In re L.M. CA4/3

CourtListener 10738024Calctapp18 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/18/25 In re L.M. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re L.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. G065467

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL (Super. Ct. No. 17DP1327B)
SERVICES AGENCY,
OPINION
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
June Jee An, Judge. Affirmed.
Suzanne Davidson, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Aurelio Torre,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
S.M. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s finding at the 18-month
review hearing that he was provided reasonable reunification services with
respect to his then 15-year-old daughter, L.M. Specifically, Father contends
the Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) failed to provide in-
person conjoint counseling with L.M. and liberalize his visits with her. At the
same hearing, the juvenile court ordered L.M. returned to the custody of her
mother, N.C., denied Father’s request for custody, terminated Father’s
reunification services, and scheduled a family maintenance hearing pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 364.1 Father does not challenge
these rulings, however.2 He challenges only the court’s finding that he was
provided reasonable reunification services.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of
reasonable reunification services and affirm.

1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
Although Father’s notice of appeal states he is appealing the
denial of custody to him, he does not address that issue in his appellate
briefing. He also does not contest either the court’s award of custody to N.C.
or the order terminating his reunification services. We therefore consider any
challenge by Father to these aspects of the court’s order waived. (In re Sade
C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [order challenged on appeal is presumed correct
so appellant must raise claims of error and “‘present argument and authority
on each point made’”]; Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
1336, 1345–1346, fn. 6 [“[A]n appellant’s failure to raise an issue in its
opening brief waives it on appeal”].)

2
3
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
BACKGROUND
Father and N.C. were together for 17 years, until approximately
2015 or early 2016. L.M. is one of their five children.
Father and N.C.’s involvement in juvenile dependency
proceedings dates back to 2017, when N.C. left all five children alone
overnight in a motel room and they became dependents of the court. In 2019
and 2021, two other panels of this court issued decisions detailing the
extensive history of issues involving Father and N.C., including criminal
allegations against Father of stalking and making criminal threats; both
parents’ incarceration, as well as mental health and substance abuse issues;
and domestic violence.4 As of February 2023, when the children were removed
in the current proceedings, Father had full custody of them.

3
The following summary is limited to certain background
information and facts relevant to the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable
reunification services as to Father and L.M. made at the 18-month review
hearing. Our recent unpublished decision in the related child welfare
proceedings involving certain of L.M.’s siblings contains more detailed facts
relating to the proceedings. (See S.M. et al. v. Superior Court (Sept. 11, 2025,
G065442) [nonpub. opn.].)

4
See In re T.M. (Feb. 15, 2019, G056588) [nonpub. opn.]
[rejecting Father’s appeal of order denying him visitation during pendency of
juvenile dependency proceeding]; In re T.M. (Oct. 4, 2021, G060012) [nonpub.
opn.] [affirming termination of dependency proceeding with exit orders
granting full legal and physical custody of children to Father and granting
monitored visitation to N.C.].

3
II.
REMOVAL, DETENTION, AND PETITION
In February 2023, the Agency received a report Father and his
live-in girlfriend were involved in a dispute resulting in domestic violence
while the children were home; the children heard but did not witness the
incident. During the Agency’s initial investigation, the children reported an
incident involving Father and L.M.’s older sister, M.M., who was then 16
years old, that took place in the presence of the other children. M.M. reported
Father became upset and stated he did not want her in the home and called
her a “‘disrespectful whore.’” Father also called her a “‘slut’” and told her to
go “‘suck a dick, like your mother.’” Father then crushed a cup M.M. was
holding against her chest and pushed her against the wall. Father also
“smash[ed]” M.M.’s face before she called the police.
Father reportedly told L.M. when a “‘bitch gets out of line’” he
feels like beating them. The Agency also learned Father had been failing to
provide for the children’s basic needs, had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, was not taking his medication, and had progressively worsened
throughout the years to the point where he was not fit to care for the
children.
On February 18, 2023, the Agency obtained a protective custody
warrant to remove the children from Father’s care. The Agency filed a
petition on February 22, 2023, alleging L.M. came within section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c) and (j), and later amended the petition. The
juvenile court ordered the children detained from Father on February 23,

4
2023,5 and released the children to N.C. Less than three weeks later,
however, N.C. tested positive for narcotics, and L.M. and her siblings were
removed from her care and placed in out-of-home care.

III.
JURISDICTION AND DISPOSITION
On May 2, 2023, the juvenile court found the allegations of the
operative amended petition true, bringing the children within the definitions
of section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j). The court found vesting
custody with Father and N.C. would be detrimental to the children and
vesting custody with the Agency was necessary to serve their best interest.
Father and N.C. were offered family reunification services.
IV.
INITIAL REUNIFICATION PERIOD AND
COMBINED SIX/12 MONTH REVIEW HEARING
After the May 2023 disposition, L.M. expressed some trepidation
about visiting with Father due to his past verbal abuse. Although she was
willing to attend supervised visits, L.M. stated she might feel awkward
seeing Father again and was afraid she might start crying.
An early July visit went well according to L.M., although just
days earlier Father had stated to the Agency he would “‘not be part of [the
children’s] life if they have contact with their mother. I don’t want to be
around a bunch of liars that hang out with a whore.’” In late August, Father
gave L.M. a letter apologizing for his actions, and the two began to exchange
text communications. By early September, however, Father had sent multiple
inappropriate messages to L.M., ranging from pictures of his scantily-clad

5
Father was found to be the presumed father of L.M. and the
other minor children.

5
girlfriend to disparaging remarks and accusations about N.C. Father
subsequently messaged the Agency that L.M. was blackmailing and
threatening him. Father’s obsessive barrages of inappropriate messages to
L.M. included telling her to go “smoke weed” and “sell her [private part] for
money.” Although Father continued to participate in individual counseling
and drug testing, his angry and unpredictable outbursts and communications
remained of concern to the Agency.
By late 2023 and early 2024, Father had completed individual
counseling, continued to submit negative drug testing results, and was
attending 12-step meetings. L.M. stated in late 2023 she was enjoying visits
with Father. By late December 2023, however, Father was denying that he
bore any responsibility for the existence of the child welfare case and sending
strings of inappropriate messages to L.M. that alternated between
statements of affection for L.M. and insults to N.C.
By mid-January 2024, L.M. no longer wanted to visit with
Father, complaining the visitation monitors did not intervene when he made
inappropriate comments. L.M. blocked Father’s number to stop his excessive,
venting text messages. As of early April, L.M. noted she was not visiting
Father as frequently because of her chiropractor appointments, wrestling
team commitments, and visits with N.C., which together consumed much of
the week. L.M. also noted Father continued to send her numerous messages
and links and described Father as “‘smothering’” her. L.M. reported she did
not care to have a relationship with Father, but attended visits solely to see
her younger sister.6

6
We presume L.M. was referring to being able to see her younger
sister at joint visits with Father because they did not share the same mother.

6
By early May 2024, L.M. noted she was visiting Father more
frequently because he was making fewer comments to her about the case,
because her continued relationship with her younger sister was important to
her, and because of the things Father bought her. But L.M. began declining
visits with Father again after receiving additional excessive text messages
from him in which he would discuss details of the case in a bizarre manner.
L.M. was addressing her relationship with Father in therapy and using what
she has learned to inform her level of contact with him.
The combined six- and 12-month review hearing took place on
May 14, 2024, during which Father stipulated—and the juvenile court
found—reasonable services had been provided up to that point and services
would continue to the 18-month review hearing. As part of those services, the
Agency was ordered to refer L.M. to in-person conjoint counseling with
Father.
V.
FINAL REUNIFICATION PERIOD LEADING UP TO 18-MONTH REVIEW HEARING
In late May 2024, the senior social worker assigned to the case
inquired directly of several therapy providers about providing conjoint
counseling for Father and L.M. Both providers responded they had limited or
no availability. Soon thereafter, the social worker submitted the referral to
the Agency’s counseling services inbox for processing. In early August, the
social worker followed up on the status of the referral, and one week later the
referral was assigned to a specific service provider. The Agency provided the
information regarding the service provider to Father and instructed him to
begin the intake process as soon as possible. Meanwhile, having previously
completed parenting education and individual counseling referrals, Father
continued to submit negative drug test results and attend 12-step meetings.

7
Father also continued to complain to the Agency about the purportedly
unjust allegations against him.
In July 2024, L.M.’s therapist reported to the social worker that
L.M.’s diagnosis is posttraumatic stress disorder. The therapist further
reported L.M. had said Father was manipulative and controlling and she
would run away or even kill herself if she were forced to reunify with him. In
early July 2024, L.M. sent the social worker a letter discussing Father’s daily
verbal abuse prior to her removal, her comfort in foster care, and her
realization that she was “not the gay freak [m]y dad told me I was the day I
was taken from his home.” Later that month, L.M. reported she had again
blocked her Father’s phone number because she did not want to be insulted
by him and complained he was trying to “‘reel’” the children in through gifts
and manipulation.
In late August 2024, L.M. attended a visit with Father but
stressed she only did so because she was with her paternal grandmother and
older sister and wanted to see her younger sister, who also was visiting with
Father. L.M. further stated Father had suggested to her he might harm
himself, but she did not believe he was actually suicidal; she believed he only
said that to make her feel guilty. Meanwhile, Father continued to send
hundreds of text messages to the social worker referencing, among other
things, supposed conspiracies against him by one or more of his children and
N.C., and accusing the social worker of brainwashing his children. Later in
August 2024, the social worker received a termination report from the family
counseling referral indicating the referral had expired because the children
and caregivers never completed the intake process.

8
On September 30, 2024, at one of the case review hearings with
the court, Father’s counsel asked the court to order the Agency to evaluate
liberalizing Father’s visits with his children, including L.M. The Agency
responded it did not object to assessing for liberalization but opposed
immediate unsupervised contacts based on Father’s continued inappropriate
comments. The court ordered the Agency to assess liberalizing Father’s visits.
In early November, at Father’s request, the court ordered the Agency to
continue assessing whether to liberalize his visits.
After L.M. moved to a new foster home in October 2024, she
reported to the social worker that Father “‘still gets to be too much because
he’s mentally unstable.’” She also stated she did not need therapy with
Father because she can handle talking to him and she was too busy with
school, her own individual counseling, athletics, and her visitation schedule
with Father. In mid-November, Father stated his concern that L.M.’s sexual
orientation was an “‘unresolved psychological issue due to [N.C.’s] actions.’”
Meanwhile, L.M. continued to participate in individual therapy and also
received counseling at her school. Father was continuing to vent to L.M. by
text messages during this period, with L.M. reporting that some days were
“fine” and others were “bad.”
In early December 2024, after L.M. informed the court she would
agree to unsupervised visits for the holidays with Father, the court directed
the Agency again to conduct an assessment of unsupervised visits with
Father, noting “[s]he is old enough to let the Court know what she wants.
However, in all honesty, the Court doesn’t know regarding the safety
concerns on that . . . .” Just a few days later, however, L.M. told the social
worker she was feeling “‘iffy’” about unsupervised visits with Father, not out

9
of fear of Father, but because he was sometimes “‘all over the place’” and
continued to vent to her.
When the social worker explained to Father how his combative,
accusatory, off-topic, and aggressive communication style might suggest he is
unable to manage his adjustment disorder symptoms, he blamed the Agency
for his communication styling, calling social services “‘dirtbags.’” He asked
the social worker if he should just “‘lick a social workers balls’” to get
liberalized visits. When the social worker suggested Father find more
appropriate ways to cope with his frustrations than venting to L.M. and the
social workers and caregivers, he replied that the “‘fact that I go off on people
is part of the script,’” insisted he is a “‘genius producer,’” and said he was
making a movie about his experience.
In early 2025, Father continued to complain about how long the
case was taking, the direction it was going, and purported abuse directed at
him by N.C. Father claimed L.M. was lying about him texting her and
venting to her. L.M. still felt unsure about unmonitored contacts with Father
and how her mental health would be affected if Father could say whatever he
wanted to her.
In mid-February 2025, Father complained to the social worker
that L.M. was being coached by N.C. and had been brainwashed. He also said
L.M. was manipulating the social worker so she can be returned to N.C.
Father followed that conversation with 12 text messages to the social worker,
which included information about his girlfriend’s net worth and a picture of
the girlfriend in a showgirl outfit. Around this time, L.M. was also receiving
“‘bizarre’” messages from Father about his investments and businesses. L.M.
reported Father was “‘worse than normal’” and that he had been venting in
text messages to her after she had provided testimony to the court.

10
As of March 2025, Father continued his rants to the Agency. The
social worker noted: “[Father] continues to exhibit patterns of inappropriate
communication with the youth, [L.M.], in ways she perceives as
manipulative. The father utilizes his currently unmonitored communication
with the youth as a method to further his own interests. The father also
continues his pattern of blaming the child welfare case on others, through
bizarre e-mail communication with the assigned social worker. . . . The Social
Services Agency is concerned about the father’s presence at the children’s
activities, due to hostility he directs towards their foster parents, and
potential discomfort the children would be subjected to. These patterns
highlight minimal behavioral changes by the father, possible unresolved
anger management/mental health issues, and unwillingness to accept
responsibility for his actions remain. In consideration of remaining concerns,
the Social Services Agency is unable [sic] liberalize the father’s visitation
with the children at this time, as it would likely serve as an additional
opportunity for these unhealthy patterns to continue.”
VI.
FINAL REVIEW HEARING
The final review hearing began on January 21, 2025, and
concluded on April 21, 2025. The juvenile court received into evidence the
Agency’s reports and heard testimony from L.M., Father, and the social
worker, among others.
L.M. testified she never considered returning to Father’s care
and, although she had briefly considered overnight visits, she was “iffy” about
that prospect now. Living with Father had been “okay” for about two years
after she was released to his custody during their prior dependency
proceedings, but she felt scared after seeing him hit her siblings. L.M. stated

11
Father was helping her with some financial support and by being there for
her at her wrestling tournaments and supporting her when she cried. L.M.
loved Father and enjoyed their weekly visits. Although she had seen some
improvement in Father’s level of texting, she remained concerned about
Father’s venting during in-person visits.
L.M. explained she was unsure about overnight contacts for
multiple reasons: “some of it is trauma from the past, and some of it is a little
scared. Not of, like, physical harm, but, like, mental harm.” Father said
inappropriate things to her even when the visitation monitor was present.
L.M. was not physically afraid of Father and although he had said bad things
about L.M. in the past, he had not done so in a while. L.M. felt her
relationship with Father was about the same as it was at the beginning of the
case.
During Father’s testimony, he was asked whether any of his own
conduct had precipitated the case. In response, he gave a rambling answer
that did not acknowledge the sustained jurisdictional allegations. Father did
not believe he had sent inappropriate texts to L.M. and said his texting “pales
in comparison to what the courts have done to my family.” He believed his
visits with L.M. went well. Father acknowledged being informed he had
adjustment disorder and said he was doing well with respect to that
condition. He also noted he was open in his conversations and saw L.M. as an
adult. He loved her, but admitted their relationship was “[l]imited.” He
described L.M. as “very smart, somewhat manipulative.”
Father testified he asked for unsupervised visits every month. He
felt the social worker was “doing the best she can, given the circumstances.
Because this is probably one of the most toxic cases she’s probably ever held
on to.” He acknowledged the social worker was helping him but said there

12
was “an agenda here. . . . otherwise, you guys wouldn’t be paid, and I’m the
bad guy.” Father also denied ever being diagnosed as bipolar or currently
being required to take medication.
After Father’s testimony, L.M. read a letter to the court
regarding her preferences, detailing her desire to return to N.C.’s care and
expressing her deep connection to her mother.
The social worker also testified at the final review hearing. She
testified Father had been compliant with his case plan but was unable to
demonstrate what he had learned from those services. He continued to blame
others for the Agency’s involvement and was dismissive of the jurisdictional
allegations that resulted in the children being removed. The social worker
had concerns about Father’s mental health, specifically his unresolved anger
management and his lack of emotional regulation.
The social worker testified L.M. prioritized other activities, such
as chiropractic appointments and her wrestling team activities, over visits
with Father, and her primary motivation for visiting Father was to see her
younger sister (who also visited with Father at the same time). The social
worker explained she had not liberalized Father’s visitation “due to the
concern that he would use that unsupervised time to continue to
communicate in ways that are not appropriate with the children.” The social
worker had seen text exchanges between L.M. and Father in which the two
traded words of affection and L.M. told Father she loves him. The social
worker believed L.M. responded to Father’s messages because he is her dad
and “of course she wants to have some type of relationship” with him. But she
testified L.M. “continuously reports a lot of venting” from Father—so much,
in fact, that the venting “feels pretty normalized to [L.M.].”

13
On April 21, 2025, the juvenile court granted N.C.’s motion under
7
section 350, subdivision (c) with respect to L.M. The court ordered L.M.
returned to N.C.’s custody, continued the matter for a case plan review set for
early May 2025, and set a family maintenance review hearing for September
2025. The court found pursuant to section 366.22, subdivision (a) that return
of L.M. to N.C. would not create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of L.M. and her placement in
foster care is no longer necessary or appropriate. The court further found
reasonable services had been provided or offered to both parents. The court
ordered the immediate return of L.M. to N.C. as the permanent plan.
The court denied Father’s motion under section 350, subdivision
(c), as to all of the children, including L.M., and it terminated his
reunification services. In so doing, the court noted it maintained concerns
“about [F]ather’s possible mental health issues, and the ability to regulate his
outbursts and lashing out at others. [¶] Father has continued to present in an
erratic, compulsive and combative manner, as evidenced by his repeatedly
blaming and lashing out at others, sending excessive and duplicate e-mails
about non-case-related issues, and on his past and negative perspective on
the siblings—on the mother of his children.”

7
Section 350, subdivision (c), provides in pertinent part: “At any
hearing in which the probation department bears the burden of proof, after
the presentation of evidence . . . the court, on motion of the minor, parent, or
guardian, or on its own motion, shall order whatever action the law requires
of it if the court, upon weighing all of the evidence then before it, finds that
the burden of proof has not been met. That action includes, but is not limited
to, the dismissal of the petition and release of the minor at a jurisdictional
hearing, the return of the minor at an out-of-home review held prior to the
permanency planning hearing, or the termination of jurisdiction at an in-
home review.”

14
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPEALABILITY AND STANDING
The Agency contends Father’s appeal should be dismissed
because his notice of appeal is too narrow and does not encompass the specific
challenge he is making to the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable
reunification services were provided to him. Specifically, Father’s notice of
appeal states he is appealing the denial of custody to him on April 21, 2025,
and cites as appealable orders those issued on “1/21/2025, 2/3/25, 4/9/25,
4/16/25, 4/17/25, and 4/21/25.” We disagree with the Agency’s contention. The
notice of appeal specifically appeals from one of the enumerated orders—the
April 21, 2025 order—which included the court’s finding Father was provided
reasonable reunification services. The Agency is not prejudiced by Father’s
failure to specifically mention that finding in his notice of appeal. (In re
Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 [“‘[I]t is, and has been, the law of this
state that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the
right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to
appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled
or prejudiced’”].)
The Agency also contends Father lacks standing to appeal the
court’s finding of reasonable reunification services because L.M. was returned
to the custody of her mother and reunification services are no longer a goal of
the proceedings. We agree reunification is no longer a goal of the proceedings
because L.M. is now in the custody of one of her parents and no longer in

15
8
foster care. But Father is not challenging the court’s termination of
reunification services. He is appealing the finding he had been provided
reasonable reunification services as of the final review hearing. As both
parties seem to agree (and as courts have held), a finding that Father
received reasonable reunification services may affect any request Father may
make in the future to further attempt reunification with L.M. if she were to
be again removed from N.C.’s custody. (See In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
1048, 1061 [“Because a parent is aggrieved by an erroneous reasonable
services finding, the parent may obtain appellate review of the finding by
appealing the order in which it was made, even if the parent is not
challenging any other part of that order”]; In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
994, 1005 [“An erroneous reasonable services finding may have consequences
for the parent if the child is removed again from the other parent’s custody
during the dependency proceedings [citation] or if the parent is involved in a
future dependency proceeding”].)
We therefore consider Father’s challenge to the finding of
reasonable reunification services on the merits.

8
Where a child has been ordered returned to one parent after a
period in foster care, the court “may, but is not required to, continue services
for the noncustodial parent.” (In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644,
647; see In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 470, 475–478.) This is because
once a child is placed back with a parent, “the court is not concerned with
reunification, but with determining whether continued supervision is
necessary in the family home.” (In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th. at
p. 650.) Under those circumstances, the juvenile court has broad discretion to
determine whether any services need be provided in view of the child’s best
interests. (Id. at pp. 651–652.) For instance, “[a] court has discretion to
terminate services for one parent even when ordering services for the other
parent.” (Id. at p. 651.)

16
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT’S FINDING OF REASONABLE
REUNIFICATION SERVICES
At the 18-month review hearing, “[t]he court shall not order that
a hearing pursuant to [s]ection 366.26 be held unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to
the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(C)(iii).) “When reviewing
a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court
must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below
and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012.)
“The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness
of [the Agency’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each
case.” (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) “To
support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the
parent, ‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified the
problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy
those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the
course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents
in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . . ’” (In re A.G., supra, 12
Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) “The standard is not whether the services provided
were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were

17
reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
Father contends the court’s finding that he was provided
reasonable reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence
because the record shows the Agency failed to ensure he received in-person
conjoint counseling with L.M. and did not consider in good faith liberalizing
his visitation with her. Father argues conjoint counseling would have helped
his relationship with L.M., allowed him to demonstrate what he had learned
from services, assisted him with communication, and helped him regulate his
anger and emotions, all of which would have made it possible to liberalize his
visitation. Having reviewed the record, we reject Father’s contention that the
absence of in-person conjoint counseling with L.M. and the lack of
unsupervised visitation defeats the court’s finding of reasonable reunification
services.
The record shows the Agency took reasonable steps following the
12-month review hearing to reach out to service providers and arrange in-
person conjoint therapy between Father and L.M. The social worker inquired
of several therapy providers, but they had no or limited availability. The
social worker then submitted the referral to the Agency’s counseling services
inbox for processing, and the referral was assigned in August 2024. The social
worker provided the referral information to Father and urged him to begin
the intake process. In September 2024, the social worker received a
termination report from the Agency’s family counseling referral, which
indicated the referral had expired because the children and their caregivers
did not complete the intake. The following month, in October 2024, Father
was again provided and completed a family counseling referral. In the

18
meantime, L.M. had expressed frustration about being referred to therapy
with Father and had said she did not think she needed it.
Father correctly notes the record does not reflect the Agency
made efforts after October 2024 to ensure conjoint therapy with L.M.
occurred. A minor’s psychological wellbeing, however, is a relevant factor in
deciding whether to force unwanted contact with a parent. (In re Danielle W.
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238.) And, here, the record shows L.M did not
want to participate in counseling with Father. In addition, Father argued at
later hearings for unsupervised visitation with L.M. and conjoint therapy and
unsupervised visitation with two of his other children, but he did not bring to
the court’s attention the contention he is now raising that the Agency failed
to ensure conjoint therapy occurred with L.M. Although we agree it was the
Agency’s—not Father’s—responsibility to reasonably arrange for the therapy
with L.M., the record supports a finding the Agency acted reasonably under
the circumstances here in attempting to do so. In fulfilling its responsibilities,
the Agency is not required to provide perfect services or take every
conceivable step in order to satisfy its duty to provide reasonable services.
(Elijah R. v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 969; In re Misako
R.(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
With respect to visitation, we find no merit in Father’s contention
the Agency failed in good faith to consider liberalized visitation with L.M.
Father was provided his allotted amount of visitation, and the record shows
Father never reached the point where unmonitored visits would have been
appropriate. Father was never able to demonstrate an ability to consistently
regulate his emotions and improve the substance and manner of his
communications with L.M. We agree with the Agency the record reflects
Father made repeated inappropriate and emotionally challenging comments

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during the review period at issue, both to L.M. and the social worker, and
repeatedly failed to accept any responsibility for L.M. and the other children
being removed from his care. Father made inappropriate comments to L.M.
despite the presence of a visitation monitor, which supports the Agency’s
concern about how he would conduct himself with L.M. if left unsupervised.
In addition, L.M. expressed concern about the impact of more liberalized
visitation on her mental health and wellbeing.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Agency
and considering the testimony heard by the court, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the Agency provided Father reasonable reunification services.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding and order on April 21, 2025, that
appellant S.M. was provided reasonable reunification services as to minor
L.M. is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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