People v. Miranda CA2/2

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Filed 10/21/25 P. v. Miranda CA2/2
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B336236

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA093251)
v.

KING ISMAL MIRANDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Scott T. Millington, Judge. Affirmed.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Theresa A. Patterson and Nikhil
Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
King Ismal Miranda (defendant) appeals from the superior
court’s order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The court appointed counsel for
defendant and, after briefing from both parties, denied the
petition at the prima facie stage on the ground defendant was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We find no error and
affirm the order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, defendant was charged with attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187, 664, subd. (a);
count 1); first degree residential robbery (§ 211; count 2); criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 3); assault with a deadly weapon,
a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4); kidnapping to commit
another crime (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 5); and first degree
burglary (§ 459; count 6). As to the attempted murder charge, it
was alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury
upon the victim, Jorge Cuervo (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). It was
further alleged that defendant personally used a deadly weapon,
a knife, in the commission of counts 1–3, 5, and 6 (§ 12022, subd.
(b)(1)), and defendant had served three prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Pursuant to agreement, defendant entered a plea of no
contest to attempted murder and first degree residential robbery.
He also admitted the great bodily injury and personal use of a
deadly weapon allegations attached to the attempted murder
charge, and he admitted the prior prison term allegations.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a total of 17 years
four months. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to
the plea agreement.
On March 3, 2023, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95,
recodified without substantive change by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10,
eff. June 30, 2022). Counsel was appointed for defendant. After
receiving briefing from the parties, the court denied the petition
based on a finding that defendant had not made a prima facie
case for relief. The court noted, “I don’t think there’s a dispute
that both sides say that the defendant . . . personally stabbed the
victim.” The court found, “[B]ased upon the fact that the
defendant admitted [to] a personal use of a weapon, a knife, [and]
he admitted personal infliction of great bodily injury, there’s no
doubt that he stabbed Mr. Cuervo . . . . [H]e’s the actual stabber
in this incident . . . .”
On December 19, 2023, defendant filed his notice of appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
In the early morning hours of September 21, 2015, Elvis
Reyes was working on his car in the garage of his apartment
complex. Present with him were defendant, defendant’s
girlfriend, and Cuervo. Earlier that evening, defendant had
requested a knife from Reyes. A few hours later, Reyes handed a
knife to defendant.
Shortly thereafter, Reyes heard Cuervo screaming. Reyes
turned to see defendant using Reyes’s knife to stab Cuervo in the

2 The factual summary is based on the evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing concerning the attempted murder
charge.

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leg as Cuervo sat in the driver’s seat of Reyes’s car. When
defendant then advanced toward Reyes, Reyes dropped his tools
and asked, “What’s going on?” Defendant raised the knife toward
Reyes, threatening, “You’re going to die today.” When Reyes
asked why, defendant accused Reyes and Cuervo of hitting
defendant’s girlfriend. Reyes denied ever touching her.
Defendant’s girlfriend, appearing scared, pleaded with defendant,
“Don’t do it. Don’t do it”; after which defendant told Reyes that
she had saved his life. Cuervo remained in the car, with the door
locked, holding his chest.

DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts the superior court erred in denying
defendant’s petition for resentencing without issuing an order to
show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant also
claims because he entered into a plea agreement soon after he
was charged, no court or jury has made any findings as to his role
in the events that gave rise to the charges. Thus, defendant
argues, the superior court had a duty to issue an order to show
cause and conduct a hearing at which the parties could offer new
and additional evidence relevant to the issue of defendant’s
entitlement to relief.
Defendant also argues though evidence at his preliminary
hearing showed he was the actual perpetrator of the attempted
murder, nothing in the record of conviction conclusively
establishes the identity of the actual perpetrator. Moreover,
defendant contends nothing in the information precluded the
prosecution from pursuing more than one theory of the case,
including accomplice liability based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.

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I. Applicable law and standard of review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437), effective January 1, 2019, made “ameliorative changes to
our state’s homicide law.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th
549, 558 (Patton).) “As part of these ameliorative changes,
malice, a key element the People must prove in a murder
prosecution, may no longer be imputed to a defendant solely
because the defendant participated in another crime.” (Ibid.)
The relief provided to those with existing murder
convictions dependent on theories of the crime now rejected has
since “expanded this path to allow relief for those with ‘attempted
murder’ convictions based on ‘the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.’” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) The current
resentencing statute “provides that ‘[a] person convicted of . . .
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court that sentenced the
petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts when’ three conditions
apply.” (Patton, supra, at p. 558.) First, the charging document
must have permitted the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences
doctrine; second, the petitioner was convicted of the attempted
murder charge or accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial on such a
charge; and third, the petitioner could not presently be convicted
of the charge given the changes to homicide law effective in 2019.
(Ibid.)
“‘After the parties have had an opportunity to submit
briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’” (Patton, supra,

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17 Cal.5th at p. 559.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing, then the trial court issues an order to show cause and
holds a hearing to determine whether to vacate the conviction
and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner. (Ibid.)
At the prima facie stage of the petition process, the court
may not engage in factfinding about the petitioner’s culpability,
but should deny a petition if the petitioner fails to make a prima
facie showing. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) “‘The record
of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’” (Ibid.)
“‘“[I]f the record, including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,’ then ‘the
court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to
the petitioner.’”’” (Ibid.) “[T]here is no dispute that the record of
conviction the parties may consult at the prima facie stage
includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty
plea.” (Id. at p. 568.) This includes statements within a
preliminary hearing transcript that the conviction was premised
on the petitioner “being the sole shooter.” (Id. at p. 569.)
This court independently reviews a trial court’s
determination that a petitioner failed to make a prima facie case
for relief. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
II. Defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law
Prior to Senate Bill 1437, the prosecution was permitted to
proceed under a natural and probable consequences theory of
liability for attempted murder. (People v. Ramos (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 460, 465.) Under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the defendant is not the actual

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perpetrator of the attempted murder and need not have intended
to encourage or facilitate the offense ultimately committed by the
perpetrator. Instead, the defendant could be held liable for the
offense “committed by the confederate” if it was a natural and
probable consequence of the defendant’s intended crime. (People
v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262; see also People v.
Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 277 [natural and
probable consequences doctrine only imposes liability on
accomplice, on aiding and abetting theory].) The natural and
probable consequences doctrine is the only theory of liability on
which section 1172.6 relief is permitted for the crime of
attempted murder. (People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
860, 865.)
The actual perpetrator of an attempted murder is ineligible
for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law because he was not
held liable for the acts of another perpetrator or confederate.
(People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893.)
Here, the record of conviction demonstrates defendant is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law
because he was the sole actor—he stabbed Cuervo. Defendant
fails to “point[] to specific facts that identify someone else as the
direct perpetrator”; nor does the record reveal any. (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567.)
The information alleged defendant personally used a knife,
a dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and
personally inflicted bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) during the
course of the attempted murder. These charges and allegations
reflect the prosecution’s theory that defendant was the actual
perpetrator who carried out the attempted murder. By charging
these enhancements against defendant, the prosecution elected a

7
theory of attempted murder requiring proof defendant was the
sole and direct perpetrator of the crime. The natural and
probable consequences theory was unavailable because these
enhancements alleged personal liability on the part of defendant.
(People v. Superior Court (Pomilia) (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1464,
1469 [“[W]hen the Legislature mandated a section 12022,
subdivision (c) enhancement for those ‘personally armed,’ it
intended to exclude vicarious liability . . . .”].)
During defendant’s plea hearing, he admitted he
“personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon” and “personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon [the victim].” Thus, the plea
itself disqualified defendant from relief under section 1172.6
because it reflected defendant was the sole and direct perpetrator
of the stabbing. (People v. Muhammad, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 279–280 [admission of personal use and personal infliction
of great bodily injury enhancements help establish defendant was
“the sole, direct perpetrator”].)
The preliminary hearing transcript also demonstrates
defendant was prosecuted as the sole actual perpetrator in the
attempted murder. As set forth in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
page 568, “the record of conviction the parties may consult at the
prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript
preceding a guilty plea.” The witness to the attempted murder,
Reyes, described defendant as the individual with the knife
stabbing Cuervo. The only other person present, defendant’s
girlfriend, did not have a knife and was urging defendant to
stop—apparently saving Reyes’s life. This testimony and the
absence of any other potential assailant meant the only theory of
liability that could support defendant’s plea had to be based on
his admission to being the sole actor and only stabber.

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Furthermore, at the preliminary hearing, counsel argued the
attempted murder count should be dismissed not because
defendant was not the sole perpetrator, but because there was
insufficient evidence to establish the attempt by defendant was
premeditated.
The trial court did not err in determining defendant is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
III. Preliminary hearing evidence
Defendant argues the preliminary hearing transcript
should not be relied upon to place the burden on the petitioner to
refute the evidence from the preliminary hearing.3 However, as
defendant acknowledged in his reply brief, Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th 549 has established that courts may consult the
preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea in
determining whether a petitioner has set forth a prima facie case
for section 1172.6 relief. This claim is without merit.
IV. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel
Defendant argues, to the extent counsel agreed the trial
court could rely on part of the preliminary hearing transcript in
making its ruling, he was provided with ineffective assistance of
counsel. As discussed, the ruling in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549
supports counsel’s concession. Therefore, this claim also lacks
merit.
V. No due process violation occurred
Defendant argues the trial court’s denial of the petition
without issuing an order to show cause or allowing defendant to

3 Defendant’s opening brief was filed prior to the court’s
ruling in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549.

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present evidence at a hearing violated his procedural due process
rights. Defendant cites Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343,
346, for the proposition that a defendant’s liberty interest “is one
that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary
deprivation by the State.”
We find defendant’s state and federal due process claims to
be meritless. Defendant was not deprived of a state-created right
in this matter. Defendant remained convicted of attempted
murder during the section 1172.6 process. (People v. Guillory
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 326, 335–336; People v. Burhop (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 808, 815.) Defendant is not being prosecuted for a
crime and is not subject to additional punishment or any
deprivation of liberty. Instead, he is seeking leniency for a valid
conviction. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588–
589.)
Because defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law
under section 1172.6, his argument that he was deprived of a
state-created due process right fails. (People v. Fisher (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1030, fn. 7.)
VI. Remand is not appropriate
Pointing to Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549 and People v.
Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922 (Glass), defendant argues
remand is appropriate to allow the court to consider an amended
petition, should he choose to file one. In Patton, the court
affirmed the denial of Patton’s petition, but ordered the matter
remanded to the superior court to allow him to file an amended
petition, should he choose to do so. (Patton, at p. 570.) Relying
on the guidance offered in Patton, the court in Glass, did the
same. In this regard, however, Patton and Glass are
distinguishable.

10
In Patton, after counsel was appointed, the People filed
their opposition, but Patton did not file a reply brief. Instead, he
relied on the form petition to make his prima facie case for
eligibility. (See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 565–566 [“Where
facts from the record of conviction are undisputed, accepting
them over contrary legal allegations that are merely conclusory is
not ‘“factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.”’”].) In Glass, the defendant filed a reply to
the People’s response but “did not include any facts . . . to support
his conclusory allegation his convictions were based on a natural
and probable consequences theory.” (Glass, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 930.)
To create an issue of fact necessitating an evidentiary
hearing, a petitioner may “point[] to specific facts that identify
someone else as the direct perpetrator.” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 567.) A petitioner has multiple opportunities to do
this not just in the petition, but in briefing and a hearing. (Ibid.)
“But absent specific facts, no such dispute arises . . . from mere
latent, speculative possibilities . . . .” (Ibid.)
Here, defendant did not rely only on conclusory allegations.
Instead, he filed a comprehensive, substantive reply to the
People’s response, which was considered by the court. In it,
defendant acknowledged being the actual stabber of Cuervo, but
argued he was eligible for relief where he could be convicted of
attempted murder under a theory of natural and probable
consequences because “the stabbing of Jorge Cuervo was part and
parcel of his theft related felonious acts” committed later against
Reyes.
As discussed, ante, the actual perpetrator of an attempted
murder is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law

11
because he was not held liable for the acts of another perpetrator
or confederate. (People v. Hurtado, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 893.) Because the record of conviction does not reveal a path to
eligibility for defendant, remand is not appropriate.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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