CourtListener 10711658•People v. Curl CA6
Testo completo
Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Curl CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051444
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR004857)
v.
ROYCE DEAN CURL II,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Royce Dean Curl II of all four counts listed in the
amended information: possession for sale of fentanyl, a controlled substance (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11351; count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 2);1 possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1);
count 3); and possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1, subd. (a); count 4). The jury also found true an allegation that Curl sustained
a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) for violating
section 246.3, subdivision (a), willful discharge of a firearm.
On appeal, Curl argues that the judgment should be reversed because certain of his
statements to a sheriff’s detective were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and thus should have been suppressed. Curl also argues
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that he sustained a prior
strike conviction.
We conclude that any error in admitting Curl’s statements to the detective is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, we need not determine whether the trial
court erred in admitting the statements. We further accept the Attorney General’s
concession that substantial evidence does not support the true finding on the prior strike
allegation. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment, allowing the People the
opportunity to retry the prior strike allegation.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Monterey County Sheriff’s Office officials searched Curl’s residence, car, and
person pursuant to a warrant. In the residence shared by Curl and his girlfriend, law
enforcement found a loaded firearm, a bag containing about 460 “M30” pills, cash
amounting to $5,250, and an additional amount of $50,000 in cash. Sheriff’s officials
testified that an M30 pill is stamped to appear to be oxycodone. However, tests revealed
that the pills contained fentanyl. The search also discovered two scales containing heroin
residue. A search of Curl’s person found $2,515 in cash and an additional 296 M30
fentanyl pills.
A. Motion to Suppress Curl’s Statements
Curl moved in limine to suppress certain statements he made to a sheriff’s
detective, asserting that the detective violated Miranda by interrogating him after he
invoked his right to counsel. The prosecution also moved to admit these statements,
arguing that the detective did not ask questions of Curl after Curl invoked his right to
counsel and that Curl voluntarily gave statements when he reinitiated conversation with
the detective.
Detective Jesse Pinon testified for the prosecution at the motions hearing. He
stated that in the course of executing the search warrant, two officers searched the vehicle
described in the warrant and found narcotics. Curl was walking toward the vehicle; the
2
officers searched him and found narcotics on his person as well. Detective Pinon then
searched the house and located narcotics, cash, and a gun. Detective Pinon testified that
“[o]nce we conducted our search and our investigation at the residence and in the vehicle
[Curl] was in possession of,” he advised Curl of his Miranda rights using a standard
rights advisement card. At that point, Curl had been handcuffed for 30 to 45 minutes
during the search. Detective Pinon testified that after providing a rights advisement and
after Curl stated he understood his rights, he asked Curl whether the drugs found in the
residence belonged to Curl or Curl’s girlfriend. Curl responded that “everything was his
and that he would like a lawyer.” Detective Pinon stopped questioning Curl.
Curl was placed under arrest and remained in handcuffs. Detective Pinon testified
that the following then occurred: “I was standing near [Curl], and I was in the presence
of him when he made some spontaneous statements.” Asked to clarify what he meant,
Detective Pinon testified: “He was just ranting, just making statements about what was
going on.” Detective Pinon testified that Curl’s statements were not in response to any
questions Detective Pinon asked. Detective Pinon testified that Curl’s statements came
“[w]ithin a minute” of his earlier invocation of the right to counsel.
Detective Pinon testified in the motions hearing that after Curl invoked his right to
counsel, “Curl initially said that he had nothing to do with anything.” At trial, Detective
Pinon testified that Curl said his girlfriend (not Curl) “had nothing to do with anything.”
Regardless of the exact nature of Curl’s statement after invoking his right to counsel,
Detective Pinon then “made a statement that these pills that [Curl] had in possession were
deadly and responsible for killing people.” On cross-examination at the motions hearing,
Curl’s counsel asked Detective Pinon whether his statement about the pills being deadly
and responsible for killing people was “directly in response” to Curl’s comment that he
had “nothing to do with anything.” Detective Pinon responded: “No. I think that was
just the pills that were present, the evidence that was taken from the vehicle. The
detectives were still processing the vehicle that he was standing next to.” Detective
3
Pinon also testified that the pills located on Curl’s person were present at the scene, and
Curl’s counsel asked: “And so based on looking at those pills, did you make the
statement to him that these pills are deadly and responsible for killing people?” Detective
Pinon replied: “I think that was in general to even the ones I found inside the residence.”
After Detective Pinon stated that the pills were deadly and responsible for killing
people, “Curl said that his pills don’t kill people and that he makes sure of that, and that
he’s basically almost a chemist. [¶] And, at that point, he said he did what he has to do
and that people were out there trying to get him so he had to protect himself.” Detective
Pinon testified that he did not ask any questions or make any other statements as Curl
made these statements.
The trial court orally denied the defense’s motion to suppress the statements. The
trial court’s ruling stated: “The Court finds the testimony of Detective Pinon to be
credible. There is . . . neither a Fifth nor Sixth Amendment violation.” Other than
finding Detective Pinon credible, the trial court made no findings of fact in its ruling.
B. Trial Proceedings
At trial, Detective Pinon testified that he explained to Curl “why we were at the
residence,” and that he informed Curl about the search warrant. Curl asked “who had
snitched on him.” Detective Pinon testified that in response: “I informed [Curl] of what
we had found, the gun and narcotics in the residence. I asked him if they were his. I --
first I asked if he understood his rights. He said yes. I asked him about the gun and
narcotics found in the residence, if they were his or his girlfriend’s. At that point, he said
they’re all his.” After Curl invoked his right to counsel, Detective Pinon testified, Curl
said his girlfriend “had nothing to do with anything.” Detective Pinon testified that the
following then occurred: “I informed him that the M30 pills are what’s killing a lot of
people and it’s getting a lot of people sick. He said he made sure that his weren’t doing
that, had that kind of effect, and that he would oversee them when they were being
4
pressed or being made.” Detective Pinon testified that Curl “also did mention that he’s
almost a chemist so he’s aware of the breakdown.”
The prosecutor asked Detective Pinon based on his training and experience
whether there was “anything significant about what the defendant told you?” Detective
Pinon replied as follows: “Yes. On top of him taking claim [sic] for everything, his
statement that he made sure his pills weren’t killing anybody basically kind of adds he is
making sure his supply isn’t bad and getting people sick. That he is a chemist. So he’s
actually saying he’s basically doing research into his own -- his own product being
made.” Detective Pinon also testified that Curl made other statements about being in a
“known drug area” and asked “why was he the only one arrested or . . . contacted.”
Detective Pinon testified: “He just mentioned that why was he selected if there’s a bunch
of drug dealers down there. I told him I didn’t see anybody. I didn’t see any other drug
dealers down there at the time.”
Detective Pinon and another sheriff’s official testified as experts in fentanyl sales.
Detective Pinon opined that Curl possessed the fentanyl pills for sale. He summarized
the basis for his opinion as follows: “Based on the large amount of M30 pills and then
the heroin that he has in his possession, the individually bagged M30 pills of
denominations of 20. So those are ready to be sold in 20-pill increments. The currency,
also having a scale, and a larger amount of M30 pills at his residence. [¶] Based on
possessing all these items, I believe that he possessed these for sales. Also having the
knowledge of knowing that his product isn’t killing people, making those statements. A
user is not going to say, hey, I’m possessing these things so I don’t kill other people. His
only purpose for possessing these things would be for personal use, not for the safety of
other people.” He further testified that the fact that Curl was found with one larger bag of
fentanyl pills and smaller bags of pills supported his opinion, as “[a] user doesn’t
individually package their pills in 20-pill increments.” A second sheriff’s official opined
that Curl possessed the pills for sale based on the number and packaging of pills found,
5
along with the cash and the denominations of bills found in Curl’s possession. The
second expert did not refer to Curl’s statements as a basis for his opinion.
Curl testified on his own behalf at trial. He testified that the pills found in his
home and on his person were for his own personal use, and that he planned to return
some of the pills to the person who sold them to him because the pills did not produce the
intended effect. Curl testified that he bought M30 pills in bulk for a better price and that
he used up to eight pills at a time due to his high tolerance level. Curl testified that he
owned the firearm for protection and that the firearm had “nothing to do with drug sales.”
On cross-examination, Curl explained his statements to Detective Pinon as follows: “I
was just being sarcastic because I felt like they were just maximizing and searching and
trying to put something on me to make a case that wasn’t there.” Curl’s girlfriend also
testified during the defense’s case-in-chief. She testified that the $5,250 in cash belonged
to Curl but that the amount of more than $50,000 in cash was hers, the result of savings
from her paychecks over several years.
In rebuttal, Detective Pinon and the other expert both testified that using eight
fentanyl pills at one time would be fatal.
The jury convicted Curl of four counts, including possession for sale of fentanyl
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count 1).2 The jury also found true an allegation that Curl
sustained a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) for violating
section 246.3, subdivision (a), willful discharge of a firearm. To prove this prior strike
allegation, the prosecution submitted documentary evidence establishing that Curl was
convicted in 2019 of violating section 246.3, subdivision (a), plus another offense. Curl
also testified that he had been convicted in 2019 of “felony negligent discharge of a
firearm” and another offense.
2
Concerning count 1, the jury found not true an allegation that Curl was
personally armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (c)).
6
The trial court sentenced Curl to an aggregate term of nine years four months.
This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Curl’s Statements
Curl argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to Detective
Pinon because “the undisputed facts show that: (1) appellant was in custody when he
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel; (2) appellant’s rambling did not reflect a
desire for further discussion; (3) Detective Pin[]on did not obtain a knowing and
intelligent waiver of appellant’s previously invoked right to counsel; and (4) Detective
Pin[]on’s accusation that the pills were ‘deadly and responsible for killing people’ was
the functional equivalent of further interrogation.” He further contends that the trial
court’s error in admitting the challenged statements was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because his statements were used to help prove that he possessed the
fentanyl pills for sale.
The Attorney General asserts that the trial court properly admitted evidence of
Curl’s statements to the detective because Curl initiated further discussion after invoking
his right to counsel and because the detective’s statement about the nature of the pills was
not the functional equivalent of interrogation. The Attorney General also contends that
any error in admitting Curl’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘The Fifth Amendment provides that no “person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda [citation], the [United States
Supreme] Court concluded that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” [Citation.] “Accordingly, the Court
formulated the now-familiar ‘procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
7
against self-incrimination.’ ” [Citations.] Among these is the rule that when an accused
has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544,
577-578 (Johnson).)
The safeguards of Miranda apply to a suspect “only if he is subjected to custodial
interrogation. [Citation.]” (People v. Cressy (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 981, 986.) “Absent
‘custodial interrogation,’ Miranda simply does not come into play. [Citations.]” (People
v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) “ ‘ “[I]nterrogation” under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 578.)
The erroneous denial of a confession suppression motion is subject to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
(People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 (Neal).) Thus, the prosecution is required to
“ ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained,’ ” meaning the error was “ ‘unimportant in relation to everything else
the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) Under this standard, “ ‘confessions, “as a class,” “[a]lmost invariably” will
provide persuasive evidence of a defendant’s guilt [citation] . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[S]uch
confessions often operate “as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense”
[citation], . . . [and therefore] . . . the improper admission of a confession is much more
likely to affect the outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, and thus is
much more likely to be prejudicial . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The California Supreme
Court in Neal listed three examples of situations in which admission of a confession
might be found harmless: “ ‘(1) when the defendant was apprehended by the police in
8
the course of committing the crime, (2) when there are numerous, disinterested reliable
eyewitnesses to the crime whose testimony is confirmed by a wealth of uncontroverted
physical evidence, or (3) in a case in which the prosecution introduced, in addition to the
confession, a videotape of the commission of the crime . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
“[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621 (Quartermain).) “While some statements by
a defendant may concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when
linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for
and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching
its decision.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296 (Fulminante).)
2. Analysis
We conclude that any error in admitting Curl’s statements made after Detective
Pinon’s statements that the pills were deadly and responsible for killing people was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we need not address whether Detective
Pinon obtained these statements in violation of Miranda.
Curl’s statements that “his pills don’t kill people and that he makes sure of that,
and that he’s basically almost a chemist” did not amount to a “full confession” but rather
“concern[ed] isolated aspects of the crime[s]” for which he was charged. (Fulminante,
supra, 499 U.S. at p. 296.) These statements related only to one of the four counts Curl
faced, possession for sale of fentanyl. With regard to this count, the prosecution
introduced Curl’s statements in relation to only one of the count’s elements—that Curl
intended to sell the fentanyl he possessed. The bulk of Curl’s criminal activity, including
his possession of large amounts of fentanyl pills and his possession of a firearm and
ammunition, were proved by the evidence found in the search.
9
Additionally, the statements at issue were “incriminating only when linked to
other evidence,” evidence that by itself provided compelling proof that Curl possessed
the fentanyl with intent to sell. (Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 296.) Curl’s
statements in response to Detective Pinon did not directly admit that he possessed
fentanyl with the intent to sell it. Instead, his statements indirectly supported an inference
that Curl sold the pills to others because if he had possessed the pills for his personal use,
he would not have said that he makes sure his pills do not kill others. The physical
evidence found in the search more directly evinced Curl’s intent to sell the pills. Law
enforcement found numerous incriminating pieces of evidence in Curl’s possession,
including about 750 M30 pills with many of them in one large bag and others bagged in
increments of 20. The jury could use its common sense and experience (CALCRIM
No. 226) to conclude that Curl did not possess 750 or so fentanyl pills for his own
personal use.3 The search also revealed more than $50,000 and a firearm, among other
items. Two prosecution experts testified that this physical evidence demonstrated Curl’s
intent to sell the pills. Detective Pinon recounted the physical evidence before
concluding that “[b]ased on possessing all these items, I believe that he possessed these
for sales.” Only after stating his opinion based on the physical evidence did Detective
3
In concluding that any error in admitting Curl’s statements was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, we do not consider the potentially incriminating impact of Curl’s
testimony that he possessed the pills for his personal use and that he used up to eight pills
at a time, or the rebuttal testimony that using eight fentanyl pills at one time would be
fatal. If Curl testified “in order to overcome the impact of confessions illegally obtained
and hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the same illegality
that rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible.” (Harrison v. United States
(1968) 392 U.S. 219, 223, fn. omitted.) We conclude that any assumed error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt without reference to Curl’s testimony or the
prosecution’s rebuttal evidence in response to Curl’s testimony. Thus, we need not
speculate whether Curl testified in response to the admission of his statements at issue.
(See People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1030, fn. 7 [discounting evidence of the
defendant’s testimony in a harmless error analysis where the defendant argued “his
decision to testify flowed from the erroneous introduction of his pretrial statements”].)
10
Pinon refer to Curl’s statements made in response to Detective Pinon. The other
prosecution expert opined that Curl possessed the pills for sale based solely on the
evidence found in the search. Curl’s statements were therefore unimportant in relation to
the physical evidence in this case.
Other factors support the conclusion that any error in admitting Curl’s statements
in response to Detective Pinon was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, Curl’s
statements that he made sure his pills did not kill people and that he was almost a chemist
were not the only incriminating statements he made. Before invoking his right to
counsel, Curl admitted that everything found in the search was his. Then, after invoking
his right to counsel but before Detective Pinon’s statement, Curl said either that he or his
girlfriend had “nothing to do with anything.” Curl does not assert that these statements
were improperly admitted. Curl’s first statement admitted his ownership of all the
physical evidence found in the search. With regard to the latter statement, if Curl said he
had nothing to do with anything, then this contradicted his earlier statement that
everything was his. If Curl said that his girlfriend had nothing to do with anything, then
this amounted to an admission of some level of guilt on Curl’s part. Either way, Curl’s
remarks made before the challenged statements provide further proof of his guilt.
Second, the prosecution did not highlight Curl’s statements about making sure his
pills do not kill people and being almost a chemist in its closing argument. The
prosecution began its closing argument by highlighting the evidence found in the search,
only later mentioning Curl’s statements in response to Detective Pinon. Then, when
discussing expert opinions that Curl possessed the pills for sale, the prosecutor discussed
the physical evidence without referencing Curl’s statements. Later, the prosecutor
covered the elements of possession of fentanyl for sale. Concerning the element that Curl
intended to sell the pills when he possessed them, the prosecutor stated: “First of all, the
sheer amount of drugs is enough to be convinced that the defendant possessed these for
sale.” The prosecutor argued that “[t]he sheer amount of fentanyl pills is enough
11
evidence to prove that the defendant is guilty of selling fentanyl,” before discussing the
firearm, scales, and cash found in the search. Only after discussing this evidence did the
prosecutor discuss Curl’s statements in response to Detective Pinon. In total, the
prosecutor’s references to Curl’s statements in response to Detective Pinon amounted to
less than one page of a closing argument consisting of 15 transcribed pages.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor similarly argued that “the amount of fentanyl pills in
this case is enough to convict the defendant alone,” the prosecutor highlighted the other
evidence found in the search, and the prosecutor’s discussion of Curl’s statements
amounted to about one-half of a transcribed page in the six-page rebuttal argument.
While the prosecutor did refer to the statements at issue in closing arguments, the
prosecutor did not emphasize these statements and stressed that the jury should convict
Curl based on the physical evidence alone. The prosecutor’s arguments support the
conclusion that other evidence such as the quantity of pills and their packaging was more
probative of Curl’s intent to sell the pills than any statement Curl made to Detective
Pinon.
Detective Pinon testified as to the physical evidence found in the search, evidence
that demonstrated on its own Curl’s possession of fentanyl with intent to sell. Thus, any
error in admitting Curl’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Curl
argues that his case does not neatly involve one of the three examples in Neal of
situations in which admission of a confession might be found harmless. However, the
examples in Neal are not exhaustive, and the instant case is similar to the first two
examples Neal provided. Curl was apprehended in the course of possessing fentanyl with
intent to sell it, and Detective Pinon and the other prosecution expert were
“ ‘disinterested reliable’ ” witnesses “ ‘whose testimony is confirmed by a wealth of
uncontroverted physical evidence . . . .’ ” (Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86.) The
statements that Curl argues were obtained in violation of Miranda “concern isolated
aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when linked to other evidence” instead
12
of “a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the
crime . . . .” (Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 296.) Any assumed error did not
contribute to the verdict and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Neal, supra, at
p. 86; Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 621.)
B. Prior Strike Offense
Curl asserts that the prosecution failed to introduce substantial evidence that his
conviction for violating section 246.3, subdivision (a) constituted a strike as defined by
section 1192.7. The Attorney General concedes that the prior strike conviction was not
proved by substantial evidence. The concession is well taken. We agree that substantial
evidence does not support the jury’s finding that Curl sustained a prior strike conviction.
Section 246.3, subdivision (a) states: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, any
person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could
result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) lists offenses that
constitute a strike for purposes of sentencing under section 667. A violation of
section 246.3 is not specifically enumerated as a strike offense in section 1192.7,
subdivision (c). However, section 1192.7 states that a strike offense includes “any felony
in which the defendant personally uses a firearm” (id., subd. (c)(8)) or “any felony in
which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon” (id., subd. (c)(23)).
At trial, the prosecution introduced documentary evidence that Curl was convicted
in 2019 of violating section 246.3, subdivision (a) along with another offense, and Curl
admitted the convictions. The evidence did not prove whether Curl violated
section 246.3, subdivision (a) by personally using a firearm, or instead if Curl’s guilt was
based on his vicarious liability as an aider and abettor. “Section 246.3 can be used as a
strike only if the defendant personally used the firearm. [Citations.]” (People v. Golde
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 111-112.) “It is possible to be convicted of grossly
13
negligent discharge of a firearm under section 246.3 without personally using a firearm,
e.g., as an aider and abettor.” (Id. at p. 112.)
“On an appellate challenge to a finding that a prior conviction was a strike, where
the prior conviction is for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, one or more
of which would not qualify it as a strike, and if it cannot be determined from the record
that the offense was committed in a way that would make it a strike, a reviewing court
must presume the offense was not a strike.” (People v. Watts (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
589, 596.) Here, the prosecution’s evidence did not demonstrate that Curl personally
used a firearm, which was necessary to qualify his prior section 246.3, subdivision (a)
conviction as a strike. Thus, the jury’s true finding on the prior strike allegation is not
supported by substantial evidence. We therefore will vacate the finding, reverse the
judgment, and remand the matter for retrial of the prior strike allegation at the People’s
election. (See People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239 [retrial of a prior strike
allegation is permissible where the reviewing court reverses a true finding for insufficient
evidence].)
III. DISPOSITION
The jury’s true finding on the prior strike enhancement (Pen. Code, §§ 667,
subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) is vacated and the judgment is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the Superior Court of Monterey County. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the
clerk of this court shall remit a certified copy of this opinion to the superior court for
filing, and respondent shall serve another copy thereof on the prosecuting attorney in
conformity with Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2). If the People do not elect
to retry Curl on the prior strike allegation within 60 days after service pursuant to Penal
Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), the trial court shall enter a judgment reflecting
convictions for counts 1 through 4 and shall resentence Curl accordingly under current
law. (See Pen. Code, § 1260.)
14
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Grover, J.
______________________________________
Lie, J.
People v. Curl
H051444
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