In re L.C. CA4/1

CourtListener 10712478Calctapp28 ott 2025

Testo completo

Filed 10/28/25 In re L.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered pub lished for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.C. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH D085502
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos.
J520838A, J520838C, J520838E)
v.
N.S. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant N.S.
Jack A. Love, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant J.C.
Brent Riggs, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant J.
David J. Smith, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel and Evangelina Woo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
This appeal involves minors J., age 10; Y., age 6; and L., age 4. These
children and two of their nondependent siblings came to the attention of
the juvenile court as a result of reports of domestic violence between

N.S. (Mother) and J.C. (Father1). Following failed attempts at family
maintenance and reunification, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing under

Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 366.26 to select permanent plans for
the children. In response, both Mother and Father filed section 388 petitions
asking for the children to be returned to their care, and the court set these
petitions for a contested hearing to be held in conjunction with the contested
permanency plan hearing.
After the presentation of both documentary and testimonial evidence,
the juvenile court made a series of rulings that are at issue here. The court
(1) denied both parents’ section 388 petitions; (2) found the two younger
children, Y. and L., adoptable and determined no exceptions to adoption
applied; (3) ordered the termination of parental rights as to those two
children; and (4) ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship for the
eldest child, J., maintaining jurisdiction as to him and scheduling a review
hearing.

1 The children who are the subject of this appeal do not all share the
same father. Minor J., who is also an appellant in this matter, and Y., who
has not appealed, are the children of M.M. M.M. briefly appeared in the
underlying proceedings and was appointed counsel, but his counsel was
relieved in November 2023 as a result of lack of contact from her client. M.M.
has not appeared in this appellate matter. J.C. is L.’s father and is a party to
this appeal. Although J.C. is pursuing his parental rights with respect to L.,
only, for simplicity and ease of discussion, we refer to J.C. as Father in this
opinion.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
Mother, Father, and J. have appealed the court’s order on the section
388 petitions, as well as the order on the permanency plan for Y. and L.
under section 366.26. Mother and J. assert the court erred in denying
Mother’s section 388 petition, while Father contends the court erred in
denying his section 388 petition. Mother and J. also challenge the court’s
decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Y. and L., arguing that the
court should have applied the beneficial relationship and sibling relationship
exceptions to adoption. Father contends the trial court should have applied
the beneficial relationship exception to adoption with respect to L.
Finding no legal error or abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in any
of its orders, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Detention, Jurisdiction and Disposition

Mother has five children who came to the attention of the Agency—the
three children who are the subject of this appeal, as well as X.G. and X.S.
The San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a
petition on behalf of all five children after receiving a referral regarding
domestic violence between Mother and Father. The referral was made after
an August 15, 2021 incident in which Mother and Father each alleged the
other was physically violent, and Father was arrested. The Agency’s
petitions alleged the children were at substantial risk of serious physical
harm due to ongoing domestic violence between Mother and Father.
The social worker who was assigned to investigate the Agency referral
learned that police had responded to the family’s home 14 times in the period
between January 2020 and August 2021. Six of the police calls involved
domestic violence. Additionally, his review of the parents’ history with the
Agency revealed multiple referrals had been made because of domestic

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violence, some as early as June 2017. At that point in time, Mother was
involved in domestic violence with J. and Y.’s father, M.M. One incident
involved inflicted damage to a vehicle while J. was inside it. After a
February 2018 incident, the Agency offered Mother a voluntary services
case, which she completed successfully.
A number of the prior incidents involved violence between Mother
and Father, and Mother informed the social worker that she and Father
had separated after at least one of them. But they then resumed their
relationship after criminal charges were dropped, and Mother initially denied
that any further physical violence had occurred between them after that.
Later, however, she admitted to the social worker there had been other
domestic violence incidents, including one in which Father “stomp[ed]” on
her head.” She also acknowledged J. had witnessed the violence.
On August 27, 2021, the juvenile court ordered the children detained
with Mother on the condition that Father remain outside of the home. The
following month, the parents requested a trial regarding the truth of the
allegations in the petitions. A jurisdiction and disposition report filed in
September 2021 recommended that Mother be provided family maintenance
services and that Father be granted unsupervised visits with L.
After the court’s August 27, 2021 order, the social worker observed
Mother with bruising on her left eye, as well as swelling around her mouth
and the left side of her face. Mother said she had been accosted by a neighbor
while at an event with her children. Father acknowledged to a social worker
that he and Mother had agreed to tell a previous social worker that nothing
had happened between them, and he then recounted at least one specific
incident of violence during which, according to Father, Mother was the
aggressor. In late October 2021, Mother complained that Father had been

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following her and at one point blocked her car with his, prompting her to call
the police.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the
petitions as to all three children, J., Y., and L., and ordered family
maintenance services. One condition imposed by court was that both parents
would maintain custody of L. as long as they resided separately.

B. Family Maintenance Review

In preparation for a family maintenance review hearing, a social
worker reported that Mother and the children were living with the maternal
grandmother as Mother searched for housing. At this point in time, Mother
was not in compliance with her court-ordered parenting class, having
completed only 7 of the required 21 sessions, but she had been participating
in individual counseling.
Of concern was the fact that J. had been missing a significant amount
of school. He was reported absent or late 62 percent of time. Mother offered
no reasonable explanation for this, instead complaining the line for school
drop off was always long, despite the fact the family was living a block away
from J.’s school.
Father had made some progress in his case plan. He completed his
required parenting classes and indicated he found the classes beneficial.
Father also reported that he and Mother were no longer romantically
involved, and had been successfully coparenting L. However, Father made no
progress in connection with the requirement he participate in and complete a
domestic violence group.
Because Mother and Father appeared to be progressing in their
parenting plans but concerns remained, the social worker recommended they
be provided six more months of services.

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C. The Section 387 Petitions

In early May 2022, a week after the initial review hearing, the Agency
filed petitions under section 387 seeking removal of the children from the
parents’ care. The new petitions asserted that on January 25, 2022, Mother
and Father had engaged in a physical altercation near Father’s home. It was
further alleged that Mother and the children had been residing with Father
without the awareness or permission of the Agency or the court.
A subsequent detention report provided the details of the altercation.
Father shoved Mother, and police observed a bruise under her eye. In the
report it was noted that a newly assigned social worker had asked Mother
about bruising around her eye in January 2022. At that time, Mother told
this social worker that a client had punched her in the face when she was
cleaning the client’s home without wearing a mask. The maternal
grandmother confirmed Mother’s claim. Mother also insisted that she had
been living with the maternal grandmother, which the maternal
grandmother also confirmed. The report noted the Agency’s concern that
the grandmother had assisted Mother in covering up the domestic violence,
reflecting a familial failure to protect the children.
According to the detention report, neighbors also confirmed that
Mother and Father were living together with the five children in Father’s
apartment complex. These witnesses described the parents as fighting “all
the time.”
At the detention hearing, the court detained the children out of
Mother’s care but allowed them to live with the maternal grandmother on the
condition Mother did not reside there. The court “strongly admonished” the
maternal grandmother “to be very open with the court as to what is going on
in the home” in order for the children to “stay in her home.”

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In an addendum report, the reporting social worker described Mother
as having prepared what appeared to be an official legal document, with a
judge’s name on it, that stated “all the parties are in agreement for the
children to reunify with the mother.” The social worker was worried Mother
would present this document to the children’s school, babysitter, or maternal
grandmother in order to reunify with the children without a true court order.
The social worker also reported that Mother had disclosed another incident of
domestic violence between her and Father. She claimed Father tried to
intimidate her with his car, while Father claimed that Mother was the
aggressor and stated he had filed for a restraining order against her.
At a contested review hearing held on July 12, 2022, both parents
testified. The court ultimately sustained the section 387 petitions, removing
J. and Y. from Mother’s care and L. from Mother and Father’s care. It placed
all three children with the maternal grandmother and ordered unsupervised
visitation for both parents.

D. The Agency’s Section 388 Petitions

Approximately two months after the July contested review hearing,
the Agency filed petitions under section 388, asking to modify the parents’
visitation status to supervised, based on yet another domestic violence
incident that occurred a month after the last court hearing. During this
incident, Father placed his body on top of Mother’s, held her down, slapped
her, dragged her out of the apartment, and locked her out. She sustained
bruises on both arms, her chin, and a swollen cheek. Mother indicated to
police she did not want to press charges. According to the social worker,
Mother told her therapist the bruises on her arms were caused by her job
as a dishwasher. In addition, other family members who live in the same
apartment complex as Father reported to the Agency that Mother was seen

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there with Father after he was released from custody following his arrest for
the recent domestic violence incident.
The Agency obtained two more pieces of information that were cause
for concern. First, the reporting social worker discovered that the maternal
grandmother had allowed Father to take L. overnight for L.’s birthday.
Second, the Agency received a police report documenting yet another
domestic violence incident between Mother and Father in late September.
Grabbing Mother by her right arm and leg, Father tried to pull her out of his
vehicle. Despite this, Mother informed the social worker that she did not
need domestic violence shelter resources. In her view, she was “not in a
domestic violence relationship” and planned to “continue to live with” Father.
At a hearing on the Agency’s section 388 petition, the court ordered
that visitation for both parents would be supervised.

E. The Remainder of the Reunification Period

1. L.’s Removal from His Placement with the Maternal Grandmother

On December 30, 2022, the Agency filed a second section 387 petition
for L. In it, it was alleged that the maternal grandmother could no longer
provide appropriate care for him. The grandmother had, for at least a second
time, allowed L. to have an unsupervised visit with the parents and, while L.
was in their care, they engaged in yet another physical altercation. This
time, Father threw a metal frying pan at Mother’s head and a ceramic plate
at her hand. He also hit her with a belt and an electric cord several times.
Mother also admitted there had been multiple domestic violence incidents
that December, before the second section 387 petition was filed.
In response to the section 387 petition for L., the juvenile court
detained him in a licensed foster home as of January 4, 2023, and ordered
supervised visits for the parents.

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2. The Delayed Six-Month Review Hearing

The Agency recommended termination of services for Mother and
Father at a March 7, 2023 six-month review hearing. The hearing had been
continued several times to allow for completion of an investigation and an
opportunity for the Agency to facilitate reunification of X.S. and X.G. with
their fathers.
The Agency reported significant concerns about the pattern of domestic
violence between Mother and Father. The social worker noted that Mother
continued to repeat the same behaviors with respect to Father, despite
individual therapy and participation with a domestic violence group. The
social worker explained that Mother’s therapist had at one point shared her
“suspicion the mother and the father were together the whole time.” The
therapist also indicated that while Mother had “made growth in being more
transparent,” at the outset she was lying “[Ninety-nine percent] of the time.”
As a result, the therapist continued to encourage Mother to be truthful.
The therapist was concerned about Mother’s safety, and she observed a
pattern in which domestic violence seemed to occur every two month or so.
The parents have “not been able to manage 6 months without domestic
violence,” and yet Mother continued to report to the therapist that “she
understands” the fact that the “true victims are her children.” The therapist
made the decision to terminate Mother from her care because Mother “is
waiting for [Father], she does want to be with him, and she is just waiting for
him to make the change so their relationship improves,” and so “the reality is
that she is not ready to make that leap to leave him.”

9
The Agency also noted similar concerns with respect to Father. In
particular, Father repeatedly failed to be forthcoming about the domestic
violence between the couple. Despite his participation in and completion of
services, he, too, demonstrated no true behavioral change.
In response to the Agency’s recommendation that services be
terminated, Mother and Father requested a contested hearing.

3. The Removal of J. and Y. from the Maternal Grandmother’s Care

On April 10, 2024, just over four months after filing a section 387
petition for L., the Agency filed section 387 petitions for J. and Y., seeking
their removal from the maternal grandmother’s care. The petitions alleged
the maternal grandparents had engaged in domestic violence. According to
the maternal grandmother, she and the maternal grandfather began fighting
after he consumed alcohol. He eventually pulled her down a flight of stairs.
J. and Y. were removed from her care and detained in the same licensed
foster home as L. the day after the March 24, 2023 incident.
The juvenile court detained J. and Y. out of the maternal
grandmother’s care and ordered a counseling referral for J. The parents were
offered two supervised visits with the children per week. Father
discontinued his visits after obtaining a new job, and the Agency reported
Mother was routinely 15 minutes late to the visits.

4. The Contested Six-Month Review Hearing on the Section 387 Petitions

At a contested six-month review hearing on May 5, 2023, both parents
testified. The juvenile court sustained the section 387 petitions for J. and Y.,
ordering that they be placed in the licensed foster home of L.’s caregiver. The
court continued reunification services to the parents for another six month
period.

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5. The 12-month Review Hearing Period

A 12-month review hearing was set to take place on June 13, 2023.
In a report prepared for this hearing, the Agency recommended services be
terminated for the parents and a section 366.26 permanency hearing be set.
The Agency’s report noted that despite all of the services provided to Mother
and Father, there had been eight reported incidents of domestic violence
between May 2022 and June 2023. In March 2023, Mother was discharged
from her virtual domestic violence group because she reported that she was
still living with the perpetrator of the domestic violence and the facilitator
could hear Father coaching Mother during the meetings. Similarly, Mother’s
individual therapist terminated Mother from her care for similar reasons and
expressed to the social worker serious concern for Mother’s well-being. The
Agency report noted that Mother was pregnant again, and the pregnancy did
not interrupt the pattern of domestic violence.
Father continued to deny the domestic violence allegations against him,
and took no personal responsibility for the violent altercations between him
and Mother.
Both parents requested a contested hearing to decide issues of
continued reunification services, expanded visits, and/or the children’s
return. The Agency requested that any trial be set as a combined 12- and 18-
month review hearing.

6. The Contested 12- and 18-Month Review Hearing

In the period leading up to a contested review hearing, J. was
hospitalized due to threats of self-harm. At a pretrial status hearing in
November 2023, counsel for the children told the court that J. was requesting
expanded visits with Mother. But in her role as J.’s guardian ad litem, she

11
stated that her opinion on the matter was consistent with the Agency’s
recommendations.
The court held a contested combined 12- and 18-month review hearing
over two days in late November and early December 2023. Although Mother
had finished her 52-week domestic violence class in October 2023, the social
worker was of the opinion that she had not implemented the lessons from
that class and had not demonstrated any behavioral changes. The social
worker noted that throughout the entire case, Mother lived with Father and
the domestic violence pattern continued. At times they would claim to have
separated, but then they would be back together again. At other times, they
would say they had never separated. The “same behaviors” kept repeating
through the life of the case.
The social worker explained that Mother had again reported she was
not in romantic relationship with father, and she said she was living with her
mother. But when the social worker made an unannounced visit to Father’s
home and spoke to neighbors, she was told Mother continued to be seen at

Father’s home on a daily basis.3 In addition, although no new police reports
had been filed in the prior six months, a relative who lived downstairs from
Father reported he continued to hear yelling and Mother crying.
The social worker raised the issue of J.’s threats of self-harm and his
hospitalization. She was concerned that if J. was returned to his Mother’s
care and her relationship with Father remained unstable and volatile, J.
was at risk of following through on harming himself.

3 The record demonstrates that Mother and Father were sharing custody
of the new baby together during this time.
12
Mother testified to having obtained new, flexible employment, as well
as childcare. She explained that she and Father had a new child and they
were coparenting together well. According to Mother, they alternated weeks
with the child, and the exchanges occurred through Monday pick-ups from
the infant’s daycare. To explain her frequent visits to Father’s home, Mother
said she was picking up the baby’s items from Father. According to Mother,
she was not romantically involved with Father and wanted to reunify with
the children on her own. Mother denied having previously violated the
court’s orders regarding visitation and claimed there had been no domestic
violence incidents for approximately a year.
The court acknowledged the parents had appeared to make progress
from where they were when the case had been opened. However, it concluded
the Agency had met its burden to demonstrate that returning L. to Father
would create a substantial risk of detriment to L.’s physical or emotional
well-being. It made a similar finding with respect to Mother and all three
children. The court noted the repeated pattern of serious domestic violence
between the parents, the evidence suggesting they continued to see each
other on what may have been a daily basis, and the fact that their arguing
and fighting had not abated. It found Mother’s testimony “less than credible”
due to her tone, demeanor, and answers that appeared to conflict with other
evidence in the record. The court rejected the possibility of placing the
children with Mother or the maternal grandmother for purposes of additional
family maintenance due to the unauthorized visitation that occurred during
both parties’ caregiving.
Ultimately, the court determined that termination of reunification
services for Mother and Father was appropriate. In the court’s view, the
Agency had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable

13
services had been provided to the parents but returning the children to
their care would continue to place their well-being at risk. The court set a
selection and implementation proceeding to take place 120 days later and
suggested the parents could, with the assistance of their attorneys, file a
section 388 petition asking for a change in the court’s orders.

F. The Permanency Phase

1. The Time Period Leading Up to the Section 366.26 Hearing

J. was moved to a different foster home on December 1, 2023. The
caregiver who had been caring for all three children was unable to provide
care for him as a result of his self-harm ideations and other behaviors.
J.’s new caretakers were open to pursuing legal guardianship of J. They
explained they did not want to sever J.’s ties with his mother, given her
importance to him. Y. and L. remained together in their placement, and their
caregiver indicated a desire to pursue adoption. During this time, Mother
visited the children every Sunday, and was also present for sibling visits that
occurred on Tuesdays.
In June 2024, the Agency received a referral for Mother and Father’s
youngest child. There was an allegation the parents had once again engaged
in domestic violence, this time while the youngest child was present. Mother
informed a social worker she would not allow Father to see the child. She
temporarily moved to Anaheim in July 2024, citing concerns for the child’s
safety. She reported there had been altercation with Father and showed
videos of police arriving at her home. Father shared with the social worker
emails from Mother that he interpreted as threatening, and he shared videos
of an altercation between the pair.

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In preparation for the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency recommended
that J.’s caretakers be appointed his legal guardians and jurisdiction be

terminated.4 With respect to Y. and L., however, the Agency recommended
freeing them for adoption. The social worker summarized Mother’s visitation
with the children between April through August 2024, noting she was
appropriate with the children and attentive to their needs, but struggled to
set limits at times. She reported that the children were not upset when the
visits concluded and separated from Mother easily.
With respect to Father’s visitation with L., the social worker noted that
Father did not consistently attend the scheduled visits, and this caused the
Family Visitation Center to close Father’s referral. She was able to observe
two visits between Father and L., however, and both times L. left the visit
without incident. L. did not appear upset when Father said goodbye and left.
He did not ask for Father in between visits.
The social worker reported that Y. and L. continued to be adoptable,
and their caretaker expressed a commitment to adopting them. Since the
case had been opened, Y. was diagnosed with speech delay and mixed
receptive-expressive language disorder; L. was diagnosed with autism.
Their caretaker advocated for their needs, and both children made
developmental progress and improved while in her care. The children
expressed physical affection for the caretaker, giving her hugs and kisses.
They called her “Mama Maria.”
In the reporting social worker’s view, the benefits of adoption to Y. and
L. outweighed the potential detriment they might suffer as a result of
terminating parental rights. This was based on the children’s young age,
and observations that the children were thriving in their placement, were not

4 This hearing was continued multiple times over many months.
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upset when visits with Mother ended, and did not ask for Mother in between
visits. In addition, L. also did not appear upset at leaving visits with Father,
and did not ask for him in between visits. The social worker also noted that
the sibling relationship between the children and J. was not such that the
two younger siblings were upset at the conclusion of the sibling visits, and
because they were not living with J., their shared common experiences were
limited to these visits.
In response to the Agency’s recommendations, Mother requested a trial
on the permanency plan and indicated a section 388 petition would be
forthcoming. The court granted the parents’ request that Y. and L. be made
available for a bonding study.
Approximately a week after the initial permanency plan hearing, J.
was appointed new counsel and a separate attorney was appointed to
represent Y. and L. J.’s new attorney filed a section 388 petition seeking
recognition of his relationship with Y. and L. under subdivision (b) of the
provision and asking to present evidence regarding the permanent plan for
his siblings. Mother filed a section 388 petition in which she requested
unsupervised visits, reinstatement of reunification services, and the
development of a “transition plan to reunify the minors with” her “after
expansion of [her] visitation.” J.’s new attorney argued in support of granting
Mother’s section 388 petition, and opposed the Agency’s recommendation of
legal guardianship for J. Counsel suggested that if a return to Mother was
not going to be pursued, then the request would be for a “permanent plan of
long-term foster care,” given that “supportive services” would end under a
legal guardianship.

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The trial court made findings that Mother and J. had made a prima
facie showing that a hearing on their section 388 petitions would be in the
best interests of the children, and the court set the evidentiary hearing on
October 30, 2024, the same date on which the section 366.26 permanency
plan trial was set to proceed.
Visits between Mother and the children continued between the status
hearing and the October 30 trial date. At one visit, J. expressed displeasure
with not being permitted to return to living with Mother. For the most part,
however, the children appeared to enjoy their visits with Mother but also
appeared fine when the visits ended. Mother brought an unknown man to
one of the visits. He paid for Mother and the children’s admission to a
pumpkin patch and later dropped off food, water, and sunblock. The social
worker asked Mother who the man was, and Mother responded, “[A] very
close friend of mine.” The social worker advised Mother to attend the visits
alone, as doing otherwise could confuse the children.
Although Father also continued visits with L., he cancelled two
consecutive weekend visits, one of which was L.’s birthday visit.

2. The Joint Contested Hearing on the Section 388 Petitions and the
Section 366.26 Permanency Plan

The contested hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition and the
children’s permanent plans took place over six days between November 2024
and January 2025. During this time, Father also filed a section 388 petition

in which he requested that L. be returned to his care.5
The court heard testimony from Mother, Father, ten-year-old J., a
maternal uncle who lived with the maternal grandmother, a social worker, an

5 Father was allowed to present evidence at trial in connection with his
section 388 petition after the parties submitted on the issue of a prima facie
finding.
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expert in clinical psychology who had conducted a bonding study for Mother,
and a licensed daycare provider.
The social worker testified that the benefits of adoption for Y. and L.
outweighed the value of a continued relationship with Mother. She explained
that Y. and L. both have special needs and were being provided services to
address those needs. Y. was diagnosed with ADHD and anxiety, has an IEP
in place for speech services, and receives in-home and school behavioral
support. L. was diagnosed with autism and receives ABA therapy three
times a week. He also has an IEP for speech services. The social worker
noted that Mother was difficult to reach at times about the children’s school-
related services. She was also concerned as to whether Mother would be able
to maintain all of the services if the children were returned to her care.
With respect to Father’s request to care for L., the social worker
highlighted that L. had been out of Father’s custody for half of his life. And
when L. was in the parents’ care, he had been exposed to significant domestic
violence. Father had engaged in consistent visitation with L. between
October and December 2024, but the social worker still believed a return to
Father’s care was not in L.’s best interest. Father had not attended any of
L.’s medical appointments and did not seem to understand L.’s autism
diagnosis.
As to J., however, the Agency was recommending legal guardianship
with supervised visits for Mother. The social worker commented that Mother
had a history of being untruthful with the Agency, and most recently had not
been honest about the nature of her relationship with her new boyfriend.
In addition, the social worker was concerned that Mother was having
inappropriate discussions with J. about the case and its possible outcomes.
She indicated that J.’s caregivers were committed to the plan of

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guardianship, and she had no concerns about their ability to provide the
requisite support. The relationship between J. and his caretakers was
positive, and his mental health issues appeared to be stable.
J. testified that he wanted to live with Mother, and he insisted that
“[s]he [has] changed a lot.” According to J., Mother was “really nice” now.
J. talked about the history of violence in the home, and explained that the
parents would hit each other. When asked what he would do if he were
returned to Mother’s care and there was physical fighting in the home or
things were not safe, J. said he would “maybe” tell someone. He was
concerned that the dependency process would start again if he told someone
that violence was occurring in his home. He also expressed concern about
what Mother would do if he told someone she was doing something she
should not be doing.
The court designated Dr. Elizabeth Stanton as an expert in clinical
psychology, and she testified about the bonding study she completed for
Mother. Dr. Stanton has conducted over 100 bonding studies, and has been
called to testify over 40 times. She explained that “bonding” is best described
as the parent’s desire to care for the child, whereas “attachment” better
describes the connection of a child to the parent. In conducting her study
for this case, Stanton observed two visits between Mother and the children.
In her view, the children engaged in healthy attachment behaviors directed
toward Mother, and she responded in a healthy way. Stanton had not read
the Agency’s reports before conducting her observations, believing her
opinions should be based solely on direct observation of the interactions
between the children and Mother. She conceded that children could be
securely attached to multiple adults, and that it would be possible for a child

19
to have secure attachment disrupted or severed without the child suffering
detriment. Stanton’s written bonding study was entered in evidence.
Mother testified that she lived in a one-bedroom apartment and had
beds for the children. She said that although her current job with Amazon
required her to be outside of the home, she would soon be transferred to an
at-home position. Mother reported that she continued to have visits with her
two other children, X.S. and X.G., even though their fathers had custody of
them. She acknowledged that she had a new romantic partner, whom she
brought on visits with her other children sometimes. Although Mother had
not shared this information before, she stated she would be willing to provide
this individual’s date of birth so the Agency could conduct a background
check.
In Mother’s view, she had been transparent with the Agency in all
respects for the past two years. She completed more than one domestic
violence course and had developed relapse prevention plans. Mother
discussed L.’s autism diagnosis, and she was aware he was being provided
services at home and at school for speech, communication, and behavior.
She thought Y. did not have any diagnoses, but was aware she had hitting
behaviors and tantrums. She was aware that J. was in therapy to address
the effects of the domestic violence and his self-harm ideations.
Mother stated she was not allowing Father to have contact with their
youngest child, who remained in Mother’s care. She felt strongly that
Father’s visits with L. should be supervised, and if L. was returned to her
care, she would wait to get an order from the family court regarding
visitation before allowing Father to visit with L. If the court ordered
unsupervised visitation, she would appeal and would not comply in the
interim. When asked about her ability to coparent with Father, she said,

20
“I don’t see why we should even co-parent at this point.” When asked
whether she would allow J. to have visits with Father, she indicated she
would not because Father was not J.’s biological father and there was
“no reason” for him to be in communication with J.
Father testified about his visitation with L. He explained that before
October 2024, he was struggling mentally and emotionally, which hindered
his ability to visit consistently. Father did not communicate with L.’s
caretaker often because he knew L. was safe in her care and she was taking
good care of him. Although Father was aware that L. had been diagnosed
with autism, he did not know how that condition affected him. Father
testified that the last domestic violence incident in which he was involved
occurred in February 2024, when he and Mother argued and yelled at each
other regarding their nondependent child. Father had not seen that child
since that point in time, even though he had obtained a court order allowing
him to visit with that child twice a week. One time when Mother would not
allow him visitation, he called the police but was informed Mother was
refusing visitation. A second time he called the court and was advised to
initiate contempt proceedings. Father admitted he and Mother argued again
in July 2024.
At the conclusion of the hearing on January 16, 2025, the court denied

both parents’ section 388 petitions.6 It also terminated parental rights as to
Y. and L., but ordered a plan of legal guardianship for J., with the court
continuing to assert jurisdiction over him as a dependent. As to J., the court
made a finding that he is adoptable, but determined the exception in section

6 At an earlier hearing the court granted J.’s unopposed section 388,
subdivision (b) petition, seeking to have his sibling relationship with Y. and
L. recognized for purposes of permanency planning.
21
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iv) applied.7 J.’s caretakers were appointed as
his legal guardians.

DISCUSSION

Mother and J. contend the juvenile court erred in denying Mother’s
section 388 petition, while Father similarly challenges the court’s denial of
his section 388 petition. All three appellants also assert the court erred in
finding that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply to avoid the
termination of parental rights as to Y. and L. Mother and J. additionally
argue the court erred in finding that the sibling relationship exception did
not apply.

A. The Section 388 Petitions

1. The Relevant Legal Framework for Assessing Section 388 Petitions

The section 388 modification procedure is an “ ‘escape mechanism’
when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the
termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of
parental rights.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528 (Kimberly
F.).) Under section 388, a parent, interested person or the dependent child
may petition the court to change, modify or set aside a previous order on the
grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).)
The petitioner has the burden to show a change of circumstances or new

7 This provision provides an exception to termination of parental rights
where a child is determined to be adoptable but “[t]he child is living with a
foster parent or Indian custodian who is unable or unwilling to adopt the
child because of exceptional circumstances that do not include an
unwillingness to accept legal or financial responsibility for the child, but who
is willing and capable of providing the child with a stable and permanent
environment, and the removal of the child from the physical custody of their
foster parent or Indian custodian would be detrimental to the emotional well-
being of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(iv).)
22
evidence, and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interest.
(In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e).)
In connection with a section 388 petition, the parent must show a “genuine
change of circumstances” and not merely changing circumstances. (Kimberly
F., at p. 529.)
“In considering whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing,
the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of
the case. [Citation.] The court may consider factors such as the seriousness
of the reason leading to the child's removal, the reason the problem was not
resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, the relative strength
of the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of circumstance, and the
reason the change was not made sooner. [Citation.] In assessing the best
interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring
stability and continuity.’ ” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616;
see Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 531–532.)
Importantly, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no
longer paramount,” and instead “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child
for permanency and stability.’ ” (Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317
(Stephanie M.).) “A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this
stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining
the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.”
(Stephanie M., at p. 317.)
We review the juvenile court’s ultimate determination on a section
388 petition for an abuse of discretion (see Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at
pp. 318–319), and any factual findings supporting that determination for
substantial evidence (see In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102

23
[under abuse of discretion standard findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence].) Under the abuse of discretion standard, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. Instead, we ask
whether the court’s ruling fell outside the bounds of reason. (See Stephanie
M., at pp. 318–319.) Therefore, “[i]t is rare that the denial of a section 388
motion merits reversal as an abuse of discretion.” (Kimberly F., supra, 56
Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)

2. The Court’s Findings on the Parents’ Section 388 Petitions

The juvenile court found that Father failed to demonstrate the
circumstances had changed between the court’s termination of his services
and the time of trial. As the court noted, Father relied on his completion of
his domestic violence program and the fact he was no longer in a relationship
with Mother as the changed circumstances. But the evidence demonstrated
that the parents “continued to have a high-conflict dynamic,” and they had
engaged in a documented altercation as recently as July 2024. The court also
considered the seriousness of the reason for L.’s removal from Father’s care,
the relative strength of L.’s bond with Father, and the fact the asserted
changed circumstances—Father and Mother no longer being in a romantic
relationship and the length of time since the last documented domestic
violence incident—did not mean the underlying domestic violence dynamics
had been fully addressed or eliminated. Rather, the court found it likely that
the domestic violence would continue given the lengthy history of the case,
the parents’ inability to alter their behavior despite the children being
removed from their care, and their on-going high-conflict dynamic.

24
The court noted that the bond between L. and Father was not
particularly strong, given L. had been out of Father’s care for nearly half of
his life. In addition, Father’s visits had largely been supervised, and they
had been inconsistent until only the few months before trial. The court
reasonably inferred that the inconsistency in Father’s visits negatively
impacted the relationship. And in considering whether a change to Father’s
care would be in L.’s best interests, the court was concerned that Father
appeared to know very little about L.’s autism or the unique needs that come
with such a diagnosis. The court concluded that a modification of its prior
orders was unwarranted, and therefore denied Father’s request to return L.
to his care.
With respect to Mother, the court found she similarly failed to
demonstrate sufficiently changed circumstances. Although she had
completed her domestic violence program before her services were
terminated, the court was concerned Mother had not really benefited from
the program, as she continued to be in a relationship with continued domestic
violence occurring while completing her course. And the court again pointed
out that although the domestic violence between the parents had seemed to
subside recently, the relationship was still contentious and involved a high-
conflict dynamic. In fact, Mother’s testimony reflected her “strong feelings
regarding [Father],” making the court concerned that “negative interactions
resulting from the conflict between her and [Father] will be part of the
family’s reality in light of the history of this case and the dynamic that
continues to exist.” Thus, even though Mother had a place to live and a job,
the continuing coparenting struggle with Father demonstrated Mother’s
domestic violence circumstances were not yet changed, and instead could
only be considered to be changing.

25
The court further determined that even if Mother had demonstrated
sufficient changed circumstances, she had not established it would be in the
children’s best interest to grant her request for expanded unsupervised
visitation, leading to reunification. In assessing what would promote the
children’s best interests, the court considered the Kimberly F. factors, as well
as the children’s need for stability and permanency and their special needs.
The court found the seriousness of the problem leading to dependency
and its continuation led the court to find these factors weighed against
granting Mother’s section 388 petition request in the same way that it
counseled against Father’s. In connection with the children’s bond with
Mother, the court explained that while the children appeared to have a “good
relationship” with her, reports demonstrated she at times has difficulty
managing the children, and they are “not upset or distraught” at the end of
visits with her. At the same time, however, it recognized that J. had a
stronger bond with Mother than did Y. and L., which stemmed from the fact
he had spent most of his life in her care. But even with respect to J., the fact
the domestic violence had occurred in front of him and the other children
likely “had a negative impact on” Mother’s relationship with all of the
children.
The court specifically noted the difficult position J. would be in if
reunified with Mother, given the lengthy history of the family hiding or
downplaying the domestic violence that was occurring. J. had bravely
testified about his wishes to live with Mother, but he also admitted that he
would likely have difficulty speaking up about any new domestic violence
that might occurred in the home “because he does not want to impact
placement with his Mother.” This left the court rightfully worried that
unsafe conditions in the home would go unreported in the future.

26
The court determined that the bonding study and testimony provided
by Dr. Stanton was of limited value. It noted that Stanton had only
minimally observed Mother with the children, and her characterization of the
visits was contradicted by the social worker’s reports. The court expressed
particular concern that Stanton had reviewed only a small number of the
Agency’s reports in this case. Because of this, she “does not have a full
picture of the relationship and how the ongoing protective issue may have
impacted” the children’s relationships with Mother. Similarly, Stanton
stated that knowing the children’s diagnoses and special needs would not
have impacted her evaluations in the bonding study. In the court’s view,
however, the fact that Stanton had never been made aware of the children’s
diagnoses prior to her observations rendered her opinions of limited value.
The court determined that all three children had a good relationship
with their respective caregivers. In particular, Y. and L. sought out their
caregivers for support. The court believed the children’s best interests would
be served if they continued to receive the services they’ve been offered,
particularly in connection with their special needs and behavioral challenges.
To this point, witnesses had testified that Mother had not attended all of
these services and was not completely aware of what they were. Indeed, the
Agency and the court were uncertain whether Mother could ensure that the
children continued to receive these services. In addition, Mother’s “struggles”
to handle the children’s needs during visits, as well as her failure to respond
timely to requests for information relating to the children’s education or
services, caused the court to question whether she could attend to all of the
children’s needs if they were returned to her “full-time.”

27
The psychological evaluation Mother completed a year and a half
earlier had indicated concerns for the children in her care. Although Mother
disagreed with those conclusions, she was unwilling to submit to another
evaluation. The court observed that while the evaluation could be argued to
be “stale,” Mother had not produced information about her treatment goals
or her progress in treatment to demonstrate to the court that the issues
identified in the evaluation were being or had been addressed. And other
evidence in the record tended to show that those concerns remained. For
example, the fact that Mother recently introduced the children to her new
romantic partner, and her lack of awareness as to how and why the timing
of this introduction was problematic, demonstrated that the concerns
highlighted in the psychological evaluation remained relevant.
Beyond this, the court expressed concern that if it were to return any
particular child to Mother’s care, that child would be subject to court orders
from the juvenile or family court regarding visitation with the different
fathers. This would require all of the parents, including Mother, to follow
court orders. But Mother’s history of disregarding court orders left the court
unconvinced she would comply in the future.
The court thus determined it was not in the children’s best interest to
grant Mother’s section 388 petition.

3. The Record Supports the Court’s Findings That the Parents Failed to
Demonstrate Changed Circumstances

The change in circumstances alleged in support of a section 388
petition must be substantial in nature. (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 219, 223.) During the post-reunification phase of a dependency
case, “[a] parent establishes a substantial change of circumstances for
purposes of section 388 by showing that, during the period between
termination of reunification services and the permanency planning hearing,
28
he or she has resolved the previously unresolved issues supporting juvenile
court jurisdiction.” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 846 (J.M.).)
Evidence of changing, rather than changed, circumstances is insufficient to
justify the modification of a prior order under section 388. (In re Alayah J.
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 482; Ernesto R., at p. 223.)
Mother and Father’s reunification services were terminated at the
conclusion of the December 8, 2023 hearing. The evidence in the record
supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that while the material
circumstances were changing for the better, the problems that led to juvenile
court jurisdiction had not yet been resolved. In particular, there was at least
one documented altercation between the parents in June 2024, and Father
admitted to yelling and using foul language directed toward Mother in
February 2024, both of which occurred after services had been terminated.
Even Mother’s own testimony revealed the parties continue to have a high-
conflict relationship, making it difficult for them to coparent their
nondependent youngest child. Mother testified she was refusing to let
Father see that child, and she conceded that if a court order provided him
unsupervised visits, she would appeal and would not comply with such an
order. She thus demonstrated that a high level of conflict remained,
suggesting that the conditions were ripe for the prior domestic violence
patterns to reemerge. Indeed, Mother’s own therapist terminated Mother’s
therapy out of concern that Mother was repeating the same patterns and
appeared unwilling to make the necessary changes. Given all of this, the
court reasonably found the parents had demonstrated only that their
circumstances were changing, but not that their circumstances had in
fact changed to a degree that the court could be confident the children
would be safe from further domestic violence in the home.

29
4. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Concluding a Return to
Mother or Father Was Not in the Children’s Best Interest

Mother, J., and Father contend the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Mother’s and Father’s respective section 388 petitions. The record
does not support their contentions.
Father argues the factors set out in Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at page 532 compelled a finding in his favor with respect to L. Under
Kimberly F., a trial court may consider: “(1) the seriousness of the problem
which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that
problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to
both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be
easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.”
(Kimberly F., p. 532.) The trial court considered these factors and concluded

that, on balance, they did not favor a return of L. to Father.8 We see no error
in the court’s determination that it would be in L.’s best interest to continue
in his placement and proceed on course toward adoption.

8 The same court that issued Kimberly F. later raised questions about its
continued vitality, as Kimberly F. may not “give full consideration to [the]
shift in focus” away from the interests of parents and to the needs of children
for stability and permanency mandated by the Supreme Court in Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) Thus,
where a trial court has considered and applied the Kimberly F. factors
without also considering the shift in focus identified in Stephanie M., parents
potentially receive a more beneficial analysis than that to which they may be
entitled. The juvenile court here considered and applied the Kimberly F.
factors while also keeping in focus whether the changes requested by the
parents would be in the children’s best interests. We will therefore review
the court’s assessments as to these factors, but in the context of considering
whether the parents have demonstrated an abuse of discretion in how the
court answered the principal question at issue here, “that is, [what is in] the
best interests of the child[ren].” (Stephanie M., at p. 317.)
30
As to the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency, and
the reason for the continuation of that problem, the record reflects that L.’s
removal from his parents’ care was due to a serious and ongoing safety
problem arising from recurring domestic violence between his parents.
These violent confrontations, which occurred while the children were in the
home, included the parents throwing objects at or toward one another (and
sometimes near a child), hitting one another, Father stomping on Mother’s
head, Father dragging Mother or trying to pull her out of a car, as well as
Father striking her with a belt. J. reported that the parents fought all day.
This violence cannot be considered anything but extremely serious. And
despite the removal of the children and the parents taking classes and
participating in domestic violence programs during the pendency of this case,
the physical violence did not cease until very late in this process. And even
after the parents finally began to live separately, their conflict remained
evident. It was not unreasonable for the court to consider the seriousness of
the domestic violence, as well as the family’s history of minimization and
even hiding of that domestic violence, in concluding that returning L. to
Father’s care would not be in his best interests.
With respect to the strength of the relative bonds between L. and
Father and L. and his caregiver, the court concluded that L.’s lengthy time
with the caregiver meant their relationship was stronger than L.’s bond with
Father. This, too, is a reasonable conclusion. Father’s inconsistent visits
undermined his ability to bond with L. The caretaker was the person L.
sought out for support, and he did not appear troubled when he had to
separate from Father at the conclusion of their visits.

31
On the question of the degree to which the problem that led to L’s
removal might be “easily removed or ameliorated” (see Kimberly F., supra,
56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532), we see no error in the court’s determination that
this factor, too, weighed against granting Father’s section 388 petition.
Father asserts his “commitment to ending his tendency to engage in domestic
violence showed the problem could be easily removed, if it had not already
been removed,” and he further contends the family’s issues could be readily
addressed through additional family maintenance services. But these
assertions are belied by the lengthy history of Father and Mother engaging in
domestic violence and repeatedly denying or minimizing the problem while
participating in services intended to address the domestic violence. A brief
period of relative calm between the parents does not demonstrate that this
significant problem has been fully addressed, or could be fully addressed in
the relatively brief period of time that would be required for reunification to
occur. Indeed, the parents continue to argue and fight over Father’s visits
with their nondependent child. The record and testimony at the hearing thus
demonstrated that even after more than three years of Agency involvement,
Mother and Father were still unable to communicate and make coparenting
decisions without significant conflict and, at times, the involvement of law
enforcement.
The court reasonably concluded that L.’s interest in permanency and
stability would not be advanced by the granting of Father’s petition. (See
Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 526–527.) L. has experienced day-to-day support, caring and consistency
from his caregiver—not Father— for the greater part of his life. Although L.
was receiving particularized special services related to his autism diagnosis,
Father remained mostly unaware of what this meant for L.’s daily life, and

32
he showed little interest in gaining a greater understanding. In view of the
entire picture presented by this record, the court’s ultimate determination
that returning L. to Father would not be in L’s best interests cannot be
considered unreasonable or arbitrary.
Although the circumstances are not identical, we reach a similar
conclusion with respect to Mother’s and J.’s contention that the court abused
its discretion in denying Mother’s section 388 petition. The same analysis
regarding each of the Kimberly F. factors as to Father also applies to Mother.
And as to the one factor where a discernable difference might exist—i.e., the
strength of the relative bonds between the children and Mother and the
children and their respective caregivers—the court’s assessments on this
point were sound.
Mother did not care for the children between May 2022 and the date of
the court’s decision on her section 388 petition in January 2025—a period of
over two and a half years. For the youngest dependent children, Y. and L.,
this meant they spent almost half or more than half of their young lives
living in someone else’s care. Although Mother’s visitation was more
consistent than Father’s, the youngest children did not ask for Mother
outside of these visits and they did not appear upset at the conclusion of
these visits. Mother suggests that the juvenile court erred in relying on the
children’s lack of demonstrable distress upon separating from mother as
evidence that their bond with mother was not strong, such that severing their
relationship with her would not cause them detriment. She posits that
“expect[ing] them to cry and show serious distress” upon separation from
her “shows a demonstrable lack of basic [knowledge of] child development.”
But Mother did not offer an alternative approach to determining what kinds
of behaviors would be indicative of a strong or weak bond between a child

33
and a parent. The social worker, who has experience with observing family
visitations, was of the opinion that the ease of separating from Mother
reflected the lack of strong bond. The trial court was entitled to credit that
opinion, and to infer that the lack of outward distress shown by the children
suggested they were less likely to suffer irreparable damage from the
severing of a relationship with Mother.
The juvenile court also sensibly treated J. as situated differently from
Y. and L. The court found J.’s relationship with Mother was relatively
stronger than Y. and L’s relationship with her, given his age and the amount
of time he spent in mother's care before his removal. But the court also
understood that J.’s bond with Mother was negatively impacted by his
repeated exposure to the domestic violence and daily fights occurring in the
home. Moreover, the court attempted to weigh and consider the varying
desires J. expressed over the course of this case. At times, J. voiced a desire
to return to living with Mother. But at other times, he said he was very
happy at the caretakers’ home and wanted to live there permanently. He told
a social worker that he wanted to call his caretakers “my parents.” And in
response to a social worker explaining what a legal guardianship meant, J.
expressed a desire for that plan, indicating he was happy with his caretakers
and how they cared for him. Thus, the court acted reasonably in concluding
that even despite the relatively stronger bond between J. and Mother, it
would nevertheless be in J.’s best interest to proceed toward a permanent
plan of legal guardianship, which required that it deny Mother’s section 388
petition.
We believe the record supports the trial court’s weighing of various
factors to reach the conclusion that granting Mother’s section 388 petition
would not be in the children’s best interests. Nevertheless, Mother and J.

34
argue that the juvenile court erred in weighing certain evidence and
addressing certain recommendations by those involved in this matter.
For example, Mother and J. challenge the court’s treatment of Dr. Stanton’s
bonding study report and testimony. J. contends the court should not have
given more weight to the social worker’s observations than to Stanton’s
opinions. But our role is not to reweigh the evidence or credit certain
evidence more or less than the trial court did. (See, e.g., In re Tanis H. (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226–1227.) And the trial court provided a considered
explanation as to why it found Stanton’s opinions to be of limited value. Her
conclusions were based on limited knowledge of the family and the children’s
diagnoses and special needs. She also observed only two supervised visits in
preparing her report. The court acted within its discretion in concluding the
limited nature of these observations entitled her opinions to less weight in its
assessment of the children’s best interests.
In addition, J. and Mother contend the court erred by effectively
rejecting the recommendation of J.’s counsel (acting as guardian ad litem),
that J. be returned to Mother’s care. They suggest that because minor’s
counsel is under a duty to provide an independent opinion as to what is in
the child’s best interests, the court should accept the recommendation of J.’s
counsel without question. We disagree. While an appointed guardian ad
litem is required to “make recommendations to the court concerning the best
interest of the child” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.662(d); see In re Josiah Z.
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 679–680), there is no authority dictating the weight a
juvenile court must give those recommendations. Instead, the law grants the
juvenile court “ ‘extensive’ ” authority “to fashion orders concerning the
welfare of a dependent child.” (In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 387.)
In exercising this authority, the court “ ‘must look to the totality of the child’s

35
circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) Recommendations made by a child’s guardian ad
litem are but a single component of this totality.
Finally, J. and Mother assert that J.s’ self-harm ideation was the result
of his separation from Mother. Although not expressly argued, the
implication of this portion of the briefing seems to be that the court should
have granted Mother’s section 388 petition to allow J. to reunify with her
because reunification would have resolved J.’s concerning self-harm ideation.
We disagree the record must be interpreted in this way. Rather, the evidence
reflects that the psychological dynamics leading to J.’s psychiatric holds are
likely far more complex than simply being caused by J.’s removal from his
home. There is no dispute that J. witnessed repeated and severe domestic
violence and daily fighting between Mother and Father. The severity of
the violence occurring while the children lived with Mother cannot be
understated and certainly cannot be excluded as a possible contributor to J.’s
psychological challenges. Moreover, Mother seemingly did not prioritize J.’s
educational needs while he was in her care, given the concerning number of
absences and tardies that occurred despite their proximity to J.’s school.
There is also evidence showing J.’s desires were not clear-cut in that he has
expressed contentedness with his current placement, at one point saying he
“wanted to live there forever and still be able to have visits with” Mother.
Beyond this, the persistent high-conflict dynamic between Mother and
Father would mean that a return to Mother’s care could risk placing J. back
into the same emotional turmoil that he experienced prior to his removal.
Moreover, J. acknowledged he would have difficulty reporting any future
violence because he worried about preserving his family. The court
reasonably concluded that this kind of emotional burden would be
detrimental to a child who had already experienced significant instability

36
and uncertainty. Given the complexity of the relationships and dynamics at
issue here, we reject an argument suggesting the trial court failed to give
sufficient consideration to J.’s psychological well-being when it determined
permanent guardianship would be the best long-term plan for him. The
permanency plan the court selected maintains J.’s relationship with Mother,
while prioritizing the benefits available to him as a result of the stability and
support provided by his caregivers.

B. The Court’s Section 366.26 Permanency Plan

The Legislature has declared that California has an interest in
providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from
parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with their parents have
been unsuccessful. (§§ 366.25, subd. (a), 366.26, subd. (b).) Thus, once
reunification services have been terminated, the focus of a dependency
proceeding shifts from family preservation to promoting the child’s best
interests, including the child’s interest in a placement that is stable,
permanent, and allows the caregiver to make a full emotional commitment to
the child. (See In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534; In re
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.)
“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 [permanency plan] hearing is
to select and implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification
efforts have failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852.) At the
permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of three alternatives:
terminate parental rights and order adoption, appoint a legal guardian, or
place children in long-term foster care. If the child is adoptable, there is a
strong preference for adoption over the other two alternatives. (In re B.D.
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.)

37
As a result of the strong preference for adoption, “[o]nce the court
determines by clear and convincing evidence that a child is likely to be
adopted, the burden shifts to any party opposing adoption to show that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one
of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).” (In re D.O.
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 (D.O.).) Here, it is undisputed the Y. and L.
were likely to be adopted. Thus, our focus is whether a statutory exception
to adoption and the termination of parental rights applies. The two statutory
exceptions relevant here are the beneficial parental relationship exception
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and the sibling relationship exception (id., subd.
(c)(1)(B)(v)).)

1. The Beneficial Relationship Exception

The parental-benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applies
where “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination
would be detrimental to the child” (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)), including where “[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Id., subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception “allows a child a legal basis for maintaining a
relationship with the child’s parent if severing that relationship would, on
balance, harm the child,” thereby “preserv[ing] [a] child’s right to [a]
relationship [with his or her parent] even when the child cannot safely live
with that parent.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 643 (Caden C.).)
The beneficial relationship exception requires a parent to prove three
elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, taking into account the extent
of visitation permitted; (2) a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship; and (3) a showing that terminating the

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attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 836, 847.)
“We review the juvenile court's factual findings as to whether the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as
well as the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial
evidence.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1225.) In undertaking
this review, we do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts,’ ” and we will not disturb the
juvenile court’s findings even where substantial evidence to the contrary also
exists. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) However, “the ultimate
decision—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with [the] parent—is discretionary
and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court abuses its
discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)

a. Prong One of the Beneficial Relationship Exception

As to Mother’s visitation with the children, the court found she visited
Y. and L. consistently.
With respect to Father, however, the court’s finding was less
straightforward. The court noted the reports indicated Father’s visits with L.
“were inconsistent until recently when visits became more consistent.” Thus,
although the court initially stated it planned to find Father failed to meet his
burden to demonstrate regular visitation and contact with the children, it
ultimately concluded Father met his burden on this first prong.
No party challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to the first
prong of beneficial relationship exception.

39
b. Prong Two of the Beneficial Relationship Exception

Regarding the second prong of the beneficial relationship exception, the
court found the question close as to whether the children had a substantial,
positive emotional attachment to Mother. On balance, however, the court
determined Mother met her burden to demonstrate the existence of such an
attachment. We therefore do not further consider this prong in connection
with Mother’s challenge on appeal.
As to Father, however, the court found no substantial, positive
emotional bond existed between L. and him. Father contends the record does
not support this finding, arguing the Agency’s reports and testimony at trial
provided evidence showing that L. had a “substantial, positive emotional
attachment” to him. But the question is not whether there might be some
evidence from which the court could have found the existence of a substantial
emotional attachment. The issue before us is whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the finding the juvenile court made—i.e., that L. did not
have a substantial, positive emotional attachment with Father. (See Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640 [court finding as to existence of a
beneficial parental relationship reviewed for substantial evidence].) And for
purposes of the beneficial relationship exception, the emotional attachment
between a child and a parent is to be considered from the child’s perspective.
(Caden C., 11 Cal.5th at p. 633 [second element addresses “the psychological
importance of the relationship for the child”].) “[C]ourts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.
[Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child . . . .” (Id. at
p. 632.)

40
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the attachment
between L. and Father was not sufficiently strong that L. would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The
Agency’s reports note that L. “does not have an emotionally significant
relationship with his father.” Father had maintained only “sporadic
visitation” with L., and the lack of consistency was an impediment to
strengthening their bond. Although L. appeared to enjoy visits with Father,
the evidence demonstrated that L. did not ask for Father outside of their
visits, and he did not appear distraught or distressed about separating from
Father when the visits ended. And although Father’s visitation did become
more consistent for a brief period just before the permanency planning
hearing, this change occurred late in the process, making it difficult to
overcome the lack of attachment that resulted from many cancelled visits and
sporadic contact earlier in the process. The record thus provides substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Father failed to
demonstrate L. “has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to [him].”
(Ibid.)

c. Prong Three of the Beneficial Relationship Exception

Concerning the third element of the beneficial relationship exception—
whether “termination would be detrimental to the child” (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)) because of the relationship—the court must decide whether it would
be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption, despite
it benefits. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) In doing so, the court
“needs to determine . . . in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.) Although a child
might suffer effects such as “emotional instability and preoccupation leading
to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression,” as a

41
result of the loss of relationship with a parent, the benefits of an adoptive
home “may alleviate the emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
such problems,” and could “provid[e] a new source of stability that could
make the loss of a parent not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.)
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that adoption by committed caregivers outweighed any
detriment Y. and L. might experience by losing their relationship with

Mother, or that L. might experience by losing his relationship with Father. 9
L. was only one year old when he was removed from his parents’ care,
and he was two years old when he was removed from his maternal
grandmother’s home and placed with the caregiver. Y. was first detained
when she was three, and then removed from the maternal grandmother’s
home and placed with the caregiver when she was four. Because of this, Y.
and L. had spent a significant portion of their young lives outside of Mother’s
and Father’s care.
The caregiver was providing both children with excellent care and
addressing each child’s unique needs. This included ensuring that the
children were assessed for services and then facilitating the provision of those

9 Although the court found Father had not met his burden with respect
to the second prong of the beneficial relationship exception, it nevertheless
proceeded to complete the weighing required under the third prong as to him,
ultimately concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights to L.
would not be detrimental to L. when balanced against the benefits to him of
adoption. Because the juvenile court addressed this prong with respect to
Father, we will similarly assume for purposes of argument that Father
showed L. had a positive emotional attachment to him and also consider
whether the court abused its discretion in connection with the third prong.
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services.10 Furthermore, the caregiver was committed to adopting both
children. She considered them to be part of her family, the children viewed
her as a parental figure, and she and the children had a reciprocal affection
and love for each other. The children were physically affectionate with the
caregiver, and referred to her as “Mama Maria.” They also were observed
verbally expressing love for the caregiver. Although J. contends there was
“not much evidence as to attachment” with the caregiver, this evidence
demonstrates significant emotional attachment.
Neither parent offered any evidence suggesting that the children were
not attached to the caregiver. In fact, Father testified the caregiver had been
“taking really good care of [L.],” and he had “no complaints about how she
takes care of him.” And Mother seemed to acknowledge the children’s
attachment to the caregiver by testifying that she was open to allowing the
children to maintain a relationship with the caregiver even if the children
were returned to Mother’s care because she anticipated such a transition
being difficult on the children.
Mother and J. both highlight the bonding study assessment provided
by Dr. Stanton. They emphasize Stanton’s conclusion that Y. and L. were
securely attached to Mother and that they would necessarily suffer so much
detriment from the severing of her parental rights that it would outweigh
the benefits to them of adoption. But Stanton’s testimony undermines this
contention. She acknowledged it would be “possible” for a child with a secure

10 This stood in stark contrast to Father, specifically, who failed to
demonstrate to L’s caregiver and the Agency that he understood or
appreciated L.’s needs related to his autism diagnosis. Father at one point
seemed to believe that L. suffered from Down syndrome, and after being
corrected, he did not ask questions of the social worker or caregiver to learn
more about autism. Father’s testimony revealed that even by the time of
trial, he lacked familiarity with L.’s autism-related needs.
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parental attachment to “experience no detriment” from the severing of the
“parent-child bond.” She also conceded that she was unfamiliar with the
relationship that Y. and L. have with their caregiver, as it was “not
pertinent” to the bonding study she conducted. Given the limitations of the
bonding study in connection with the assessments the juvenile court was
tasked with making, the court acted reasonably in giving report less weight.
Given these children’s young ages, their need for permanency and
stability was paramount. And the caregiver was willing and able to provide
permanency. Although both Mother and, with respect to L., Father, were
able to maintain some parental relationship through their visitation with Y.
and L., we cannot say this presents an extraordinary case where preservation
of parental rights outweighs the preference for adoption. (See In re G.B.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166 [“ ‘ “it is only in an extraordinary case
that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s
preference for adoptive placement” ’ ”].)
We express no doubt that Mother and Father love the children, or that
the parents’ visits with their children were generally positive and enjoyable
for everyone. However, “[a] ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive some
benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of
visitation” ’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference
for adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818, quoting
In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.)
In sum, the court reasonably concluded that maintaining Y. and L.’s
relationship with Mother, and L.’s relationship with Father, did not outweigh
“ ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) We therefore cannot find that the

44
juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to apply the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception in connection with Y. and L.
i. The sibling relationship exception

To establish the sibling relationship exception applies, the party
opposing the termination of rights must demonstrate that such a result
would constitute a “substantial interference with a child's sibling
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) In assessing whether a
“substantial interference” can be demonstrated, the court is to “tak[e] into
consideration the nature and extent of the [sibling] relationship, including,
but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same
home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has
existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is
in the child's best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest,
as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (Ibid.;
see D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.)
This statutory framework has been held to require the juvenile court
to “ ‘first . . . determine whether terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with the sibling relationship.’ ” (D.O., supra, 247
Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) “ ‘If the court determines terminating parental rights
would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then
directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling
relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency
of adoption.’ ” (Id. at pp. 173–174.) The sibling bond exception is evaluated
from the perspective of the child who is being considered for adoption, not
the perspective of that child's siblings. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
45, 54–55.) And in considering this exception, courts are mindful that

45
“ ‘ “the child’s relationship with his or her siblings would rarely be sufficiently
strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption.” ’ ” (D.O., at p. 174.)
In considering Mother and J.’s appellate challenge to the court’s finding
that the sibling exception did not apply, we apply a hybrid standard of
review. (See In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.) We review the
juvenile court’s underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence,
and we then consider whether the court abused its discretion in its ultimate
weighing of the competing interests at stake. (Ibid.)
The mere existence of a sibling bond is not enough to meet the
substantial interference standard. “Many siblings have a relationship with
each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the
relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination,
there is no substantial interference with that relationship.” (In re L.Y.L.
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952 (L.Y.L.).) Our review of the record confirms
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Y. and L.’s
relationships with J. were not so significant, from their point of view, that
the potential severing of those relationships would constitute substantial
interference.
Y. and L. had been raised in the same home with J. until their removal
and placement with their maternal grandmother. But they were only two
and four when this occurred. L. was then removed from the grandmother’s
care and placed with his current caretaker in December 2022, while Y. and J.
were placed in that same home three months after L.’s placement there. The
children lived together with the caretakers for approximately eight months;
after that point, J. was moved from that placement and into the home of his
current legal guardians. Thus, Y. and L. lived in the same home with J. for

46
only a portion of their young lives, and thus had limited shared experiences
with him.
It is true that the younger children continued to interact with J. during
weekly visits, but the court reasonably presumed the limited common
experiences from these weekly visits were not likely to have “impacted [them]
in the same way” as those experiences impacted J. The Agency’s reports
support this conclusion, as they reflect that while the younger children
appeared to enjoy spending time with J., Y. and L. demonstrated no
particular distress upon separating from him. And there is no indication in
the record that Y. or L. tended to rely on J., asked for him between visits, or
appeared distraught by not having more contact with him. The record thus
supports the trial court’s determination that no substantial interference with
Y. and L.’s sibling relationship with J. would result from the termination of
parental rights because the relationship was not sufficiently developed and
significant. (See L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)
Further, appellants have not demonstrated an abuse of discretion in
the court’s ultimate determination that, on balance, the benefits to Y. and L.
of adoption would outweigh any potential detriment caused by interference
with the sibling relationship. These two children had been living a
significant portion of their lives with a caregiver who is willing to adopt them
and who has demonstrated a long-term commitment to meeting their special
needs. Their caregiver has advocated for them to obtain the support they
need, and they have made developmental progress and shown significant
improvement while in her care. Moreover, there is evidence in the record
that sibling contact between the younger children and J. would continue,
even after Y. and L. are adopted. The caregivers for J., on the one hand,

47
and Y. and L. on the other, expressed a willingness to continue facilitating
visits between the siblings.
Given that sibling contact likely will continue, and given the benefits to
the children that adoption will provide, the court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that the sibling relationship exception did not apply. And even
if one assumes that the sibling bond fails to thrive under these particular
circumstances, it remains the case that the court acted well within reason in
determining that the emotional support and consistency provided to Y. and L.
by their caregiver outweighed any detriment they might suffer as a result of
the severing of their sibling bond with J.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the trial court issued on January 16, 2025 are affirmed.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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