CourtListener 10705248•People v. Herrera CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 10/16/25 P. v. Herrera CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B338772
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA085365)
YOVANNY DOMINGUEZ-
HERRERA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Megan Moine,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Yovanny Dominguez-Herrera guilty
of committing a lewd act upon his 14 year-old daughter. (Pen.
Code1, § 288, subd. (c)(1).) On appeal, defendant contends the
evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with specific intent
because he was undisputedly intoxicated at the time of the
offending conduct. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
On the evening of October 29, 2022, defendant committed a
lewd act upon his then 14 year-old daughter, H.L., who was
visiting him and his family2 for the weekend. During the
investigation that followed, defendant’s daughter J.D. disclosed
that defendant had engaged in the same type of lewd conduct
with her a couple of years prior. The Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed criminal charges against defendant for the sexual
abuse of each girl. The charges before the jury at the May 2024
trial were: count 1, commission of a lewd act upon H.L., a child of
14 or 15 years, in violation of section 288, subdivision (c)(1); and
count 2, commission of a lewd act upon J.D., a child under the age
of 14, in violation of section 288, subdivision (a).
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defendant lived with his wife (Irma), their daughter (J.D.),
and a son.
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A. Trial Testimony
1. H.L.’s Testimony
In October 2022, H.L. was a 14 year-old girl who lived with
her mother and had never lived with defendant, her father. At or
around age 12, H.L. began regularly spending weekends at
defendant’s home, where she shared a bedroom with her half-
sister J.D.
On October 29, 2022, H.L. saw defendant drink “a couple of
beers and wine.” Around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., he began listening to
music and dancing with her and J.D. in the parents’ bedroom.
When defendant started playing “sad music,” the girls retreated
to their bedroom.
J.D. changed into a party dress to show H.L. what she was
planning to wear to a school dance. About ten minutes later,
when the girls were each lying on their separate beds looking at
their cell phones, defendant came in and laid down next to H.L.
on her bed, “spooning” her. He put his hand under H.L.’s shirt
and began rubbing her stomach. He then put his hand down the
front of H.L.’s pants, inside her underwear, and began rubbing
her vagina. She pushed his arm away with her elbow three or
four times, but he continued touching her vagina. At one point,
H.L. described defendant’s arm as barely moving away when she
pushed it; she agreed with the defense attorney that it felt like
“dead weight.” H.L. could also feel defendant’s erect penis
rubbing against her buttocks. H.L. felt defendant’s penis during
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the entirety of the time that he rubbed her vagina.3 When
defendant pulled away, H.L. got up from the bed, went into the
bathroom, closed the door, and cried. H.L. remained in the
bathroom until she heard defendant’s footsteps leave her
bedroom; then, she returned to her room and locked the door.
H.L. told J.D. what had happened and called her mother
and asked to be picked up. Shortly thereafter, Irma began
knocking on the girls’ bedroom door asking to be let in.
Eventually, H.L. told Irma what defendant had done.
Irma brought the defendant into the girls’ room and
confronted him with the accusation. H.L. could not remember
how defendant responded, except that he mentioned that J.D.’s
dress was “provocative.” After having her memory refreshed with
her prior testimony, H.L. recalled defendant had also said that
“he doesn’t remember doing that.”
When questioned about defendant’s intoxication, H.L. said
that during her visits to defendant’s home, she had observed him
drinking a lot of alcohol and had seen him “drunk.” If he was
really drunk, he would move slowly and get angry. H.L. testified
that she believed defendant was “really drunk” on the night of
October 29, because he was moving slowly and slurring his
words. She agreed with defense counsel that when defendant
first put his hand down her pants, she thought it was an accident
and that he did not know what he was doing. But he kept his
hand down her pants and continued to rub her vagina, despite
her pushing him away. She said she was shocked at what was
happening.
3 On cross-examination, H.L. testified that the period of
spooning lasted between one and five minutes. “And then his
hand underneath my underwear were [sic] a couple of minutes.”
4
2. J.D.’s Testimony
J.D., who was a year younger than H.L., testified that
defendant drank alcohol every night after work but was “drunk”
only on the weekends. It was normal for defendant to play music
when he was drunk. On the night of October 29, when J.D. was
13 years old, defendant drank a lot of beer throughout the day
and he was intoxicated that evening. He was able to sing and
dance but “it wasn’t like he was fully there. It was kind of like he
was somewhere else and there at the same time.”
J.D. was in the room with H.L. when defendant came in
and laid down next to H.L., but she did not observe the lewd
conduct. Defendant appeared drunk when he left the bedroom.
“It looked like he really didn’t know what he was doing.” H.L.
went to the bathroom and was gone a while. When H.L.
returned, H.L. was crying and locked the door. H.L. called her
mother to pick her up, and disclosed to J.D. and Irma that
defendant had touched her inappropriately. Defendant tried to
come into the bedroom and asked why H.L. was crying. Irma
helped J.D. push defendant out of the room at some point to keep
him away from H.L. who did not want defendant anywhere near
her.
3. Defense Witnesses
Defendant called three character witnesses. Two longtime
coworkers of defendant testified they interacted with defendant
and his kids at parties and family functions a couple times a year
and had never seen defendant mistreat his children; in their
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opinion, defendant was a good father. Neither coworker opined
on defendant’s drinking.
Defendant’s cousin, who was also a coworker, testified he
and defendant had a close relationship and he had seen
defendant interact with his children thousands of times. The
cousin had seen defendant drunk and he usually acted “[c]alm.
Nothing—no outbursts, nothing crazy.” He characterized
defendant as a good father, and the allegations of sexual
misconduct did not make sense to him and were out of character.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support
his conviction for lewd conduct because—given his level of
intoxication that night—no reasonable jury could have concluded
he had the specific intent to sexually arouse either himself or
H.L.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is
well-established: “We ‘review the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, we presume in support of the judgment ‘“the existence of
every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’
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[Citation.]” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550.) “[I]t is
the jury, not the reviewing court, that must weigh the evidence,
resolve conflicting inferences, and determine whether the
prosecution established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.]” (People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 392.)
B. Legal Principles
Section 288 prohibits the commission of a lewd or lascivious
act upon a child, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator
or the child. (§ 288, subd. (a).) That section “is violated by ‘any
touching’ of an underage child committed with the intent to
sexually arouse either the defendant or the child.” (People v.
Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442 (Martinez).)
“Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost
inevitably circumstantial.” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d
1194, 1208.) A jury must therefore consider the surrounding
circumstances when determining whether a defendant had the
required specific intent when he committed a prohibited act.
(Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 445; People v. Jones (1954) 42
Cal.2d 219, 223 (Jones) [specific intent to arouse, in violation of
section 288, “was clearly established by the circumstances
connected with the offenses”].) The nature of the touching itself
can be sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer specific intent to
sexually arouse. (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 445; see, e.g.,
Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d at pp. 221–223 [deciding specific intent
was necessarily present if defendant’s conduct was as the
complaining witness had claimed]; People v. Guardado (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 757, 762 [rejecting defendant’s insufficient evidence
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challenge to section 288 conviction because the “conduct is
quintessentially lewd and lascivious and blatantly betrays
defendant’s intent to gratify his own sexual desires”].)
Specific intent can be negated by voluntary intoxication.
(§ 29.4, subd. (b).) “Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary
ingestion, injection, or taking by any other means of any
intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance.” (§ 29.4, subd. (c).)
“Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the
issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required
specific intent” (§ 29.4, subd. (b)), which in the context of section
288, would be the intent to sexually arouse. A jury decides
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, intoxication actually
prevented the defendant from forming the specific intent
necessary to commit the crime. (People v. Morga (1969) 273
Cal.App.2d 200, 209.) “[A]nd its finding upon conflicting evidence
will not be disturbed on appeal.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that defendant acted with the intent to
sexually arouse himself. The substantial evidence includes the
nature of the touching. Defendant used his hand to rub H.L.’s
vagina beneath her underwear while rubbing his erect penis
against her buttocks. That he maintained an erection during the
activity, which lasted more than one minute, was strong evidence
that defendant acted to sexually arouse himself. And, when Irma
confronted defendant about H.L.’s allegation on the evening of
the abuse, defendant responded that J.D.’s dress was
“provocative,” which supports an inference that defendant was
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sexually aroused and intended to gratify his sexual desire when
he rubbed H.L.’s vagina.
By comparison, and contrary to defendant’s contention, the
evidence that defendant was unable to form specific intent was
relatively weak. Although both prosecution witnesses testified
defendant was intoxicated on the night of October 29, 2022, only
J.D. testified he “looked like he really didn’t know what he was
doing.” H.L. testified he had consumed two beers and some wine
before the incident; but she did not say he had been drinking to
excess or for a long period of time. Even if intoxicated, defendant
was able to play music and dance just ten minutes before he
walked into the girls’ bedroom and laid down next to H.L. At
that time, defendant was able to persist in his lewd conduct even
as H.L. continued to resist and push his arm away with her
elbow. Afterward, he stood up and walked out of the room.
Shortly thereafter, when his wife summoned him to the girls’
room to address H.L.’s accusation, defendant walked back into
the bedroom. He asked why H.L. was crying. He said he did not
remember touching H.L. in an inappropriate way, but the jury
could find defendant’s statement not credible. Defendant’s
dancing, walking, evasion of H.L.’s resistance, and conversation
all undermined a finding that defendant was so intoxicated that
he was unable to form specific intent.
On this record, the jury could reasonably conclude that
defendant’s mental capacity was not so reduced or impaired as to
negate the required criminal intent. Because the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the judgment.
(People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
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