People v. Rios CA5

CourtListener 10734210Calctapp10 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/10/25 P. v. Rios CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088061
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 4001700)
v.

RICARDO RIOS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Carrie M.
Stephens, Judge.
Martin Baker for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Following a jury trial, defendant Ricardo Rios was found guilty of first degree
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count I) and arson (§ 451, subd. (d); count II), after
stabbing his neighbor over 130 times, and then setting the victim’s vehicle on fire in an
attempt to cover up evidence of the murder. At a second guilt phase of the trial, the jury
found defendant was sane when he committed the crimes. During a bifurcated bench
trial, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt defendant had suffered a prior conviction
for first degree burglary (a strike) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and for purposes of an enhancement allegation
under section 667, subdivision (a).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a determinate term of four years
for the arson on count II (§§ 451, subd. (d), 667, subd. (e)(1)) plus an indeterminate term
of 50 years to life for the murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a), 667, subd. (e)(1)), and
a one-year enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The
court struck the prior serious conviction enhancement alleged under section 667,
subdivision (a), but declined to dismiss defendant’s prior strike conviction for purposes
of the Three Strikes law.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court weighed irrelevant aggravating factors
in determining the low-term presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), was
overcome on count II. As defendant’s sentencing claim was forfeited by failing to object
on this basis at the sentencing hearing below, we affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
Summary of Guilt Phase Evidence and Jury Verdict
On November 12, 2016, the City of Turlock Fire Department was dispatched to a
vehicle fire. The fire crew found an SUV with smoke coming from its passenger side. A
civilian who discovered the fire had used a fire extinguisher before the fire crew arrived,
but the fire was fully extinguished by the fire crew. On examination, fire personnel
found what appeared to be a large amount of blood dripping onto the passenger side
running board. The keys to the vehicle were discovered underneath the vehicle, and the
vehicle was registered to Pedro Ruiz (the victim) at an address in Turlock.
An assessment of the vehicle disclosed three points of origin for the fire; the
driver’s side floorboard; an area close to the driver’s side door; and an area close to the
center console. The fire appeared to have been set intentionally using leaves and
newspaper. A search of the vehicle yielded a bloody knife found on the passenger side
floorboard, and a piece of an object shaped like a dragon found on the front passenger
seat.
Given the vehicle’s condition, police proceeded to make a security check on the
victim at his residence. When no one answered at the victim’s apartment door, police
proceeded inside the apartment to complete the security check. They found no one inside
the apartment and no signs of a struggle, but there were indicia the victim lived there.
Other residents in the complex had seen the victim and defendant together earlier that
day. With reason to believe defendant was involved in whatever had happened, police
performed a security check at defendant’s apartment, which was in the same building as
the victim. Defendant’s parents, who also lived in the apartment, were at home, and upon
a search, police found defendant hiding in one of the back bedrooms. A search of

2 As a full recitation of the trial evidence is not necessary to resolve the sentencing claim
presented on appeal, only a truncated summary of the trial evidence is provided.

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defendant’s apartment revealed the victim’s cell phone inside a wallet case with the
victim’s driver’s license in it. There appeared to be some blood on the case. Defendant
was arrested and later released.
The next day, the victim’s body was discovered in an orchard less than four miles
from the burned SUV. The victim had been stabbed over 100 times and appeared to have
been dragged into the orchard. Tire tracks in the dirt near the body matched the tire
treads on the burned SUV, and the tracks suggested to police the SUV had been moved
after the body was dumped so that the headlights would illuminate the area. A small,
dragon-shaped object was found in blood between the edge of the orchard and the body.
Police returned to defendant’s apartment to rearrest him, and he was found hiding
in some scaffolding. Police retrieved a trash bag from the apartment containing a black
T-shirt with a red stain, a bandana, dark-colored tennis shoes, and a sheath to a small
sword. The design of the sheath matched the dragon-shaped object found near the
victim’s body.
In a recorded police interview on November 15, 2016, which was played for the
jury, defendant told police that he got a ride from the victim and was in the passenger seat
of the victim’s SUV when the victim stopped driving and attacked him with a machete.
Defendant told police he defended himself with a knife in each hand, and after stabbing
the victim, defendant pushed him into the passenger seat before disposing of his body in
the orchard. Defendant admitted using leaves, paper and matches to light the SUV on
fire because it was “dirty.” He admitted to removing his clothing and the shoes he had
worn and placing them in a white plastic bag in the closet at his apartment.
The shoes found at defendant’s apartment matched the shoeprints in the orchard
near the body, and the victim was a “major contributor” to the DNA found on the bloody
knife recovered from the SUV and the shirt found in defendant’s apartment. A
pathologist found the victim had been stabbed 138 times. Video surveillance at
defendant’s apartment complex showed him leaving around 6:00 p.m. on November 12,

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2016, and returning around 8:47 p.m.—47 minutes after the SUV fire was reported. The
walking distance from the fire to defendant’s apartment was 2.1 miles and would take
about 40 minutes to walk.
The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder; found
true the allegation the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated; and found true a
deadly weapon enhancement allegation. The jury also found defendant guilty of arson.
Summary of Sanity Phase Evidence and Jury Verdict
After the initial verdict on the first phase of the trial, a second sanity phase of the
trial began. The defense presented testimony from forensic psychologist Richard Blak,
Ph.D., who diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia and posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). Dr. Blak opined that appellant did not know the quality and nature of his acts,
nor could he distinguish right from wrong, at the time of the crime because of a mental
defect or disease.
The People presented testimony from clinical and forensic psychologist John
Chellsen, Ph.D. Chellsen opined defendant had a psychotic disorder not otherwise
specified and a history of PTSD; but he noted defendant was not exhibiting signs or
symptoms of a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder and did not report experiencing
command hallucinations at the time of the offense. In his opinion, defendant was capable
of understanding the nature and quality of his actions when he stabbed the victim, and
that he was aware of the wrongfulness of those actions.
The jury found defendant sane when he committed the offenses. In a bifurcated
court trial, the trial court found true beyond reasonable doubt defendant had been
convicted of a serious offense for purposes of the prior serious conviction enhancement
allegation and the Three Strikes allegation.
Sentencing
At a sentencing hearing on May 6, 2024, the court declined to strike the prior
strike conviction pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a), but struck the five-year prior

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serious conviction enhancement. The court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life for the
murder (25 years to life doubled for the prior strike), plus one year for the deadly weapon
enhancement; and imposed the middle term for the arson offense (doubled for the prior
strike offense) for a total of four years to be served consecutively. The aggregate
sentence imposed was five years determinate, plus 50 years to life.
DISCUSSION
I. Imposition of the Middle Term for Arson Conviction
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing the lower
term on count II for arson because the court considered and balanced aggravating factors
that were relevant only to the murder and not the arson offense. The People argue this
claim is forfeited on appeal because no objection was made during the sentencing
hearing. On the merits, the People maintain the court did not abuse its discretion and any
error was harmless.
A. Standard of Review
“We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 764, citing People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th
825, 847, abrogated on a different ground in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
759.) “A court abuses its sentencing discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously,
relies on improper matter in reaching its decision, or is unaware of the scope of its
discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at all.” (Knowles, supra, at
p. 765, citing People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.)
“We presume that the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives.
[Citation.] The burden is on the party challenging the sentencing decision to show that
the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] We may not presume error from a silent
record. [Citation.] ‘Unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial
court is deemed to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in the

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rules.’” (Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765, quoting People v. Parra Martinez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322 & citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409.)3
B. Additional Background
At the sentencing hearing, the court first explained it would provide the parties
with the sentence it intended to impose, so that any arguments could be framed around
that tentative. In doing so, the court explained that it had considered defendant suffered
from “significant mental health issues” that were “absolutely apparent … throughout the
trial .…” The parties’ attorneys indicated they did not wish to be heard on that issue, and
the court proceeded to give a detailed explanation of its sentencing decisions. The court
explained, in relevant part, as follows:
“There are circumstances in aggravation pursuant to Rule
… 4.421(a), the following factors exist: [rule 4.421]([a])(1), the crime
involved great violence and great bodily harm; [rule 4.421](a)(2), the
defendant was armed and used a weapon; [rule 4.421](a)(8), the manner in
which the crime was carried out indicates planning, sophistication or
professionalism.
“Factors relating to the defendant as described by … rule [4.421] in
(b)(1) are that the defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a
serious danger to society; [rule 4.421](b)(2), the defendant’s prior
convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness; [rule 4.421](b)(3),
the defendant has served a prior term of prison or county jail under …
Section 1170[, subdivision ](h).
“The following circumstances in mitigation, pursuant to Rule
… 4.423(a), factors relating to the crime are: that the defendant
participated in the crime under circumstances of coercion or duress, or the
criminal conduct was partially excusable for some other reason not
amounting to a defense. And in this case the defendant did have significant
mental health issues.
“Factors relating to the defendant are Rule … 4.423(b)(2), the
defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced his culpability for the crime; [rule 4.423](b)(3), the

3 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise indicated.

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commission of the current offense is connected with the defendant’s mental
health issues as defined by … Section 1385[, subdivision ](c);
[rule 4.423](b)(4), multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case;
[rule 4.423](b)(5), an enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old. And in this case it was barely over five years old; and
by that I mean the [section] 667[, subdivision ](d) prior and the
[section] 667[, subdivision ](a) prior.
“The aggravating factors do, however, outweigh these mitigating
factors. The Court cannot sentence the defendant to the aggravat[ed term]
for Count 2, however, because those aggravating factors were not pled or
proven at the jury trial.
“The court recognizes it has authority to strike the [section] 667[,
subdivision ](d) prior pursuant to … Section 1385. If the Court finds, in
light of the nature and circumstances of his present felony and prior serious
and/or violent felony convictions, the particulars of the defendant’s
background, character and prospects, that defendant is deemed outside the
spirit in whole or in part of the three strikes law. [¶] The defendant is not
outside the spirit in whole or in part of the three strikes law. [¶] … [¶]
“He had a history of mental health disease, however. According to
Dr. Chellsen he suffered from a psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified,
and PTSD.
“Dr. [Chellsen] opined defendant’s actions were not primarily the
product of a psychiatric issue—of his psychiatric issues rather.
“Dr. Baik [sic] opined the defendant suffered from schizophrenia
and [PTSD] at the time of the homicide, and believed the defendant was
legally insane at the time of his offenses.
“The PTSD diagnosis stems from three gunshot wounds to his
abdomen when he was 23 or 24 years old.
“The defendant had a prior misdemeanor conviction in 2010 for
violating Vehicle Code Section 14601.1.
“He had a misdemeanor domestic violence related conviction in
2012 for which he was sentenced to five days in jail.
“And the felony strike conviction was for a violation of …
Section 459 for which he was sentenced to 24 months in prison.
“The defendant is, as I said earlier, not outside the three strikes law
in spirit—in whole or in [part]. The circumstances of the present murder
are extreme. He stabbed an entirely innocent person who was a neighbor

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giving him a ride to the store more than a hundred times. The act was
significant not only for its violence, but for the defendant’s attempt to hide
it and destroy evidence. The prior strike was only five and a half years
earlier. For these reasons, the Court declines to strike the [section] 667[,
subdivision ](d) prior.”
The court then sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the murder, doubled for
the prior strike, plus a one-year enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), for
the use of a weapon. For the arson conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a
consecutive middle term of two years, doubled to four years for the prior strike. The
court struck the section 667, subdivision (a), enhancement under section 1385 “because
the current offense is connected to the defendant’s mental health,” and the court
concluded dismissal would not endanger public safety. The court concluded by asking
whether anyone had “anything that they need to say? Clarification requested?” The
prosecutor requested the court give an advisement to defendant about the nature of the
offenses committed, which the court did. No further objection or request for clarification
was made.
C. The Sentencing Claim is Forfeited
Defendant argues two of the aggravating factors the trial court identified (the
violence of the crime and the use of a weapon) were not relevant to the crime of arson,
and thus the court did not properly find the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors for purposes of overcoming the low-term presumption under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). The People contend defendant’s sentencing claim was forfeited
because defendant’s trial counsel made no objection at the sentencing hearing.
Defendant maintains his trial counsel had no meaningful opportunity at the hearing to
object to how the trial court weighed the aggravating factors because the court gave its
reasons for doing so after it asked whether the parties wished to be heard.
“‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the

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party did not object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in
which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which
the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor,
misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number
of valid reasons .…”’” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) “Strong policy
reasons support this rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on
appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily
corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“‘“The law casts upon the party the duty
of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of
them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be
silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would
be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.”’”’” (People v. Stowell (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; accord, People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 239–240;
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46.)
“‘[D]iscretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases
presenting an important legal issue.’” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–888,
fn. 7.) Absent a change in the law that applies retroactively (e.g., People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 698–699), or an extenuating circumstance such as futility (e.g.,
People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8), neither of which is applicable here, the policy
reasons underlying the forfeiture doctrine fully support its application where a defendant
remains silent in the trial court when sentenced and then seeks to obtain appellate relief
based on asserted sentencing errors.
At the sentencing hearing, there was no objection to the aggravating factors the
trial court considered, and we are unpersuaded defendant’s trial counsel had no
meaningful opportunity to do so. The trial court provided its reasons for the sentence
imposed, and then asked whether anyone had anything they “need[ed] to say?
Clarification requested?” The prosecutor took the opportunity to seek a serious felony

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advisement, which the court provided. There was, therefore, a sufficient opportunity for
defense counsel to make any objection regarding the sentence imposed and/or the trial
court’s stated reasoning. Having had an opportunity to object and bring the matter to the
trial court’s attention, the failure to do so forfeited the claim of sentencing error for
purposes of appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MEEHAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

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