CourtListener 10732021•In re D.C. CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 11/6/25 In re D.C. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
G063528
THE PEOPLE,
(Super. Ct. No. 23DL1466)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
D.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Isabel Apkarian, Judge. Affirmed.
Larenda R. Delaini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
D.C. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition
orders (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 702, 706) based on findings he was a minor in
1
possession of a handgun (Pen. Code, § 29610, subd. (a)). He contends
surveillance video evidence was wrongly admitted because it lacked
foundation and authentication. While that is a close issue, we conclude any
error was harmless. We also find unpersuasive D.C.’s contention that gang-
related evidence was wrongly admitted. We affirm.
FACTS
I.
THE INVESTIGATION
On October 7, 2023, gunshots were reported fired “at 1:00 in the
morning,” on the “700 block of Shalimar.” Ten hours later, a Costa Mesa
police officer investigated the scene and “spoke with the reporting party who
had called [him].”
A Costa Mesa gang investigator “assisted . . . with looking
through” a system of “cameras” and “file[s]” called “an Automated License
Plate Reader that was installed through the city” and “use[d] to assist in
investigations.” The system allowed the investigator to log in for “specific
cameras [to] check for vehicles that [were] reported stolen or . . . would pass
in front of [them,] . . . collect[ing] . . . license plate” information. He identified
“a black Honda in the area of Wallace and Shalimar on October 7 around 1:00
A.M.”
The investigator spoke with the vehicle’s owner and obtained a
search warrant for the cell phone of the owner’s son. Stored in the phone, the
investigator found two video recordings and several pictures.
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The first cell phone video “starts off with . . . [a] person in [a
moving vehicle’s] front passenger seat looking towards their lap holding a
handgun with a slidelock to the rear. . . . Then the person taking the video
looks to their left and shows the driver,” who the investigator recognized to be
D.C. The investigator recognized the “slide . . . and the barrel” as “appear[ing]
to be . . . similar [to that] of a Gen Glock 19.” In another cell phone video, the
investigator recognized a “hand tattoo” of D.C., who “appear[ed] to be
grabbing a handgun . . . while making [a] hand sign” showing he belonged to
a “criminal street gang[].” In both videos, D.C. was wearing the same “navy
blue hoodie with white lettering on the front . . . , a white undershirt, and
black pants.”
A cell phone picture had a date and time stamp of October 7 at
1:03 a.m. and showed “someone standing in front of a posted sign” identifying
the 700 block of Shalimar Drive. Even though the person was wearing a
facemask, the investigator believed the individual was D.C. “holding a black
handgun in [his] right hand . . . wearing a navy blue hoodie with” the same
“white lettering” and shoes “consistent with the observations . . . made of
[D.C.] in [the cell] phone.” The investigator was “certain” two other
photographs showed D.C. “holding a firearm.” D.C. was standing in the “same
stance” as in one of the other cell phone pictures and was “holding the
firearm in the right hand.” The picture’s “time stamp . . . [was] October 7th
. . . 14 minutes after midnight.” Another picture showed D.C. wearing the
same clothing and “pointing a firearm at the camera.”
3
II.
THE JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
The district attorney filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602)
alleging D.C. had been a minor in possession of a handgun (§ 29610,
subd. (a)).
At the jurisdiction hearing, the officer testified about obtaining
two surveillance videos—these are different from the license plate reader and
cell phone videos already discussed. They are not in our record.
First, the prosecutor asked “[A]t some point, were you able to find
surveillance that captured the area of [the shots fired] at that date and time?”
The court sustained D.C.’s foundation objection, but allowed the prosecutor to
rephrase: “Did you locate surveillance showing the area of [the shots fired]
from October 7th at approximately 1:13 in the morning? [¶] [D.C.’s counsel]:
Objection; foundation as to time, calls for expert testimony. [¶] [The court]:
Overruled.” The officer answered, “Yes.”
The prosecutor played the first surveillance video for the court.
D.C. objected again, asserting insufficient authentication, foundation, and
proof of chain of custody. Overruling, the court explained: “I don’t believe the
video is being entered into evidence yet. I’m waiting to see if the [prosecutor]
can lay the proper foundation.”2 The officer identified the area recorded as
“the 700 block of Shalimar Drive.” The officer testified, over objections, that it
contained a “date and time stamp” of “October 7th, 2023. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]t,
approximately, 0113 hours.” D.C.’s counsel later renewed a foundation
objection: “The officer testified that he was not there at 1:07 A.M.; as such, he
2
We commend the trial court for its patience with a series of
premature objections.
4
cannot testify via personal knowledge that this is a clear and accurate
depiction of what this environment looked like at that alleged time.” The
court overruled it. The officer then testified that in the video he saw three
males leave and return quickly to a parked car: “It seems like something
happened, and the two males then immediately start running back to the
vehicle. You see the third male run back to the vehicle.”
Next, the prosecutor asked the officer about a second surveillance
video. “Q. Did you eventually locate another surveillance video? [¶] A. Yes. [¶]
. . . [¶] Q. Did you recover surveillance video from another source showing
that same vehicle around the same date and time?” D.C. objected on the
grounds of speculation, lack of personal knowledge, and lack of foundation
and was overruled. The officer responded “Yes,” and testified the video
showed “a Honda parked westbound similar to this [sic] video, and you see a
male walking eastbound. You see what appears to be some kind of -- how do I
say it -- muzzle fire coming out of an item, then you hear, approximately, six
gunshots.” The officer then saw “the males running towards the vehicle that
was parked.”
The officer testified about his training and experience with gangs,
including those active in the area of the shooting. The assisting investigator
opined about sharing “photos and videos” from cell phones in gang culture, to
“boast.” He also testified about “ghost gun[s]” used as a “slang term” and the
gang signal he believed D.C. showed with his hand, in the second cell phone
video.
When the evidence closed, D.C. renewed his objections to the
videos and pictures. The court overruled them without explicit findings.
5
The court found true that D.C. had been a minor in possession of
a handgun. (§ 29610, subd. (a).) Regarding the weapon, the court explained
“that, perhaps, any one of these pieces of evidence on their own wouldn’t be
enough, [but] it’s when you look at all of it together that the court is seeing
the link between the allegation. It’s not simply a photograph of what appears
to be [D.C.] holding a gun and that is it; . . . we have to worry about, ‘Is this a
real gun?’ [¶] And when I look to the call for the shots fired, the sound of
what appears to be a real gun compared to the jury instruction that says,
‘Look at reasonable interpretations,’ we heard about cross-examination over
replica guns, imitation firearms, items that are used on movie sets that are
not capable of being fired, M-80s, fireworks. None of that is reasonable given
the totality of the circumstances. [¶] It is not reasonable that the gun
possessed in the early hours of October 7 was not an actual firearm. I don’t
find the purported other interpretations of the evidence to be reasonable;
therefore, the Court is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the black
item that looked like a firearm in the photographs and videos is, in fact, a
firearm.” The court ordered D.C. to serve 180 days in a juvenile institution.
DISCUSSION
I.
ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING THE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS WAS HARMLESS
A. Admissibility Is a Close Call
D.C. argues “[t]he surveillance videos should have been excluded
because [the officer’s] testimony neither proved that the videos were
authentic nor established the necessary foundation.”3 The Attorney General
3
D.C. does not challenge the license plate identification nor the
cell phone evidence.
6
counters the court’s admissibility rulings passed muster under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, as applied in People v.
Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 (Goldsmith) and In re K.B. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 989, 997–998.
This is a close call. On one hand, there was some evidence to
make a “prima facie case” of authentication. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 267.) The officer confirmed the videos generally represented the 700 block
of Shalimar. Though he could not confirm the surveillance videos accurately
represented that area at the time of the shooting, they apparently had date
and time stamps. We cannot confirm because the videos are not in the record.
But because the People failed to offer evidence to show the origin
of either surveillance video, D.C. may have the better argument about
whether the videos were what they purported to be—depictions of where the
shots were fired when they were fired. (See People v. Valdez (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434–1435 [proponent’s burden].)
Neither of the Attorney General’s two cited cases are especially
helpful here.
First, the Attorney General correctly notes that in Goldsmith,
statutory presumptions helped “supply the foundation for admission of” video
and pictures showing a traffic light violation. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at pp. 267, 268.) But he does not acknowledge the “statutes’ presumptions
partly, but not completely, suppl[ied] the foundation for admission of [the]
evidence.” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 267–268, italics added; id. at
7
p. 271 [“presumptions . . . d[id] not in themselves fully supply the necessary
4
foundation”].)
Goldsmith provides a two-step analysis. First, the statutory
presumption shows the “‘print function . . . worked properly’”—the printed
exhibit offered in court is an accurate representation of whatever was on a
computer, video, or digital medium. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
Second, something else besides the presumption is needed to show the
computer, video, or digital medium accurately captured the information. (Id.
at p. 271.) That could be testimony from a witness who saw an event and
believes a photo of it is accurate. (Id. at p. 268.) It could be testimony from
someone who took the picture (ibid.) or who knows how the camera that
captured the information works (id. at p. 271). It could even be “supplied by
. . . circumstantial evidence, content and location.” (Id. at p. 268.)
In Goldsmith, the something extra was the testimony of a
witness who confirmed the photographs came from specific equipment and
explained the “operation of the . . . camera system” that had created the
photographs. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 271.) The photographs’
contents also served as “circumstantial evidence” showing “the system was
working properly.” (Id. at p. 271, fn. 7.)
4
Evidence Code section 1553, subdivision (a) provides: “A printed
representation of images stored on a video or digital medium is presumed to
be an accurate representation of the images it purports to represent. This
presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. If a
party to an action introduces evidence that a printed representation of
images stored on a video or digital medium is inaccurate or unreliable, the
party introducing the printed representation into evidence has the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the printed representation is
an accurate representation of the existence and content of the images that it
purports to represent.”
8
Our record is short on the kind of foundation required by
Goldsmith. No one testified about whether either surveillance video was an
accurate representation of the scene at the time of the gunshots. No one
testified they took the videos. No one explained how the camera system
worked—we don’t know what cameras took the videos. We don’t have the
videos so we can’t rely on their content as circumstantial evidence. The officer
only confirmed without elaboration that he “locate[d],” “collected,”
“recovered,” “retrieved,” and “c[a]me to be in possession” of the videos.
Second, In re K.B. is also inapt because trial witnesses laid the
foundation for Instagram photos. A trial witness “explained [that] Instagram
is a Web-based photograph sharing platform through which users share[d]
user-generated content.” (In re K.B., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992, 998.)
Another witness explained how he “extract[ed] images” from a suspect’s cell
phone. (Id. at pp. 993, 997.) We lack such testimony here.
B. Any Error Was Harmless
Even assuming the surveillance videos lacked sufficient
foundation, D.C. does not show a reasonable probability he would have
achieved a more favorable outcome had the videos been excluded. (People v.
Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 840.) While the second surveillance video was
the only direct evidence of gunshot noises, “as a matter of law” the “inability
to say conclusively that the gun was real . . . does not create a reasonable
doubt.” (See People v. Monjaras (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1437, italics
added (Monjaras).)
Here, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of an actual
handgun. (See Monjaras, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1435–1438
[“Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a finding that an
9
object used by a robber was a firearm”].) Police officers investigated a report
of shots fired at the 700 block of Shalimar Drive around 1:00 a.m. The officers
identified a black Honda in that area at that late hour. The son of that car’s
owner had a cell phone with videos and pictures showing D.C. holding a
5
handgun. Even without the second surveillance video capturing the sound of
gunshots, we would still agree with the juvenile court that “[i]t is not
reasonable that the gun possessed in the early hours of October 7 was not an
actual firearm. [We] don’t find the purported other interpretations of the
evidence to be reasonable.”
II.
GANG EVIDENCE WAS CORRECTLY ADMITTED
Finally, we reject D.C.’s contention that wrongly admitted
“irrelevant gang evidence was likely used” by the trier of fact to improperly
infer that “since [D.C. was] a gang member, and gang members possess
firearms to intimidate rival gang members and boost their credibility within
the gang, [D.C.] must have possessed a real firearm . . . when he drove into
rival gang territory.”6
D.C.’s reliance on People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214,
is unhelpful. First, the gang evidence at issue here was highly probative of
motive and intent and not “extremely inflammatory” like the evidence in
Albarran. (Id. at p. 227; see id. at pp. 223–224 [gang evidence relevant to
motive and intent].) In contrast to the cell phone pictures here, in Albarran
there was “no evidence presented that any gang members had ‘bragged’ about
their involvement” in a shooting. (Id. at p. 227.) Second, this case was tried to
5
The cell phone pictures are in the record but not the cell phone
videos. We rely on the officer’s testimony about these videos.
10
an experienced judge, not a jury as in Albarran. (See People ex rel. Reisig v.
Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 22 [“we are mindful that this case does not
involve a jury, but rather a bench trial in which the trier of fact was a judge
capable of weighing the evidence without being influenced by its
inflammatory nature”].)
DISPOSITION
The order sustaining the petition and the dispositional order are
affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
11
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.