People v. Lawrence CA4/1

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Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Lawrence CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084438

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD278012)

KMAAL LAWRENCE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Dismissed in part, affirmed in part.
Kmaal Lawrence, in pro. per.; and Paul Raymond Kraus, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kmaal Lawrence appeals from the denial of his postconviction petition
seeking resentencing. His appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and Lawrence filed
a supplemental brief. We have reviewed the issues raised in
Lawrence’s supplemental brief and have independently reviewed the record.
(Id. at p. 232.) To the extent the order is not appealable, we dismiss. To the
extent there is an appealable aspect of the order, we find no reasonably
arguable appellate issues and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Plea and Sentencing

Lawrence was charged with 31 counts arising from sexual abuse of a
child over a three-year period, from 2015 and 2018. The operative complaint
alleged four counts of having sexual intercourse with a child 10 years of age

or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (a); [counts 1–2 and 11–12]); eight
counts of oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7,
subd. (b) [counts 3–6 and 13–16]); six counts of committing a forcible lewd act
upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1) [counts 7–8, 17–18, and
27–28]); six counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14
(§ 288, subd. (a) [counts 9–10, 19–20, and 29–30]); and seven counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a) [counts 21–26 and 31]).
The complaint also alleged an enhancement for substantial sexual contact
with the victim in committing the forcible lewd act charges (§1203.066, subd.
(a)(8) [counts 7–8, 17–18, and 27–28]).
In March 2019, Lawrence pleaded guilty to one count of sexual
intercourse with a child under the age of 10 (count 1) and to one count of
forcibly committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (count 17).
He admitted the enhancement allegation that he had substantial sexual
contact with the child in committing the act charged in count 17. In
exchange, Lawrence stipulated to a state prison sentence of 25 years to life
for count 1 plus a lower term sentence of five years for count 17 for an
aggregate term of 30 years to life. The People agreed to dismiss the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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remaining charges and enhancements. The court accepted Lawrence’s guilty
plea after examining him about his signatures and initials on the plea form
and confirming he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Lawrence
admitted on the record the factual basis for each crime.
Consistent with the plea deal, the court sentenced Lawrence in May
2019 to a total term of 30 years to life in state prison. This included the low
term of five years for count 17.
In imposing the sentence, the court commented about Lawrence’s
criminal history of committing lewd lascivious acts upon children, and the
fact that this case included over 30 counts of sexual abuse of a child. The
court continued, “How many times do you have to be told that this is wrong
and you continue to engage in this type of activity? As far as I’m concerned,
you are getting a gift of 30 years to life. This is worth a thousand. You
should never get out in my opinion. [¶] So what your attorneys worked out
with you and the DA’s office, as far as I’m concerned, you’re very fortunate to
have.”
B. Petition for Resentencing
In June 2024, Lawrence filed a preprinted form entitled “Petition for
Resentencing Pursuant All Applicable Sections of Penal Code § 1170, § 1171,
§ 1172, and Assembly Bill 1540 (2021).” Lawrence filled in his name,
address, and case number on the first page.
The form petition listed the following legislative enactments for “all
possible applicability”:
(1) Senate Bill No. 483 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, §§ 1–4) [retroactively eliminated prison-prior enhancements
except for sexually violent offenses];

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(2) Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, §§ 1–2) [amended former § 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) to permit
defendants convicted of manslaughter or attempted murder to seek
relief for convictions based on a theory of natural and probable
consequences liability for aiding and abetting];
(3) Assembly Bill No. 256 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022,
ch. 739, §§ 1–4) [amended the Racial Justice Act (§ 745) to apply to
judgments final before January 1, 2021];
(4) Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1) [amended § 1385 to authorize a trial court to dismiss an
enhancement in the furtherance of justice after considering mitigating
circumstances, unless dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety];
(5) Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 699, §§ 1–5 ) [amended § 186.22 related to the evidence and
evidentiary burden necessary to prove a gang-related enhancement];
(6) Senate Bill No. 73 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 537, §§ 1–6) [increased eligibility for probation for individuals
convicted of certain crimes related to controlled substances];
(7) Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, §§ 1–3) [amended § 1170 for the standards to impose an upper-
term sentence and establishing the middle term as the presumptive
sentence]; and
(8) Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 719, §§ 1–7) [moved the recall and resentencing provisions from
former § 1170 to current § 1172.1].

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Lawrence added a handwritten statement at the end of the petition
regarding general resentencing rules. Neither the petition nor the
handwritten addendum explained how he was eligible for resentencing in this
case under any statutory authority.
The court issued a letter stating it received the “request for recall and
resentencing ostensibly pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1, in addition to
‘sections 1170, 1171, 1172 and AB 1540.’ ” The court noted that a defendant
is not entitled to file a petition for relief and, if such a petition is filed, the
court is not required to respond. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) “Nonetheless” the
court “carefully reviewed all the official court reports” including “probation
reports, social studies and psychological reports.” The court found “no
reasonable basis to recall defendant’s sentence pursuant to any of the code
sections or legislation referenced in his petition.” Therefore, the court took no
action on the request.
Lawrence appealed, challenging the “improper denial of resentencing.”
The superior court issued a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

Lawrence’s appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues and
requesting this court proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.
Lawrence submitted a supplemental brief describing the Racial Justice
Act and recent amendments. Lawrence contends the trial court erred by
failing to appoint counsel, which he says, “should have been done as a right,
triggered by a showing [of] a ‘plausible justification’ that an RJA violation
existed.”
Lawrence’s contentions in his supplemental brief are without
merit. He does not explain how his race or ethnicity played any role in the
charges, his guilty plea, or in the subsequent sentencing based on a

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stipulated sentence. Furthermore, an incarcerated defendant whose
judgment is final may bring a Racial Justice Act claim only by a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. (§ 745.) The trial court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction
to act on his motion for relief based on the Racial Justice Act. (People v.
Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999–1000.) The court’s decision not to act
on this petition is not appealable (Ibid.)
Lawrence was also not entitled to petition for relief under section
1172.1, subdivision (c). Therefore, the court’s decision not to act on such a
petition is not appealable because it does not affect his substantial rights.
(People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 999, 1001; People v. Faustinos
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696; People v. Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 999.)
To the extent Lawrence identified any theoretical basis for relief, the
denial of which would amount to an appealable order, we have exercised our
discretion to independently review the record and have not discovered any
potentially meritorious issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has
represented Lawrence on this appeal.

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DISPOSITION

To the extent the order is not appealable, we dismiss. To the extent
any aspect of the order is appealable, we affirm.

DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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