In re E.H. CA1/3

CourtListener 10733219Calctapp7 nov 2025

Testo completo

Filed 11/7/25 In re E.H. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re E.H., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173260
v.
(San Francisco County
J.J. et al.,
Super. Ct. No. JD23-3196)
Defendants and Appellants.

J.J. (Father) and N.H. (Mother), parents of minor E.H., each appeal
from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights,
claiming the court erred in concluding the parents failed to establish the
beneficial relationship exception, and in determining the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California
law did not apply. Mother additionally contends the court erred in denying
her petition to modify the order terminating her reunification services. The
San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) concedes, and we agree, that
a conditional reversal and remand is appropriate on the ICWA claim, but we
find no merit in the parents’ remaining claims. Accordingly, we will

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conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for
the limited purpose of compliance with ICWA and its related statutory
provisions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Dependency Proceedings
This family was the subject of two prior dependency proceedings. In or
around August 2018, then two-year-old E.H. was hospitalized for ingesting
methamphetamines and opioids. He was detained on allegations of Mother’s
substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence issues, and Father’s
substance abuse, domestic violence issues, and inability to provide care to the
child due to a lack of housing and income. The case was closed in February
2020, with legal and physical custody of E.H. awarded to Mother, and no
visitation for Father.
A second dependency case was initiated three months later in May
2020 upon allegations that Mother was again using methamphetamines
while caring for the child. Mother admitted to relapsing and agreed to have a
relative care for E.H. Father was provided with therapeutic visitation from
October 2020 to April 2021, but the visits were terminated in May 2021 due
to the issuance of a restraining order protecting Mother and E.H. from
Father. The second dependency case was dismissed in or around March
2022, with sole legal and physical custody again awarded to Mother, and no
visitation for Father.
B. Charging Petition and Detention
On June 26, 2023, the Agency filed a juvenile wardship petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j),
seeking to again detain E.H. (age six) due to Mother’s substance abuse and

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.

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mental health issues and unsafe home environment; the parents’ domestic
violence history; and Father’s substance abuse and failure to protect E.H.
from abuse and neglect.
In a combined detention and jurisdiction report, the Agency detailed
Mother’s long history of substance abuse and inability to appropriately care
for E.H. (who is autistic) and his half-brother D.B. (not a party to this
appeal). Mother, who was 32 years old at the time of the report, had
struggled with substance abuse since she was 15 years old. Her home was
unlivable and “ ‘covered in trash’ ” with no space to walk. The walls of the
bathroom were smeared with feces, and broken glass was found on a bed.
The Agency reported that Mother had not been taking her medication for her
mental health issues, and that she and D.B.’s father had been using drugs.
Mother refused to divulge information about her mental health, submit to a
drug test, or sign a release of information allowing the social worker to speak
to E.H.’s health care providers. Although Mother later agreed to submit to a
drug test, she was aggressive and uncooperative, and no test was completed.
Father was angry that E.H. had been removed from Mother three
times, as “he had been telling the Courts from the beginning that she was not
able to care for him.” Father reportedly wanted custody of E.H. but was
unable to take him at the time due to unsuitable housing.
At the initial detention hearing in June 2023, Father’s parental status
was elevated from alleged to biological father. At the continued hearing the
following month, the juvenile court detained E.H. and placed him in foster
care. The parents were granted supervised visitation.
C. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In its August 2023 disposition report, the Agency recommended that
the petition be sustained, that E.H. remain in foster care, and that

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reunification services be provided to the parents. The report included the
following information.
Mother denied having substance abuse issues but had not complied
with random drug screening. She reported having been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety, and she was seeing a therapist and a
psychiatrist who managed her medication. She denied her home was in an
unsafe or hazardous condition. She also denied domestic violence with D.B.’s
father, but acknowledged prior domestic violence incidents with Father.
According to Father, Mother had substance abuse and mental health
issues in the past, but he had “not interacted with her for some years.” He
acknowledged domestic violence with Mother but claimed she was the
aggressor. Father said he had been clean of methamphetamines for six
months but used cannabis daily. He stated his housing situation did not
allow him to care for E.H., as he lived in a single residence occupancy (SRO)
unit.
The Agency found E.H. was in good medical and physical health. E.H.’s
doctor at Kaiser Permanente reported E.H. had been diagnosed with autism
and had “difficulty expressing himself through language.” The doctor
recommended further applied behavior analysis (ABA) therapy. E.H. had an
individualized education plan (IEP) due to his autism and speech
impairment, and his disability affected his ability to participate in classroom
activities, appropriately communicate and socially interact with others, and
follow adult directions without specialized services and supports. He had
been placed with a foster parent who had experience working with minors on
the spectrum. The foster parent reported some challenges with E.H. hitting
himself and others and screaming when he became overwhelmed, but the

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foster parent had worked to reduce these outbreaks through positive
reinforcement and a stable routine.
The Agency reported that E.H. “is connected to his maternal family and
has a limited relationship with his father.” Father “has not had significant
contact with the minor throughout his life” and was “an absent father, with
little interactions and/or contact with the child.”
Regarding visitation, the Agency reported that Mother was disengaged
and abruptly ended the first in-person visit with E.H., but she attended all
subsequent visits. Father missed one visit during the review period due to
illness. The parents reportedly “interacted very well” with E.H.
In a December 2023 addendum report, the Agency reported that E.H.
had been moved from his initial foster placement and was being assessed for
further placement and services because the caregiver did not have “the skills
to be able to address and mitigate [E.H.’s] developmental and behavioral
needs.”
The Agency further reported that Mother initially tested negative for
substances, but her drug tests from September 2023 came back positive for
methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana, and a third test came
back positive for the same substances, along with fentanyl. Father
meanwhile had not identified the services he was purportedly engaging in to
address his substance abuse and mental health issues. He displayed erratic
behavior with the social worker, sending her repeated messages and blaming
her for his own trauma and child welfare history.
At the jurisdiction hearing in December 2023, the juvenile court
sustained a first amended petition, continued the matter for disposition, and
maintained supervised visitation for the parents.

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In a second addendum report filed in March 2024, the Agency reported
that Mother tested positive for marijuana in December 2023, and her
January 2024 results came back positive for norfentanyl, the metabolite of
fentanyl. Mother claimed the test results were inaccurate and stressed she
had been participating in substance abuse treatment. She missed some drug
tests due to purported illness. Mother’s psychiatrist reported her working
diagnosis was unspecified schizophrenia with moderate methamphetamine
use. Mother had reportedly stopped taking psychotropic medication against
medical advice while pregnant with D.B., and she refused to provide the
social worker with any details about her psychotropic medication.
The Agency reported E.H. had been moved to an intensive services
foster home in Brentwood. He was being transported to his school of origin in
San Francisco, a two-hour commute each way, and the school reported that
his behavior had become “more intense.” He was reportedly hitting and
punching himself and others for no apparent reason. He was continuing to
receive ABA therapy.
At the contested disposition hearing on March 21, 2024, the juvenile
court adopted the recommendations of the Agency and ordered out-of-home
placement for E.H., with reunification services for the parents. Mother was
granted unsupervised visitation, while Father was granted an additional in-
person supervised visit per week.
D. Post-Disposition Review Period
In September 2024, the Agency filed a status review report
recommending the parents’ reunification services be terminated. According
to the Agency, Father still lived in an SRO and was unwilling to accept
services and interventions. He had met with a therapist, but the Agency
believed he needed more intensive support. At times, he presented with

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rapid speech, and his thoughts were not linear, but he denied a substance
abuse problem. The Agency emphasized that in all three of the dependency
cases involving this family, Father failed to take accountability for his actions
and denied needing services.
Father’s twice-weekly visits with E.H. reportedly went well. His visits
progressed from supervised to monitored in the community. Father was
described as a caring parent who brought food and toys to the visits. He was
coherent and attentive and did not appear to be under the influence of
substances during visits.
Mother was engaged in individual and group therapy, domestic
violence services, and substance abuse treatment and testing. During the
reporting period, the Agency increased Mother’s visitation and facilitated
unsupervised visits, as well as an in-home trial visit for E.H. Mother was
described as “capable and attentive” and kept her home clean, with food, toys,
and other provisions for the children. She interacted with the children
lovingly and attended to each of their needs, while the children appeared
comfortable, responsive to her directives, and happy in her presence.
From July to August 2024, Mother missed several drug tests for
various reasons. In mid-August 2024, Mother tested positive for fentanyl.
Due to her relapse, the Agency changed visitation to twice-weekly monitored
visits, and Mother “expressed serious apprehension about the Agency’s
requirement that she be sober when parenting her children.” The Agency
concluded that “[d]espite [Mother’s] stellar engagement, connection to
resources, intelligence, and parenting skills, she has not been able to
demonstrate a desire or ability to remain sober in order to safely parent her
children.”

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E.H., age eight at the time of the report, had been placed in eight
different foster homes since his removal and was most recently placed with
his great aunt. He was in a special day class, received services through the
school district for his autism, and was engaged in ABA therapy. The Agency
described E.H.’s “inability to effectively use language to communicate
feelings, needs, and experiences,” but noted he could engage in basic
conversation when he felt comfortable. When E.H. experienced unexpected
changes or transitions, he would cry, elope, refuse to go to school, hit, and
pull hair. The Agency emphasized the “overwhelming need” for E.H. to be
“able to acclimate to a home, school, and community without facing the fear
of being uprooted. Multiple removals and arbitrary placement changes have
traumatized him and caused major setbacks in his overall progress and
functioning.”
The six-month review hearing was continued after Father filed a
request to elevate his parenting status to presumed parent, a move that was
opposed by minor’s counsel. In November 2024, the juvenile court held what
it concluded was the 18-month review hearing and found that E.H. could not
safely be returned to the parents. The court terminated their reunification
services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing. The court denied without
prejudice Father’s motion to be declared a presumed parent. The parents’
visits were reduced to one visit per month.
E. Section 366.26 Report
In its section 366.26 report, issued in February 2025, the Agency
recommended termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent
plan for E.H. The Agency reported E.H. had been placed with a great aunt
for one month before being placed with Shauna Sims, an experienced
caretaker who had earlier fostered E.H. for several months. E.H. reportedly

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responded very well to Sims, who loved him, kept his environment calm, and
was committed to adopting him. E.H. continued to receive services provided
by the school district, including speech and behavioral therapy.
After reunification services were terminated, the parents’ visitation
was reduced to one Saturday visit at the library or a park. E.H. was happy to
go to visits with Mother but did not return her affection when she greeted
him, and he separated easily at the end of visits. The Agency similarly
reported that E.H. appeared comfortable around Father but did not return
his hugs.
F. Mother’s Section 388 Petition
In May 2025, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking reinstatement
of reunification services. Mother alleged that since the 18-month review
hearing in November 2024, she had continued engaging in services to support
her mental health and sobriety and began participating in new services,
including a methadone program and a modified therapeutic substance abuse
program. Mother had also moved out of her prior residence in the
Tenderloin, where she faced daily challenges, and was now living in a more
positive environment. In her petition, Mother stated that an additional six-
month period of reunification services would “support and strengthen
[Mother’s] sobriety” and would “demonstrate to the court, the benefit to
[E.H.]” that Mother “is ready and able to receive the child back into the home,
to resume the parental role and to build upon the already loving relationship
she and [E.H.] have.”
In support of her petition, Mother included several letters: one from
her therapist indicating that Mother had continued to actively participate in
weekly psychotherapy sessions since December 2023; a second letter from a
counselor at an opioid addition treatment clinic confirming Mother’s

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participation and compliance with her treatment plan since February 2025; a
third from the addiction recovery services at Kaiser, confirming Mother’s
current enrollment and active participation in services since September 2024;
and a fourth letter from therapist Edna Barnes, with whom Mother had been
engaging since December 2024. Barnes stated Mother had been cooperative
and reflecting in sessions and was making meaningful progress.
The juvenile court scheduled a hearing to address whether or not to
grant an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition. At the
hearing on May 12, 2025, the court ultimately declined to hold an evidentiary
hearing, concluding Mother had not made a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances given her prior engagement in services that did not resolve her
underlying substance abuse. The court further concluded it was not in E.H.’s
best interest to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and offer Mother additional
services, as E.H. was presently with a caregiver who was meeting his needs.
G. Section 366.26 Hearing
The contested section 366.26 hearing took place on May 14, 2025.
Protective services worker (“PSW”) Monica Ternullo was called as a witness
for Mother. Ternullo testified that during her work on the case, Mother’s
supervised visitation had progressed, and visits were consistent and positive.
Mother showed patience with E.H., and her interventions sometimes helped
to calm him. Although E.H. had limited language skills and significant
behavioral issues that made it difficult to assess the quality of his
relationship with Mother, Ternullo noted E.H. would generally respond to
Mother’s directions and attempts to interact. Mother was a good education
advocate for E.H.
On cross-examination, Ternullo acknowledged that despite her positive
remarks about Mother, she still recommended termination of services based

10
on Mother’s relapse and Ternullo’s observations that E.H. was comfortable,
happy, and more expressive and willing to interact in his placement with
Sims.
With regard to Father, Ternullo testified that as visits transitioned
from supervised to community-based visits, Father was appropriate with
E.H., and the visits were positive.
PSW Sharon Anderson testified regarding her involvement in the case
after reunification services were terminated. With regard to Sims’s report
that E.H. was “pretty normal” and once in a while was “more agitated” after
visits with Mother, Anderson believed, based on her review of contact logs,
the case file, and the prior social worker’s notes, that E.H.’s agitation
occurred because of the car ride or change in routine. On one occasion,
Anderson was at Sims’s home and observed “he was eager to go when the
transportation worker came” to take him for a visit with Mother. However,
Anderson testified that E.H. never had “an issue” in separating from Mother
at the conclusion of visits, and that he kept his arms at his sides when
Mother hugged him.
Anderson further testified that Father’s visitation had been mostly
consistent. In Anderson’s view, nothing stood out about the visits, and E.H.
had no negative reaction when the visits were reduced from once a week to
once a month. When asked how she assessed this, Anderson responded,
“mostly, through the reports of the caregiver.” Anderson explained she did
not interview E.H. “because he doesn’t talk. The only time he has talked to
me is when he is prompted by his caregiver to say, thank you, hello, or
goodbye. Then he kind of just echoes it back.” Anderson acknowledged she
did not ask E.H. whether he missed either parent.

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When asked whether Father’s role was beneficial to E.H., Anderson
explained that the permanency provided by Sims was more beneficial given
Father’s pattern of substance abuse. She later testified that post-adoption
contact with Father could be a benefit to E.H., but she acknowledged there
was no agreement on post-adoption contact. Anderson testified that due to
E.H.’s special needs, she did not know how the severance of the parent-child
relationship with either parent would affect the child.
Anderson explained E.H. would communicate by making a face,
walking backwards, or twiddling his fingers. Although he would not sit close
to her, Anderson noted E.H. would sit close to Sims, listen to her, and do
whatever she asked him to do. He had had no behavioral outbursts since
living with Sims, and there had been no reported difficulty at school.
Anderson believed that E.H. looked to Sims as a parent to take care of his
daily needs, and that adoption was the best permanent plan for E.H.
Mother’s evidence included a flash drive containing videos of her and
E.H. dancing and a graduation ceremony during which E.H. could be heard
asking for Mother. The drive also contained a collage of photographs of E.H.
and Mother; a compilation of visitation and transportation logs from
September 2023 to March 2025; a copy of the Agency’s six-month status
review report; and a letter from E.H.’s special education teacher. A letter
from Mother was admitted over the objections of the Agency and minor’s
counsel.
Mother also testified. She believed E.H. was attached to her and
excited to see her based on how he smiled and walked with her. Mother
described two instances when it was hard for E.H. to leave at the end of
visits. She further explained that E.H. enjoyed looking through photographs
and videos of them and verbally instructed her to “make it record. Then I

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have to record whatever he is doing. Then I have to watch it because I record
him so much.”
Father presented no evidence on his own behalf.
After closing arguments, the juvenile court took the matter under
submission and continued the case for decision on May 19, 2025. At the
continued hearing, the court first found by clear and convincing evidence that
E.H. was generally and specifically adoptable, and that both parents had
satisfied the first element of the beneficial relationship exception by
maintaining consistent visitation.
Turning to the second element as it pertained to Father, the juvenile
court found he had offered no evidence that E.H. was “bonded to him for a
significant period of time or that he provided any day-to-day care for the
child.” The court noted visits were “generally positive, but there was no
persuasive evidence of a significant positive attachment from [E.H.] toward
[Father].” Relying on Anderson’s testimony, the court noted that E.H. was
“unaffected by the visits and acted ‘normal,’ after the visits, and there was no
on problem separating at the end of the visits.”
The juvenile court further found Father did not satisfy the third
element of the beneficial relationship exception that terminating parental
rights would be detrimental to E.H. In concluding E.H. would not be harmed
by severing his relationship with Father, the court observed E.H. “has lived
for a significant amount of time with Ms. Sims thriving” and is more
talkative and more expressive with fewer behavioral issues while in her care.
The court also pointed to “evidence that behavioral incidents at school are
down” and to “evidence that Ms. Sims can calm [E.H.] down and that she
loves him, and there is evidence that they are affectionate.”

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The juvenile court then turned to Mother’s showing and found that, on
balance, Mother satisfied the second element of the beneficial relationship
exception by sufficiently demonstrating E.H. had a significant, positive, and
emotional attachment to her. The court noted E.H. had lived about half of
his life with her; he referred to her as “mommy” and was eager to go on visits
with her; he reciprocated her affection; and she was a calming presence for
him. However, the court concluded Mother failed to satisfy the third element
of the beneficial relationship exception. The court cited evidence that
Mother’s missed visits with E.H. “had no impact” on the child. The court
further noted that, unlike in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631
(Caden C.), there was no evidence suggesting the termination of the
relationship “would lead to emotional instability, acting out, difficulties in
school, insomnia, depression,” and there was no “ ‘intense bond.’ ” In
highlighting “the opposite evidence that [E.H.’s] emotional instability and
behavioral incidents have decreased while he has been with Ms. Sims,” the
court determined the bond with Mother was “not an intense one” and found
“no evidence of distress on [E.H.’s] part at . . . not being able to live with
[Mother].”
Based on its findings, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights
of both parents. The court also found that ICWA did not apply.
Father and Mother each appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 388 Petition
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying her
section 388 petition because she made a prima facie case of changed
circumstances based on her engagement in new services and her change of

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residence to a more stable environment. No error or abuse of discretion
appears.
“Section 388 permits the parent of a dependent child to petition the
juvenile court for a hearing to modify an earlier order on the basis of changed
circumstances or new evidence. [Citation.] The petitioning party bears the
burden of showing that there is new evidence or changed circumstances and
that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child.”
(In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120 (N.F.).) “Whether the juvenile
court should modify a previously made order rests within its discretion, and
its determination may not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of
discretion.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525.)
The petitioning party must make a prima facie showing of the requisite
elements to warrant an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition. (In re
J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127.) A prima facie showing is made when
“the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would
sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[I]f the liberally
construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of
changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best
interest of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition.’ ” (In
re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.)
“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior
order. [Citation.] The change in circumstances must relate to the purpose of
the order and be such that the modification of the prior order is appropriate.
[Citations.] In other words, the problem that initially brought the child
within the dependency system must be removed or ameliorated. [Citations.]
The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant

15
nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged
order.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.)
“In the context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly
resisted treatment in the past, a showing of materially changed
circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period of sobriety or
participation in yet another program.” (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121,
citing In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [7 months of sobriety
since last relapse insufficient to show changed circumstances]; In re Kimberly
F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9 [“one must be ‘clean’ for a much
longer period than 120 days to show real reform”].) Courts have held that
when a parent has a long history of substance abuse, a period of recent and
relatively brief sobriety represents “changing” rather than “changed”
circumstances. (See In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 482.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Mother
failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances to entitle her
to an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition for modification. The
record reflects that Mother has grappled with substance abuse for more than
half her life, and that her methamphetamine abuse led to two prior
dependency proceedings in 2018 and 2020 as well as the instant proceedings.
During this case, the Agency continued to report Mother’s positive drug tests
through mid-August 2024. And in September 2024, she expressed “serious
apprehension about the Agency’s requirement that she be sober when
parenting,” which reflected a troubling lack of insight into her substance
abuse and the threat that it posed to her young children.
As such, Mother had to show more than “a relatively brief period of
sobriety or participation in yet another program” to demonstrate changed
circumstances. (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) The allegations and

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evidence supporting Mother’s petition demonstrated that she had been
continuing to engage in existing services for mental health and sobriety since
November 2024; that she was in the process of receiving opioid addiction
treatment; that she had remained compliant with counseling and medication
since February 2025; and that she had moved out of a challenging
neighborhood. We commend Mother for these efforts. Nonetheless, the
record reflects that Mother’s problems with substance abuse have been
resistant to similar services in the past, and that her recent period of
sobriety—approximately 9 months between Mother’s last positive drug test
and the juvenile court’s decision on her section 388 motion—was
comparatively brief given her long history of substance abuse. On this
record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in concluding Mother’s
petition demonstrated changing but not yet changed circumstances.2
B. Beneficial Relationship Exception to Termination of
Parental Rights
The parents contend the juvenile court erred in concluding the
beneficial relationship exception did not apply in this case. As we shall
explain, we conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s factual
findings against the parents, and its determination that any harm of
terminating their parental rights would not outweigh the benefits of adoption
was not an abuse of discretion.
1. General Legal Principles
At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court may order one of three
alternative permanent plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster

2 In light of our conclusion, we need not address the Agency’s alternative
contention that the juvenile court could have denied Mother’s section 388
solely on the grounds that it was filed too close in time to the section 366.26
hearing.

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care. (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted,
the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption, subject to
several statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) It is the parent’s
burden to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1). (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296–297.)
At issue here is the beneficial relationship exception, which applies
when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination
would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following
circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To establish this exception, a
parent must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements:
(1) regular visitation and contact; (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child; and (3) the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
The first two elements are factual determinations reviewed for substantial
evidence, while the third element involves both factual determinations
reviewed for substantial evidence, as well as the juvenile court’s weighing of
the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a
new, adoptive home, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at
pp. 639–641.)
In evaluating whether the beneficial relationship exception applies, we
do not consider the possibility that visits will continue after adoption.
Rather, we “must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the
relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how

18
the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect,
what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent
in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
2. Undisputed Findings
There is no dispute that E.H. was shown to be adoptable by clear and
convincing evidence, or that the parents adequately maintained regular visits
and contact with E.H. to meet the first element of the beneficial relationship
exception. Thus, we turn to the second and third Caden C. elements.
3. Existence of Beneficial Relationship
For the second element of the beneficial relationship exception, the
juvenile court must determine whether there is a “significant, positive,
emotional” parent-child relationship that the child would benefit from
continuing. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.) “[T]he focus is the
child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he
age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . . . [C]ourts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.
[Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, even as courts
must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to
an entirely consistent pattern. [Citations.] Certainly, it is not necessary—
even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise ‘quantitative measurement of
the specific amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical care” [the parent]
provided during [his or] her weekly visits.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s ruling
that Father did not satisfy the second Caden C. element. E.H. was eight
years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and had special needs due

19
to his diagnosis of autism, needs that had proven challenging even for
multiple skilled foster caretakers during the dependency proceedings. He
had never lived with Father and the two had only minimal contact prior to
the initiation of the dependency proceedings. During the prior two
dependency matters, Father never gained placement or physical custody of
E.H., and his therapeutic visitation with the minor was eventually
terminated. In the instant proceedings, visits never progressed beyond
supervised and monitored status. In short, the evidence of Father’s very
limited contact and caregiving experience with E.H. over the course of the
child’s life supports the court’s conclusion that the two did not form a
significant and emotional attachment that E.H. would benefit from
continuing.
Father emphasizes that his interactions with E.H. during visits were
appropriate and positive, and that E.H. was comfortable and happy in
Father’s presence. But “[a] parent must show more than frequent and loving
contact or pleasant visits” in order to carry their burden as to the second
Caden C. element. (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) Notably, it
was reported E.H. did not return Father’s outward displays of affection or
experience any difficulty separating from Father when visits ended and when
Father’s visitation was reduced. On this record, the court could reasonably
conclude the evidence of positive interactions during visits was insufficient to
demonstrate the type of significant emotional attachment necessary to meet
the beneficial relationship exception. (See In re Andrew M. (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 803, 819 (Andrew M.) [no evidence that minor showed distress or
was upset when separating from parents]; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1311–1313, 1316 [minor never lived with mother and
evidently had no difficulty separating from her].)

20
Father suggests the juvenile court erred by relying on PSW Anderson’s
testimony because she admitted during the section 366.26 hearing that she
had not considered any beneficial aspects of E.H.’s relationship with Father.
Though Anderson testified she simply “did not consider” whether there was a
benefit to E.H. in maintaining his relationship with Father, such testimony
provides no grounds for reversal. It was ultimately Father’s burden to prove
the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 636–637), not the Agency’s burden to show the absence of it.
Critically, Father simply chose to cross-examine Anderson, while offering no
testimony or evidence at the section 366.26 hearing on the nature and quality
of his relationship with E.H. Unlike Mother, Father did not submit any
detailed logs of his visits with E.H. (see In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833,
856 (J.D.) [visitation logs provided “an extremely telling glimpse of how”
child felt and interacted with parent]), nor does he contend such records were
unavailable to him.
Meanwhile, Anderson’s testimony was not the only evidence before the
juvenile court that bore on Father’s relationship with E.H. As Father points
out, the Agency had a duty to provide “objective, disinterested information”
about the quality of parent-child contacts to assist the juvenile court in
evaluating the beneficial relationship exception. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th
at p. 860; see §§ 366.22, subd. (c)(1)(B), 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(B); In re Lorenzo
C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343–1345.) Our review reveals that at all
relevant times, the Agency included facts about the quality of Father’s
interactions with E.H. in its reports to the juvenile court. These reports
provided substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s findings regarding the
relationship between Father and E.H.

21
Father additionally criticizes Anderson for “rel[ying] on the caretaker,
the person who had a vested interest in parental rights being terminated, to
tell her whether the child was effected [sic] by any reduction in visits” and for
not asking E.H. how he felt about Father or whether he missed Father. But
Father cites no authority that prohibits a social worker or juvenile court from
relying on information from a prospective adoptive parent in assessing the
parent-child bond, particularly where the child lacks the ability to effectively
communicate. (See In re Keyonie R. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1572
[hearsay in social worker’s report is admissible to support juvenile court’s
findings at post-disposition review hearing].) As Anderson explained, she did
not interview E.H. because he is mostly nonverbal, and the record amply
establishes that E.H. had difficulty expressing himself through language. On
this record, the court could reasonably conclude it was appropriate for
Anderson to rely on Sims’s accounts of E.H.’s behavior before and after
visitation to assess the impact of the visits with Father.
Father’s remaining arguments likewise fail to persuade us that the
juvenile court erred. He suggests his limited contact with E.H. should not be
held against him because, as he testified at the 18-month review hearing,
Mother would “run[] and hide[] . . . behind the restraining order” and
“ignore[]” him when he attempted to contact her.3 He further contends E.H.

3 The Agency contends Father cannot cite, and we may not consider,
Father’s testimony from the 18-month review hearing because he did not
present this same evidence to the juvenile court at the section 366.26
hearing. Though the Agency cites no specific authority prohibiting a
reviewing court from considering a parent’s testimony from a prior hearing in
the same dependency case, we acknowledge that general principles of
forfeiture and fairness may dictate such a result. (See In re D.P. (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1282, 1292–1293.) In any event, Father’s earlier testimony
would not have assisted him in demonstrating the juvenile court’s error on
the second Caden C. element. Notably, the record indicates that the

22
did not show affection in typical ways due to his autism, and thus, the
comfort and happiness he displayed during visits supported the conclusion
that the relationship was beneficial to him. However, on review for
substantial evidence, we must “draw all reasonable inferences in support of
the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order,
and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Father’s attempt to draw inferences and view the
record in a light most favorable to him is insufficient to demonstrate error.
In sum, the juvenile court did not err in concluding Father failed to
demonstrate the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship.
4. Whether Harm of Terminating Parental Relationship
Outweighs Benefits of Adoption
For the third element of the beneficial relationship exception, the
juvenile court must determine “whether the harm of severing the relationship
outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would
deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’
even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would
‘harm[]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.]
That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform:
does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm
[the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive,
emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ [Citation.] When the relationship
with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a

restraining order, which was issued in or around May 2021 during the second
dependency case, “allowed for supervised visits.”

23
new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to
the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634, italics omitted.)
As our Supreme Court has cautioned, “understanding the harm
associated with severing the relationship is a subtle enterprise—sometimes
depending on more than just how beneficial the relationship is. In many
cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will
substantially determine how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship,
which must be weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive home.
[Citation.] A child would benefit from continuing a strong, positive, and
affirming relationship, and it would be destabilizing to lose that relationship.
Sometimes, though, a relationship involves tangled benefits and burdens. In
those cases, the court faces the complex task of disentangling the
consequences of removing those burdens along with the benefits of the
relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Examples of potential
harms from the loss of a parental relationship may include “emotional
instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school,
insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Id. at p. 633.)
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding the parents did not satisfy the third Caden C. prong. The court’s
on-record remarks reflected the appropriate and subtle balancing of the
relevant considerations required under Caden C. As the court noted, E.H.
has thrived in his placement with Sims, who wishes to adopt him and has
provided a stable home environment appropriate to his special needs. His
relationship with Father was not shown to be sufficiently significant to
suggest E.H. would be harmed by losing it, and despite E.H.’s attachment to
Mother, he generally showed no difficulty separating from her after visits.

24
On this record, the court could reasonably conclude that life for E.H. in the
adoptive home without the parents in his life would not be so detrimental
that it outweighed the benefits of a secure and stable new home.
Resisting this conclusion, the parents emphasize the positive
interactions they had with E.H. during visits. But this was insufficient to
satisfy their burden. “A ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive some benefit
from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation” ’ is
not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption.
[Citation.] It is only ‘[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so important to
the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its
loss, [that] termination would be “detrimental to the child due to” the child’s
beneficial relationship with a parent.’ ” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th
at p. 818.) The parents “must prove some type of harm beyond the fact that
their loving visits would cease.” (Id. at p. 820.)
Father insists there was a “plethora” of evidence of such harm. For
instance, he argues the testimony of child welfare worker Amone Bounkhoun
at the disposition hearing provided evidence of “visible behavioral issues after
visits ended,” such as E.H. not wanting to eat, not wanting to get up the next
morning, and being less responsive to the caregiver’s directions. Setting
aside Father’s forfeiture of this contention by failing to present Bounkhoun’s
testimony at the section 366.26 hearing, we conclude the evidence does not
compel a finding in Father’s favor as a matter of law. (See In re Aurora P.
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1165 (Aurora P.) [where issue on appeal turns
on appellant’s failure of proof at trial, question is whether evidence compels a
finding in appellant’s favor as a matter of law].) Notably, Bounkhoun did not
attribute E.H.’s behavioral issues to his dissatisfaction with the foster
caregiver or the termination of visits with the parents. Indeed, when asked if

25
E.H.’s behavior was a sign that he wanted more time with the parents,
Bounkhoun responded, “it’s hard to say with [E.H.] given his developmental
disability and that he’s not able to articulate it. I don’t know how much of it
is, you know, his parents, how much of it could be just a long car ride.” As
such, Bounkhoun’s equivocal testimony does not compel a finding in Father’s
favor as a matter of law.
Father also relies on testimony that he and Mother gave at the 18-
month review hearing. Specifically, Father cites his testimony that E.H.
showed “a little disappointment” when visits ended and once asked Father if
he would “run away with him.” Father also cites Mother’s testimony that
E.H. would “hit sometimes because he doesn’t want to leave me,” and would
“throw a fit when it is time to leave.” Again, setting aside Father’s failure to
present this evidence at the section 366.26 hearing, we are not persuaded the
cited testimony calls for a finding in Father’s favor as a matter of law.
(Aurora P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) Because Mother already gave
similar testimony at the section 366.26 hearing, i.e., that E.H. hit her
because “he didn’t want me to leave,” we may reasonably assume the juvenile
court would have remained unpersuaded by the additional cumulative
testimony. Moreover, the juvenile court was not required to accept the
parents’ self-serving testimony, and the court was entitled to credit other
evidence in the record that showed E.H. generally having no difficulty
separating from the parents.
Father suggests he sufficiently demonstrated that E.H. would be
harmed by the termination of parental rights by testifying at the disposition
hearing regarding his firsthand knowledge of the difficulties and
disadvantages of growing up in foster care and having no ties to family. Once
again, setting aside Father’s failure to present this testimony at the section

26
366.26 hearing, we are unconvinced that Father’s testimony on his personal
experiences in the foster care system bore on the “case-specific inquiry”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634) required of the juvenile court as
to E.H. based on his circumstances and needs.
Father additionally contends the juvenile court erroneously considered
an “irrelevant and erroneous factor” in evaluating the third Caden C.
element: whether Father “provided day to day care for his child.” We
disagree. From our review of the record, it is readily apparent the juvenile
court remarked on Father’s lack of day-to-day care of E.H. in connection with
the second Caden C. element, not the third. As discussed above, in
determining whether there is a beneficial parent-child relationship at the
second Caden C. step, it is appropriate to consider the portion of the child’s
life spent in the parent’s custody and care. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 633–634.)
Mother, meanwhile, contends she sufficiently demonstrated that E.H.
would be harmed by the termination of her parental rights, citing her
testimony that she had particular insight into E.H.’s specific needs, was a
strong educational advocate for him, and was able to sooth him and maintain
a clean and safe home for him. Though we acknowledge and laud Mother’s
efforts in these matters, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its
discretion in concluding that any harm to E.H. from the loss of this
relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. Viewing the record
favorably to the judgment, the court could reasonably conclude E.H. will be
provided with comparable comfort, support, and safety in his prospective
adoptive home, with the added benefit of permanency. (See Andrew M.,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 816 [record revealed “no particular need that
can be met uniquely by the parents”].)

27
Citing Caden C., Mother contends it “should not be held against” her
that E.H. is doing well in Sims’s care. But nothing in the record suggests the
juvenile court improperly compared Mother’s “attributes as custodial
caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s),” as
disapproved in Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Put
another way, the court did not improperly evaluate whether Mother could
provide as secure and stable a home as E.H.’s prospective adoptive home.
Rather, the record reflects the court appropriately balanced the benefits E.H.
stood to receive from his adoptive home against any potential harm he may
experience from losing his relationship with Mother and concluded the
balance weighed in favor of adoption. That was an appropriate balancing of
the relevant factors on the third Caden C. element.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the parents fail to
demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion or otherwise erred
in finding the beneficial relationship exception inapplicable.
C. ICWA Compliance
Father (joined by Mother) contends the juvenile court’s finding of ICWA
inapplicability was not supported by substantial evidence. The Agency
concedes the record is insufficient to establish that it conducted a satisfactory
inquiry into Father’s potential Native American ancestry. We accept the
Agency’s concession and agree that a conditional reversal and remand is
required.
1. Additional Background
In its initial section 300 petition, the Agency attached a Judicial
Council form ICWA-010(A) stating that the parents had been interviewed in
June 2023, and that “[t]his inquiry . . . gave [the social worker] reason to
believe the child is or may be an Indian child.

28
In its combined detention and jurisdiction report, the Agency stated
that Father had previously reported having “Blackfoot” ancestry.4
In its disposition report, the Agency indicated that “[f]urther inquiry is
required because there is reason to believe the child[] is an Indian child.”
(Original emphasis.) The Agency reiterated this point in an addendum report
filed in December 2023. In a second addendum report in March 2024, the
Agency stated that ICWA “does or may apply,” while reporting that a
“maternal great grandfather (on the mother’s mother side) denied any Native
American ancestry on his side of the family. Additionally, the social worker
reportedly left a voice message with “the maternal grandfather (mother’s
father)” and was awaiting a return call. The Agency stated additional time
was needed to determine if there was a reason to believe or know that E.H.
was an Indian child.
In March 2024, Father filed a Judicial Council form ICWA-020
indicating he is or may be eligible for membership in a federally recognized
tribe, but he left blank the spaces for identifying the name and location of the
tribe.
In September 2024, the Agency filed a status review report
recommending the juvenile court find that ICWA did not apply. The Agency
asserted that “[u]pon lengthy inquiry and lack of response, the Agency has
determined that [E.H.] and [D.B.] are not ICWA eligible.”
In its section 366.26 report, the Agency stated that “[o]n 8/20/2020, the
Court found that the [ICWA] does not apply for [E.H.]”

4 The Agency asserts that there is no “Blackfoot” tribe as Father
reported, and that the closest federally-recognized tribe is the Blackfeet Tribe
of Montana.

29
At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court summarily found that
ICWA did not apply.
2. Analysis
ICWA and California’s related statute (Cal-ICWA; § 224 et seq.) “are
intended to protect Native American heritage, cultural connections between
tribes and children of Native American ancestry, the best interests of Indian
children, and the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125 (Dezi C.).) Under these laws, “courts
and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in
dependency cases.” (Dezi C., at p. 1125.)
“ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to follow before
removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care
or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (D.S.).) As
relevant here, “section 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in
dependency proceedings.” (D.S., at p. 1052.) After a child welfare agency’s
initial contact with the minor and his or her family, “the statute imposes a
duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be an
Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if that [“initial”]5 inquiry
creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the [Agency]
‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child,
and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id., subd. (e), italics
omitted.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know the child
is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3

5 As our Supreme Court has emphasized, the term “initial” inquiry “is a
bit of a misnomer, as the duty ‘continues throughout the dependency
proceedings.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.)

30
apply.” (D.S., at p. 1052, italics omitted.) “On appeal, we review the juvenile
court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. [Citations.] But where the
facts are undisputed, we independently determine whether ICWA’s
requirements have been satisfied.” (D.S., at p. 1051.)
The initial inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child,
the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
“ ‘[E]xtended family member’ means ‘a person who has reached the age of
eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin,
or stepparent.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132, citing 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2), § 224.1, subd. (c).) “[S]ection 224.2 ‘does not require the agency to
“find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely
to make reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are
reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation into whether
the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’ ” (Dezi C., at
p. 1140.)
“If the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe
that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient
information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child, the court, social worker, or probation officer shall make further
inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that
inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “There is reason to
believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court,
social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the

31
parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for
membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
With these authorities in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.
Father’s express claim to Native American ancestry was “information
suggesting” that he and/or E.H. “may be eligible for membership or
citizenship, in an Indian tribe,” which established a “reason to believe” E.H.
was an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) The Agency’s receipt of this
information triggered a “further inquiry” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), including
interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and any reasonably available
extended family members, and contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
the State Department of Social Services for assistance (id., subd. (e)(2)).
We cannot say the record before us establishes an adequate further
inquiry, let alone an adequate initial one. As far as we can ascertain, the
Agency interviewed the parents and made or attempted contact with two
family members on Mother’s side. We are not aware of any attempts to
contact reasonably available extended family members on Father’s side even
though it was he who claimed Native American ancestry. That Father’s
reference to a “Blackfoot” tribe did not precisely match the name of any
federally-recognized tribe did not put the matter to rest, and the Agency does
not contend otherwise.
We note there was evidence in this case of a prior ICWA inapplicability
finding dated “8/20/2020,” which would have been during the early stages of
the second dependency case. While we are not aware of any authority
prohibiting a juvenile court from carrying forward an ICWA inapplicability
finding from a prior dependency case involving the same family members, we
cannot say that prior finding is dispositive in this case. The record before us
does not include any of the information supporting the August 2020 finding.

32
Furthermore, even where a court makes a finding that ICWA does not apply,
the child welfare agency and the court “have a continuing duty under ICWA,
and the court ‘shall reverse its determination if it subsequently receives
information providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child and
order the social worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry.’ ”
(Dezi C., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) Given the Agency’s concession that a
conditional reversal and remand is appropriate, and mindful of the
continuing obligations of the Agency and the juvenile court under ICWA and
Cal-ICWA, we conclude it is appropriate to conditionally reverse the order
terminating parental rights with directions for the Agency and the court to
ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s May 19, 2025, order terminating parental rights is
conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
We direct the Agency and juvenile court to comply with the inquiry and
notice provisions of ICWA and Cal-ICWA consistent with this opinion. Based
on the information reported, if the court determines that no additional
inquiry or notice to tribes is necessary, the order terminating parental rights
shall be reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is warranted, the court
shall make all necessary orders to ensure compliance with ICWA and related
California law.

33
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Streeter, J.

SFHSA v. J. J. (A173260)

34

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