CourtListener 10733293•Wiknich v. Blades CA5
Testo completo
Filed 11/7/25 Wiknich v. Blades CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THOMAS R. WIKNICH,
F089551
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCM-24-001013)
v.
KYLE BLADES, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Bernard C.
Barmann, Jr., Judge.
Thomas R. Wiknich, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance filed on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
This appeal arises from an election contest brought by Thomas Wiknich against
Kyle Blades, in the Kern County Superior Court. Both parties were self-represented in
the trial court. Wiknich, the appellant, is self-represented on appeal. Blades, the
respondent, did not appear on appeal.
Wiknich’s election contest related to a municipal general election held in
November 2024, for two seats on the City Council of Ridgecrest. Three people—
Wiknich, Blades, and Solomon Rajaratnam—ran for two open city council seats. Blades
placed first, Rajaratnam second, and Wicknich third in the election. Blades and
Rajaratnam were subsequently seated on the city council.
Wiknich asserted that Blades was ineligible to run for election under a municipal
term limits law. Wiknich sought an order removing Blades from the city council and
seating Wiknich in his place. The trial court held an election contest hearing. The court
determined there were no grounds for the election contest and that Blades was eligible to
run in the November 2024 city council election and to currently hold the office of
member of the Ridgecrest City Council. Thereafter, the court entered judgment
“confirming the election.”
Wiknich appealed. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Wiknich Initiated an Election Contest by Filing an Affidavit
On December 9, 2024, Wiknich initiated the instant case by filing an “affidavit”
regarding the “ineligibility of … Blades” as a “Ridgecrest City Council [c]andidate of the
2024 Ridgecrest City Council [e]lection.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Wiknich
asserted that a “Ridgecrest City Council election was held on November [5], 2024.” He
added that three candidates were on the ballot for “two open City Council positions.”
Blades and Rajaratnam were elected to the city council seats at issue. Wiknich placed
third in the election. City council terms are normally four years in duration.
2.
Wicknich noted in his affidavit that Blades had served on the Ridgecrest City
Council prior to the November 2024 election. Specifically, Blades was appointed to the
city council in December 2019 and served for one year in an appointed capacity.
Subsequently, in an election held in November 2020, Blades was elected to a full
four-year term. Wiknich further noted in the affidavit: “The current Ridgecrest [t]erm
[l]imits Municipal Code section 2-25[, subdivision (c)] … states: ‘Any person who has
held the office of member of the City Council for [eight] consecutive years shall not be
eligible to hold such office until at least two years have passed since such person last held
such office. In no event shall any person be eligible to serve as a member of the city
council for more than eight consecutive years.’ ” Wiknich added that Blades would have
served eight years on the city council as of December 2027 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve the last year of the four-year term to which he was elected in the
November 2024 election.
In addition, Wiknich asserted in his affidavit: “I am contesting the election
because … Blades is in [v]iolation of Elections Code [section] 16440[, subdivision (a)]
and Ridgecrest City Council [t]erm [l]imits Municipal Code [s]ection 2-25[,
subdivision (c)]. Plaintiff is requesting the court to issue an order to declare [that] …
Blades is ineligible to serve on the Ridgecrest City Council [for] this upcoming
[four]-year term from 2024 [to] 2028.” Wiknich further stated in his affidavit: “In
conjunction, I am also requesting the court [to] order that [Wiknich], currently number
[three] in the election results[,] now become number [two] in the election results and is
eligible to be sworn in and serve as a member of the Ridgecrest City Council for the full
term of four years [from] 2024 [to] 2028.”
Wiknich Filed Amended Motions to (1) Remove Blades from the City Council, and
(2) Have Himself Declared Officially Elected
On January 17, 2025, Wiknich filed an amended motion to remove Blades from
the City Council and an amended motion to have himself declared officially elected.
3.
Wiknich’s motions both stated: “Blades, was ineligible to run for Ridgecrest City
Council for the 2024 [to] 2028 term.… [Blades] was in violation of [the Election Code
and] the City of Ridgecrest Municipal Code [t]erm [l]imits [l]aw [section] 2-25 .… He is
unable to fulfill the terms of the office as established by [the] current City of Ridgecrest
[t]erm [l]imits law that only allows [eight] consecutive years to be served. He will have
completed his eighth consecutive year in December 2027. He was sworn in for his
first year on the Ridgecrest City Council in December … 2019.” The motions also
stated: “I am requesting that the court issue a judgement annulling the certificate of
election issued to [Blades] at the December 18, 2024 City Council meeting .…” The
motions further stated: “I am requesting that [I] be declared officially elected [as] having
the highest number of legal votes other than [Blades] .…”
On January 28, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Wiknich’s amended
motions. The court denied both amended motions as “procedurally improper.” (Italics
omitted.)
Trial Court Held an Election Contest Hearing
On February 6, 2025, the City of Ridgecrest filed an amicus letter, evidently in
support of Blades. However, the amicus letter is omitted from the record on appeal
provided by Wiknich.1
1 Although the City of Ridgecrest’s amicus letter is not in the record on appeal, it is
reflected on the Register of Actions included in the clerk’s transcript. Furthermore, the
record contains another communication from Ridgecrest’s City Attorney. Specifically,
the record contains an email dated July 16, 2024, from Ridgecrest’s City Attorney to
Wiknich’s wife, Shannon Wiknich. The email states:
“The City is well aware of the [eight-]year term limit in the
Ridgecrest Municipal Code. The language of our statute precludes a
council member from serving more than [eight] consecutive years on the
Council. Nothing in the Code prohibits a candidate from filing papers and
participating in the election process. Local elections are a matter governed
by the local agencies and they have the power to regulate such elections.
The right to participate in the elections and to run for a public office is one
4.
Thereafter, on February 7, 2025, the trial court held an election contest hearing.
Wiknich and Blades were present, each in a propria persona capacity; it appears that
counsel for the City of Ridgecrest was also present. The court heard argument from the
self-represented parties as well as counsel and took the matter under submission. The
record on appeal, however, does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the hearing.
On February 14, 2025, the trial court issued, via minute order, a written ruling,
including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined there were no
grounds for the election contest and that Blades was eligible to currently hold the office
of member of the Ridgecrest City Council. Accordingly, the court confirmed the election.
Trial Court’s Written Ruling
Specifically, the trial court’s written ruling stated:
“Plaintiff in this case … Wiknich seeks (1) an order removing …
Blades from the Ridgecrest City Council including annulling the
[c]ertificate of election; and (2) [d]eclaring [p]laintiff officially elected and
… issued a certificate of election as member of the Ridgecrest City Council
for the term of 2024 [to] 2028.
“Plaintiff contends … Blades was appointed to the City Council and
sworn in [in] December 2019 [citation]. He served a full year in 2019 [and
2020] and then he ran for [a] [four]-year term in November 2020. [Blades]
won the election and was sworn in again [in] December 2020. Currently he
is finishing year [five] and it will terminate in December … 2024. He will
be [t]ermed [o]ut [in] December 2027[,] however he was still allowed to
run for a term that ends in December 2028. He is ineligible and prohibited
by law to serve from December 2027 to December 2028.
“This case presents two principal issues:
of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. The City will not
and cannot restrict access to that process to a person that is otherwise
qualified to run for the office.… Blade[s], if elected, can serve the
remainder of his [eight-]year term. If at that time the term limits in the
Municipal Code remain unchanged by the voters, he can step down. If he
does not, then he would be in violation of our statute. In summary, the City
will not interfere with … Blades[’] right to seek reelection, as our Code
does not prohibit him from running for office.”
5.
(1) Whether there are grounds for an election contest.
(2) Whether … Blades is currently eligible to hold the office of
member of the Ridgecrest City Council.
No Grounds for Election Contest
The trial court next addressed the first issue it had identified, that is, whether there
were grounds for an election contest. The court noted that Elections Code section 16100,
subdivision (b) expressly provides that an elector2 may contest an election when “the
person who has been declared elected to an office was not, at the time of the election,
eligible to that office.” (Underlining omitted.) The court added: “Plaintiff files this
action pursuant to Elec[tions] Code[ section] 16100[, subdivision] (b), alleging that the
person who has been declared elected to an office was not, at the time of the election,
eligible to that office.” But the court concluded: “Here, … Blades was eligible to run for
office at the time of the election.” (Italics added.)
The trial court explained the reasoning underlying its conclusion. The court
referenced Ridgecrest Municipal Code section 2-25, subdivision (c), which was cited by
Wiknich and provides: “Any person who has held the office of member of the city
council for eight consecutive years shall not be eligible to hold such office until at least
two years have passed since such person last held such office. In no event shall any
person be eligible to serve as a member of the city council for more than
eight consecutive years.” (Italics added.) The court then observed: “At the time of the
election in November 2024[,] … Blades had not reached eight consecutive years [as a
member of the city council]. In November 2024[,] … Blades would be reaching
[five] years. He will not reach his eighth year until December 2027.” The court
determined: “[Accordingly,] [t]here are no grounds for the election contest.”
2 Section 321 of the Elections Code defines an “elector” as, among other things, “a
person who is a United States citizen 18 years of age or older and … is a resident of an
election precinct in this state on or before the day of an election.” In other words, elector
is basically synonymous with voter.
6.
Blades is Currently Eligible to Hold the Office of Member of City Council
Thereafter, the trial court turned to the second issue it had identified at the top of
its ruling, that is, whether Blades was currently eligible to hold the office of member of
the Ridgecrest City Council. As an initial matter, the court addressed in detail the
applicability of Pope v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 871, 873 (Pope) to the
instant case; Wiknich had cited Pope in support of his position that Blades was not
eligible to serve as a member of the City Council.
With regard to Pope, the trial court noted: “Pope held that a city term limit law
referring to an election to a four-year term does not [encompass] appointment or election
to a less than four-year term.” The court then recited Pope’s facts and procedural history:
“Harry Barovsky was elected to the Malibu city council for a
four-year term April 1998 to April 2002.… Barovsky passed away in
March 2000. In June 2000, Ms. Barovsky was appointed by the city
council to serve as a council member in her late husband’s place pending a
special election. The special election was held in November 2000 and
Ms. Barovsky was elected to the remaining 17-month term ending in
April 2002.… She [then sought] reelection for a further four-year term,
from April 2006 to April 2010.”
Thereafter, four individuals “filed a mandate petition and complaint for declaratory relief
and injunctive relief alleging Ms. Barovsky [was] ineligible to seek reelection under the
city’s term limit law.” (Pope, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 874.) The trial court there
granted the writ petition, prompting the Malibu City Clerk Lisa Pope and the City of
Malibu to file a mandate petition with the appellate court “challenging the [trial court’s]
order removing Ms. Barovsky from the ballot.” (Ibid.)
The Pope court observed: “The question before us is the proper construction of
the Malibu city council term limit law. This is a legal issue subject to our de novo
review. [Citations.] The proper interpretation of a municipality’s written law is subject
to our independent determination.” (Pope, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.) Pope
explained: “We find the meaning of the term limit law must be derived from its clear and
7.
unambiguous words without resorting to indicia of the city council’s or the voters’ intent.
It is well established that in determining the meaning of a statute, initiative, or ordinance,
we first look to its words.” (Ibid.) Pope added: “Ambiguous statutory language is that
which permits more than one reasonable interpretation. [Citations.] Because, as
discussed below, the language of the Malibu City Council term limit law is clear and
unambiguous, we presume the city council and the voters intended the meaning apparent
on its face and our inquiry ends there.” (Id. at pp. 875–876.)
Malibu Municipal Code section 2.08.040 was the municipal law at issue in Pope.
Pope noted: “There is nothing ambiguous about Malibu Municipal Code
section 2.08.040. Its language permits only one reasonable interpretation. It clearly
states, ‘No person shall be elected as a member of the city council for more than
two four-year terms .…’ ” (Pope, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.) Pope emphasized:
“Elected does not mean appointed. Appointed means: chosen officially for a job or
responsibility .…” (Id. at p. 877.) Pope added: “Further, a ‘four-year term’ is a
four-year term, not a 17-month term. The words ‘four-year term’ cannot reasonably be
construed to mean less than a four-year term or a term of up to four years’ duration.”
(Ibid.)
Pope concluded: “Ms. Barovsky was appointed by the city council to serve as a
council member for approximately five months, from June 2000 to November 2000. She
was elected to serve a remaining 17-month term, from November 2000 to April 2002,
pursuant to a special election. Ms. Barovsky was elected to serve one four-year term,
from April 2002 to April 2006. Because she has been elected to date to serve only
one four-year term, she is eligible, under Malibu Municipal Code section 2.08.040, for
reelection to a second four-year term. Hence, the respondent court’s ruling to the
contrary, which was premised on voter intent materials, must, with respect, be set aside.”
(Pope, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.)
8.
After summarizing Pope in detail as set forth above, the trial court, here, noted:
“The Pope Court distinguished the time that Ms. Barovsky was appointed versus elected.
The Malibu Municipal Code section 2.08.040 applicable in Pope states that ‘No person
shall be elected as a member of the city council for more than two four-year terms .…’ ”
The court further stated: “The facts here are similar to Pope; however, the relevant
municipal code is different. [¶] In the instant case, … Blades was appointed to the City
Council in December 2019[, when] [t]he former seat occupied by Vice Mayor Wallace
Martin became vacant upon his resignation. The City Council decided to determine
Martin’s replacement by appointment rather than by holding a special election.… Blades
was appointed to take Martin’s place and sworn in immediately on Dec. 4, 2019.” The
court continued: “Thereafter … Blades was elected to serve his first four-year term
[from] December 2020 [to] December 2024.… Blades was elected to serve his
second four-year term [from] December 2024 [to] December 2028. Following Pope, this
would be fine because the applicable municipal code in Pope states that a person cannot
be elected for more than two four-year terms. In the instant case, however, the municipal
code is different.” (Italics added.)
The trial court pivoted to the relevant section of the Ridgecrest Municipal Code.
The court observed: “Plaintiff cites to the Ridgecrest Municipal Code, [a]rticle II—City
Council, [section] 2-25[, subdivision] (c), which states … ‘Any person who has held the
office of member of the city council for eight consecutive years shall not be eligible to
hold such office until at least two years have passed since such person last held such
office. In no event shall any person be eligible to serve as a member of the city council
for more than eight consecutive years.’ ” The court explained: “The City of Ridgecrest
Municipal Code, unlike the City of Malibu[,] does not make a distinction between
whether someone was appointed or elected as a member of the city council. The plain
language of the Ridgecrest code suggests that a person cannot serve for more than
eight consecutive years regardless of whether they are appointed or elected.” (Italics
9.
added.) The court further analyzed: “However, at this juncture, … Blades has not
reached eight consecutive years. He will not reach his eighth year until December 2027.
The code does not suggest that … Blades cannot run for the city council, or must be
removed before he reaches more than eight consecutive years. The code states a person
cannot serve more than eight consecutive years.” (Italics added.)
Trial Court’s Conclusion
The trial court ruled: “The Court denies the Plaintiff’s request to remove
… Blades and declare himself officially elected. Plaintiff has no grounds to contest the
election.… Blades was eligible to run at the time of the election. In November 2024,
… Blades had served [five] years.”
The trial court added: “Blades is eligible to hold the office of member of the city
council no more than eight consecutive years.… Blades will not reach his
eighth consecutive year until December 2027. Plaintiff cites to no authority that suggests
this Court should remove … Blades before he reaches the eighth consecutive year.”
The trial court concluded: “For the reasons discussed herein, the Court’s judgment
is to confirm the election. [¶] Judgment will be entered separately.”
The same day, judgment was entered “confirming the election.” Wiknich’s appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court Properly Denied the Election Contest and Properly Declined to
Remove Blades from Office and Install Wiknich in His Place
Wiknich challenges the trial court’s ruling and judgment confirming the election.
We affirm the court’s ruling and judgment.
Wiknich’s argument in the trial court hinged primarily on the City of Ridgecrest
Municipal Code, article II, section 2-25, subdivision (c). As previously noted, this term
limits provision states: “Any person who has held the office of member of the city
council for eight consecutive years shall not be eligible to hold such office until at least
10.
two years have passed since such person last held such office. In no event shall any
person be eligible to serve as a member of the city council for more than
eight consecutive years.”
“The proper interpretation of a municipality’s written law is subject to our
independent determination.” (Pope, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.) Accordingly, we
review de novo the trial court’s construction of the term limits provision of the Ridgecrest
Municipal Code. We conclude the term limits provision at issue is clear and
unambiguous and thus our inquiry ends with interpreting its plain language. As relevant
here, the term limits provision clearly precludes any person from serving on the city
council for more than eight consecutive years.
As discussed above, the trial court ruled: “The [municipal] code [provision] does
not suggest that … Blades cannot run for the city council, or must be removed before he
reaches more than eight consecutive years. The code states a person cannot serve more
than eight consecutive years.” (Italics added.) We agree with the court’s interpretation.
Here, Blades had served as a member of the city council for five consecutive years
when he was reelected in the November 2024 election to serve another four-year term.
Under the plain language of the Ridgecrest Municipal Code’s term limits provision,
Blades can only serve three years of his current four-year term.
Wiknich complains that the trial court did not consider a resolution passed by the
Ridgecrest City Council on July 17, 2024. Wiknich provided the court with an unsigned
and uncertified copy of the city council’s resolution. Wiknich points to a provision of the
resolution that states: “Pursuant to the requirements of the laws of the State of California
relating to General Law Cities, there is called and ordered to be held in the City of
Ridgecrest, California, on Tuesday, November 5, 2024, a General Municipal Election for
the purpose of electing one Mayor for a term of two years and two Members of the City
Council, each for the full term of four years.”
11.
However, this provision of the resolution merely clarified that the November 5,
2024 city council election was a general election rather than a special election and that
each of the seats at issue was open for a full four-year term. In other words, the election
was not called to elect members to serve out the remainder of existing terms of members
who had prematurely left their positions on the city council. Rather, the election was for
city council seats that were open for full four-year terms. To the extent Wiknich suggests
that this provision of the resolution somehow precluded Blades from standing for
election, or made him ineligible to stand for election in November 2024, his contention is
unsupported and unpersuasive.
In sum, as the trial court noted, Wiknich “cites to no authority that suggests [the
courts] should remove … Blades before he reaches the eighth consecutive year” of his
service as a member of the Ridgecrest City Council. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the court confirming the election. (See Pope, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at
p. 876 [“the right to serve in a public office is a fundamental right of citizenship that
cannot be restricted except by a clear declaration of law”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear his own costs on appeal.
12.
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