People v. Blocker CA2/1

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Filed 11/3/25 P. v. Blocker CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337847

(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. YA018677)

v.

LINNETTE BLOCKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Green, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General for the Plaintiff and Respondent.
Linnette Blocker appeals from the lower court’s denial of
his1 Penal Code section 1172.62 resentencing petition. In 1995,
a jury convicted Blocker of felony murder and aiding and abetting
attempted murder. Blocker was 18 years old at the time. The
instant appeal is from Blocker’s second resentencing petition
concerning these convictions. He filed his first resentencing
petition in 2020, which the trial court denied, a decision we
affirmed in a 2021 unpublished opinion.
In the instant appeal, Blocker argues he is eligible for
resentencing on the murder conviction based on cases postdating
his first resentencing petition. These cases expanded the implied
malice analysis applicable to felony murder to include consideration
of a defendant’s youth and maturity. But Blocker has forfeited this
argument, because his counsel did not raise it below. We disagree
with Blocker that this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel—
and that we should therefore consider his youth factor argument—
because counsel’s failure to raise the argument was not prejudicial.
The argument applies only to implied malice murder theories, and
in denying his first resentencing petition, the court found Blocker
was guilty of murder on a direct aiding and abetting with express
malice theory as well. That finding has collateral estoppel effect.
As to his attempted murder conviction, we agree with Blocker
that the lower court erred in relying on a felony-murder theory
when concluding Blocker was ineligible for sentencing. But this
error was harmless because, based on both law of the case and
collateral estoppel principles, Blocker could not have disputed

1 Blocker is a transgender male. As do the parties in their
briefing, we use male pronouns to identify Blocker.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
earlier findings that the evidence also supports he is guilty of
attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor who acted with
the intent to kill.
Finally, we conclude Blocker failed to establish that the
court improperly relied on the factual summary in a prior appellate
opinion, rather than the trial transcripts in evidence, when
assessing the facts relevant to Blocker’s resentencing petition.
Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Direct Appeal
In 1994, Blocker took part in a burglary in which one of his
cohorts killed Tairree Lynne West, and another cohort attempted
to kill Ashley L., West’s 12-year-old foster child. Blocker was
18 years old at the time. In 1995, a jury convicted [him] of one
count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted murder
(§§ 187, 664), one count of residential burglary (§ 459), and one
count of felony child abuse (§ 273d). On the murder count, the
jury found true a felony-murder special circumstance allegation.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The trial court sentenced Blocker to life
in prison without the possibility of parole, plus an additional
10 years 4 months.
In a prior opinion, we described the facts of the case as
follows: “T[airree] Lynne West (West) lived in a small apartment in
El Segundo with her infant daughter, Carlie, and with 12-year-old
Ashley L[.], whom West was adopting. Erica Olsen (Olsen) had
lived with West for approximately two months. She left at West’s
request in late November or early December 1993. Olsen had a key
to the apartment. While Olsen was living with West, her boyfriend,
Robert Foster (Foster), occasionally visited and spent the night.

3
“Foster and Olsen were living in room 401 of the Hollywood
YMCA in early February 199[4]. Marcus Brewington (Brewington)
lived in room 414. At approximately 2:30 p.m. on February 8,
1994, Foster asked the YMCA residence director for permission to
bring a visitor to his room to discuss business. The director gave
permission, after which Foster and Olsen walked toward the
rooms with [Blocker]. The desk supervisor saw these three and
Brewington leave the YMCA later that night; they walked toward
the bus stop. Their demeanor appeared to be uncharacteristically
serious; they were all wearing dark clothing and bandannas.
[Blocker] was wearing gloves.
“West, the baby and Ashley arrived home at approximately
midnight on the night of February 8. After Ashley finished her
homework, they retired for the night. The baby, Carlie, was ill
with bronchitis and therefore was sleeping with her mother.
“Foster, Olsen, Brewington and [Blocker] had taken a bus
to West’s apartment, arriving at approximately 11:00 p.m. They
waited in a nearby park for approximately one hour until West
and the children returned home. As they waited, Foster, Olsen
and Brewington discussed entering West’s apartment to steal her
belongings and then killing the family. Foster, who had a butcher
knife, said he would break West’s neck. Brewington said he would
‘take care of the baby.’
“Shortly after they saw West drive up in her Nissan Pulsar
and enter the apartment, the quartet left the park and went to
the apartment. Foster used Olsen’s key to open the door. As the
others entered the apartment, Foster went to West’s bedroom. He
attacked her with the knife, inflicting a number of stab wounds.
She also was struck forcefully 15 to 20 times. She died from
strangulation.

4
“Aware that West was struggling for her life, [Blocker]
entered the kitchen. Finding Carlie, clad only in a diaper, lying in
the sink, [he] picked her up. [Blocker] carried Carlie to the living
room; [he] placed the baby on the sofa. At this point, [Blocker] saw
Brewington wrestling with Ashley. He called to [Blocker] to come
and hold down Ashley. [Blocker] did so briefly. When [he] left the
room, Brewington still was struggling with Ashley. According to
Ashley, Foster attempted to strangle her, after which Brewington
punched her and she passed out.
“As the quartet gathered West’s property, they heard
Ashley moan. Foster went into Ashley’s bedroom briefly. When
he emerged, the quartet left with a radio, West’s spoon collection,
a large number of compact discs, a stereo and West’s Nissan Pulsar.
They also took a jacket of West’s and her pager.
“Ashley regained consciousness some time later. After
discovering that her neck was bleeding, she crawled to the
telephone and called 911. As she passed West’s bedroom, she could
see West’s legs and a great deal of blood.
“El Segundo Police Officer Louis Kutil found the panic-
stricken and terrified Ashley holding a bloody towel to her neck.
West was lying on her bed, covered with blood. She had been
strangled with a black scarf. There was a broken knife in the
bedroom. The living room had been ransacked. Officer Calvin
Smith found Carlie lying face down on the living room sofa
underneath pillows and towels. She had been gagged with a light
blue bandanna; she was extremely cold, pale and tired; her diaper
was abnormally saturated.
“Foster, Olsen, Brewington and [Blocker] returned to the
YMCA at approximately 2:30 a.m. on February 9, 1994. After
cleaning up, they discussed the venture. Foster acknowledged

5
stabbing and choking West. Brewington said he tried to choke
Ashley, but she simply would not succumb; Foster went into her
room and slashed her throat.
“[Blocker] initially denied knowing anything about the killing.
[He] stated, however, that [he] spent the entire night with Foster.
While talking to [Blocker], Detective Bart Langley noticed a pager
hanging from [Blocker’s] waistband; the pager was West’s. He
arrested [Blocker] and Brewington. Shortly thereafter, Foster and
Olsen returned to the YMCA in West’s automobile. Officer Rudy
Kerkoff arrested them. They had pawned most of the property
taken from West’s apartment.
“Defense
“In early February 1994, Thomas Semblower (Semblower)
met Foster, Brewington and Olsen at the Teen Canteen. Foster
asked Semblower to help with a burglary in El Segundo; he
intended to burglarize a place he and Olsen knew. They had a key
to the apartment. Semblower’s role would be to help restrain the
boyfriend; the other participants would be Foster, Brewington,
Olsen and [Blocker]. Olsen and [Blocker] would restrain the
children. Semblower agreed to participate in the burglary.
“Semblower met Foster and the others at the YMCA on the
following day to discuss the matter further. Foster took Semblower
aside; he said he had changed plans. Rather than restraining
the burglary victims, they would kill them. [Blocker] was not
present when this conversation took place. Semblower refused
to participate under these circumstances.”
In 1996, we affirmed Blocker’s convictions on direct appeal.
(See People v. Blocker (Oct. 29, 1996, B099624) [nonpub. opn.]
(Blocker I).) We rejected Blocker’s argument that “the burglary
felony-murder special circumstances must be stricken, in that

6
the burglary was incidental to the plan to kill the occupants of
the apartment.” In so doing, we held that “[t]here is ample evidence
the perpetrators intended to steal West’s property, including the
automobile, as well as to kill her and the children.” (Italics added.)

B. 2019 Petition Under Section 1170.95
(First Resentencing Petition)
1. Section 1170.95 background
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which limited
the application of the felony-murder doctrine and abolished the
natural and probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder.
(See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 includes both prospective and retrospective
provisions. Prospectively, it amends section 188 such that a
conviction for felony murder requires proof that the defendant
was either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or
“was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see § 188,
subd. (a)(3) [“Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189,
in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime”].)
The retroactive component of Senate Bill No. 1437 is codified
in former section 1170.953 (see Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853),

3 As noted below, the Legislature has since amended and
renumbered the statute to be section 1172.6. Given that our
citations in this section are in the context of describing the
petition Blocker made before this amendment, however, we cite

7
which allows a defendant “convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a
petition” for resentencing under the new law. (Former § 1170.95,
subd. (a).) To be eligible for resentencing, a defendant must show
that he or she “could not be convicted of first or second degree
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective”
as a part of Senate Bill No. 1437. (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)
If the trial court determines that the defendant has made a
prima facie showing of eligibility, “the court shall issue an order
to show cause” (former § 1170.95, subd. (c)) and hold a hearing
to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) At this final stage of the proceeding, the prosecution
has the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing”—that is, that the petitioner
is guilty of murder under current law. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)

2. Petition
On January 7, 2019, Blocker filed a section 1170.95
resentencing petition, seeking resentencing on his murder and
attempted murder convictions. Blocker acknowledged there
was a split of authority as to whether relief was available under
section 1170.95 for an attempted murder conviction, but argued
the court could and should grant relief as to that conviction,
because the court had instructed the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and the prosecutor had relied
in part on this theory during closing argument. As to the murder
conviction, Blocker argued his conduct did not directly aid Foster
in killing West.

that statute, rather than the current version, in this portion of
our opinion.

8
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the
prosecution had proven that Blocker was ineligible for resentencing
because he was guilty of murder under two separate, currently
valid theories: (1) He was a major participant in the burglary and
acted with reckless indifference to human life (implied malice felony
murder); and (2) Blocker acted as “an aider and abettor with intent
to kill both” West and Ashley. In reaching the latter conclusion, the
court relied on the holding in Blocker I that Blocker intended to kill
both victims.
The court assumed that section 1170.95 authorized relief from
attempted murder convictions, but found Blocker was ineligible for
such relief, because he had acted with an intent to kill Ashley and
directly aided and abetted her attempted murder.

3. Appeal
Blocker appealed the denial of the petition, and this court
affirmed “on two grounds. First, the jury in Blocker’s trial found
true a felony-murder special circumstance, making [him] ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. Second, even assuming that the
special circumstance finding did not disqualify [him],” “there
was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
Blocker was a major participant in the burglary.” (People v. Blocker
(Aug. 30, 2021, B309642) [non pub opn.] (Blocker II).) Blocker
“[did] not contend that the trial court erred by finding that [he]
acted with reckless indifference to human life,” so the court reached
no conclusions on that issue. (See Blocker II, supra, B309642.)

C. 2023 Petition Under Section 1172.6
(Second Resentencing Petition)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551) (Senate Bill No. 775) renumbered section 1170.95 as

9
section 1172.6 and expanded the scope of potential relief it
authorized by applying Senate Bill No. 1437’s ameliorative changes
to, inter alia, individuals convicted of attempted murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
In April 2023, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 775,
Blocker filed in propria persona a resentencing petition under
section 1172.6. In it, he argued that his first resentencing petition
did not prevent him from again seeking resentencing, because the
law had changed since he filed his first petition, both as a result
of Senate Bill No. 775 and in other respects. He argued he was
entitled to resentencing because, under current law, he was not a
major participant in the burglary that resulted in the murder and
attempted murder convictions. He also noted that he was “18 years
old at the time of the crime” and cited People v. Harris (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 939 (Harris), for the proposition that a defendant’s
“ ‘youth at the time of the crime, particularly in light of subsequent
case law’s recognition of the science relating to adolescent brain
development’ ” can render it “ ‘far from clear that [he] was actually
aware “of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime.” ’ ”
(Quoting Harris, supra, at p. 960.)
The court appointed counsel for Blocker. Appointed counsel
filed a brief arguing Blocker had stated a prima facie case for relief
on various bases, none of which relied on Blocker’s age or maturity
level at the time of the crimes. In opposing the second petition, the
People relied solely on their response and accompanying exhibits
filed in opposition to the first resentencing petition,4 which includes
trial transcripts and the Blocker I opinion.

4 The prosecutor stated that “[t]he new petition doesn’t
necessarily allege anything differently, other than just contesting

10
The court concluded Blocker had established a prima facie
case, issued an order to show cause, and scheduled an evidentiary
hearing. Blocker’s counsel filed an evidentiary hearing brief,
arguing the prosecution could not prove Blocker’s conduct rendered
him a major participant who acted with reckless disregard for
human life. Blocker’s counsel further argued that Blocker had
not sufficiently assisted in the murder or attempted murder, such
that he could be convicted as a direct aider and abettor. The People
continued to rely solely on their submission opposing the first
resentencing petition.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on April 18, 2024.
Neither in Blocker’s evidentiary hearing brief, nor at the
evidentiary hearing, did Blocker argue that his age was a relevant
factor in assessing any aspect of his eligibility for resentencing.
At the outset of the hearing, the court announced its tentative
ruling that “the rule of the case in [the] matter is that the Court
of Appeal has previously ruled that defendant Blocker was a
major participant in the underlying offense and acted with
reckless indifference to human life and, therefore, is not entitled
to resentencing.” Blocker argued in response that the court was
“precluded from considering the appellate court’s factual summary.”
Neither party, nor the court, mentioned Blocker’s age or maturity at
the time of the crimes. The court denied the petition, stating it was
relying “not . . . on the statement of facts” in Blocker II, but rather
on the decision’s “rul[ing] that . . . Blocker was in fact a major

the facts. And the People’s position is [Senate Bill No.] 775
didn’t actually change anything related to this defendant’s legal
positioning to the fact. [¶] So the People’s prior response listed
all the facts and listed all of the citations, including all of the
exhibits.”

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participant in the underlying offense, and acted with reckless
disregard for human life.” In using this as the basis for its ruling
on the attempted murder conviction, the court noted there was “no
factual . . . distinction between the [two] crimes,” given the physical
and contemporaneous proximity of the two.
Blocker appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Attempted Murder Conviction
1. Felony-Murder Theory
Blocker argues the court improperly relied on a felony-
murder theory of attempted murder in denying his petition,
citing the court’s statements that, because Blocker had been a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life during the burglary, he was ineligible for resentencing on his
attempted murder conviction. The People agree, as do we, that
this was error. Attempted murder requires a specific intent to
kill. (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) Thus, neither
felony murder, nor any other type of implied malice, can provide
the mens rea attempted murder requires. (See In re Lucero (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 38, 51; People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327;
People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456.)
For this error to provide a basis for relief on appeal, however,
Blocker must also establish that it was prejudicial; that is, he must
demonstrate a reasonable probability of a more favorable result,
but for the court’s erroneous reliance on a felony-murder theory.
(People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 716-717 [application
of an incorrect legal framework at a section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing subject to harmless error analysis under People v. Watson

12
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) We agree with the People that Blocker
has not and cannot make such a showing.
Section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).) Thus,
“[d]irect aiding and abetting [with intent to kill] remains a valid
theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill
No. 775,” and a court is “not required to grant resentencing on
[an attempted murder] count” if the evidence supports guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt on such a theory. (Coley, supra, at p. 548.)
The trial court found in denying the first resentencing petition
that Blocker was guilty of attempted murder as a direct aider and
abettor who acted with the intent to kill. For reasons we explain
below, Blocker would have been collaterally estopped from arguing
otherwise at his second resentencing petition hearing, so any error
in the court’s analysis of the attempted murder conviction is
harmless.5

5 In his reply brief, Blocker contends the People may
not argue collateral estoppel as a basis for affirmance, because
the People failed to raise it below. But here, we consider the
argument in deciding whether the court’s application of a felony-
murder theory to Blocker’s attempted murder conviction resulted
in a denial of his resentencing petition that was erroneous and
must be reversed. For the purposes of this analysis, we consider
the court’s ultimate decision, not its reasoning or the reasons
presented to the court in reaching it. Put differently, whether or
not the People raised the collateral estoppel argument below, we
would affirm the court’s denial of resentencing on the attempted
murder conviction, because it was the correct outcome under
collateral estoppel principles. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4
Cal.4th 929, 976 [“ ‘ “a ruling or decision, itself correct in law,

13
Courts—including the California Supreme Court— have
applied collateral estoppel in the context of section 1172.6 petitions.
(See, e.g., People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451 (Curiel);
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715; People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1242, fn. 5.) The doctrine prevents a
party from challenging an issue previously decided only when
several threshold requirements are met. (Strong, supra, at p. 716.)
Namely, the issue in the current proceeding must be identical
to that decided in an earlier proceeding; the issue must have
been “actually litigated” and necessarily decided in the earlier
proceeding; “the decision in the former proceeding must be final
and on the merits”; and the party against whom preclusion is
sought must be the same or in privity with the party from the
earlier proceeding. (Ibid.)
In the first resentencing petition, Blocker argued that he
could not be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted
murder on a theory of direct aiding and abetting with express
malice. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court made express
findings to the contrary and denied the petition. The court’s
resolution of the issue was thus on the merits and necessary to
the resolution of the proceedings. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 452 [“[a]n issue is necessarily decided so long as it was
not ‘ “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment in the initial
proceeding’ ”].) The People were obviously a party to that
proceeding, and the court’s decision is now final. The court’s

will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong
reason” ’ ”]; Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 138 [it
is a “settled principle of appellate review that a correct decision
of the trial court must be affirmed on appeal even if it is based on
erroneous reasoning”].)

14
finding at the first resentencing petition hearing that Blocker
was guilty of attempted murder under a direct aiding and abetting
with intent to kill theory thus satisfies the threshold requirements
for it to have collateral estoppel effect.
Although subsequent material changes in applicable law
can justify making an equitable exception to collateral estoppel,
the legal developments Blocker identifies do not support doing so
here, because he cannot show that they “would have resulted in
a different [conclusion] under the law as it exists today.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 455.) Rather, the authority he cites requires
courts to consider a defendant’s youth in assessing whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life for the
purposes of assessing implied malice. (See, e.g., People v. Jimenez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 997 (Jimenez) [court’s finding on
a prior section 1172.6 petition that the defendant had acted with
implied malice did not preclude a second section 1172.6 petition
based on “significant changes in the law [since the first petition]
relating to the culpability of defendants who were young adults in
their teens or early 20s at the time of their crimes”]; Harris, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th 939, 944, 960-961 [based in part on relevance of
defendant’s youth and maturity level in the reckless indifference
analysis, remanding for an evidentiary hearing on resentencing
petition on implied malice felony-murder conviction]; see also
People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076; People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466; People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400.)
These youth factor cases do not apply to an assessment of whether
a defendant assisted an attempted murder and/or acted with the
intent to kill. Blocker does not argue that we should expand the
current state of the law by applying these cases in other contexts,
nor would we find such an argument persuasive. And as to Senate

15
Bill No. 775’s expansion of section 1172.6 to cover attempted
murder convictions, the trial court at the hearing on the first
resentencing petition explicitly stated that it was assuming this
was the case. Thus, there is no equitable basis for ignoring the
collateral estoppel effect of the court’s ruling.
Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that, had the
court not erroneously relied on a felony-murder theory of attempted
murder, the trial court would have concluded Blocker was eligible
for resentencing on his attempted murder conviction under
section 1172.6. The court previously concluded Blocker was guilty
under an alternative theory, valid under current law, and Blocker
was collaterally estopped from arguing otherwise.

2. Role of Blocker II factual summary
Finally, Blocker argues that the court erred by relying
on the factual summary in Blocker II in its analysis, which
section 1172.6 does not permit. “[T]he factual summary in an
appellate opinion is not evidence that may be considered at [a]
[section 1172.6] evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility for resentencing.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
974, 988; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [limiting reliance on prior appellate
opinions to “the procedural history of the case”].) But Blocker has
failed to provide any basis on which we might conclude that the
court relied on that factual summary and not the trial transcripts
that were also in evidence. These transcripts amply support the
court’s factual assertions, and Blocker does not argue to the
contrary. Nor has he identified any discrepancy between the
factual summary contained in Blocker II and the trial transcripts
that might suggest the court’s reliance on the former as opposed
to the latter. (See People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015,
1027 [“there is nothing unfavorable to appellant in any hearsay

16
documents that the trial court did not already know from the other
admissible evidence”].) Moreover, after Blocker repeatedly objected
that the court could not rely on factual summaries in prior appellate
opinions, the court agreed and expressly identified the limited
manner in which it was relying on Blocker II. There is thus no
basis for concluding that the court relied on Blocker II, rather than
the trial transcripts, in its assessment of the facts.

B. Blocker’s Murder Conviction
Blocker argues the court incorrectly concluded that, under
the law of the case doctrine, Blocker II prevented Blocker from
challenging that he was a major participant in the burglary who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. The law of the case
doctrine “prevents parties from seeking appellate reconsideration
of an already decided issue in the same case, ‘ “ absent some
significant change in circumstances.” ’ [Citation.] For the doctrine
to apply, the point of law must have been presented and determined
by the [appellate] court, the issue must have been necessary
to the prior decision, and application of the doctrine must not
result in an unjust decision.” (Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1006; see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 374, fn. 6 (Bryant).) “[T]he doctrine does not apply ‘ “where
the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by
a decision intervening between the first and second appellate
determinations.” ’ ” (Jimenez, supra, at pp. 1006–1007, quoting
People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197; People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 786.)
Blocker again relies on the youth factor cases, decided after
Blocker II, arguing they constitute such a “significant intervening
change in the law.” (See Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1007.) We agree with the People, however, that because Blocker

17
failed to raise any argument based on the youth factor cases at the
evidentiary hearing, he has forfeited his right to do so on appeal.
(See People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 653; see People v.
Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 [courts excuse forfeiture for failure
to raise an issue under only extreme circumstances].)
We also disagree with Blocker that we should nevertheless
consider the argument because his counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to raise it below. To prevail on his claim
of ineffective assistance, Blocker must show (1) failure to raise
the argument fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms, and (2) such failure prejudiced
him, meaning there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel
raised the argument, the court would have ruled differently
on his petition. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745-746.)6 Even
assuming for the sake of argument that counsel’s failure to
argue for resentencing based on Blocker’s age was objectively
unreasonable, the record does not support that any such failure
was sufficiently prejudicial for counsel to have rendered ineffective
assistance. As previously discussed, the youth factor cases Blocker
argues his counsel should have relied on support that a defendant’s
youth is a relevant factor in assessing implied malice and reckless

6 Blocker did not have a Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance at the evidentiary hearing, but due process
affords him this right. (People v. Foley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
653, 659-660 [after court issues order to show cause and holds
section 1172.6, subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing, petitioner
has a due process right to effective assistance of counsel as in
other postconviction proceedings where order to show cause
has issued].)

18
indifference to human life—not in assessing express malice. (See
Discussion part A.1, ante.) Under current law, a murder conviction
does not require the defendant to have acted with reckless
indifference to human life if the defendant instead acted “with
the intent to kill” and “aided, abetted, . . . or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) As to the
assistance element of such direct aiding and abetting liability, the
trial court rejected Blocker’s argument in the second resentencing
petition that his conduct during the murder was not sufficiently
helpful to the actual killer to constitute aiding and abetting,
and he does not challenge that conclusion on appeal. As to the
requisite mens rea, the issue preclusive effect of the court’s earlier
finding that Blocker acted with an intent to kill both victims (see
Discussion part A.1, ante) supports that, whatever arguments
Blocker made to defend against a reckless indifference
felony-murder theory, the People could have established Blocker
was guilty of murder under a direct aiding and abetting with
express malice theory.7 Moreover, Blocker I held that Blocker acted

7 As noted ante, footnote 5, Blocker argues that we may
not rely on collateral estoppel, because the People did not raise
it below. But here, we look to collateral estoppel principles
in considering what is reasonably probable to have happened,
had Blocker’s counsel raised the youth factor argument. It is
reasonably probable that the People would not have, as actually
occurred, relied solely on appellate holdings applicable only to
an implied malice theory as providing law of the case. This is
because, had Blocker raised the youth factor cases, they would
have created a basis for Blocker arguing, as he does on appeal,
that the law of the case doctrine should not apply due to
significant intervening changes in the law on implied malice.
(See Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) It is thus

19
with the intent to kill both victims. That holding is law of the case,
as it was necessary to this court’s resolution of Blocker’s arguments
on direct appeal and it is unaffected by any subsequent changes in
controlling law.8 (See Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 374, fn. 6.)
Thus, even if Blocker’s counsel had raised and prevailed
on the argument that Blocker did not act with reckless disregard
(based on his youth or for any other reason), the evidence before
the court still would have supported his conviction for West’s
murder on the theory that he was a direct aider and abettor
acting with the intent to kill. Therefore, Blocker cannot show a
reasonable likelihood that the court would have reached a result
more favorable to Blocker on his second resentencing petition, had
Blocker’s counsel raised the youth-based arguments he identifies
on appeal, and counsel’s failure was not ineffective assistance.

reasonably probable that the People would have instead or
in addition argued that earlier trial court findings applicable
to express malice theories had a collateral estoppel effect
and rendered Blocker ineligible for resentencing on the murder
conviction.
8 We thus need not address whether the court below was
correct that Blocker II created law of the case preventing Blocker
from arguing he did not act with reckless indifference. We note,
however, that reckless indifference was not at issue in Blocker II,
so the Court of Appeal held only that Blocker had been a major
participant in the burglary.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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