People v. Mackey CA1/3

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Filed 10/23/25 P. v. Mackey CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170103
v.
MICHAEL E. MACKEY, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR186577)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2008, Michael E. Mackey was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, and two counts of robbery. In 2023, Mackey petitioned for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.62 and sought to replace
appointed counsel by filing a Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2
Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)). After substitute counsel appeared on Mackey’s
behalf, Judge Robert Bowers summarily denied the resentencing petition at
the prima facie stage and denied the Marsden motion.
On appeal, Mackey argues the trial court erred both by denying his
Marsden motion without a hearing and by denying his section 1172.6

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95

to section 1172.6, with no substantive changes in the statute. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion for ease of
reference.

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petition. We conclude the Marsden motion was rendered moot by the
appearance of substitute counsel to represent Mackey for the section 1172.6
proceeding. However, we reverse the court’s denial of the resentencing
petition, which was not based on a review of the record, and remand for
further proceedings under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Convictions and Sentence
In 2008, a jury convicted Mackey of first degree felony murder (§ 189)
and second degree robbery (§ 211) against one victim, and attempted murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and second degree robbery (§ 211) against a second
victim, for his role in a shooting and drug theft.
The jury found true for all four counts that Mackey personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally discharged a firearm (id.,
subd. (c)), and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which
proximately caused great bodily injury (and death, as to the first victim)
(id., subd. (d)).
The judge who presided over the trial (not Judge Bowers) sentenced
Mackey to an aggregate term of seven years plus 75 years to life in prison.
Postconviction Proceedings
In 2020, Mackey filed a motion requesting a Franklin proceeding—in
which youthful offenders can make a record to preserve evidence for an
eventual parole hearing—and appointment of counsel. (People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.) In 2020, another trial court judge appointed counsel,
who withdrew in 2022. Judge Bowers then appointed the Solano County
Public Defender’s Office to represent him; Deputy Public Defender Damian

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Spieckerman represented Mackey throughout the conclusion of the Franklin
proceedings in October 2023.3
In July 2023, while the Franklin proceeding was still ongoing, Mackey
petitioned in propria persona for resentencing under section 1172.6 (section
1172.6 petition). Mackey used the Office of the State Public Defender’s
section 1172.6 “Petition for Resentencing” form, checking the boxes indicating
he presented a facially sufficient petition and requested appointment of
counsel. The record does not reflect any response by the prosecution to the
section 1172.6 petition.
At a September 2023 combined status hearing on the Franklin
proceeding and the section 1172.6 petition, Spieckerman stated he was not
able to file anything regarding Mackey’s resentencing petition and suggested
the petition be discussed at a future hearing.
At a hearing on December 5, 2023, Spieckerman appeared on Mackey’s
behalf and indicated Mackey may want to file a Marsden motion. Judge
Bowers continued the matter for 30 days to allow Spieckerman and Mackey
to speak regarding the potential Marsden motion. Given the continuance,
Spieckerman opted not to submit on the section 1172.6 petition at that time.
Later that month, Mackey filed the Marsden motion at issue in this
appeal seeking to replace Spieckerman. The motion was based on various
allegations concerning Spieckerman’s representation, as well as personal
accusations against him. Specifically, Mackey asserted Spieckerman failed to
meet with or communicate with him, was not doing his job on Mackey’s
behalf, falsely stated Mackey had not provided him necessary information,

3 Mackey filed a Marsden motion in 2022 to remove Spieckerman,

which a different trial court judge denied after holding a hearing. The 2022
Marsden denial is not on appeal and we therefore do not address it.

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failed to file certain motions as Mackey had requested, and was having sex
with Mackey’s ex-wife. The motion did not include any allegations against
the public defender’s office generally.
On January 9, 2024, Judge Bowers held a hearing on the section 1172.6
petition. The Solano County Public Defender, Elena Marie D’Agustino,
appeared on behalf of Mackey; Mackey was not present. When Judge Bowers
asked D’Agustino if she represented Mackey, D’Agustino explained that her
office represented him on the completed Franklin matter, but Mackey had
also filed the section 1172.6 petition. Judge Bowers then appointed
D’Agustino’s office to represent him for that petition.
Turning to the section 1172.6 petition, the prosecutor stated it was his
“understanding” from the prior hearing—apparently referring to the
December 5, 2023 hearing—that Spieckerman did not see any reason to go
forward on the resentencing petition because Mackey was the actual killer.
The prosecutor averred there was “no question [Mackey]’s the actual killer”
and was therefore ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
D’Agustino noted Mackey had filed the petition in propria persona and
stated she did not feel she could withdraw it without his consent. After
Judge Bowers indicated he would allow additional time for D’Agustino to
reach out to Mackey before proceeding, D’Agustino indicated they had
already spoken and she was prepared to submit on the section 1172.6 matter.
Judge Bowers then denied both the section 1172.6 petition and
Marsden motion, stating as the entirety of his ruling: “All right. Then you’re
going to submit on it. I’m going to deny it, deny his Marsden and that’s that.”
No further matters were raised at the hearing.
Through D’Agustino, Mackey appealed.

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DISCUSSION
Mackey challenges the trial court’s denial of his Marsden motion and
its denial of his section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. We address
each issue in turn.
I. The Marsden Motion Was Rendered Moot
Mackey asserts the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his
Marsden motion without holding a hearing and in the absence of either
Mackey or Spieckerman. However—and assuming Marsden applies to a
section 1172.6 petitioner—the motion was rendered moot by D’Agustino’s
appearance in place of Spieckerman as Mackey’s counsel after he filed his
motion.
The California Supreme Court held in Marsden that a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel
includes the right to have such counsel discharged and substituted by other
counsel if failing to do so would “ ‘ “substantially impair or deny” ’ ” the right
to assistance of counsel. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) The right to
seek replacement of counsel under Marsden applies at all stages of a criminal
proceeding. (People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1179 (Armijo).)
“[O]nce the defendant clearly indicates to the trial court a request for
the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel, the court must hold a
hearing to allow the defendant to explain the basis for the request.” (Armijo,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1179.) Nevertheless, a request for the
replacement of counsel under Marsden is rendered moot when the counsel
complained of in the request is replaced by substitute counsel. (Armijo, at
p. 1180.)
In Armijo, the defendant sent a letter to the court requesting new
counsel to replace two deputy public defenders who had represented him at

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his preliminary hearing and several pretrial conferences. (Armijo, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.) After the court received that letter, a new, third
deputy public defender appeared at a hearing on Armijo’s behalf. (Ibid.) The
appellate court concluded that, while Armijo’s letter triggered his right to a
Marsden hearing, that request was rendered moot when the third deputy
public defender replaced the first two as Armijo’s attorney. (Armijo, at
pp. 1179–1180.) The court explained: “Although the record does not indicate
that this switch came about as the result of any action by the trial court,
Armijo got what he wanted in the first letter:[4] a new lawyer.” (Id. at
p. 1180.)
Just as in Armijo, Mackey’s request to replace Spieckerman was
rendered moot when D’Agustino appeared at the January 9, 2024 hearing on
Mackey’s behalf and replaced Spieckerman as Mackey’s counsel for the
section 1172.6 proceedings. (See Armijo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1180.)
Though the record is silent as to whether this switch came about as a result
of the Marsden motion, D’Agustino’s appearance as Mackey’s attorney gave
Mackey what he wanted in his motion: a new lawyer. (See Armijo, at
p. 1180.) Thus, his request for substitute counsel was rendered moot. (Ibid.)
We are unpersuaded by Mackey’s assertion that, because
Spieckerman was a deputy public defender in D’Agustino’s office, “[n]o ‘new’
attorney had been ‘appointed.’ ” As an initial matter, Mackey does not cite
any legal support for this argument.
Further, the Marsden motion was premised on personal and
professional allegations against Spieckerman individually, not any

4 Armijo also sent a second letter, which was not rendered moot and is

therefore not relevant for our purposes. (See Armijo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1176, 1180.)

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allegations against the Solano County Public Defender’s Office generally.
(Cf., e.g., People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092, 1096 [Marsden motion
sought disqualification of the public defender’s office and individual deputy
public defender].) Mackey presents no reason, such as a conflict of interest,
why the allegations in his Marsden motion should be extrapolated to the
entire public defender’s office, including D’Agustino. (Cf. Carter, at p. 1104
[directing trial court to conduct Marsden hearing to determine whether
alleged conflict of interest implicated the public defender’s office].)
Finally, Spieckerman did not appear at any further hearings or submit
any other pleading or documents on Mackey’s behalf. Rather, D’Agustino
was the only attorney who appeared on his behalf after the December 2023
Marsden motion was filed; she was also the attorney who filed Mackey’s
notice of appeal.
In sum, Mackey got what he asked for when D’Agustino replaced
Spieckerman as his attorney for the section 1172.6 proceeding, rendering his
Marsden motion moot. (See Armijo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1180.) It is
not our duty to pass upon moot questions (see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 276), and we decline to do so here.5
II. The Trial Court Erred by Denying the Resentencing Petition
Without Reviewing the Record of Conviction
Mackey avers the trial court erred by denying his section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage based solely on the prosecution’s position
that Mackey was ineligible for relief and D’Agustino’s submission of the
matter without further argument. Although such decisions are reviewable

5 As we conclude the Marsden motion was rendered moot, we need not,

and do not, reach the parties’ arguments as to whether Marsden applies to a
section 1172.6 petitioner or whether any error in denying the motion was
prejudicial.

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for harmless error, we agree with Mackey that the appropriate remedy in this
case is to reverse and remand for the trial court to assess his petition
considering the record of conviction in the first instance.
A. Applicable Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which “made significant changes
to the scope of murder liability for those who were neither the actual killers
nor intended to kill anyone, including certain individuals formerly subject to
punishment on a felony-murder theory.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707.) Relevant here, the bill limited the scope of the felony-murder rule
to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with intent to kill, or was not a major participant in
the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Id.
at pp. 707–708.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure for those convicted of murder
under the former law to seek retroactive relief by filing a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708; § 1172.6.) The Legislature later extended that path to relief for those
who were convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, under which “an aider and abettor who lacked a
specific intent to kill could be found guilty of attempted murder solely due to
their participation in a different target crime, if attempted murder was the
natural and probable consequence of the target crime.” (People v. Rodriguez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456; see id. at p. 457.)
If a petitioner files a facially sufficient section 1172.6 petition by
indicating, among other criteria, that he meets the statutory requirements
for relief—as Mackey did here—that triggers the prosecution’s duty to submit

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a response and the petitioner’s right to file a reply on the issue of whether a
prima facie case for relief exists. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549,
558–559; § 1172.6, subds. (b) & (c).) The court then holds a hearing to
determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes such a showing, the court issues an order
to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to
recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner. (Id., subds. (c) & (d).)
“A trial court may deny a section 1172.6 petition ‘at the prima facie
stage only if “the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that
the defendant is ineligible for relief” as a matter of law.’ ” (People v. Hickman
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268 (Hickman).) The California Supreme
Court has explained that “[t]he record of conviction will necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) The record of
conviction includes documents from jury trial such as jury instructions and
verdict forms. (People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301
(Gallardo).)
We review an order denying a petition at the prima facie stage de novo.
(Hickman, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1268.) Although we may review the
court’s decision for harmless error, we are not required to “ ‘substitute our
judgment for the judgment of the trial court.’ ” (See Gallardo, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at pp. 302–303 & fn. 3.)
B. Analysis
Mackey contends the court erred by failing to base its ruling on any
analysis of the record, instead relying on the prosecutor’s assertion that
Spieckerman had conceded Mackey was the actual killer and D’Agustino’s

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submitting the matter. He further asserts we should follow the reasoning of
the court in Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 296 and decline to analyze the
record of conviction in the first instance given the court’s patent failure to
follow the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
In Gallardo, the petitioner filed a facially sufficient petition, but the
prosecutor failed to submit a response (as required by § 1172.6, subd. (c)) and
instead orally proffered at the hearing that Gallardo was ineligible for relief
based on the prosecutor’s review of the jury instructions. (Gallardo, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 300, 302.) Defense counsel then agreed with the
prosecutor’s recitation, and the trial court summarily denied the petition
without reviewing any part of the record of conviction. (Ibid.)
The appellate court concluded the trial court erred by failing to comply
with section 1172.6’s requirements. (Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 302.) Further, the court declined the Attorney General’s invitation to
affirm on harmlessness grounds, explaining: “Although . . . an order denying
a section 1172.6 petition may be reviewable for harmless error [citation], the
Attorney General’s argument is, in effect, a request that we review the record
to determine Gallardo’s eligibility for relief in the first instance. We decline
to do so. In its prima facie review, the trial court was required to determine
if the record of conviction conclusively established Gallardo was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. [Citation.] The parties did not submit briefing or
any part of the record of conviction to the trial court, and therefore the court
could not have conducted the review required by section 1172.6,
subdivision (c). This court will not perform the trial court’s statutorily
mandated task for the first time on appeal.” (Gallardo, at p. 302.)
Here, similarly, the record does not reflect that the prosecution filed a
response to Mackey’s petition or that Judge Bowers consulted the record of

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conviction or any briefing by the parties before summarily denying relief.
Also like in Gallardo, Judge Bowers relied on the prosecutor’s mere
assurance that Mackey was ineligible for relief, including the prosecutor’s
representation of an apparent concession by Spieckerman—who, as discussed
in section I, ante, was no longer representing Mackey. This was error.
(Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 302.) And, even assuming, arguendo,
it was proper to consider a prior concession by Spieckerman, Mackey
correctly notes the transcripts of the previous hearings do not reflect
Spieckerman stating on the record that Mackey was the actual shooter.
Rather, Spieckerman stated he was prepared to submit the matter (just as
D’Agustino stated at the prima facie hearing).
Therefore, it is apparent Judge Bowers erred by denying Mackey’s
petition without conducting the review required by section 1172.6,
subdivision (c). (Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 302; see Hickman,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1267 [only if petition and record conclusively
establish the petition is meritless may the trial court dismiss the petition].)
And Judge Bowers was aware of his obligation to consult the record before
denying relief. Indeed, at the September 2023 hearing where the section
1172.6 petition was first discussed, Judge Bowers stated:
“[O]n the 1172.6 petitions, I just got one back from the Appellate Court
stating that the Court needs to say more than ‘there is no prima facie case.’
And trust me, there is -- there have been several that there is just no there
there. But what I’m hearing from the Court of Appeals is I literally have to
say, ‘We reviewed the jury instructions. We reviewed the testimony of this
person was the actual killer. There was no accomplice felony murder
instructions, et cetera, et cetera.’ Merely -- merely submitting by both

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lawyers that there is no there there apparently is not enough. . . . [¶] . . .
[Y]ou know, again, let’s follow the law.”
Despite that awareness, Judge Bowers failed to follow his own advice.
Given the court’s wholesale failure to review the record or any briefing by the
parties before denying relief, we conclude “the appropriate remedy is reversal
of the order denying the petition with directions to the trial court to perform
its functions under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).” (Gallardo, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 303.) We take no position on whether the trial court should
ultimately determine that Mackey has made a prima facie claim for relief.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Mackey’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition is
reversed. We remand this matter to the trial court with directions to conduct
proceedings consistent with section 1172.6, subdivision (c).

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PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

A170103 / People v. Mackey

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