CourtListener 10708965•People v. White CA3
Testo completo
Filed 10/22/25 P. v. White CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100356
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE002146)
v.
DEVONTE LEE WHITE,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Devonte Lee White of first degree murder and being a
felon in possession of a firearm. It found true various firearm enhancements and the
special circumstance under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21) that the murder
was perpetrated by discharging a firearm from a car.1 The trial court sentenced White to
life without the possibility of parole, plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life and a
two-year determinate term. On appeal, White contends that the statutory scheme
governing murder committed by a drive-by shooting facially violates due process
guarantees by giving prosecutors unfettered discretion to decide between charging
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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defendants with first degree murder or special circumstance murder. White
acknowledges that binding precedent forecloses his contention but asserts his claim to
preserve it for further review. We agree that his claim fails under controlling authority
and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
A second amended information charged White with murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
count one) and alleged as a special circumstance that the murder was perpetrated by
means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)). The
information further alleged that, in committing the murder, White intentionally and
personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The information also charged White with being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count two) and alleged several aggravating
circumstances.
The jury found White guilty of first degree murder and being a felon in possession
of a firearm. It also found true the special circumstance allegation under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(21) and the firearm enhancements.
The trial court sentenced White to life without the possibility of parole for his
conviction for the special circumstance murder. It imposed an additional term of
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and
a consecutive term of two years (the middle term) for the felon in possession conviction.
White timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
White’s sole contention on appeal is that the special circumstance for a murder
committed by a drive-by shooting under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21) facially
violates constitutional due process guarantees. He argues that, because the elements of
first degree murder by means of a drive-by shooting (§ 189, subd. (a)) are the same as
those for special circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21), the
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statutory structure gives prosecutors unbounded discretion to decide which of the two
charges to bring: first degree murder, which carries a sentence of 25 years to life, or
special circumstance murder, which is punished by life without the possibility of parole.
He argues that he did not forfeit his claim by failing to raise it below, maintaining that he
asserts a facial challenge only. On the merits, he acknowledges that his claim is
foreclosed by controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court and our state
high court but seeks to preserve his claim for further review.
To the extent White failed to assert his claim below, we agree that his present
facial challenge is not forfeited on appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
On the merits, we accept his concession. (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S.
114, 125 (Batchelder) [statute allowing prosecutor to choose between offenses with
identical elements but different sentences does not confer unconstitutionally excessive
discretion; “prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but
this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clause”]; Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 86-89 [discussing
Batchelder and rejecting claim that rule conferring discretion on prosecutors to select
between a felony or misdemeanor charge offended equal protection principles or was
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to prosecutor]; People v. Brown
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 320, 338-340 [Batchelder foreclosed claim that prosecutors
enjoyed unconstitutional discretion to charge defendant’s conduct “as either pandering or
human trafficking—the former with less severe penalty provisions than the latter”].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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