CourtListener 10714972•In re P.P. CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 10/30/25 In re P.P. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re P.P., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
CONTRA COSTA CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172621
v.
(Contra Costa County
K.P.,
Super. Ct. No. J23-00459)
Defendant and Appellant;
J.C.,
Objector and Appellant.
This is our second opinion in this dependency proceeding involving P.P.
(born November 2022), the daughter of K.P. (mother) and J.C. (father). The
juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a permanency
planning hearing under section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In our first opinion, we denied mother’s and father’s writ petitions
challenging that order.1 The juvenile court then terminated mother’s and
father’s parental rights under section 366.26. Both parents now separately
appeal, claiming the court erred by concluding they did not establish the
parental-benefit exception to termination under section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Proceedings
In August 2023, the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services
Bureau (Bureau) filed a juvenile dependency petition “alleging that P.P. was
described by subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 due to mother repeatedly
leaving the infant minor unattended for extended periods, using marijuana,
and failing to comply with mental health treatment.” “Mother’s behavior was
described as angry, aggressive, abusive, and manipulative.”
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court “formally detained [P.P] in
foster care” and “raised [J.C.] to presumed father status.” The court ordered
supervised visitation for mother and visitation for father to be “supervised at
the Bureau’s discretion.” “[M]other and father each filed a waiver of rights
and jurisdiction was established based on slightly revised petition language.”
B. Reunification Period
“In advance of the dispositional hearing, the Bureau filed a report
recommending reunification services for both parents.” At that time, “mother
did not have a safe and stable place to stay. She had engaged in therapy and
enrolled in a parenting class. She admitted to smoking marijuana
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code. Quoted portions from the factual background come from our prior
opinion, J.C. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Feb. 10, 2025,
No. A171654) [nonpub. opn.]. We take judicial notice of the record in that
appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
2
approximately twice a week to help her anxiety. Father was living in a
studio apartment, but, upon inspection, the home was not in a state where
the minor could spend time there. He was employed full time and identified
some family and friends who might help him care for P.P. He declined to
share his strengths or needs because he considered himself nonoffending and
believed he should have immediate custody of his daughter.” “P.P. had been
very behind developmentally when she entered foster care.” But “[a]fter two
months in foster care, [she] could roll over, crawl, pull herself to a stand, hold
food, and self-feed. She was babbling and smiling and had adjusted well to
daycare.”
At the dispositional hearing in November 2023, “the juvenile court
declared the minor to be a juvenile court dependent and ordered reunification
services for both parents. Mother was ordered to complete a psychological
evaluation and comply with treatment; participate in random drug testing;
and attend parenting classes. Father was required to complete a
psychological evaluation and attend parenting classes. Visitation for mother
and father was ordered a minimum of eight hours four times per month, to be
supervised at the Bureau’s discretion.”
Later that month, “the court suspended mother’s visitation with the
minor until she complied with mental health treatment. The Bureau
requested the change due to mother’s escalating erratic and dangerous
behaviors. For example, mother sent a series of e-mails to father, calling him
names and threatening him. . . . In addition, mother stated father had hired a
hit man to kill her and P.P. in the past. Mother threatened to sue the social
worker for lying in reports and, at one point, walked aggressively toward the
social worker while the worker was holding another foster child, yelling and
recording the interaction. On another occasion, mother carried the minor
3
into the lobby after a visit and recorded with her other hand while she
screamed and cursed at the foster parent and accused the foster father of
raping P.P. She set the minor down and took off her diaper to show everyone
in the lobby that P.P. was being raped. P.P. was crying the whole time and
falling out of mother’s arm.” In February 2024, “the juvenile court appointed
a guardian ad litem for mother and reinstated supervised visitation for her
once per week for one hour.”
“In its report for the six-month review hearing, the Bureau
recommended that reunification services be terminated for both parents.
Mother was reportedly living in an RV (recreational vehicle) in an
undisclosed location but was open to moving to a shelter. She was a full-time
college student majoring in child development and hoping to find a job
working with children. During the reporting period, the social worker
repeatedly had to redirect mother away from focusing on father or on efforts
outside of her case plan. Mother continued to contact father, telling him to
stop showing up for court, stating that he was stalking her, and threatening
that she would have him arrested. In March, mother punched the maternal
grandmother repeatedly in the head while she was driving and told her she
would kill her if she lost her baby. Battery charges were filed.”
“Mother was seeing a psychiatrist, had been diagnosed with
adjustment disorder with anxiety, and was taking prescribed medication that
she found helpful. Mother also reported benefitting from seeing a therapist.
She had completed her parenting class. Mother had a number of no shows for
her drug testing, otherwise testing positive only for marijuana. Despite her
participation in services, mother had not shown the behavior changes needed
to be able to safely parent P.P., and her mental state was still unstable.
Although she had ‘unwavering love’ for P.P., mother could not consistently
4
acknowledge that she had put the minor in an unsafe situation by leaving her
alone.”
“Father continued to work full time but was unhoused and living in his
car. He refused to sign his case plan, reiterating that he was the
nonoffending parent. When mother charged at father after a court hearing in
February, yelling and alleging the foster parents were raping P.P., the court
worker suggested father obtain a restraining order with the help of the
Bureau’s domestic violence liaison, but he had not done so. He declined to
participate in any services, stating he would play ‘the long game’ and reunify
with his daughter ‘another way.’ ”
Following a “contested six-month review hearing” in June and July
2024, the juvenile court “continued reunification services to the 12-month
mark.” “[T]he Bureau again recommended that reunification services be
terminated for both parents. Mother had entered a homeless shelter . . . and
was invited to participate in a 90-day program of classes, including anger
management, to [explore] the shelter’s yearlong Life Transformation
Program.” But she “only participated for one month,” citing “employment
reasons.” “Although she could have reunified with P.P. in the Life
Transformation Program and was urged to reconsider, mother was reluctant
because she would not have her cell phone for a period of days and was
worried she would not be able to visit or do services. The social worker
explained that she would still be able to continue her case plan with her
current providers. Nevertheless, mother refused to enter the program
without P.P.” “Mother stated she was medication compliant but the social
worker’s attempts to confirm this were not successful. Mother continued to
do well in therapy and noted a reduction in anger and anxiety. Although she
still had several no shows, she was testing negative for all substances since
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May 2024. She was able to articulate a basic plan of age-appropriate foods
and activities for P.P.”
“Father was still living in his vehicle.” “He continued to state he did
not want to work with the Bureau, and, despite numerous attempts by the
social worker, the two had no contact after June. He continued to decline
participation in services, stating he did not trust the Bureau. Both parents
were consistent in their twice weekly visitation, although father still had
issues reading P.P.’s cues, and the minor still showed some reticence in
engaging with father.”
“A contested 12-month review hearing was held over several days in
October and November 2024. [Fn. omitted.] While the hearing was pending,
mother raised concerns that P.P. was being sexually abused in foster care, as
she had at the beginning of the case. Mother was observed excessively
cleaning the minor during diaper changes to the extent that P.P. would say
‘ “ow” ’ and try to lock her legs. These behaviors were not observed with other
care providers and were one of the reasons mother’s visits remained closely
supervised. The social worker believed it was in the minor’s best interest to
reduce mother’s visitation at this point.”
“Mother had left the shelter and would not share her location with the
social worker. The social worker tried to assist mother in entering another
program, especially since she was pregnant again, but mother continued to
state she could not afford it despite the worker telling her repeatedly how she
could access the necessary funds through general assistance.” A new
psychiatrist had diagnosed mother “with PTSD and major depressive
disorder (in remission) as well as generalized anxiety. Mother was still
struggling with her anxiety, but was using tools she had learned to help
manage it. The social worker testified that, though there were still moments
6
of concern, mother’s behavior had improved and was less unpredictable than
it had been at the beginning of the dependency.”
“While the hearing was ongoing, father finally contacted the social
worker, explaining he did not make himself available sooner because he was
upset about a portion of the social worker’s previous court testimony. . . .
Father indicated wanting to have P.P. with him but presented no plan for
caring for her. The social worker was concerned about father refusing to take
a parenting class as he would misread the minor’s cues during visits. . . . The
case plan requirement for a psychological evaluation stemmed from Bureau
concerns regarding father’s perceived paranoia regarding both the Bureau
and mother. However, the real problem for the social worker was not lack of
compliance with his case plan or father’s living situation but rather the fact
that she had not been able to fully assess his ability to safely parent P.P. She
was also concerned that father would not cooperate with the Bureau if P.P.
was placed with him so that it could monitor the minor.”
“At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated reunification
services and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to
section 366.26 . . . . In doing so, the court concluded there would be a
substantial risk of detriment to P.P. if she was placed with either parent,
noting that both parents had declined to provide the social worker with
information about their current living situations and neither had
demonstrated the protective capacity necessary to be granted custody of the
minor.” “With respect to a substantial probability of return by the 18-month
mark, the court found that both parents had consistent and regular contact
with P.P. However, neither parent had shown ‘at all’ that they had made
significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the dependency.
With respect to being able to complete the case plan objectives if granted
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additional time, while mother had worked hard on her case plan, there was
‘no indication’ this had translated into the required behavioral changes. And
father made clear he was not willing to do anything but visit.”
“Although the court adopted the Bureau’s recommendation to
terminate reunification efforts, it found the Bureau’s request to reduce visits
to once per month ‘too drastic.’ The court recognized that the case had
shifted to focus on the minor’s interests rather than the parents’ but adopted
the suggestion of minor’s counsel for visitation twice a month for two hours.
A permanency planning hearing was set for February 2025.”
This court denied mother’s and father’s separate writ petitions
challenging the juvenile court’s order.
C. Subsequent Proceedings
At the permanency planning hearing, the Bureau relied on its report
recommending that the juvenile court terminate the parental rights of both
mother and father. The report noted that P.P. “continue[d] to make great
progress on her developmental milestones” while in foster care, was “doing
great” in day care, had “not shown any emotional instability,” and received
negative results from a mental health screening. Both parents consistently
completed supervised visits: mother completed 60 of 70 visits offered and
allowed the maternal grandmother to join at least one visit per month, and
father completed 96 of 105 visits offered. The report noted that mother’s
visits were suspended from mid-November 2023 until mid-February 2024.
During visits, “the parents still require[d] prompting when engaging with
[P.P.] in age-appropriate ways and reading her queues.” P.P. had “an easier
time transitioning to” mother than father but “engage[d] with both of her
parents.” Still, she “continue[d] to need the support and guidance of” the
8
visitation supervisor, suggesting she “view[ed] her parents as friendly
strangers.”
After mother’s visits resumed, P.P. “show[ed] a bigger response to
seeing [her] at the beginning of the visit due to recognizing her.” Mother
could remain focused on P.P. “for the most part” and could usually leave
worries or anxieties “ ‘outside of the visit’ ” as instructed. At times, “a
particular event that ha[d] been triggering for” mother could “enter the visit,”
and mother would “ask for the social worker or their supervisor.” During two
visits, mother was “on the telephone for nearly half of the visit.” “However,
during most of the visits,” mother was “appropriate with [P.P.] and follow[ed]
her lead.” “During all visits, [mother] was able to take any
reminders/direction” from the visitation supervisor without issue.
Mother brought “grooming items such as lotions or oils to put on [P.P.],”
would “play nursery rhymes or gospel music for” her, and once “brought a
Biblical Pamphlet and read it to [P.P.,] telling her the importance of
Baptism.” P.P. “enjoy[ed] role playing with baby dolls and kitchen toys
during the visits,” and mother also allowed her “to watch movies/ shows and
music videos.” P.P. was “clear with [mother] about what she want[ed].”
Although P.P. and mother “generally engage[d] well with one another,”
mother did “not notice when [P.P.] ha[d] transitioned in play.” For example,
mother once told P.P. she would “go in ‘time out’ too” after P.P. “refused to
dance” to a song mother played on her phone.
As father’s visits progressed, P.P. would “allow[] him to get near her,
hold her and play with her.” Father would “play blues music for” P.P. and
allow her “to explore her surroundings with minimal intervention.” He would
“intervene if she place[d] things in her mouth,” offer her “bottles and snacks,”
and change her diaper if she was soiled. P.P. was “not always hungry and
9
[would] not take to the bottle or snacks well.” Father was “an avid
fisherman” and once brought “a worm” that P.P. held during the visit.
Father was “completely focused” on P.P. and would “not answer his phone” if
it rang during a visit. On a couple of occasions, he would say “ ‘No!’ ” and
redirect P.P. to bite on his finger “instead of allowing [her] to play with a toy
that [wa]s safe to chew on.” Once, father was “a bit resistant to the direction
of” the visitation supervisor, and P.P. would “still seek out” the supervisor
during visits. P.P. would say “ ‘No’ ” when father would “try to engage with
[her] or do her hair.” Once, when P.P. was telling father “ ‘No’ as he tried to
approach her,” she “attempt[ed] to swing at” or hit father. Instead of
redirecting her, father “move[d] around [her] swings.” Another time, father
placed P.P. on his shoulders and she “started to cry and appeared scared.”
Father “reassured [P.P.] that he had her” and “questioned why she was
scared.”
The report concluded that P.P. was “adoptable” and had no “apparent
medical issues or developmental delays.” Her foster parents had been
married for eleven years, lived in a three-bedroom home in “a quiet, family-
oriented neighborhood,” and were committed to providing P.P. with a
permanent home. P.P. was comfortable in her foster parents’ care, and she
identified them as “ ‘Mom’ and ‘Dad.’ ” She had “a loving and playful
relationship” with their eight-year-old daughter. The foster parents were not
interested in legal guardianship. The report recommended that any future
visitation between P.P. and her birth parents be at the discretion of the
adopting parents.
Father did not testify or present any other evidence at the hearing.
Mother testified that her visits with P.P. “went well,” and P.P. would “run to
[her] and tell [her] she loves [her].” She described activities that P.P. enjoyed
10
during the visits. Mother testified that P.P. “loves to call [her] Mommy.”
After this testimony, mother made an oral motion under section 388, on the
grounds that her circumstances had changed and she was now capable of
caring for P.P. Mother provided additional testimony to support that motion,
which the juvenile court denied.2
D. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling Terminating Parental Rights
The juvenile court explained that, unless an exception was established,
it need only find by clear and convincing evidence that P.P. would be adopted
and find that reunification services had previously been terminated to
terminate parental rights. The court made these findings. It explained that
the parental-benefit or “parental bond exception” was the only potentially
applicable exception in P.P.’s case, and there were three prongs that must be
established for that exception to apply.
“[E]veryone agree[d]” that the first prong of regular visitation was
established, and the juvenile court found that prong satisfied. Moving to the
next prong, the court analyzed whether P.P. had a “substantial, positive
emotional attachment” to her parents. The court observed that “[f]rom the
beginning, it has been very clear that the parents love [P.P.] very much, and
so the connection in that direction has always been clear.” But the court
emphasized that for the exception to apply, “the substantial, positive
emotional attachment has to go from child to parent.” Among the relevant
factors were “whether there was an existing bond prior to removal, and the
conditions in the removal detention reports . . . as they reflect on the current
bond.” The court explained that P.P. was only eight months old when she
2 Since mother does not appeal that ruling, we need not further discuss
those proceedings. Still, we have reviewed and considered mother’s
additional testimony.
11
was removed from mother’s care and had never been in father’s care: “Given
that she was so young, she never had time to establish a significant bond
outside of the visitation room with her parents.” While visits recently had
been “relatively positive,” their quality ebbed and flowed over the course of
the action, and there had been some interactions that “inhibit[ed], to some
degree, establishment of a bond,” “more so with . . . mom’s visits than with
dad’s.” Ultimately, the court concluded that “as reflected in this past report,
there is not sufficient evidence of a substantial, positive emotional
attachment from child to parent.” The court also found that under the third
prong, there was “not sufficient evidence to suggest that termination of
parental rights would be detrimental, such that it would outweigh the
benefits of the stability that an adoptive home would bring.”
At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court again told mother it could
“see how sincere you are in your love for [P.P.],” heard additional comments
from mother, and noted that she had the right to appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Governing Legal Principles
The purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement a
permanent plan for the child. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630
(Caden C).) “[I]f the court finds that the child is likely to be adopted and that
‘there has been a previous determination that reunification services be
terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for
adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that termination would be
detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the
court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another
permanent plan.’ (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631 [citation]; see
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi), (4)(A).)” (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
12
486, 507 (M.V.).) One of those exceptions is the parental-benefit exception.
(Ibid.)
The proponent of the parental-benefit exception must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, three elements: “(1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, italics omitted.)
“ ‘The first element . . . is straightforward. The question is . . . whether
“parents visit consistently,” taking into account “the extent permitted by
court orders.” ’ ” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316
(Katherine J.), quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
“To establish the second element, . . . the parent must show the child
has a ‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.’ ” (M.V., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 507, quoting Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “The ‘focus is the child,’ ” id. at p. 508, and the
court considers “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of
the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs,’ ”
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576. In assessing this element, “courts often consider
how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
Finally, per the third element, courts must determine “how the child
would be affected by losing the parental relationship — in effect, what life
would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the
child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “That subtle, case-
13
specific inquiry” asks whether “the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive
home outweigh[s] ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a]
significant, positive, emotional relationship’ ” with the parent. (Ibid.)
“ ‘When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the
security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss,’ ” the
parental-benefit exception applies. (M.V., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 508.)
Caden C. “establishes a hybrid standard of review” for the parental-
benefit exception. (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) “The first
two elements, which require the juvenile court to ‘make a series of factual
determinations’ regarding visitation and the parent-child relationship, ‘are
properly reviewed for substantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[T]he ultimate
decision—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the
child due to the child’s relationship with his [or her] parent—is discretionary
and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 318.)
B. Determination as to Mother
The juvenile court’s determination that P.P. did not have a substantial,
positive attachment to mother is well-supported. The court appropriately
considered P.P.’s youth, the little time she spent in mother’s custody, and the
inconsistent quality of her visits with mother due to “some of the behaviors
that were presented in mom’s visits.” While generally acknowledging that
visits were “fairly positive” and there was “a connection from the parents to
the child,” the court concluded there was insufficient evidence of a
substantial attachment “from child to parent.” Throughout their history of
visits, P.P.’s continuing “need [for] the support and guidance of” the visitation
supervisor suggested to the Bureau that P.P. “view[ed] her parents as
friendly strangers.” This evidence and inference went unchallenged at the
permanency hearing. The fact that P.P. enjoyed visits with mother and the
14
two “showed affection for each other” did not require the court to find a
substantial attachment, particularly where the record provided no indication
that P.P. experienced any distress when visits ended or even when visitation
was suspended for a period of time. (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683,
692–693 [meaningful, affectionate visits and child’s expressions of concern for
mother did not compel a finding of substantial, positive attachment]; see also
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 318–322 [“pleasant visits” and
“warm and loving relationship” did not compel a finding of substantial,
positive attachment, particularly where parent’s substance abuse and
violence issues compromised the relationship].) Given its amply supported
finding that P.P. lacked a substantial, positive attachment to mother, the
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the benefits of adoption would
outweigh any detriment from terminating mother’s parental rights.
Mother urges that P.P.’s young age and brief time in her custody do not
preclude an attachment sufficient to establish the parental-benefit exception,
citing In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836. But in that case, both the
juvenile court and the court-appointed expert focused on the parents’ abilities
as caregivers to the disabled minor, not the quality of the minor’s emotional
attachment to his parents. (Id. at pp. 845, 849–851 [court noted parents
“ ‘have not acted in a parental role’ ”; expert focused on “concerns about
[minor]’s other, nonemotional issues”].) Here, the court appropriately focused
on P.P.’s emotional attachment to mother, not mother’s ability to parent her.
While the court considered mother’s “struggles” insofar as they impacted the
elements of the exception, this was entirely proper. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)
Mother also seems to argue that it was improper for the juvenile court
to weigh the detriment of terminating parental rights against the benefits of
15
adoption, and that a plan of legal guardianship would benefit P.P. more than
adoption. But our Supreme Court has explained that the court’s role is to
“decide[] whether the harm of severing the [parental] relationship outweighs
‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer’ ” through
adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Section 366.26,
subdivision (b) establishes the preference for adoption over guardianship. “If
adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights,” unless
the parental-benefit or other specified exception “compel[s] a finding that
termination would be detrimental to the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th
529, 532, italics added; see also § 366.26, subd. (c).) The court correctly
applied these legal principles.
Like the juvenile court, we recognize mother’s sincere love for P.P. and
her efforts to complete her case plan. But as the court emphasized, in
analyzing the parental-benefit exception, “the focus is on the best interests of
the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) We find no fault with the
court’s performance of this “difficult task in making th[e] important decision”
to terminate parental rights to allow for P.P.’s adoption. (Id. at p. 625.)
C. Determination as to Father
The juvenile court’s termination of father’s parental rights is also well-
supported. Like mother, father presented no evidence P.P. was unhappy or
showed distress when visits ended. And while P.P. grew more comfortable
with their visits over time, there was little evidence she felt an attachment to
father, let alone a substantial, positive attachment sufficient to establish the
parental-benefit exception. The court’s finding that there was no such
attachment is supported by substantial evidence, and the court was well
within its discretion to determine that the benefits of adoption would
outweigh any detriment from terminating father’s parental rights.
16
Father contends his consistent visits with P.P. were “predominantly
positive.” But even accepting that characterization, this is not enough to
show P.P. experienced a substantial, positive attachment to father, as we
have explained. Father reasserts that he was not an offending parent in an
effort to defend his unwillingness to participate in services. But as father
himself acknowledges, the decision to terminate parental rights is focused on
the child’s relationship with the parent, not whether the parent’s actions
were justified or understandable.
On appeal, father also relies on general statements about the
importance of a “natural parent-child relationship.” However, what is
required to establish the parental-benefit exception is evidence of an actual,
substantial, positive attachment from the child to the parent. Father’s
conclusory argument that his relationship with P.P. was “important” to her
does not suffice. (See In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818
[parents must prove something more than some benefit from a relationship
during visits “to depart from the statutory preference for adoption”; it is only
“ ‘[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the
security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, [that]
termination would be “detrimental to the child due to” the child’s beneficial
relationship with a parent’ ”].) Here, the circumstances do not support a
conclusion that father’s relationship with P.P. was “so important” as to
outweigh the benefits of adoption. (Id. at p. 820.)
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and declaring
adoption to be the permanent plan for P.P. is affirmed.
17
_________________________
Smiley, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
In re P.P. A172621
18
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