In re K.G. CA2/5

CourtListener 10735080Calctapp12 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/12/25 In re K.G. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

In re K.G., a Person Coming B344229
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 23LJJP00205B)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jennifer W. Baronoff, Commissioner. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Minor K.G.’s maternal grandmother K.B. appeals from the
January 27, 2025 order denying her request to be appointed
minor’s de facto parent, and her petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3881 to conduct a relative placement
hearing under section 361.3 and change minor’s placement from
maternal great-aunt R.W.2 to maternal grandmother. Because
maternal grandmother had not assumed day-to-day
responsibility for minor, we affirm the order denying maternal
grandmother de facto parent status. Because the allegations of
maternal grandmother’s section 388 petition made a prima facie
case showing both that circumstances had changed since the
court’s prior placement order and that consideration of maternal
grandmother as a relative placement option was in minor’s best
interest, the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying
maternal grandmother an evidentiary hearing. We therefore
reverse the court’s summary denial of K.G.’s section 388 petition,
and remand with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing under
section 388 and 361.3 to determine whether placing minor with
maternal grandmother would be in minor’s best interests.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

2 The record and briefs refer to R.W. as either maternal
great-aunt or maternal grand-aunt, but the two terms are
interchangeable.
<https://www.legalgenealogist.com/2015/02/25/great-versus-
grand> [as of Nov. 10, 2025], archived at https://perma.cc/N2NQ-
S23K. We will use the term maternal great-aunt.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Record on Appeal

Because maternal grandmother is not a party to the
underlying dependency case concerning minor, her access to the
juvenile court case file is limited under California Rules of Court,
rule 5.552(d). Four days after filing her notice of appeal,
maternal grandmother filed a “Petition for Access to Juvenile
Case File” (JV-570) on February 24, 2025. On March 27, 2025,
more than a month later, the juvenile court issued an “Order
after Judicial Review on Petition for Access to Juvenile Case File”
(JV-574) granting maternal grandmother access to the clerk’s
transcript and to redacted portions of the reporter’s transcript, on
the condition that such records would only be used for the
purpose of creating the record on appeal. Although the order
does not direct the clerk to exclude any records from the case file,
the clerk’s transcript does not contain any case records before
January 27, 2025,3 when maternal grandmother filed a de facto

3 To the extent maternal grandmother may have filed a
request for access to court records separate from the request
associated with this appeal, we have only the Department’s
February 13, 2025 objection, but we do not have the request or
the court’s ruling. An attachment to the Department’s objection
stated that maternal grandmother requested “copies of all
records regarding placement or removal of the child from the
[maternal grandmother’s] care.” According to the Department’s
objection, maternal grandmother sought the records “to prepare
for a 388 petition and possible trial.” The clerk’s transcript does
include a January 30, 2025 declaration in support of access to
juvenile court records, filed by R.W., maternal great aunt—not

3
parent statement and request. The reporter’s transcript is also
very limited because the juvenile court only authorized an
extensively redacted copy of the reporter’s transcript for the
hearing conducted on January 27, 2025.
On July 21, 2025, while the current appeal was pending,
maternal great aunt filed a notice of appeal with numerous
attachments.4 In addition, maternal grandmother’s notice of
appeal also includes some orders that are not included in the
clerk’s transcript. While most of our summary of relevant facts
and procedure is based solely on the limited record provided on
appeal, to the extent we may consider documents or information
connected to either maternal great-aunt’s notice of appeal or
maternal grandmother’s notice of appeal, we will note that fact.

maternal grandmother—seeking access to the juvenile court’s de
facto parent order. From the limited record on appeal, it is
unclear whether the Department’s February 13, 2025 objection
was filed in response to maternal great aunt’s request (which we
have in our record), or to maternal grandmother’s request (which
is not in our record, but is referenced in the objection).
4 We take judicial notice of the July 21, 2025 filing, as well
as the juvenile court’s May 20, 2025 order granting the
Department’s section 388 petition to remove minor from maternal
great aunt’s custody. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 455, 459.)
In doing so, we emphasize that we are not seeking to consider
“postjudgment evidence that is outside the record on appeal and
was never considered by the trial court,” but rather to fill in gaps
about the trial court’s state of knowledge at the time it made its
appealed decision. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 407.)

4
B. Background Information About Minor’s Dependency
Case

According to a declaration filed by maternal grandmother,
minor’s mother has a long history of substance abuse, and when
minor was born on July 15, 2024, he was removed from his
mother’s care, just like mother’s older children. Minor’s four
older siblings had been under maternal grandmother’s care for
several years, and the Department planned to close those
children’s cases with legal guardianship “in the next couple of
months.” When the social worker called maternal grandmother
to pick minor up from the hospital, maternal grandmother said
she was on her way. But shortly afterwards, the social worker
called again and told maternal grandmother not to come because
the Department had some concerns and asked if there was any
other family member who could pick minor up. Maternal
grandmother assented, and asked her sister, maternal great-aunt
R.W., to pick up minor. Maternal great-aunt picked up minor,
and he had been living with her ever since.
Based on statements contained in a report filed by the
Department in April 2025 and attached to maternal great-aunt’s
notice of appeal, it appears that on October 7, 2024, the day the
juvenile court found minor to be a dependent child, it issued a no
removal order, preventing minor’s removal from maternal great-
aunt’s home absent further order by the court. After
disagreement between the Department and maternal great-aunt
about whether she was required to obtain resource family
approval (RFA), the Department filed a walk-on request under
section 388 on December 20, 2024, asking the court to lift its no
removal order in 30 days if maternal great-aunt continued to

5
refuse to participate in the RFA process.5 The court continued
the Department’s walk-on request to January 27, 2025, and on
that date, the court ordered maternal great-aunt to re-submit her
RFA application by the next hearing, or the court would lift the
do-not-remove order. The court’s January 27, 2025 order is also
evidenced by a minute order attached to maternal grandmother’s
notice of appeal. The minute order stated that maternal great-
aunt “is present and is ordered to re-submit the RFA application
by the next date or the Court will lift the do-not-remove order,”
and ordered the Department to prepare a last minute information
report to address the RFA application. On the next scheduled
court date, February 4, 2025, the court vacated the do-not-remove
order, over the objection of minor’s counsel.

C. Maternal Grandmother’s Request for De Facto
Parent Status

On January 27, 2025, maternal grandmother filed a De
Facto Parent Request (form JV-295) and a De Facto Parent
Statement (JV-296), together with a declaration and a
memorandum of points and authorities. In her statement,
maternal grandmother acknowledged that she “has not cared for
[minor], as he has been placed with the maternal grandaunt since
birth, however, she is willing and able to provide the child with a
permanent home.” Maternal grandmother stated that she was
applying to become minor’s de facto parent, but also
acknowledged that maternal great-aunt had been granted de

5 The RFA program is administered at the county level, as
described in Welfare & Institutions Code section 16519.5.

6
facto parent status. Maternal grandmother stated that she and
her sister could work together to meet minor’s needs and her only
intent in applying for de facto parent status was minor’s best
interests.
The memorandum of points and authorities acknowledged
that maternal grandmother had not cared for minor since his
placement, but argued that she had visited regularly and stayed
informed of minor’s medical appointments and developments.
She had assumed a parental role and provided day-to-day care for
his older siblings, and was ready to provide the same for minor if
he were placed with her.
The juvenile court denied maternal grandmother’s request
to be appointed de facto parent. Most of the reporter’s transcript
of the hearing on January 27, 2025 is redacted, but the
unredacted portions indicate that maternal grandmother was
present but was not a party.
According to the minute orders attached to maternal
grandmother’s notice of appeal, the juvenile court held two
hearings on January 27, 2025: a motion hearing and a non-
appearance progress report hearing. Maternal grandmother,
maternal great-aunt, and their respective attorneys appeared at
both hearings. At the motion hearing, the court denied the de
facto parent requests of both maternal grandmother and
maternal great-aunt. At the progress report hearing, the court
stated it had read and considered the Department’s report—
presumably the section 388 walk-on report attached to maternal
great-aunt’s notice of appeal—and ordered the Department to
prepare a last minute information report to address the RFA
application. The next scheduled court date was February 4,
2025.

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D. Maternal Grandmother’s Section 388 Petition

On February 6, 2025, maternal grandmother filed a request
to change court order under section 388, seeking to change
minor’s placement. Maternal grandmother’s section 388 petition
asked the court to change its July 2024 order that placed minor
with maternal great-aunt, and instead order maternal
grandmother to be assessed for placement under section 361.3
and to place minor with her. Maternal grandmother alleged
circumstances had changed because her home was recently
reassessed by RFA and granted approval for continued placement
of the four grandchildren, plus one additional child. Maternal
grandmother argued the requested change would be in minor’s
best interest because he would benefit from growing up with his
siblings; she was caring for minor’s older siblings, and the
siblings spending each day together growing a sibling bond would
improve their emotional, mental, and psychological well-being.
In her supporting declaration, she provided information about
each of the siblings under her care, and stated she had met all
the requirements for relative placement including RFA
requirements, and was ready and able to provide minor with the
same level of care she provided to his siblings. Maternal
grandmother argued that dependency law required the
Department to assess maternal grandmother under the criteria
set forth in section 361.3, and that after such an assessment was
conducted, the court should hold a hearing.
One day later, the juvenile court denied maternal
grandmother’s section 388 petition without a hearing, stating as

8
its reason for the denial that the request was not in minor’s best
interest “as previously stated on the record at prior hearing.”

E. Maternal Grandmother’s Appeal

On February 20, 2025, maternal grandmother filed a notice
of appeal, appealing from all findings and orders made by the
court on January 27, 2025, including but not limited to her
request for de facto parent status, and the February 6, 2025
denial of her section 388 petition without a hearing.

DISCUSSION

A. Maternal Grandmother’s Request to be Recognized
as a De Facto Parent

1. Relevant law

“De facto parent status is ‘a judicially created and
maintained concept’ [citation] which is not incorporated into the
statutory dependency scheme but is recognized in court rules
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.502(10) (defining de facto parent),
5.530(a) (right to be present at court proceedings), 5.534(e)
(standing to participate and procedural rights)).” (In re A.F.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 692, 699 (A.F.).) The de facto parent
doctrine “recognizes that persons who have provided a child with
daily parental concern, affection, and care over substantial time
may develop legitimate interests and perspectives, and may also
present a custodial alternative, which should not be ignored in a
juvenile dependency proceeding.” (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6

9
Cal.4th 68, 70–71, 77 (Kieshia E.).) De facto parent status does
not guarantee that the child will be placed or will remain in that
de facto parent’s custody. (A.F., at p. 700; In re Abigail L. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 169, 177–178 (Abigail L.); In re B.S. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 888, 897 (B.S.).) Instead, de facto parent status
merely secures the right to (1) present relevant information to
the juvenile court, so that “ ‘ “all legitimate views, evidence, and
interests are considered” . . . . ’ ” in making placement decisions
regarding the child (A.F., at p. 701), and (2) have a proverbial
seat at the table, so that the de facto parent can assert their “own
interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of
the child” and offer the court an alternative placement option (In
re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 693 (B.G.); Kieshia E., supra, 6
Cal.4th at pp. 77–78.). These limited rights dovetail with the
“key reason” why the courts invented the concept of a de facto
parent in the first place: De facto parents, by virtue of their close
relationship with the child, “may provide critical information that
assists the [juvenile] court in determining what disposition is
best for the child.” (A.F., at p. 701; B.G., at p. 693.)
A de facto parent is a “ ‘a person who has been found by the
court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of
parent, . . . and who has assumed that role for a substantial
period.’ ” (In re A.F., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 699, quoting
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).) Factors relevant to deciding
whether a person falls within the definition of a de facto parent
include “whether (1) the child is ‘psychologically bonded’ to the
adult; (2) the adult has assumed the role of a parent on a day-to
day basis for a substantial period of time; (3) the adult possesses
information about the child unique from the other participants in
the process; (4) the adult has regularly attended juvenile court

10
hearings; and (5) a future proceeding may result in an order
permanently foreclosing any future contact with the adult.” (In
re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66–67, fn. omitted
(Patricia L.); Abigail L., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 177.) De
facto parent status is liberally granted “[b]ecause a court can only
benefit from having all relevant information.” (Patricia L., at
p. 67; see also Abigail L., at p. 177.)
“A person requesting de facto parent status has the burden
to show by a preponderance of the evidence he or she qualifies for
that status. [Citation.] We review a juvenile court’s decision
denying a request for de facto parent status for an abuse of
discretion. [Citations.]” (Abigail L., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 178.)

2. Analysis

Maternal grandmother acknowledged in her request for de
facto parent status that she had never been responsible for
minor’s day to day care. Nonetheless, she contends that the
court’s order should be reversed because the remaining factors for
determining de facto parent status weighed in her favor, based on
her care for minor’s older siblings. Maternal grandmother’s bond
with minor’s older siblings is simply not pertinent to whether she
met the factors for being minor’s de facto parent. In light of the
role of a de facto parent in providing information to the court
based on the applicant’s relationship with that particular child,
maternal grandmother has not shown that the juvenile court
abused its discretion when it denied her request for de facto
parent status.

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B. Maternal Grandmother’s Section 388 Petition

Maternal grandmother contends that because her section
388 petition stated a prima facie case of changed circumstances
and that the requested relief would be in minor’s best interests,
the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her
request without a hearing. She further contends that by denying
her a hearing on the question of relative placement, the court
failed to meet its obligations under section 361.3.

1. Relevant law – section 388 request to change court orders

“Any parent or other person having an interest in a child
who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the
court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of
court previously made . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (a) ‘The petitioner has
the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1)
that there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2)
that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of
the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833,
845.) A relative who seeks to modify a disposition order with
respect to the child’s placement has standing to appeal from the
denial of a section 388 petition. (See In re R.T. (2015) 232
Cal.App.4th 1284, 1293–1294, 1299–1300 [reviewing denial of
§ 388 petition brought by aunt and uncle seeking to modify
placement in disposition order on the grounds that they were
denied preferential consideration for placement].)
A petition under section 388 must be liberally construed in
favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a).)

12
Nonetheless, if the juvenile court finds that even so construed the
petition fails to make a prima facie case as to either or both tests
under section 388, the court may deny the petition without an
evidentiary hearing. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181,
189; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806; In re
Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414; see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.570(d).) A prima facie showing is not made “unless
the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the
hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In
re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127.) “In determining
whether a parent has made a prima facie showing under section
388, we may consider the entire factual and procedural history of
the case.” (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 711.)
We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for
an abuse of discretion. (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1,
7; In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) “ ‘ “The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ”
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)

2. Relevant law – section 361.3 relative placement request

“The California Legislature has expressed a strong
preference to place children who have been detained from their
parents with family members whenever possible. To that end,
there is a detailed statutory scheme setting forth the duties of the
[Department] and the juvenile court, including requiring [the
Department] to promptly, and diligently assess any interested

13
family members for placement when a child is removed from
parental custody.” (In re N.J. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 96, 102–
103.) “Section 361.3 gives ‘preferential consideration’ to a request
by a relative of a child who has been removed from parental
custody for placement of that child. . . . The preference applies at
the disposition hearing and thereafter ‘whenever a new
placement of the child must be made.’ [Citations.]” (In re M.H.
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1302–1303.) “If a family member
requests placement, the statutory placement preference under . .
. section 361.3 requires [the Department] and the court to place
the relative at the head of the line for placement and to place the
child with the relative if practicable.” (In re N.J., supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 103.) A relative is defined as “an adult who is
related to the child by blood, adoption, or affinity within the fifth
degree of kinship, including stepparents, stepsiblings, and all
relatives whose status is preceded by the words ‘great,’ ‘great-
great,’ or ‘grand,’ or the spouse of any of these persons . . . .”
(§ 361.3, subd. (c)(2).)
By requiring relatives to be considered for placement,
section 361.3 does not “guarantee that the child will be placed
with any person so identified.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(8)(B); see also
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
160, 180. Nonetheless, any relative requesting placement “shall
be assessed according to the factors” listed in subdivision (a) of
section 361.3, and the factors include “(1) The best interest of the
child, including special physical, psychological, educational,
medical, or emotional needs,” “(4) Placement of siblings and half
siblings in the same home, unless that placement is found to be
contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings . . . [¶]
(5) The good moral character of the relative and any other adult

14
living in the home, including whether any individual residing in
the home has a prior history of violent criminal acts or has been
responsible for acts of child abuse or neglect. [¶] (6) The nature
and duration of the relationship between the child and the
relative, and the relative’s desire to care for, and to provide legal
permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful,” among
others. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1) – (8).)

3. Relevant law - minor’s best interests under sections 361.3
and 388

“[A] relative seeking placement of the child is entitled to
file a petition under section 388 to trigger a relative placement
assessment and/or request a hearing under section 361.3.
However, in determining whether the child should be placed with
the relative, the juvenile court should not substitute the
generalized best interest showing required under section 388 for
its independent assessment of the relevant statutory criteria
under section 361.3. [Citation.]” (Isabella G. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 722, fn. 11.) In other words, when a juvenile court
considers the question of a child’s placement after disposition, in
the context of a contested section 388 evidentiary hearing, section
361.3 does not create a presumption, but requires the
Department to assess relatives for placement and the court to
consider all of the section 361.3 factors, including whether such
placement would be in the child’s best interests. (In re Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 321 [“the court is not to presume that a
child should be placed with a relative, but is to determine
whether such a placement is appropriate, taking into account the
suitability of the relative’s home and the best interest of the

15
child”]; In re Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 719–723
[agency required to assess relative under section 361.3,
subdivision (a) and court required to exercise its independent
judgment]; Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
1023, 1033–1035 [same]); Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 856, 862–863 [“The linchpin of a section 361.3
analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best
interests of the minor”].)

4. Analysis

The court erred in denying maternal grandmother’s section
388 petition without an evidentiary hearing to permit both
maternal grandmother and the Department to present their
competing evidence on whether it was in minor’s best interests
for minor to be placed with maternal grandmother and his half-
siblings.
First, we disagree with the Department’s assertion that the
change in maternal grandmother’s RFA status was an
immaterial change in circumstances. Although the truncated
nature of the appellate record prevents us from discerning the
juvenile court’s rationale for initially ordering minor placed with
maternal great-aunt at disposition in July 2024, we can
reasonably infer that RFA approval was at least one of the
impediments to placing minor with maternal grandmother when
he was initially detained from parental custody and placed with
maternal great-aunt. Obtaining RFA approval for another child
in the home would therefore qualify as a change of circumstance
necessary for relief under section 388.

16
Next, maternal grandmother alleges placing minor with
her—or at the very least conducting a section 361.3 hearing on
relative placement—is in minor’s best interests because he would
have the benefit of growing up in the same home as his older
half-siblings. On appeal, the Department argues that the court
was already aware of the siblings’ circumstances and maternal
grandmother’s home environment when it decided against
placing minor in her care, and so this court should uphold the
juvenile court’s determination that changing its order would not
be in minor’s best interests. The Department argues that the
court reasonably favored minor’s interest in the stability of his
ongoing placement with maternal great-aunt over his interest in
fostering sibling relationships. However, documents attached to
maternal great-aunt’s notice of appeal place the Department’s
argument in doubt.6 Specifically, by February 4, 2025, the
Department had informed the court of maternal great-aunt’s
failure to participate in the RFA process, and the juvenile court
had lifted its earlier order preventing minor from being removed
from maternal great-aunt’s home.
Maternal grandmother filed her section 388 petition just
two days later, on February 6, 2025, and the only evidence we

6 Because we may consider the entire factual and
procedural history of the case in determining whether a section
388 petition makes the required showing (In re K.L. (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 52, 62), the interests of justice warrant our choice to
take judicial notice of documents that shed light on the
contemporaneous information available to the court at the time of
its decision, particularly where the juvenile court limited
maternal grandmother’s access to the juvenile case file,
potentially hampering her ability to demonstrate error.

17
have of the court’s reason for its summary denial of maternal
grandmother’s section 388 petition is a handwritten statement
that the request was denied because it was “not in child’s best
interests as previously stated on the record at prior hearing.”
However, the redacted reporter’s transcript for the January 27,
2025 hearing sheds no light on any reasoning the court may have
engaged in at that hearing. Other than a portion where the court
states it has denied the request for de facto parent status, which
we presume to be referring to maternal grandmother’s request,
no other reasoning is evident from the reporter’s transcript.
Maternal grandmother alleged it would be in minor’s best
interests for the court to conduct a section 361.3 hearing and
place minor with her because minor and his siblings would all
benefit from “spending each day together growing a sibling bond
which will improve their emotional, mental and psychological
well-being” and that minor “will benefit from growing with his
siblings.” The importance of the sibling bond is recognized as one
of several factors in determining relative placement. (§ 361.3,
subd. (a)(4).) The preservation of sibling relationships is relevant
to determining a child’s best interests in other parts of the
dependency statutory scheme as well. (See, e.g., In re L.M. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 898, 911 [the ability of a family seeking a child’s
placement to provide that child “a sibling relationship in a loving
home directly bears on whether [the child’s] best interests are
furthered by removal”]; In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428,
437 [discussing sibling relationship exception to termination of
parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)]; In
re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404 [in enacting the
sibling-relationship exception “the legislature was concerned with
preserving long-standing relationships between siblings which

18
serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in
turmoil”].)
Against this legal backdrop of the role of maintaining
sibling ties in the dependency context, and the factual backdrop
of minor’s placement with maternal great-aunt being at some risk
based on her refusal to participate in the RFA process, it was an
abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to determine that
maternal grandmother’s section 388 petition did not allege
sufficient facts to clear the low threshold of a prima facie case
that the requested relief was in minor’s best interests. We
reverse the order summarily denying the section 388 petition and
remand for an evidentiary hearing.

5. Remand

We acknowledge the challenge associated with remanding
this matter to conduct a hearing on a petition filed more than
nine months ago, and we recognize that events that have taken
place since maternal grandmother filed her appeal will factor into
the court’s analysis. We emphasize that the focus of the hearing
on remand is what placement is in minor’s best interest at the
time of the hearing on remand. (In re K.B. (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 1275, 1291 [looking to “the circumstances existing at
the time of the hearing”]; In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
726, 734 [same].) We need not decide whether the hearing on
remand is technically categorized as a “relative placement”
hearing under section 361.3, or a hearing under section 388.
That is because both inquiries will address whether changing
minor’s placement to maternal grandmother’s home, with his
half-siblings, is in minor’s best interests.

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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s January 27, 2025 order denying
maternal grandmother K.B.’s request to be appointed de facto
parent is affirmed. The court’s February 6, 2025 order
summarily denying maternal grandmother’s petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 is reversed, and the
case is remanded with directions to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on the section 388 petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

BAKER, J.

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