CourtListener 10707339•Howitson v. Evans Hotels CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 10/20/25 Howitson v. Evans Hotels CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CHRISTINA HOWITSON, D085078
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-
00026768-CU-OE-CTL)
EVANS HOTELS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Matthew C. Braner, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Barnes & Thornburg, Mark W. Wallin and Michael P. Witczak, for
Defendants and Appellants.
Schneider Wallace Cottrell Kim, Carolyn H. Cottrell, Ori Edelstein, and
Robert E. Morelli, III, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Christina Howitson invoked Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98 to
extricate her claims against Evans Hotels, LLC and The Lodge at Torrey
Pines Partnership, L.P. (collectively, Hotel) from arbitration and return them
to court when Hotel failed to pay arbitration fees within 30 days of their due
date. Hotel contends, among other things, section 1281.98—as part of the
California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq.)—does not apply here because the
parties’ arbitration agreement is governed by the substantive and procedural
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). We agree with
Hotel, and thus we reverse the court’s order granting Howitson’s
section 1281.98 motion and the corresponding monetary sanctions awarded.
I.
Hotel hired Howitson as a service worker, and Howitson signed an
arbitration agreement with Hotel. The agreement states it “will be governed
by, interpreted, and enforced in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.”
Later, Howitson sued Hotel under the Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) for Labor Code violations. Based on the
parties’ stipulation, the trial court compelled Howitson’s individual PAGA
claims to arbitration and stayed them in court pending arbitration.
According to Hotel, the parties have engaged in “substantial discovery”
in arbitration, with Howitson serving interrogatories and requests for
production and taking at least four depositions.
At one point, the arbitrator issued Hotel an invoice for $20,000 “‘due
upon receipt’” as a retainer. When Hotel did not pay the retainer within
30 days, Howitson moved the trial court under section 1281.98 to lift the stay
and reinstate her claims in court. She also sought monetary sanctions under
sections 1281.98(c)(1) and 1281.99(a).
Hotel opposed the motion on several grounds, including that
section 1281.98 “does not apply” because the arbitration agreement “is
governed by the substantive and procedural laws of [the] FAA.” At the
motion hearing, Howitson’s counsel agreed the arbitration agreement selects
the FAA as the governing law.
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The trial court granted Howitson’s motion. It found that, “regardless of
references to the FAA in the arbitration agreement, section 1281.98 applies”
because it “provides a ground upon which material breach may be established
under state law.” The court granted Howitson fees and costs as a monetary
sanction under section 1281.99(a) and reserved a separate hearing on the fees
she requested under section 1281.98(c)(1).
II.
A.
We directed the parties to address the appealability of the trial court’s
order granting Howitson’s motion to lift the stay and reinstate the action in
litigation. They contend the order is appealable under section 1294(a) as the
functional equivalent of an order denying a petition to compel arbitration.
We conclude the same. (See Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc. (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 94, 99-100.)
B.
On the merits, Hotel argues the trial court erred in applying
section 1281.98 because the arbitration agreement is governed by the
substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA. We agree.
We review de novo “a question of law involving interpretation of
statutes and the contract (with no extrinsic evidence).” (Rodriguez v.
American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117.)
Section 1281.98 “governs the payment of fees in employment and
consumer arbitrations.” (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th
310, 323.) It creates a default rule (1) making required arbitration fees or
costs due upon receipt and (2) obligating the drafting party to pay them
within 30 days. (§ 1281.98(a)(1)-(2).) Willful, fraudulent, or grossly negligent
nonpayment or late payment constitutes a “material breach” of the
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arbitration agreement such that the drafting party is in default of and has
waived its right to arbitration. (§ 1281.98(a)(1); Hohenshelt, at p. 346.) “But
short of such wrongful conduct, a breaching party may be relieved from
forfeiting its right to enforce an arbitration agreement based on the
circumstances, as provided by long-standing legal principles.” (Hohenshelt,
at p. 346.) The statute also establishes a procedure for the employee or
consumer to unilaterally withdraw the claim from arbitration and litigate in
court following this material breach. (§ 1281.98(b)(1).)
This case turns on what law the parties chose to apply to their
arbitration agreement. Generally, “the CAA’s procedural rules apply by
default to cases brought in California courts.” (Quach v. California
Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582.) But parties may “expressly
designate that any arbitration proceeding should move forward under the
FAA’s procedural provisions” instead. (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge
Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394, italics omitted.) In Rodriguez, for
example, the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes “‘[p]ursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act’” was so “broad and unconditional” as to expressly
adopt both the substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA.
(Rodriguez, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1116, 1122.) So too here.
The arbitration agreement here is “governed by, interpreted, and
enforced” under the FAA.1 By its plain language, the agreement expresses
the parties’ intent to apply the entire FAA—both its substantive and
procedural provisions—to the arbitration. As a result, CAA procedures,
including the procedures in section 1281.98, do not apply. (See Hernandez v.
1 Though the agreement in Hohenshelt contained a similar choice-of-law
provision, the Supreme Court “assume[d] the CAA applie[d]” because the
employer forfeited any contrary argument by not timely raising it.
(Hohenshelt, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 324, 327.)
4
Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 222, 242 [concluding same
for similar section 1281.97], disapproved on other grounds in Hohenshelt,
18 Cal.5th at p. 349.)
Howitson counters that “section 1281.98 applies even if the parties
expressly incorporate[d] the FAA’s substantive and procedural terms”
because it “defines breach in the employment and consumer arbitration
context.” Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are “enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
(9 U.S.C. § 2.) According to Howitson, section 1281.98 “simply provide[s] ‘an
external body of law governing revocation’” based on breach.
Even if we were to agree section 1281.98 has substantive elements,
Howitson also invoked its procedures, which she cannot do under the terms of
the arbitration agreement.2 As Hotel notes, in addition to defining material
breach, section 1281.98 “provides a procedural framework that allows a
plaintiff to select a remedy resulting from a possible breach.” We find
support for construing section 1281.98 as at least in part procedural in
Justice Groban’s concurring opinion in Hohenshelt, where he discussed how
California courts often will not need to engage in a preemption analysis of
section 1281.98 if “the CAA’s procedural rules” apply. (Hohenshelt,
18 Cal.5th at p. 351 (conc. opn. of Groban, J.).) Howitson moved—and the
court granted her motion—under section 1281.98’s procedures. Given the
parties’ choice of FAA procedural law, doing so was improper.
(See Hernandez, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 242.)
2 Whether Howitson could rely on the “material breach” portion of
section 1281.98 to return her claims to court through an FAA procedural
mechanism, as opposed to the procedures established in section 1281.98, goes
beyond the scope of this appeal.
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We thus reverse. Given our disposition, we do not reach the other
independent grounds for reversal Hotel raised.
III.
We reverse the (1) order granting Howitson’s section 1281.98 motion
and (2) corresponding monetary sanctions awarded under that motion. We
remand with directions for the trial court to reinstate its December 8, 2022
order compelling Howitson’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration and
staying them in court pending arbitration. Each party is to bear its own costs
on appeal.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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