People v. Dixon CA2/7

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Filed 11/12/25 P. v. Dixon CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B337673

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA021029)
v.

DUANE DIXON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kristen J. Inberg and Louis W. Karlin, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

Duane Dixon was convicted of the first degree murders of
Kevin Jones and Jamie Blankenship with robbery and multiple
murder special circumstance findings as to both, and the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Patricia
Lacey, along with personal firearm use findings as to all the
offenses. The trial court sentenced Dixon to two consecutive
sentences of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the
murders and a consecutive life term for the attempted murder,
plus 15 years for the firearm enhancements. Dixon was 22 years
old at the time of the offenses. He appeals from a postjudgment
order denying his motion for a hearing under People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th
439 (Cook).1 The superior court determined Dixon was ineligible
for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code
section 30512 because he was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole.
Dixon contends section 3051 violates his federal and state
constitutional rights to equal protection because young adult

1 In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 283 to 284, the
California Supreme Court held a juvenile offender (i.e., under the
age of 18) who is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
pursuant to section 3051 is entitled to a hearing to develop and
preserve evidence of his or her youth-related characteristics and
the circumstances at the time of the offense. In Cook, supra,
7 Cal.5th at page 451, the California Supreme Court further held
that “an offender entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and
4801 may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though
the offender’s sentence is otherwise final.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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offenders serving LWOP sentences for crimes they committed
when they were 18 to 25 years old are ineligible for youth
offender parole hearings, but young adult offenders serving non-
LWOP sentences and juvenile offenders who committed crimes
before the age of 18 serving LWOP sentences are eligible. Dixon
also argues his sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment
in violation of the California Constitution. (See Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 17.) We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

In 1995, a jury found Dixon and a codefendant guilty of the
first degree murders of Jones and Blankenship (§ 187, counts 1
and 2) and the willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted
murder of Lacey (§§ 664, 187, count 3). The jury found true as to
both defendants multiple murder special circumstance
allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), counts 1 and 2);4 a robbery
special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), count 2); a
principal armed with a firearm allegations (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1),
counts 1-3); and a personal firearm use allegation (§ 12022.5;
count 2). The jury also found true allegations Dixon had
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5) in the commission of counts
1 and 3 but not true that his codefendant had done so (§ 12022.5).
Finally, the jury found the count 1 robbery special circumstance

3 The facts regarding the underlying offenses are not
relevant to our analysis and are omitted.
4 Upon the parties’ stipulation, the court ordered the count 1
and 2 verdicts corrected to reflect the special circumstance
finding as being under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), rather
than section 190.2, subdivision (a)(13), as was mistakenly listed
in the information and verdict forms.

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allegation not true. (See People v. Maurice Robinson (Jan. 27,
1997, B099798) [nonpub. opn.].) As stated, Dixon was 22 years
old at the time of the offenses.
The trial court sentenced Dixon to two consecutive
sentences of LWOP for the two murders, a consecutive life term
for the attempted murder, plus 15 years for the personal firearm
enhancements. This court affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Maurice Robinson, supra, B099798 [nonpub. opn.].)
In September 2022, Dixon filed a motion in propria persona
requesting a Franklin/Cook hearing to preserve youth-related
mitigating evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing
under section 3051. The superior court appointed counsel to
represent Dixon and two defense experts. On April 23, 2024, the
superior court denied Dixon’s request for a Franklin/Cook
hearing, explaining that the California Supreme Court’s recent
decision in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838 (Hardin)
made Dixon ineligible for relief.
Dixon timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 3051 Does Not Violate Dixon’s Constitutional Right
to Equal Protection
Section 3051 “offers opportunities for early release to
certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed
at a young age.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 838.) “Under
the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a
crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole
hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration.
[Citation.] But not all [young adult] offenders are eligible for
parole hearings. The statute excludes, among others, offenders

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who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility
of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.” (Id. at
pp. 838-839; see § 3051, subd. (h); see also People v. Williams
(2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 116; People v. Briscoe (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 479, 484 (Briscoe).) Defendants who were 18 to
25 years old at the time of their offenses but who are ineligible for
a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 due to their
sentences are not entitled to a Franklin hearing. (See People v.
Mason (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 411, 415.)
Dixon argues section 3501, subdivision (h), violates the
equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions
because it treats young adult offenders serving LWOP sentences
differently than other young adult offenders sentenced to non-
LWOP terms, and differently than juveniles sentenced to LWOP.
“We review these claims de novo” (People v. Morales (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345 (Morales)), and we apply a deferential
rational basis standard of review to a defendant’s equal
protection challenge to the youth offender parole statute. (See
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.)
In Hardin, the California Supreme Court rejected the
argument that “section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders
sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under
a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied” to
defendants “who are serving life without parole sentences for
special circumstance murder.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 839.) Dixon acknowledges Hardin forecloses his equal
protection argument as between young adult offenders sentenced
to LWOP and young adult offenders who committed murder and
received non-LWOP sentences. But he argues Hardin did not
directly consider whether there is a rational basis to distinguish
between young adult and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP.

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Dixon is correct that Hardin did not consider this equal
protection challenge. But Hardin observed that this court had
held it was unnecessary to address this argument because “the
Legislature acted reasonably in distinguishing between offenses
committed before and after the age of 18 because the Eighth
Amendment (and the law more generally) makes the same
distinction.” (Hardin, at p. 846.)
In all events, Dixon fails to show the Legislature acted
irrationally by granting youth offender parole hearings to
juvenile offenders with a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole while denying such hearings to young adult offenders with
the same sentence. As People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
193, 204 explained when rejecting a similar equal protection
challenge to section 3051, “The Legislature had a rational basis
to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life
without parole) based on their age.” (Sands, at p. 204.) Sands
reasoned that “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy
unconstitutional sentences [imposed on juveniles] but go no
further.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456,
463-464 [rejecting equal protection challenge to § 3051 based on
the different treatment of juvenile and young adult offenders
sentenced to life without possibility of parole because “the United
States and California Supreme Courts have found the line drawn
between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one”];
Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347 [“for purposes of LWOP
offenders, the line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; People v.
Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 (Acosta) [“[T]here is a
rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile LWOP
offenders and young adult LWOP offenders: their age.”].)

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B. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the State Constitutional
Prohibition Against Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Dixon further argues the exclusion in section 3051 of young
adult offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
who were 18 years old or older constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment under article I, section 17, of the California
Constitution. Dixon did not raise this argument in the superior
court and it is forfeited. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006)
39 Cal.4th 970, 991 [“‘[a] party cannot argue the court erred in
failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct’”].)
Even if Dixon had not forfeited the argument, his argument
is foreclosed by precedent establishing that there is no violation
of the cruel or unusual punishment clauses of the state or federal
constitutions when a nonjuvenile young adult offender is
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (See People v.
Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733 [“[t]here is considerable
overlap in the state and federal approaches” to the Eighth
Amendment and article I, section 17, of the California
Constitution, and “‘[a]lthough articulated slightly differently,
both standards prohibit punishment that is “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime or the individual culpability of the
defendant’”]; see also Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204
[sentence of life without the possibility of parole “does not violate
the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult
under the age of 26”]; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781
[Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, which held the Eighth
Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile to a mandatory term
of life in prison without possibility of parole, “applies to juvenile
offenders sentenced to mandatory LWOP terms, not 21 year
olds”]; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439 [Eighth

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Amendment does not prohibit imposing a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole on a 21-year-old defendant]; People v.
Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1020, 1030-1032 [Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit imposing a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole on an 18-year-old defendant]; cf. People v.
Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429 [Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit imposing a sentence of death on a 21-year-old
defendant].)

DISPOSITION

The order denying Dixon’s request for a Franklin/Cook
hearing is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.

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