to physical violence. She and father had
been together for two years. Father had helped her stay sober,
supported her financially, and was “a good person and a good
1 The CPO was a pretrial order issued in the criminal court
pending resolution of those proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 136.2,
subd. (a).) The form states the “order remains in effect until
further court order” and courts “must” use another specified court
form to terminate the order; the form also states the order is only
“valid as long as the court has jurisdiction over the case” and
courts “should” use the specified form to terminate it. The record
does not contain a termination order.
The CPO differs from an earlier Emergency Protective
Order restraining father from both mother and child. That order
expired on September 1, 2023, five days after father’s arrest.
2 Both the father and the department are respondents in this
appeal; each filed a respondent’s brief.
3
father.” Although they were now separated, mother allowed
father to visit child at her home during the day while she was at
work. Father coordinated visitation with child’s maternal
grandmother, who also monitored the visits. Mother had “no
concerns” about father’s visitation with child but pointed out that
maternal grandmother was always present. The social worker
reported that mother’s sister said that “she had no concerns for
mother or father or the children in their care.”
Father advised the department that the CPO remained in
place until his upcoming criminal court hearing in October.
Mother told the department she was unaware of the CPO’s
existence until the social worker mentioned it to her. The record
does not tell us the exact disposition of the criminal case, but by
August 23, 2023, father had been released on probation.
The department examined mother’s and father’s criminal
history during approximately the past 10 years, as well as
mother’s prior referral from the department. Mother had four
convictions, the most serious of which were drug-related, and had
been arrested several times. Father also had several arrests, two
of which resulted in convictions, one for misdemeanor assault
with a deadly weapon (not a firearm) and the other for driving
under the influence.
In 2013, mother was a party to separate dependency
proceedings in which her family reunification services pertaining
to child’s half-sibling were terminated because mother had
stopped complying with her court-ordered programs. Father had
no prior cases from the department.
In its written report to the court, the social worker opined
that father had “not taken accountability for his actions,”
was minimally cooperative with the department, and repeatedly
4
violated the CPO by visiting child at mother’s home.
The department requested that child be removed from father and
released to mother.
3. The Dependency Petition
On October 27, 2023, the department filed a dependency
petition alleging two counts: substantial risk of serious physical
harm and failure to protect child.3 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300,
subds. (a) & (b).) The petition alleged mother and father had
“a history of engaging in violent physical altercations in the
presence of the children,” and referred to the August domestic
violence, father’s noncompliance with the CPO by visiting child at
mother’s home, and mother’s prior case by the department.
4. Initial Hearing
At the initial hearing on November 13, 2023, the juvenile
court removed the child from father and released child to mother.
The court ordered monitored visitation for father at a neutral
location. Mother and father “remain[ed] the holder of
Educational and/or Developmental rights for the minor child.”
5. The Department’s Continued Investigation
During the next two months, the department interviewed
mother and father and observed child’s behavior and
development during home visits. The department reported that
mother and father had been separated since the dependency case
opened.
In a report dated December 18, 2023, the department
stated that mother had told the department again that the
August altercation was the first time an argument had turned
3 A third count against only mother alleged failure to protect
child’s half-sibling but was later dismissed. We discuss it no
further.
5
physical between her and father. She had also repeated she had
no safety concerns for child with father. The report stated that
“mother did not follow through with obtaining a permanent
Restraining Order as previously advised.”
Despite parents’ separation, mother preferred to co-parent
with father. Mother stated that father and child have “a bonded
relationship,” father is “very involved” in child’s life, father visits
child weekly, and he also provides financial support. Maternal
grandmother monitored father’s visits with child, which occurred
Tuesdays through Saturdays for five hours.
Father told the department this was the first physical
altercation between them but continued to deny putting mother
in a headlock. Father voiced his intention to complete his
domestic violence classes, acknowledged he made a mistake, and
believed “those classes would help me understand better” so child
would not grow up in the foster care system like father had.
Father had not enrolled in domestic violence classes as of
December 2023. Father said there were no restraining orders
between him and mother. The department reported father was
employed, he visited child weekly, and the department had no
safety concerns with those visits.
The department believed father minimized the domestic
violence incident, which was of particular concern because of
father’s criminal history. The department continued to
recommend that child be declared a dependent of the court; child
to reside with mother; mother to receive family maintenance
services; and father to receive family enhancement services and
monitored visitation.
6. The Adjudication Hearing
6
On January 10, 2024, the court adjudicated the dependency
petition. Mother and the department reached a settlement by
which mother would be ordered to attend a program for domestic
violence victims, and the court would find mother a nonoffending
party and strike from the petition the allegations against mother.
There remained the two counts involving father.
Father argued that the substantial risk of physical harm
count should be dismissed because the petition alleged only a
single incident and the child was not in any danger. He also
asked that he be allowed to attend a 26-week domestic violence
program rather than one of 52 weeks.
The department objected to the reduced program but
conceded it had found no evidence “of ongoing physical violence
between these two parents.” It nevertheless asked the court to
sustain both counts given child’s presence at the incident and
father’s violation of the CPO by visiting the child in mother’s
home.
The court sustained both counts against father, ordered
him to complete a 26-week domestic violence program, parenting
and individual counseling, and to submit to drug testing on
reasonable suspicion. The court granted father a minimum of
nine hours visitation per week, monitored by maternal
grandmother. Mother was not to be present during visitation.
The court then scheduled a further hearing for July 10, 2024.
7. The Department’s Final Report
Prior to the July 10, 2024, hearing, the department
submitted updated information about the parents’ conduct over
the previous six months. Mother maintained employment,
cooperated with the department, and complied with her court-
ordered case plan. Mother provided a certificate of completion
7
and progress letter for her required program. Mother was
engaged with child and advocated for his needs; child was
“growing in an age appropriate manner.”
The department’s report stated that father, on the other
hand, had not made himself available. Father was noncompliant
with all three court-ordered enhancement services: domestic
violence support group, parenting program, and individual
counseling.
As for visitation, mother had reported that maternal
grandmother monitored weekly visits between father and child at
a park, which went well. Maternal grandmother said father was
engaged during the visits and child seemed happy.
The department recommended that the juvenile court
terminate jurisdiction and enter a family law “exit order”
granting mother sole physical custody, mother and father joint
legal custody, and monitored visitation for father.
8. Final Jurisdictional Review Hearing
At the July 10, 2024, final hearing, the court admitted the
department’s report. No party objected to terminating
dependency jurisdiction, and the hearing proceeded to argument
on custody and visitation issues.
Father, child, and county counsel agreed with the
department’s recommendations, including for joint legal custody.
Mother opposed the recommendation. Her counsel argued for
sole legal custody for mother and told the court that she did not
believe “these parents are going to be able to co-parent together,
especially since the department is not even recommending that
mother be allowed to monitor father’s visits. So I don’t know how
they would make joint decision-making about the child.” The
court then asked whether a restraining order was in place,
8
mother’s counsel stated she “would have to check,” to which the
court responded, “I don’t think so.”4
Father’s counsel submitted on the department’s
recommendation, stating “[t]he visits, as far as I know, have all
gone well. And what wasn’t included in the latest report – father
just provided me with – he’s already completed 23 of the 26-week
domestic violence batterers program. He’ll be done with it very
shortly.” The court responded that a visitation order should be
included with the custody order, asked what else father was
ordered to do, and stated that all court-ordered programs “should
be included on the [visitation order] so you can go to family law
court and ask to have the visitation or the [juvenile custody
order] modified.”5
The court found department supervision of child no longer
necessary, terminated dependency jurisdiction, granted mother
sole physical custody, granted joint legal custody to mother and
father over mother’s objection, and stated “it’s very important
4 By using the phrase “restraining order,” we understand
that the court was referring to the CPO, not the already expired
emergency protective order discussed ante.
5 It is unclear whether the court credited counsel’s hearsay
statements regarding father’s progress in the domestic violence
program. Mother did not object or refute the representation.
The minute order for the July 10, 2024, hearing states, in part:
“Parents are in compliance with case plan.” In contrast, the
court’s Parentage-Findings and Judgment, filed the same day,
included as part of its “visitation order” two boxes checked with
an “x” indicating father “has not completed” and “has not made
substantial progress in the . . . court-ordered programs.”
We consider father’s case plan participation in the Discussion
section, post.
9
that parents find a way of co-parenting together peacefully and
putting the child first, and that father remain a part of this
child’s life and the decision-making of the child’s educational,
medical, and mental health needs.” The court ordered a
minimum of nine hours monitored supervision for father.
Father’s visitation was not to be in mother’s home, and mother
was not to be the monitor.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We find no error in the court’s joint legal custody order.
Mother proffered no evidence that she and father would be
unable to “share the right and the responsibility to make the
decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare” of child
(Fam. Code, § 3003), or that joint custody would not be in the
child’s best interests for any other reason. The evidence was
essentially uncontradicted that father maintained consistent
visitation with child, had bonded well with child, and provided
financial support to mother. Mother had previously expressed a
desire to co-parent with father and considered him a “good
person.” Contrary unsupported legal arguments and innuendos
made on appeal are not evidence. As we discuss below, we also
find mother’s other arguments unpersuasive and conclude the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the
parents joint legal custody.
I. Legal Standard
When a juvenile court terminates dependency jurisdiction
over a child, it may also issue “an order determining the custody
of, or visitation with, the child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4,
subd. (a).) This is typically referred to as an “exit order.”
(See Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1156-1158.)
10
Custody has two components: physical and legal.
Physical custody means the child resides with and is under the
supervision of one or both parents. (Fam. Code, §§ 3004 [joint
physical], 3007 [sole physical].) Legal custody refers to whether
one parent holds, or both share, the decision-making authority
“relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.”
(Fam. Code, § 3003) [joint legal], 3006 [sole legal].) Here, no
party contests that part of the juvenile court’s order giving
mother sole physical custody. Given this limited challenge to the
exit orders, we address only joint legal custody.
“When making a custody determination under section
362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must always
be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 503, 513, quoting In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 251, 268.) “Because juvenile dependency
proceedings arise when children are subject to or at risk of abuse
or neglect, ‘[t]he presumption of parental fitness that underlies
custody law in the family court just does not apply. . . . Rather
the juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the
protection of the child, is best situated to make custody
determinations based on the best interests of the child without
any preferences or presumptions.’ ” (In re J.M. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 95, 112, quoting In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 704, 712.) With these formative principles in mind,
the juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody and
visitation orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency
case. (In re J.M., at pp. 112–113.)
We review the juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of
that discretion. (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.)
Abuse of discretion occurs “if there is no reasonable basis on
11
which [the court] could conclude that its decision advanced the
best interests of the child” or the court “applies improper criteria
or makes incorrect legal assumptions.” (In re Marriage of Fajota
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497, italics omitted.) “ ‘ “ ‘The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ” ’ ”
(In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094, quoting In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
II. The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Awarding Joint Legal Custody
In the face of the substantial evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s ruling, mother presents three arguments on
appeal, none of which convinces us that the juvenile court abused
its discretion.
A. The presumption argument.
Mother first claims that the court, instead of putting the
evidence in support of sole custody on equal footing with the
evidence favoring joint custody, improperly applied a
presumption in favor of joint custody and ruled accordingly.
We agree with mother that joint custody is not the
preferred or presumed form of custody. We have earlier stated
this rule: “ ‘[T]he juvenile court, which has been intimately
involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make
custody determinations based on the best interests of the child
without any preferences or presumptions.’ ” (In re J.M., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.)
Mother argues on appeal that the court ignored this
principle and followed a supposed presumption. “The court
12
mistakenly seemed to rely on a general presumption favoring the
benefits of joint custody, without adequately considering the
specific, documented circumstances of this family.”
Nothing the court said during the July 10, 2024, hearing at
which the court terminated jurisdiction and issued its exit orders
remotely suggests the court was relying on any presumption of
joint legal custody. The court voiced neither a “presumption” nor
a “preference”; nor did it speak other words that might have
suggested the court was implicitly applying a presumption of
joint custody. The court’s entire statement on the subject was:
“The court’s order terminating jurisdiction is stayed pending
receipt of the family law order that will be prepared by [mother’s
counsel] and submitted on – giving mother sole physical, joint
legal. . . . It’s very important that parents find[ ] a way of co-
parenting together peacefully and putting the child first, and that
father remain a part of this child’s life and the decision-making of
the child’s educational, medical, and mental health needs.”
We find that nothing in the record supports mother’s
argument that the court presumed joint legal custody was in the
child’s best interest rather than assessed the child’s interest
based on all the evidence before it.
B. The case plan argument.
Mother argues the court abused its discretion in awarding
joint legal custody because father had not completed his case
plan. The court had ordered that father complete 26 weeks of
domestic violence training plus parenting and individual
counseling.
Mother’s argument fails because, among other things, the
record does not support her position. As the appellant, mother
has the burden of providing a record sufficient to carry her
13
contentions on appeal. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct, and the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate
court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608–609.)
The record shows that father was ordered to complete a 26-
week domestic violence program and other counselling. Whether
he completed any or all of these programs is not so clear. Prior to
the July 10, 2024, termination hearing, the department had
submitted a report that father was noncompliant with his court-
ordered enhancement services. Nevertheless, the department
recommended that dependency proceedings be terminated with
mother awarded physical custody and both parents to share legal
custody.
No one testified at the hearing, and the only written
material submitted was the department’s report. While the
department’s report mentioned father’s noncompliance with the
case plan, the question of compliance came up in a most indirect
way at the hearing, if it was suggested at all.
The court heard briefly from all counsel – the hearing is
recorded in six pages of reporter’s transcript. The department
submitted on its previously filed recommendation. Next,
mother’s counsel voiced her opposition to joint legal custody.
In her short statement to the court, she said nothing about any
noncompliance with the case plan. Her complete argument was:
“I know the recommendation is for joint legal custody. However,
given the severe domestic violence allegations that were
sustained by this court, I’m asking for sole legal custody. I don’t
14
think, given the domestic violence history, that these parents are
going to be able to co-parent together, especially since the
department is not even recommending that mother be allowed to
monitor father’s visits. So I don’t know how they could make
joint decision-making about the child and – about the child
[M.B.].”
The court then inquired whether a protective order was in
effect, to which mother’s counsel said, “I would have to check,”
and the court replied, “I don’t think so.”
Next, father’s counsel addressed the court. He submitted
on the department’s report and then said, “The visits, as far as I
know, have all gone well and what wasn’t included in the latest
report – father just provided me with – he’s already completed 23
of the 26-week domestic violence batterers program. He’ll be
done with it very shortly.”
Mother’s counsel said nothing in response to the remarks
by father’s counsel. She made no evidentiary objection to
counsel’s statement or challenged the information in any way.
The court said nothing in response to this exchange except that
she was reminded that the case plan information would have to
be included in form JV-206, which was eventually attached to the
final judgment.
Although nothing was said about father’s compliance with
the case plan during the July 10, 2024, hearing, the minute order
of that hearing did, specifically: “Court finds notice proper.
Parents are in compliance with case plan.” However, the final
judgment signed by the court three weeks later, contains two
checked boxes that state that father “has not completed his case
plan” and “has not made substantial progress in his case plan.”
At best, the record is unclear whether the court made
findings on the issue and whether it took into account the
15
statement by father’s counsel that father had completed 23
sessions of his 26-week domestic violence program. To the extent
mother now claims the court erred in considering partial
completion of the plan because the information on father’s
participation lacked foundation or on other evidentiary grounds,
she has waived that argument by failing to object in the trial
court. (Armando D. v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
1011, 1024 [father’s evidentiary objections waived because not
raised in trial court].)
Mother’s argument fails for another reason. Completion of
a case plan is not the sine qua non for an award of joint legal
custody to a noncompliant parent. Mother has cited no authority
for this position, and we observe that such a rule would be
inconsistent with the wide latitude afforded the juvenile court in
fashioning exit orders. (See In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 112.) Mother essentially asks us to “penalize” father for his
failure to comply with his case plan. We decline to do so.
Juvenile court orders “must . . . not reward or punish one parent
or another for failing to comply with the case plan.” (In re N.M.,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [reversing an award of sole
physical custody when appellant nonoffending parent had not
completed his case plan].)6
Rather than applying mother’s proposed “no plan, no legal
custody” rule, we find the record shows that the juvenile court
was mindful of the important parenting choices concerning child’s
“health, education, and welfare” (Fam. Code, § 3003) that would
6 The trial court in issuing the order that the appellate court
reversed in In re N.M was explicit: “ ‘It’s not appropriate to
reward a parent who does nothing in this court, so I’m not going
to make it joint legal.’ ” (In re N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1095.)
16
have to be made continuously as child aged. And that father’s
role would be important. So far, father had regularly visited with
child. Neither mother nor the department objected to visitation,
and the maternal grandmother consistently described the visits
positively. Father had bonded with child. Mother had no safety
concerns about father spending time with child, and described
father as “very involved” in child’s life. At times, she even
expressed to the department a desire to co-parent with father.
The trial court could have reasonably found on this record
that father’s participation with mother in decisions affecting the
health, education and welfare of the child was in child’s best
interests.
We find no abuse of discretion
C. The protective order argument.
In her opening brief, mother argues: “Further inquiry was
necessary concerning the father’s violation of criminal protective
order.” In her reply brief to the department, she summarized her
argument this way: “The court’s failure to investigate or make a
definitive finding [about the protective order against father]
undermined the legal and factual basis for its custody
determination.” Her authority: “California Rule of Court
5.445(b)(1)(B) encourages courts ‘hearing cases involving child
custody and visitation to take every action practicable to ensure
that they are aware of the existence of any criminal court
protective orders involving the parties to the action currently
before them.’ ”7 She does not explain how “encourages” makes
7 The subdivision states: “(b) Purpose (1) This rule is intended
to: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Encourage courts hearing cases involving child
custody and visitation to take every action practicable to ensure
that they are aware of the existence of any criminal court
17
this rule mandatory or that the failure to follow it constitutes
reversible error.
In her reply brief to father, though, she goes one step
further and misrepresents what her authority purportedly says:
“Juvenile courts must determine the existence of any active
protective orders before issuing custody orders. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.445(b)(1)(B).” We have quoted the rule in the
margin. It says no such thing. The rule does not establish
grounds for reversible error; it is an exhortation that various
departments of a superior court work together to ensure that all
courts have access to any protective order relevant to impending
custody and visitation orders.8
protective orders involving the parties to the action currently
before them.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.445(b)(1)(B).)
8 In addition to encouraging communication among courts,
Rule 5.445 directs superior courts to adopt local rules
establishing “[a] procedure requiring courts issuing any orders
involving child custody or visitation to make reasonable efforts to
determine whether there exists a criminal court protective order
that involves any party to the action.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.445(c)(1)(A).) The Los Angeles Superior Court has adopted
such a local rule. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 2.30,
former rule 8.34.) That rule states that “[b]efore issuing . . . a
custody or visitation order, the judicial officer should inquire of
the parties and the attorneys whether the court has any cases in
which there are criminal or civil protective orders . . . that involve
the child of the parties in the current case.” (Id., rule 2.30(b)(1).)
Mother does not cite Local Rule 2.30, but in any event, the
rule does not create grounds for reversible error. The record also
shows that there were inquiries about the protective order. In
December 2023, father told the department that “there are no
restraining orders in effect,” and, as discussed in the text, mother
18
Beyond the misrepresentation of the court rule, mother’s
argument reveals fundamental misperceptions about the role of
the court and counsel in trial proceedings and of the appellate
process. It is uncontested that at one time the criminal court had
issued a CPO against father and for the benefit of mother. It
included no-contact and stay-away orders protecting mother, her
house, and her vehicle. The order did not include child. The CPO
itself was part of the dependency court record. There appears
some inconsistency on how the order terminates. In one place,
the CPO states both that the “order remains in effect until
further court order” and that courts “must” use another specified
court form to terminate the order. Three pages later it states
that pretrial orders (like the CPO here) are only “valid as long as
the court has jurisdiction over the case.” Mother did not furnish
a record of father’s probation terms and conditions or information
about whether he was still on probation. Nor did she provide any
other documents from the criminal court file that could have had
a bearing on the status of the CPO at the time of the final
juvenile court hearing. According to the department, despite its
urging, mother did not seek a permanent restraining order
earlier in the case.
and the court had a brief exchange on the subject at the July 10,
2024, hearing. Mother did not ask to continue that hearing so
she could review the criminal court file or provide the dependency
court with any additional available information.
19
Mother also made no argument at the final jurisdiction
hearing that the court’s decision on joint custody should be
influenced by whether the CPO was or was not in effect. The
court and counsel had a brief exchange about whether father was
still bound by the CPO, but not about the significance of a finding
on that question on any award of legal custody. Mother’s counsel
made no mention of the CPO whatsoever until the court asked
whether father was still subject to the order. Mother’s counsel
said she was unsure. The court stated, “I don’t think so,” and
that was it. Mother did not argue that the prior issuance of a
protective order supported her argument against joint custody.
She did not ask for the court’s assistance in determining whether
father was still subject to the CPO. Nor did she ask the court to
make a finding about the protective order. She has thus waived
her argument. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-
222.)
The juvenile court committed no error concerning the
existence or nonexistence of the protective order or any impact
the order might have had on the award of joint legal custody.9
9 To the extent mother argues separately that circumstances
that led to dependency jurisdiction had not sufficiently abated to
terminate jurisdiction, that argument is waived. (In re Dakota
H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222; In re Daniel M. (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 703, 707, fn. 4 [issues not raised in opening brief
waived].) Mother did not object below to terminating dependency
jurisdiction and waited until her reply briefs to mention the
statutory presumption that failure to comply with a case plan
establishes a prima facie case that jurisdiction should not
terminate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 364,
subdivision (c).
20
DISPOSITION
The order awarding joint legal custody to mother and
father is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.*
We Concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
21
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