CourtListener 10729706•People v. Lopez CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 11/3/25 P. v. Lopez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082910
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE394555)
CHRISTIAN GOMEZ LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
One afternoon in May 2016, a group of teenagers were hanging out in
front of an apartment complex in Spring Valley. Christian Gomez Lopez, a
known gang member, and another man drove up to the group. Lopez got out
of the car and confronted the teens about their gang membership. Moments
later, Lopez attacked one of the teenagers, 17-year-old Jeffrey Quirino, with a
knife, slicing his neck and killing him. Lopez and the other man fled the
scene, and the crime went unsolved for several years.
In 2019, Lopez was in custody for an unrelated crime. The detective
investigating the unsolved killing organized a Perkins operation using a
confidential informant and undercover police officer to attempt to obtain
information about Lopez’s role in the homicide.1 The operation was
successful and, during conversations with the confidential informant, Lopez
confessed to killing Quirino. Lopez was charged with and convicted of second
degree murder. Lopez also pleaded guilty to charges of assault with a deadly
weapon and making and possessing weapons in a penal institution. The trial
court sentenced Lopez to an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life plus
one year, plus a determinate prison term of 15 years and 8 months.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Lopez makes several
arguments. He asserts the trial court erred by denying his request to
suppress statements he made during the Perkins operation. Lopez also
argues the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for the
disclosure of the personnel records of two San Diego County Sheriff’s deputies
involved in his case. Lopez additionally asks this court to conduct an
independent review of two in camera proceedings held by the trial court to
determine whether to allow the disclosure of the identity of the confidential
informant and undercover police officer involved in the Perkins operation,
1 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 (Perkins).
2
and a third confidential informant who identified the man driving Lopez at
the time of the murder. Finally, Lopez argues the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the mid-term sentence on the assault with a deadly
weapon conviction and by failing to strike a prior strike conviction and a
serious prior felony enhancement.
As we shall explain, we reject Lopez’s appellate contentions. We have
also conducted an independent review of the in camera proceedings and
conclude the court properly rejected Lopez’s request for disclosure of the
identities of the confidential informants and undercover agent. Accordingly,
the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On the afternoon of May 23, 2016, 17-year old Quirino was hanging out
after school with four friends ranging in age from 15 to 17 years old. The five
teenagers were in front of an apartment complex on the corner of Delrose
Avenue and Elkelton Boulevard in Spring Valley. Quirino and his friends
hung out there regularly after school. Quirino’s friends testified at trial that
neither they nor Quirino were gang members.2
Quirino was sitting in his Camaro, which was parked in front of the
complex, and his friends were standing around the car. A gray SUV drove up
and stopped near the group of teenagers. A man, later identified as Lopez,
got out of the passenger side of the SUV, walked toward the group, and asked
them where they were from. Some of Quirino’s friends responded that they
2 The trial court read three stipulations to the jury concerning the
group’s criminal history: Quirino had a true finding in a juvenile matter in
2015 for felony resisting arrest, a companion had a true finding in 2015 for
throwing a substance at a vehicle, and another companion had a true finding
in 2010 for felony battery.
3
did not “bang.” Quirino stood up, walked toward Lopez, and said something
like “we don’t bang but my brother’s from Lomita.” Lopez responded, “Fuck
Lomita” and stabbed Quirino in the neck with a knife.
The cut severed Quirino’s carotid artery, and blood began spurting from
his neck. About the same time, the driver of the gray SUV got out and came
around the vehicle, towards Lopez. The two men then ran back to the SUV
and drove away. Neighbors called 911.
Meanwhile, Christopher E. was driving his sedan on Elkelton
Boulevard. His girlfriend, Jasmin Z., and her sister, Crystal R., were in the
car. They saw a commotion as they neared the apartment complex. When
Christopher stopped at the stop sign at the corner of Delrose and Elkelton,
Crystal saw two people enter a parked gray SUV and drive off. Moments
later, she observed a group of people on Delrose standing around a man who
was leaning against a car and bleeding from his neck.
Crystal asked the group if they needed help. Someone helped Quirino
into the back seat of the sedan, and he collapsed onto Crystal, who was
sitting in the back passenger seat. Blood was gushing out of a large wound
on the left side of Quirino’s neck. Crystal took off her shirt, wadded it up,
and applied it to the wound. Christopher sped toward the hospital. Quirino
lost consciousness on the way, and his breathing became shallower. When
they arrived at the hospital, Quirino was taken in on a gurney and Crystal,
Jasmin and Christopher waited outside to speak with police.
By this time, several San Diego County Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the
apartment complex and began speaking with Quirino’s friends and other
witnesses. Based on evidence the witnesses provided, the deputies alerted
law enforcement to be on lookout for the suspects.
4
Quirino died from the stab wound to his neck, which was two- to two-
and-a-half inches deep. The knife severed his carotid artery and cut his
jugular vein.
Two days after the stabbing, Crystal provided law enforcement with a
description of the gray SUV and its occupants. She also helped create a
composite sketch of the driver, which law enforcement included in a bulletin
issued to the public.
In July 2016, officers located a Hyundai Santa Fe that matched images
of the SUV captured on surveillance cameras near the stabbing. The Sante
Fe was registered to Juan Carlos Arguelles. Officers impounded the vehicle
and processed it for fingerprints. Arguelles resembled the composite sketch
of the driver Crystal helped prepare and his social media posts suggested he
was a member of the Logan Heights Gang. Sheriff’s deputies interviewed
Arguelles but released him later that day. In 2017, investigators determined
three fingerprints lifted from the Santa Fe’s front passenger window matched
Lopez’s fingerprints. Then the investigation stalled.
In 2019, a new detective, Jacob Wilson, took over the investigation
after the former detective retired. Based on his review of the evidence that
had been collected, Wilson believed Arguelles was the driver of the SUV
during the stabbing. He reviewed Arguelles’s social media accounts and
phone records from the time of the crime. Wilson found the only person
communicating with Arguelles at that time was Lopez, and they were
communicating through Facebook. Photographs of Lopez on Facebook
showed Lopez had the same physical characteristics as Quirino’s killer.
Based on witness statements and a surveillance video that showed the
stabbing, Wilson believed Quirino’s killer, like Lopez, was about six feet tall,
and had slicked back hair and possibly a mustache.
5
Wilson found two additional Facebook accounts that were associated
with Lopez but that had not been discovered earlier. One of the accounts was
opened in May 2016, with the name “Crisraww Christian,” and was later
changed to the name “Sckinny Logan.” There were 30 Facebook messages
between Lopez and Arguelles during the week before the stabbing, and more
messages about a week after the stabbing. Arguelles referred to Lopez in the
messages as “Sckinny.”
In September 2019, Wilson learned that Lopez was in custody on an
unrelated crime.3 Wilson met with Francisco Brambila, a detective in the
criminal investigation unit for the sheriff’s department, which was
responsible for jail security and undercover operations within the jail, and
other members of the sheriff’s department and the district attorney’s office.
The law enforcement agents made plans to conduct a Perkins operation
several days after Lopez was incarcerated.4 The operation involved two
“operators” who were outfitted with audio recording devices. A video camera
located outside of the jail cell also captured the interaction.
3 An investigative report prepared by Wilson stated that Lopez was
arrested on September 2, 2019, for “theft related charges” and booked into
San Diego Central Jail.
4 During his testimony, Brambila described a Perkins operation. He
explained that a suspect is placed in a holding cell with one or more
operators—either undercover law enforcement agents or paid informants—
and recording devices are hidden in the cell or on the operators. During the
operation, facts about the case or evidence, “stimulation,” are presented to
the suspect to get him to discuss the crime. Brambila stated that paid
informants are usually people who had committed crimes and offered their
services to the department, and many were former gang members. The
informants Brambila used were not trying to obtain a reduced sentence and
instead were paid $1,500 regardless of whether their target confessed.
6
On the day of the operation, the two operators, one a paid informant
(Operator 1) and the other an undercover sheriff’s deputy (Operator 2), were
placed in a jail holding cell alone. Around 1:20 p.m., while the two men were
conversing, Lopez was placed in the cell. He introduced himself in Spanish to
Operator 1 as “Skinny from Treinta” and Operator 1 introduced himself as
“Toro” from the East side. Operator 2 told Lopez his name was Jason, and
Lopez said he was “Skinny from Logan.”5
At first, the men talked generally about why there were incarcerated.
Operator 1 told Lopez he was facing federal charges and was being
transported back to Los Angeles, where he was allegedly from. Lopez and
Operator 1 also discussed the drug trade in Spanish and English. At one
point, Operator 1 told Lopez that he had seen a murder charge against Lopez.
Lopez denied having anything to do with a homicide and told Operator 1 the
police had the wrong person.
Around 3:00 p.m., Wilson and another detective entered the cell and
told Lopez they were investigating a homicide in 2016. The detectives
showed Lopez some photos from Quirino’s autopsy and a photo of the gray
SUV the perpetrators were driving. Wilson also told Lopez his fingerprints
were found on the SUV. Lopez denied any knowledge about the murder, and
Wilson responded that they were not asking any questions at that point.
Wilson and the other detective exited the cell, and left behind the bulletin
with the sketch that had been issued shortly after the killing.
After this “stimulation” by police, Operator 1 took on a counseling role
with Lopez, informing Lopez about his own experiences in the criminal
justice system and telling Lopez he needed to educate himself about the
5 Operator 2 was removed from the cell about 90 minutes after Lopez
entered.
7
process and his own case. Operator 1 told Lopez he thought the officers had
more incriminating evidence than what they showed him. He emphasized
the police could obtain his internet activity, that surveillance cameras were
prevalent, and that DNA evidence could incriminate him.
During their conversation, Lopez told Operator 1 he was caught, but he
also said that the existence of his fingerprints on the car did not prove he was
connected to the crime. Operator 1 suggested someone might have “ratted”
out Lopez. Operator 1 also told Lopez he needed to get a good lawyer. Lopez
asked Operator 1 if he should tell his lawyer the truth. At one point during
this exchange, Operator 1 said, “Just with what you’ve told me, I already
know that you did the job, man, but it’s not my problem. But you have to use
your head, homie,” and Lopez responded, “Uh-huh.”
Operator 1 advised Lopez a good lawyer would help him, and told Lopez
that his lawyer could not reveal their communications to anyone. Lopez
asked Operator 1 for the name of his lawyer, and Operator 1 gave a name
and told Lopez he could find him on the internet. When Lopez asked
Operator 1 how much a good lawyer would cost, Operator 1 told him it could
be $50,000 to $60,000. Operator 1 repeated that Lopez should study the law
and get knowledgeable to help his lawyer defend him. Lopez and Operator 1
also discussed the bulletin, and Lopez said he would cut his hair so he did not
resemble the sketch in the bulletin.
As time passed, Operator 1 and Lopez became friendlier and their
conversation flowed naturally in Spanish and English. They discussed the
crime, and Lopez admitted to stabbing the victim, but throughout the
conversation maintained he acted in self-defense. Lopez said that he thought
the victim and his six friends were going to jump him, and that they were
“bang[ing]” and probably had guns, so he stabbed the victim before they could
8
hurt him. Lopez told Operator 1 that one of the teenagers was “strapped.”
Lopez repeated that he had been caught, but continually told Operator 1 the
stabbing was in self-defense, and that he believed his own life was on the
line. Lopez also repeatedly said his story of self-defense was the truth, and
Operator 1 agreed with Lopez that self-defense would help him avoid a long
sentence.
Detective Wilson listened to the recording of the Perkins operation the
following day and arrested Lopez for murder.
B. Procedural Background
After his arrest, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a
consolidated amended information charging Lopez with murder (count 1;
Pen. Code,6 § 187, subd. (a)), possession of a weapon at a penal institution
(count 2; § 4502, subd. (a)), manufacturing a weapon in a penal institution
(count 3; § 4502, subd. (b)), and assault with a deadly weapon (count 4; § 245,
subd. (a)(1)). The consolidated amended information also alleged a prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12) and a serious prior
felony enhancement (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)). Before trial,
Lopez pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3 and 4. He also admitted the prior strike
conviction and the serious prior felony conviction, as well as two aggravating
factors.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Lopez guilty of second degree
murder (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation that he used a
deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the crime in violation of
section 12022 subdivision (b)(1). On the same day, Lopez pleaded guilty in a
6 Counts 2, 3, and 4 stemmed from an assault committed by Lopez with
“a sharp instrument” while he was incarcerated awaiting trial. All further
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
9
separate case (no. SCD 283179) to grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) and
commercial burglary (§ 459).
Thereafter, the court sentenced Lopez to state prison for an
indeterminate term of 15 years to life plus one year, plus a determinate term
of 15 years and 8 months. The sentence was comprised of an indeterminate
term of 15 years to life for murder (count 1), a consecutive one-year term for
the deadly weapon enhancement attached to count 1, a consecutive two-year
term for possession of a weapon at a penal institution (count 2), a consecutive
three-year term for assault with a deadly weapon (count 4) doubled to six
years because of the strike, a consecutive 16-month term for grand theft (case
no. SCD283179), a consecutive 16-month term for burglary (case no.
SCD283179), and a consecutive five-year term for the serious prior felony
enhancement.
Lopez timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.
10
DISCUSSION
I
Perkins Operation
Lopez first contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
exclude statements he made during the Perkins operation. He argues that
his rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were violated by the operation, which
was equivalent to a custodial interrogation that occurred without an
advisement of rights. The Attorney General responds the trial court properly
denied the motion to exclude the statements because the statements were
voluntary and made without improper coercion.
A
Additional Background
As discussed, almost three years after the murder, law enforcement
conducted the Perkins operation while Lopez was in custody on unrelated
charges. The operation lasted over four and a half hours. The video
recording of the operation with matched audio from the recording devices was
played for the jury. During the operation, Lopez made several incriminating
statements to Operator 1 admitting he stabbed Quirino in the neck.
Before trial, Lopez moved to exclude the statements on the ground that
they were coerced by law enforcement during an interrogation in which
Miranda warnings were required and that his statements were not
voluntary.7 The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing no Miranda
advisement was required because the statements were made during a non-
police custodial interrogation, and they were not obtained by any coercive
method.
7 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
11
At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued Lopez’s
statements should be excluded because his right against self-incrimination
was violated during the Perkins operation; the facts of his case were
distinguishable from the facts in Perkins; and, in this case, law enforcement
used the Perkins operation “specifically to circumvent” Miranda. Defense
counsel pointed to the questioning that occurred in Perkins, which she
described as pointed questions to the suspect by the undercover officer. In
contrast, she argued the operators in Lopez’s case engaged in “manipulation
techniques” to circumvent Lopez’s Fifth Amendment rights, which caused
him to involuntarily incriminate himself.
The prosecutor responded by referring the court to the arguments in
his opposition brief, and also asserting Lopez was in a less coercive situation
than the one approved in Perkins. He argued that unlike the pointed
questions posed to the suspect in Perkins, here, the operator gave Lopez a
“forum to speak” and neither Operator 1 nor Wilson lied to Lopez. Instead,
Wilson gave truthful information about the evidence the police had, which
spurred Lopez and Operator 1 to talk about the crime, and Lopez to freely
admit his involvement.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion, stating it
did not “see any police coercion” or “intimidation.” The court also found
Lopez was not interrogated, and that the recording of the operation showed a
conversation between two cellmates.
B
Legal Standards
As Lopez himself states, it is settled that conversations between
suspects and undercover agents may be admissible without police offering the
admonitions attendant to custodial interrogations under Miranda. (Perkins,
12
supra, 496 U.S. at p. 296; id. at p. 298 [“Miranda was not meant to protect
suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of people whom
they believe to be their cellmates.”].) “The warning mandated by Miranda
was meant to preserve the privilege during ‘incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.’ Id., at 445. That atmosphere
is said to generate ‘inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely.’ Id., at 467. ‘Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of
situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.’ ”
(Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 296.)
The due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution as well as article I, section 15, of the California Constitution bar
the prosecution from using a defendant’s involuntary statements. (People v.
Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876,
920; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778 (Benson).) “ ‘A statement is
involuntary if it is not the product of “ ‘a rational intellect and free will.’ ”
[Citation.] The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is
whether the defendant’s ‘will was overborne at the time he confessed.’ ”
(People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346–347.) “ ‘A finding of coercive
police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a confession was
involuntary.’ ” (Id. at p. 347.) “ ‘Although coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it “does not itself
compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.” [Citation.] The
statement and the inducement must be causally linked.’ ” (Ibid.) “Police
trickery” therefore, “does not, by itself, render a confession involuntary.”
(People v. Chutan (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280.)
13
“[T]he ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a confession is reviewed
independently in light of the record in its entirety.” (Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d
at p. 779.) When a defendant alleges that “coercive, deceptive, and
overreaching tactics” were used by agents during a Perkins operation to
“elicit defendant’s incriminating statements,” we focus on whether those
tactics were “ ‘the type likely to procure an untrue statement.’ ” (People v.
Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 165 (Fayed).) Because Lopez’s interactions with
the operatives were recorded, the facts are undisputed. Thus, we
independently review their meaning and significance. (People v. Duff (2014)
58 Cal.4th 527, 551.)
C
Analysis
Lopez asserts he was faced with coercive police activity because he was
confronted with evidence concerning the homicide and Operator 1 directly
suggested the evidence tied him to the crime. He asserts his incriminating
statements, which were all made after Wilson showed him evidence, “were
the product of Wilson’s coercive influence and [Wilson’s] looming return.”
Lopez also argues he was subject to greater coercion than the suspect in
Perkins because he initially denied participating in the murder, even “after
Wilson confronted him with evidence connecting him to the crime.” Further,
he argues that because the transcript has many “unintelligible portions,” his
statements lack context and it is unclear whether the statements “resulted
from suggestions or comments of the undercover operators.”
We disagree with Lopez’s interpretation of the operation. Lopez
initiated the conversation with the operatives. Contrary to Lopez’s assertion
on appeal, after Wilson showed Lopez the evidence, Lopez suggested that he
acted in self-defense, not Operator 1. Thereafter, Lopez asked Operator 1 for
14
advice about how to proceed and for an attorney referral. He treated
Operator 1 as a sounding board to develop a strategy to escape a murder
charge. In doing so, Lopez participated in a voluntary discussion, and was
not subjected to a pressure campaign designed to overcome his will.8 (See
Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 166 [“If the ‘ “decision is a product of the
suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is
voluntary.” ’ ”].)
Further, Lopez’s conduct belies his coercion claim because it was
apparent that he did not feel any compulsion or pressure to speak with
Operator 1. (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 296 [“Coercion is determined from
the perspective of the suspect.”].) For example, Lopez denied any
involvement in the homicide when Wilson was present. Thereafter,
throughout the hours they were in the cell together, Lopez repeatedly asked
Operator 1 to affirm his belief that he had acted in self-defense. Further,
Lopez told Operator 1 about his relationship with his girlfriend and professed
to be done with the gang lifestyle. In addition, as the Attorney General
points out, the Perkins operation occurred three years after the homicide, also
lessening any pressure Lopez might have felt.
We also reject Lopez’s claim that Wilson’s conduct created a coercive
environment. When he entered the cell, Wilson provided Lopez with
undoctored evidence. Nothing Wilson said or provided to Lopez was false.
Wilson simply gave Lopez the facts at hand and told Lopez he would later be
questioned about the evidence. Wilson was careful not to question Lopez at
that time. While Lopez was undoubtedly stressed by the realization that law
enforcement had identified him as Quirino’s killer, the true facts Wilson
8 Indeed, Lopez continued talking to Operator 1 even after pointing out
that there was a camera facing their cell.
15
showed Lopez were not unduly coercive. (Cf. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 165 [Even “ ‘[t]he use of deceptive statements during an investigation does
not invalidate a confession as involuntary unless the deception is the type
likely to procure an untrue statement.’ ”].)
Finally, Lopez’s contention that the transcript is too unintelligible to
provide an accurate representation of the operation is not supported by the
record. Lopez asserts the written transcript contains approximately 475
“ ‘unintelligible’ portions.” The unintelligible portions, however, are at most a
word or two each. A review of the recordings makes clear the context of the
conversation is not obscured, and the actual recording contains only a
handful of inaudible words. Lopez’s contention on this point has no merit.
Contrary to Lopez’s argument, there is no indication in the video and
audio recording of the operation that anyone pressured Lopez to share the
details of his involvement in the murder. In short, nothing in this record
suggests the agents did anything to coerce Lopez to confess and his
incriminating statements during the operation were properly admitted into
evidence at trial.9
9 Our conclusion that Lopez’s incriminating statements were not coerced
obviates the need to reach the parties’ arguments concerning prejudice.
16
II
Pitchess Motion
Lopez next contends the trial court erred by denying his motion under
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) without holding an
in camera hearing to review the personnel records of Wilson and Brambila.
He asserts that contrary to the trial court’s finding, his motion set forth good
cause for the discovery. The Attorney General responds that Lopez did not
establish good cause for the information and, thus, the denial was not error.
A
Additional Background
Two months before trial, Lopez filed a motion for discovery of the
personnel records of Wilson and Brambila pursuant to Pitchess. Therein,
Lopez sought “[a]ny evidence of … false statements in the police reports; and
… complaints of dishonesty” by Wilson and Brambila. The motion alleged
that Wilson and Brambila failed to disclose information concerning a video
recording of the Perkins operation that was captured by the camera outside
the cell, which demonstrated the deputies’ “willingness to provide false
testimony under oath” and “in the police reports.”
In the motion, Lopez’s counsel asserted that “[t]he Prosecution had
previously requested any [and] all recordings [of the Perkins operation] and
had been informed there was no video recording of the Perkins Operation.”
However, on January 13, 2023, “the Prosecution informed the court and
defense counsel that [the] day prior he learned from a law enforcement
official that there indeed was a video recording of the Perkins operation held
on September 7, 201[9], in the cell facing the cell Mr. Lopez and the Perkins
operator were in.” Defense counsel claimed that this “new information”
contradicted Wilson’s testimony at the preliminary hearing “where he
17
testified that there was not a video recording of the Perkins operation.”
Counsel also alleged Brambila wrote in his police report that “the video
recording facing the cell was turned off at 6:23 p.m. without any more
explanation to inform that the video had recorded the Perkins operation.”
Lopez’s counsel claimed the requested discovery was material to the
case because Lopez’s “defense is partly based upon police misconduct,
including, but not limited to: (1) false statements in police reports; and
(2) any other evidence of or complaints of dishonesty.” Counsel argued the
“requested information could potentially lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, critical to challenging the officer’s credibility and exposing his/her
bias and/or motivation for engaging in the improper conduct alleged …
herein.” In a declaration attached to the motion, Lopez’s counsel repeated
the information she alleged in the motion and claimed “good cause has been
established for an in-chambers review of” the officers’ personnel records.
The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department filed an opposition to the
motion asserting Lopez had not established good cause for the records. The
attorney for the sheriff’s department explained that Wilson’s testimony at the
preliminary hearing was true because there was no video camera in the cell
where the Perkins operation took place. The opposition asserted Wilson gave
no indication at the preliminary hearing that he was aware of a video camera
outside of the cell. Further, Wilson testified he was not involved in setting up
the cell for the operation. Rather, the Detention Investigations Unit set up
the cell, so Wilson did not have personal knowledge of the camera. The
attorney argued “Wilson did not intentionally mislead the parties or the
court. Counsel’s assertion in the Declaration is simply incorrect.”
With regard to Brambila, the attorney for the sheriff’s department
stated Brambila’s police report had not been provided by Lopez’s counsel, so
18
there was no context for the court to evaluate the truth or falsity of the
allegation. Further, the alleged statement from Brambila’s police report bore
“no hallmarks of falsity” and showed only “the time that a video recording
was turned off.” That statement did not show “an attempt by Detective
Brambila to conceal the fact that a camera was recording in a different cell.”
At the hearing on the Pitchess motion, Lopez’s counsel argued the
detectives lied to the prosecutor when they told him previously that no video
of the Perkins operation existed. Further, counsel asserted Wilson also lied
at the preliminary hearing when he was asked if there was a video and he
answered “no.” Counsel argued the “falsity in this case” was relevant to the
officers’ credibility. In response, the attorney for the sheriff’s department
conceded “there was an error that occurred,” because “there was a video that
the sheriff’s deputies didn’t know about,” but “[a]s soon as the error was
discovered,” the video “was revealed.” Thus, the attorney argued, “nobody
lied.”
At the conclusion of the argument, the trial court denied the motion,
finding Lopez had not established good cause. The court explained, “this all
boils down to the absence of information concerning a video recording of the
Perkins operation. … The defendant claims that the testimony in the police
reports [was] deliberately falsified and as a result … the officers’ false
testimony reports affect their credibility as witnesses.” The court found
Wilson did not lie at the preliminary hearing or “create any
misrepresentation.” Rather, Wilson was not aware “at the time that the
camera in question was in a different cell and partially captured the event.”
The court also found there was no evidence Brambila had made a false
statement. The court concluded, “It is a common-sense determination that
the court is required to make. And I just do not see in [defense counsel’s]
19
declaration that there is any … specific allegations of untruthfulness or lies.
It is a question of just not having any knowledge.”
B
Legal Standards
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pitchess established that a criminal
defendant may “ ‘compel discovery’ of certain relevant information in the
personnel files of police officers by making ‘general allegations which
establish some cause for discovery’ of that information and by showing how it
would support a defense to the charge against him.” (Warrick v. Superior
Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1018–1019 (Warrick).) The Legislature later
codified Pitchess in sections 832.7 and 832.8, and Evidence Code sections
1043 through 1045. (Warrick, at p. 1019.) In short, the Pitchess statutory
“scheme entitles a defendant to information that will ‘facilitate the
ascertainment of the facts’ at trial [citation], that is, ‘all information
pertinent to the defense.’ ” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29
Cal.4th 1, 14.)
Pitchess discovery under the statutory scheme proceeds in a two-step
process. Under the first step, the defendant must file a written motion
describing the type of records or information sought, supported by an
affidavit showing “good cause” for the discovery or disclosure, setting forth
the materiality of the discovery or disclosure to the “subject matter involved
in the pending litigation,” and stating upon reasonable belief that the
government agency at issue has the records or information requested. (Evid.
Code, § 1043, subds. (a) & (b); People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226
(Mooc).) Then, if the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it conducts
an in camera review of the pertinent documents to determine which, if any,
are relevant. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b).) “ ‘Subject to statutory
20
exceptions and limitations … the trial court should then disclose to the
defendant “such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending litigation.” ’ ” (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086.)
At the first stage, a defendant need satisfy only a “relatively low”
threshold to establish good cause. (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) Nevertheless, a defendant is not entitled to an in
camera review of peace officer personnel records without “ ‘establish[ing] a
plausible factual foundation’ ” for the allegation of officer misconduct.
(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) The defendant “must present … a
specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in
light of the pertinent documents.” (Ibid.) Corroborating collateral evidence is
not required, nor is a defendant required to “present a credible or believable
factual account of, or a motive for, police misconduct.” (Id. at p. 1026.)
Instead, all that is required is a showing that the alleged scenario “might or
could have occurred.” (Ibid.) “[D]epending on the circumstances of the case,”
a sufficient factual allegation in a Pitchess motion “may consist of a denial of
the facts asserted in the police report.” (Id. at pp. 1024–1025.)
A trial court has wide discretion when ruling on a Pitchess motion.
(People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 832.) However, a trial court’s
exercise of its discretion is not unlimited and must be governed by the
controlling legal principles. (See People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14
Cal.4th 968, 977.)
C
Analysis
We agree with the Attorney General that Lopez failed to establish the
good cause necessary to support an in camera review of the officers’ personnel
21
records. As the Attorney General points out, there was no evidence that
either detective made false statements or intentionally withheld information
about the existence of a video recording before it was discovered and
disclosed. The only evidence provided by Lopez about Wilson was his
testimony at the preliminary hearing that he was not involved in setting up
the operation, that he knew there “were audio recorders set up in the room,”
and that “there were no cameras in th[e] room that we were able to use.” The
only information provided concerning Brambila was a report he prepared
setting out the operation’s timeline, which stated that “[a]t approximately
1324 hours, the video recording device [redacted] was turned on” and “[a]t
approximately 1823 hours, the video recording device facing the cell was
turned off.”
This evidence suggests only that Wilson was unaware there was a
camera in an adjacent cell that captured the operation and that Brambila did
know about the camera and was forthcoming about it in his report. Indeed,
there is no indication in the record that Brambila was ever asked whether a
video existed. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226 [“The affidavits may be on
information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge
[citation], but the information sought must be requested with sufficient
specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendant’s simply casting about for
any helpful information”].)
Further, Lopez has failed to show how the alleged misconduct was
material or relevant to his defense. At trial, Lopez’s defense was that he
stabbed Quirino in self-defense. He made no assertion that any police
misconduct by the investigators was at issue. (California Highway Patrol v.
Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020 [“A showing of ‘good cause’
requires defendant to demonstrate the relevance of the requested information
22
by providing a ‘specific factual scenario’ which establishes a ‘plausible factual
foundation’ for the allegations of officer misconduct committed in connection
with defendant.”].)
Given Lopez’s failure to identify any plausible officer misconduct or its
relationship to his defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
finding that Lopez failed to establish good cause to support an in camera
review of the detectives’ personnel files.
III
Discovery Motion
Lopez next asks this court to independently review the transcripts for
two confidential hearings conducted by the trial court to address his motion
to unseal the names of two confidential informants, Operator 1 and another
informant who provided unhelpful information to police during the
investigation, and the undercover officer, Operator 2, involved in the Perkins
operation. The Attorney General does not oppose Lopez’s request for an
independent review of the transcripts.
A
Additional Background
On December 19, 2022, Lopez filed a “motion for order to produce
discovery regarding confidential informants” seeking “the name and date of
birth of the confidential informant [and] the undercover officer” involved in
the Perkins operation. He asserted the discovery was “necessary for the
defense to investigate and determine whether the audio recordings of
Mr. Lopez and the two ‘Operators’ were obtained in violation of Lopez’s Due
Process and other constitutional rights.” Counsel argued Lopez’s statements
were “not [the] ‘product of a free and deliberate choice’ but most certainly a
direct result of a well-planned and carried out deception.” Lopez’s counsel
23
argued the confidential informant and the undercover detective “entered the
jail holding cell with [Lopez] and immediately talked in a manner designed to
signal to Lopez that they were like him, who he could trust (and fear) based
upon the bonds of their common gang membership.”
The prosecutor filed a response to the motion, noting the informant and
the undercover officer were not material witnesses, and requesting an in
camera hearing pursuant to section 1054.7 if necessary. The prosecutor
argued that because he did not intend to call the undercover agent and
confidential informant as witnesses, there was no valid basis to disclose their
identities. The prosecutor asserted neither individual had any “exculpatory
evidence” or independent knowledge of the crimes or the defendant outside of
the Perkins operation, which “was recorded and discovered to defense.”
The prosecutor also noted Lopez “did not make any admissions in front
of the undercover Deputy Sheriff.” With regard to the confidential informant,
the prosecutor argued the defense “failed to establish that [he] was a
‘material witness’ ” because he “was not a co-participant in the crime nor was
he a witness to the crime.” Rather, his involvement was comprised solely of
sitting in a cell and talking to Lopez. The prosecutor stated “there would be
an extreme danger to the [confidential informant]’s life if his identity was
revealed,” and revealing his identity would compromise the sheriff’s
department’s ability to use the individual for other operations, compromising
future investigations.
On March 3, 2023, Lopez filed a “motion for order to produce discovery
regarding confidential informant[].” Lopez sought “an order directing the
prosecution to produce discovery regarding [the] confidential informant that
identified Juan Carlos Arguelles” as the driver and “ ‘Vamps’ [as] the
passenger involved in the stabbing charged in this case.” Lopez’s counsel
24
asserted the informant appeared to have knowledge of the “precise details of
the stabbing.” Counsel explained that in January 2019, “San Diego County
Sheriff Sergeant Navarro and Deputy Wilson met with a confidential
informant (CI) at the George Bailey Detention Facility and discussed the
murder charge against Mr. Lopez. The CI told them that the driver of the
vehicle of the incident was known as ‘Tripps’ and his name was Juan Carlos,
referring to Juan Carlos Arguelles, from Logan Heights gang, subset ‘33rd.’
The CI further told officers that the passenger involved in the stabbing was
‘Vamps’ also from Logan Heights gang, subset ‘Red Steps.’ ” Defense counsel
asserted this information was exculpatory and thus the informant was a
material witness and nondisclosure of his identity would deprive Lopez of a
fair trial.
The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing the informant was not a
material witness. The prosecution also argued that the informant “provided
law enforcement with speculative hearsay information,” which was “vetted by
law enforcement and proven to be false.”
At a hearing on the motion on March 24, 2023, the prosecutor stated
that detectives were available for an in camera hearing to testify as to why
the individuals’ identities should remain privileged. The court then
conducted an in camera hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 1042
subdivision (b) and the proceeding was sealed. Thereafter, the court denied
Lopez’s request to disclose the names of the confidential informants, but
granted the request to disclose the identity of the undercover officer based on
the prosecutor’s assertion that he did not oppose releasing the name. The
prosecutor stated he would provide the officer’s name to the defense.
In its ruling, the court explained that “based upon the testimony it
heard in camera, the confidential informant’s information was hearsay. And
25
what the court looks at under 1042 is the possibility that the confidential
informant would give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result in the
defendant’s exoneration.” The court continued that a “reasonable possibility
is predicated upon the relative proximity of the confidential informant to the
offense charged.” The court concluded Operator 1 was “neither a participant
or a nonparticipant eyewitness to the charged offense. Frankly, he wasn’t
there. He was in the jail with the defendant. [¶] So the court finds that the
possibility that the confidential informant could give evidence which might
exonerate the defendant is even more speculative.” On the request of Lopez’s
counsel, the court clarified its ruling pertained to both Operator 1 and the
other informant that purported to identify the SUV occupants.10
On April 12, 2023, the prosecutor filed a motion to revisit disclosure of
the identity of the undercover sheriff’s deputy that participated in the
Perkins operation. The prosecutor asserted the undercover officer was not a
material witness and was not going to be called by the prosecution at trial,
nor could the officer provide exculpatory information since he had no
firsthand knowledge of the crime. On May 1, 2023, the court conducted a
second in camera hearing to consider the prosecutor’s motion, which was
sealed. After the hearing, defense counsel argued the officer’s identity was
relevant “to effectively … confront any statements from the Perkins operation
that were elicited by a train[ed] professional with specific techniques” to
obtain incriminating statements from Lopez. The court then ruled disclosure
was not required, finding the deputy was “really not a material witness” and
his testimony would not be relevant to the case. The court further found that
disclosure would place the officer and his family in “great danger.”
10 The court also explained it heard testimony during the in camera
hearing from a sergeant, lieutenant, and detective, relating to both of Lopez’s
discovery motions.
26
B
Legal Standards
As relevant here, Evidence Code section 1041 grants a public entity a
privilege to refuse disclosure of the identity of a person who has furnished
information in confidence to a law enforcement officer if “[d]isclosure of the
identity of the informer is against the public interest because the necessity
for preserving the confidentiality of his or her identity outweighs the
necessity for disclosure in the interests of justice.” (Evid. Code, § 1041,
subds. (a)(2) & (b)(1).)
“[T]he prosecution must disclose the name of an informant who is a
material witness in a criminal case or suffer dismissal of the charges against
the defendant. [Citation.] An informant is a material witness if there
appears, from the evidence presented, a reasonable possibility that he or she
could give credence on the issue of guilt that might exonerate the defendant.
[Citation.] The defendant bears the burden of adducing ‘ “ ‘some evidence’ ” ’
on this score. [Citations.]” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 159
[independent review of in camera hearing indicated trial court applied correct
standard in determining informant’s identity was privileged].)
When a party demands disclosure of an informant’s identity, Evidence
Code section 1042 subdivision (d), requires the court to conduct a hearing “at
which all parties may present evidence on the issue of disclosure.” However,
if the identity of the informant could be compromised by such a hearing, “the
prosecuting attorney may request that the court hold an in camera hearing.
If such a request is made, the court shall hold such a hearing outside the
presence of the defendant and his counsel. At the in camera hearing, the
prosecution may offer evidence which would tend to disclose or which
discloses the identity of the informant to aid the court in its determination
27
whether there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive
the defendant of a fair trial.” (Evid. Code, § 1042, subd. (d).)
C
Analysis
As discussed, Lopez asks this court to independently review the sealed
transcript of the in camera hearings to assess the correctness of the trial
court’s ruling, and the People express no objection. Having done so, we
conclude the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel’s request to
disclose the identity of the confidential informants and the undercover
sheriff’s deputy because they could not provide information that was
exculpatory or material to Lopez’s guilt or innocence with respect to the
offenses charged in this case and disclosure of their identities would place
them in danger. (Evid. Code, § 1041, subd. (b)(2).)
IV
Sentencing Issues
Lopez’s final contentions on appeal relate to the sentence imposed by
the trial court. He asserts that the court abused its discretion by imposing
the middle term for count 4, assault with a deadly weapon, by refusing to
strike his prior strike conviction, and by failing to strike his serious prior
felony enhancement. The Attorney General responds that the court acted
within its sentencing discretion, and that Lopez forfeited his arguments
concerning the serious prior felony enhancement by failing to raise the issue
in the trial court.
A
Additional Background
Before sentencing, Lopez admitted two aggravating factors that were
alleged in the consolidated amended information: that the offense involved
28
great violence, bodily harm, or threat of great bodily harm (California Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)), and that his prior convictions as an adult and
sustained matters in juvenile delinquency petitions were numerous and of
increasing seriousness (id., rule 4.421(b)(2)). Lopez also admitted a prior
strike conviction and a serious prior felony conviction.
The prosecutor filed a statement in aggravation and an amended
statement in aggravation. Therein, the prosecution requested imposition of
the upper term on counts 2 through 4, and asked the court to impose the five-
year enhancement for Lopez’s serious prior felony on the determinate term
for counts 2 through 4. The prosecution requested a total indeterminate term
of 16 years to life (count 1), plus a determinate term of 15 years.
Lopez filed a statement in mitigation which attached a “forensic
psychological examination” evaluation from clinical and forensic psychologist
Dr. Bruce Yanofsky. The statement asserted that the psychological
evaluation showed Lopez’s life was “plagued by trauma and abuse.”
Specifically, the statement explained Lopez had been exposed to
methamphetamine in utero, observed domestic violence and substance abuse
in his home as a child, suffered physical and sexual abuse, and was placed in
the foster care system. The defense statement asserted that as a result of
this history, Lopez became addicted to drugs, and was using PCP and heroin
daily at the time of his arrest in 2019. The statement also asserted Lopez
recently renounced his gang involvement and had started mental health
treatment. The mitigation statement emphasized that Dr. Yanofsky’s report
showed Lopez had experienced childhood trauma and had mental health
difficulties as a child. Counsel stressed that Dr. Yanofsky determined Lopez
had “youthful offender characteristics” under section 3051 at the time he
killed Quirino.
29
The mitigation statement asked the court to exercise its discretion
under section 1170 subdivision (b)(6) to impose the low terms on all charges
except the murder charge. Counsel cited two factors contained in section
1170 subdivision (b)(6): “the person has experienced psychological, physical,
or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence” and “the person is a youth or was a youth as
defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission
of the offense.” Defense counsel also argued section 1170 supported striking
the strike prior.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the court to sentence
Lopez to “the max[imum] punishment.” She asserted Lopez had shown a
pattern of violent behavior, which continued after he was taken into custody.
The prosecutor also argued Lopez’s past behavior showed he posed an
unreasonable risk to the public. Lopez’s counsel, in turn, asked the court to
impose the lowest possible term, to strike Lopez’s prior strike, to stay
punishment on the separate case involving the assault on Lopez’s father (case
no. SDC281300), and to impose the determinate term concurrently to the
indeterminate term. She explained that Lopez had “officially renounced” his
gang membership and expressed remorse for his crimes. Defense counsel
also asserted that Lopez’s childhood trauma, which included physical and
sexual abuse, caused him to “go down the wrong path.”
Lopez also addressed the court. He said he was “sorry for what [he]
did,” that he was “under the influence of alcohol and ... was in a gang and just
that [he] was going to protect [him]self.” He also said he “was drunk that
day.”
The court sentenced Lopez first on case no. SDC281300, which involved
Lopez’s assault on his father in 2019. The court stated it read Dr. Yanofsky’s
30
report and while the abuse was not an excuse for his violence, it helped
explain the assault. The court found “the mitigants are predominantly
overwhelming, as were the aggravants, but based upon the fact that as a
child, you were a victim of sexual abuse, you also had diagnoses that
appeared to be documented beyond the self-reporting of PTSD, potential anti-
social qualities, schizoaffective, and all of these things, the court is going to
find the lower term and sentence you to the department of corrections for two
years,” which would be concurrent to the sentences in the underlying case.
The court then sentenced Lopez in the instant case. For count 1,
second degree murder, the court imposed an indeterminate term of 15 years
to life plus one year for the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). With regard to counts 2, 3 and 4, the court deemed
count 4 (assault with a deadly weapon) as the primary count. The court then
found “the mitigants and the aggravants basically are the same” and
sentenced Lopez to the midterm of three years. The court declined to strike
the prior strike, explaining it was not in the interest of justice to do so,
doubling the three-year term to six. The court imposed the midterm of two
years on count 3 (manufacturing a weapon), doubled to four years because of
the strike, but stayed the term pursuant to section 654. On count 2
(possessing a weapon in jail), the court imposed the midterm of two years to
run consecutively. The court also stated it did “not find a legal basis to strike
the prior,” and imposed a five-year term for the serious prior felony
enhancement.11
11 The court also imposed concurrent 16-month sentences in a separate
case on convictions for grand theft and burglary. The total determinate term
of 15 years and 8 months includes these two 16-month sentences, the six-year
term imposed on count 4, the two-year term imposed on count 2, and the five-
year prior felony enhancement.
31
B
Imposition of The Middle Term on Count 4
“Section 1170, subdivision (b) governs imposition of a judgment of
imprisonment when a statute specifies three possible terms.” (People v.
Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 681, 704.) Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly
Bill No. 124, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1170 subdivision (b),
“in several fundamental ways.” (People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032,
1038.) Under the amended law, the statute “creates a presumption that the
sentencing court ‘shall’ enter a lower term sentence, when, among other
things, a ‘psychological, physical, or childhood trauma’ contributed to the
offense.’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419 (Salazar), quoting
§ 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (b)(6)(A).) Likewise, the low term is the presumptive
term if the defendant “is a youth, or was a youth as defined under
subdivision (b) of section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the
offense.”12 (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).) The sentencing court “may only depart
from this lower term presumption if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that the lower
term would be contrary to ‘the interests of justice.’ ” (Salazar, at p. 419,
quoting § 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
“Discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether ‘the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice’ (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (Salazar, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 428, fn. 8; People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205
(Hilburn).) The party attacking the sentence has the burden to “ ‘ “ ‘clearly
12 Section 1016.7, subdivision (b) defines “youth” as “any person under 26
years of age on the date the offense was committed.” At the time Lopez
committed the crime charged in Count 4 he was 29 years old.
32
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
Lopez contends the court abused its discretion by not imposing the low
term on count 4 because of the existence of several mitigating factors: his age
at the time of the homicide (he was 23), significant childhood trauma and
prior victimization, diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
substance abuse, and his separation from his gang and recent attempts to
address his mental health and substance abuse issues. The Attorney General
responds that Lopez forfeited this issue by not raising it in the trial court.
Further, the Attorney General asserts that the trial court appropriately
exercised its discretion in determining that imposition of the low term was
contrary to the interests of justice because the aggravating circumstances
outweighed those in mitigation.
We agree with the Attorney General that Lopez has not shown the
court abused its discretion by imposing the middle term. The court
considered Dr. Yanofsky’s report, evidenced by its imposition of the lower
term for the probation conviction stemming from Lopez’s assault on his
father, which the court found was related, at least in part, to the abuse Lopez
suffered as a child. The court then found that with respect to the crimes at
issue in the present case, the mitigating and aggravating factors were about
the same, and, implicitly, that Count 4 was not related to the abuse suffered
by Lopez and imposition of the middle term was in the interest of justice.
These findings were amply supported by the record before the court. Lopez’s
bald assertion on appeal that the mitigating factors clearly outweighed those
in aggravation does not show the court abused its discretion by sentencing
Lopez to the middle term of three years on count 4. (See Hilburn, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 205 [“After a sufficient factual basis to support the
33
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation is found, the court enjoys broad
discretion in its sentencing determination.”].)
C
Prior Strike
Section 1385 subdivision (a), permits a trial court to “strike factual
allegations relevant to sentencing, such as the allegation that a defendant
has prior felony convictions.” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13
Cal.4th 497, 504.) However, “ ‘the Three Strikes law does not offer a
discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but establishes
a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant
has at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court “conclud[es]
that an exception to the scheme should be made because, for articulable
reasons which can withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be
treated as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme.” ’ ”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).) “[T]he [T]hree
[S]trikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully
circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires
the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so.” (Id. at p. 378.)
In exercising its discretion, the sentencing court “must consider
whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or
violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) “[A] trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
34
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Lopez argues the court abused its discretion by denying his request to
strike his prior strike because of his age at the time of the crimes and because
of the trauma, mental illness, and abuse he experienced as a child. The
Attorney General responds that the nature of the crimes in this case and
Lopez’s significant criminal history establish this is not the rare case that
falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.
We agree with the Attorney General that the record shows the trial
court properly considered the relevant information and factors in denying
Lopez’s request to strike his prior strike, and that the denial was not an
abuse of discretion. As the People point out, Lopez’s violent criminal history
began in 2009 when he assaulted two other youths inside a juvenile detention
facility. In 2016, Lopez committed the violent murder of Quirino, then in
2019 assaulted his father and committed grand theft and burglary. Finally,
after he was in custody, Lopez committed another assault with a deadly
weapon. These facts demonstrate a pattern of violent behavior, placing him
squarely within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (See Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary ... by
which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very
scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a
long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was
meant to attack’ [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people
could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes
scheme must be even more extraordinary.”].)
35
D
Serious Prior Felony Enhancement
With respect to the serious prior felony conviction enhancement,
section 1385 subdivision (c)(1) provides that the sentencing “court ‘shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’ Under
subdivision (c)(2), in exercising its discretion, ‘the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof
of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor
of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)” (People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 221.) The statute “provides that
‘ “[e]ndanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.’ ” (Ibid.)
The mitigating circumstances set forth in section 1385
subdivision (c)(2) are: “(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
discriminatory racial impact .... [¶] (B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in
a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed. [¶] (C) The application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed. [¶] (D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
[¶] (E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood
trauma. [¶] (F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5. [¶] (G) The defendant was a juvenile when
they committed the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
36
convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the enhancement or
enhancements applied in the current case. [¶] (H) The enhancement is based
on a prior conviction that is over five years old. [¶] (I) Though a firearm was
used in the current offense, it was inoperable or unloaded.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
Under this statute, “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present. [Citation.] In other words,
if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the
presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in
the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.)
Lopez argues that the court erred by failing to dismiss the serious prior
felony enhancement in accordance with section 1385 subdivision (c)(2)
because multiple enhancements were alleged (the serious prior felony
enhancement he now challenges, and the deadly weapon enhancement
attached to count 1) and imposition of the 5-year enhancement term resulted
in a sentence greater than 20 years. Lopez also contends two additional
mitigating factors supported dismissal: the current offenses were connected
to his mental illness and to his prior victimization and childhood trauma.
The Attorney General responds that Lopez forfeited this challenge by failing
to raise it in the trial court.
37
We agree with the Attorney General that Lopez forfeited the issue.
(See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (Stowell) [“The forfeiture
doctrine is a ‘well-established procedural principle that, with certain
exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could
have been—but were not—raised in the trial court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]
Strong policy reasons support this rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to
permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of
the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.’ ”].) Although
Lopez’s statement in mitigation asked the court to impose the lowest possible
sentence and to strike his serious prior felony conviction, the statement did
not mention section 1385. Likewise, at the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel asked the court to strike the strike prior, but did not ask the court to
strike the serious prior felony enhancement.
Even if we were to reach the issue, we would conclude it lacks merit.
Lopez provides no argument suggesting the trial court was unaware of or
misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion. We assume the trial
court was aware of and followed applicable law. (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th
at p. 1114 [“ ‘a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
applicable law’ ”].) Accordingly, Lopez’s “citation to a silent record is
insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion” by
failing to strike the serious prior felony enhancement. (People v. Coleman
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725.)
38
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
CASTILLO, J.
39
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