People v. Shipp CA2/1

CourtListener 10739909Calctapp20 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/20/25 P. v. Shipp CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340226

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A020300)
v.

JERALD SHIPP,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal; Jerald Shipp, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Jerald Shipp appeals from an order denying his petition for
resentencing (Pen. Code,1 § 1172.6) after an evidentiary hearing.
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it “raise[s]
no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1.)

BACKGROUND
A. Guilty Plea
On October 23, 1979, Jerald Shipp waived his
constitutional rights and pleaded guilty to one count of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). He also admitted
that he committed the murder during the commission and
attempted commission of the crime of robbery (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)) and that he used a handgun (§ 12022.5). During the plea
hearing, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor
and Shipp:
“[The prosecutor]: Is it true, Mr. Shipp, that on the 2nd
day of August of 1979, you entered the King Arthur Steak House
located in Long Beach, that you were armed with a handgun, that
your intent on entering was to rob the people inside, that once
inside you began to rob some of the people when the man by the
name of Carl Duggins refused to give up his property, and that
you and one of your confederates then shot this man because he
was resisting. [¶] Is all that true?
“[Shipp]: Yes.”
The court sentenced Shipp to life without the possibility of
parole.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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B. Petition for Resentencing
Thirty-nine years after Shipp’s guilty plea, in 2018, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “to amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1(f), p. 6674; §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Senate
Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188 (defining malice) and 189
(felony murder) and added former section 1170.95, now
renumbered section 1172.6, which established a procedure for
vacating murder convictions and resentencing defendants who
could no longer be convicted of murder in light of the
amendments to sections 188 and 189 made effective January 1,
2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, pp. 6675–6677.)
On March 4, 2019, Shipp filed a petition for resentencing.2
After appointing counsel for Shipp and receiving briefing from
the parties, the trial court ordered the prosecution to show cause
why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted.
The trial court denied the petition for resentencing after an
evidentiary hearing held on August 13 and 14, 2024, at which
Shipp was represented by counsel. The court found the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Shipp was

2 Shipp filed his petition under the original version of

former section 1170.95, effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4.) Since that time, the Legislature amended the
statute (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) and then renumbered it as
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

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guilty of murder under current law (after the amendments to
sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019). The court relied
on the transcript from the plea hearing, finding Shipp admitted
he was “the shooter.” The court also found, “At a minimum, he
was an aider and abettor.” Direct aiding and abetting remains a
valid theory of murder under current law. (People v. Offley (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595-596.)

C. The Present Appeal
Shipp filed a timely notice of appeal from the August 14,
2024 order denying his section 1172.6 petition, and we appointed
counsel for him. Counsel filed an opening appellate brief raising
no issues and requesting that we follow the procedures outlined
in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. We sent Shipp the
requisite notice of his right to file a supplemental brief (see id. at
pp. 231-232), and he did so. Under Delgadillo, we are “required
to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to
issue a written opinion.” (Id. at p. 232.) “The filing of a
supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent
review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Ibid.)
However, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to
conduct “its own independent review of the record in any
individual section 1172.6 appeal.” (Ibid.) Shipp’s appellate
counsel requests that this court “exercise its discretion to conduct
an independent review of the record, as permitted by Delgadillo.”
In evaluating the arguments raised in Shipp’s supplemental
brief, we reviewed the entire record on appeal, and we have
determined there is no arguable issue for appointed appellate
counsel to brief.

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DISCUSSION
In his supplemental brief, Shipp contends, “The evidence
that was used at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] is ineligible for
resentencing.”
Shipp bases this contention, in part, on a misreading of the
record. He argues the court erred in relying on documents that
were not part of his record of conviction, but rather, documents
from his accomplice’s case. We need not decide whether this
would have been error because the record shows the court relied
on the transcript from Shipp’s plea hearing, and did not rely on
documents from the accomplice’s case, in concluding the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt Shipp was guilty
of murder under current law.3
Shipp also argues his plea does not support the trial court’s
findings that “he was the shooter” and “at a minimum, he was an
aider and abettor” of the murder. He ignores that he admitted at
his plea hearing that the following facts were true: he and one of
his “confederates” shot the victim because the victim refused to
hand over property during the robbery.
In reviewing the denial of a petition for resentencing after
an evidentiary hearing, “We review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. . . . We will not reverse unless
there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence
exists to support the trial court’s decision. [Citation.] We must

3 Initially, the prosecution sought to use documents from

the accomplice’s case to prove Shipp’s guilt. At the evidentiary
hearing, however, the prosecution made clear it was no longer
relying on those documents and would rely instead on the
admissions Shipp made at his plea hearing.

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‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) Shipp’s admissions
constitute substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding
that he aided and abetted the murder (to the extent he was not
the actual killer). He admitted that he and his accomplice shot
the victim because the victim was resisting the robbery. We have
no cause to disturb the finding that Shipp acted with the
requisite malice when he shot the victim.
Shipp’s final contention is that in 1979, he was not
sentenced in accordance with the negotiated plea deal. This
contention is not cognizable in this appeal from the August 14,
2024 order denying his petition for resentencing, and we
therefore do not address it further.

DISPOSITION
The August 14, 2024 order denying Shipp’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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