CourtListener 10703759•In re V.D. CA1/4
Testo completo
Filed 10/14/25 In re V.D. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re V.D., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v. A169633
V.D.,
(Alameda County Super.
Defendant and
Ct. Nos. JV-029412-11 &
Appellant.
JV-029412-12)
V.D. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order
continuing him as a ward of the court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 and committing him to a secure
youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of three years
and a maximum period of confinement of five years and four
months, with 776 days of predisposition custody credits and an
additional six month commitment suspended, for violating an
1
order of probation on an earlier petition.1 He contends the
juvenile court erred by imposing the suspended six-month term
for the probation violation, imposing a maximum term of
confinement that is past the day he reaches 23 years old, failing
to award him various predisposition custody credits, and
imposing a restitution fine. The People concede that the
restitution fine should be stricken and that V.D. is entitled to
some, but not all, of the additional credits he claims, but
otherwise oppose V.D.’s arguments. We agree with V.D. that the
suspended six-month SYTF term is unauthorized but conclude
the juvenile court properly calculated the maximum term of his
confinement. We accept the People’s concession of error
regarding the restitution fine and some of the custody credits and
remand the matter to the juvenile court for it to impose a new
dispositional order and address V.D.’s claims of additional
credits.
BACKGROUND
V.D. has a history of section 602 wardship proceedings in
Alameda County beginning in April 2018, with the proceedings
referred to by sequential numbers in the juvenile court’s records.
Most of this wardship history is irrelevant to V.D.’s arguments,
so we need not discuss it in detail. We summarize only the
pertinent facts.
On January 30, 2020, V.D. absconded from his placement
in Los Angeles and was picked up by the police. V.D. was
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
transported back to Alameda County and booked into juvenile
hall on February 4, 2020.
After further proceedings not relevant here, in July 2022,
V.D. admitted to an allegation in Petition 10 that he had
committed second degree robbery in February 2022. On July 29,
2022, the juvenile court continued him as a ward of the court and
committed him to an SYTF for 18 months. The court reduced
V.D.’s custody time by three months in January 2023. He
completed his commitment in July 2023 and was released on
probation to the home of his sister, with two periods of electronic
monitoring.
After the end of the second period of electronic monitoring,
V.D. was arrested in San Francisco on December 7, 2023. The
San Francisco District Attorney filed a wardship petition, later
numbered in Alameda County as Petition 12, alleging V.D. had
committed second degree robbery and other offenses. The
Alameda County District Attorney also filed a notice of probation
violation, referred to as Petition 11 despite not being a true
section 602 petition, alleging V.D. had violated his conditions of
probation. (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 405 (Greg F.) [“a
probation violation procedure is initiated under section 777 by
the filing of a notice, not a petition”].)
V.D. admitted the robbery allegation in San Francisco
juvenile court and was informed he faced up to three years in
custody. On December 29, 2023, V.D. was transferred in custody
to Alameda County for disposition. In the juvenile court in
3
Alameda County, V.D. admitted that he had violated the terms of
his probation.
On January 18, 2024, the juvenile court held a disposition
hearing on Petitions 11 and 12. The court advised V.D. that he
faced up to five years and four months on Petition 12, not three
years as the San Francisco County juvenile court had previously
stated. The juvenile court offered V.D. the opportunity to return
to San Francisco juvenile court and withdraw his plea, but V.D.
declined and opted to proceed with disposition. The juvenile
court continued V.D. as a ward of the court. It declared that his
most recent adjudicated offense was second degree robbery,
which was listed in section 707, subdivision (b) (section 707(b)).
It committed V.D. to an SYTF. The juvenile court declared that
the maximum period of confinement that could be imposed under
section 875, subdivision (c) (section 875(c)) was five years and
four months. The court awarded V.D. 776 days of
precommitment credit. It originally set the baseline term of
confinement at four years but later changed it to three years
when V.D.’s counsel noted that a four-year baseline term would
extend past the maximum term of confinement once
precommitment credits were applied.
On Petition 11, the court found that V.D. had failed to
materially comply with the terms of probation and imposed but
suspended a six-month commitment. The juvenile court
cautioned V.D. that if he did not demonstrate improvement at the
4
SYTF, the juvenile court could enter the six months. The court
also imposed a $100 restitution fine.2
In July 2024, the juvenile court reduced the baseline term
on Petition 12 by five months. In December 2024, the juvenile
court stepped V.D. down to Camp Sweeney, a less restrictive
placement.
DISCUSSION
I. Six-month SYTF term for probation violation
V.D. first challenges the juvenile court’s imposition of a
suspended six-month commitment term on Petition 11 for
violating his conditions of probation. V.D. raises four different
arguments in support of his contention that the six-month term
exceeded the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. We need not discuss all
2 Our description of the juvenile court’s disposition of
Petition 11 follows the record of the court’s oral pronouncements.
We note that the juvenile court’s minute order on Petition 11 does
not mention a six-month suspended term and is instead
substantively identical to its order on Petition 12. A later signed
written order can supersede an earlier oral announcement of
disposition. (In re D.B. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 252, 257–258.) The
disposition order on Petition 11 bears a copy of a signature but
does not indicate when the signature was added. We therefore
credit the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement and treat the
minute order as a clerical error. (See ibid.)
Relatedly, the minute orders for Petitions 11 and 12 each
reflect a restitution fine on Petition 12, but the reporter’s
transcript suggests the juvenile court imposed only a single fine
on Petition 11. We again follow the juvenile court’s oral
statement and assume that the juvenile court imposed only one
fine, but the issue is ultimately immaterial. Any restitution fines
must be stricken, as we explain post.
5
of them because we agree that section 875 does not authorize the
additional suspended six-month term.
Section 875 was enacted as part of the state’s “ ‘ “juvenile
justice realignment” ’ ” of the most restrictive placement for
juvenile offenders from the state-level Division of Juvenile
Justice (DJJ) to county level SYTFs. (In re M.B. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 435, 448.) The statute allows a juvenile court to
commit a ward to an SYTF if: “(1) The juvenile is adjudicated and
found to be a ward of the court based on an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was committed when the
juvenile was 14 years of age or older. [¶] (2) The adjudication
described in paragraph (1) is the most recent offense for which
the juvenile has been adjudicated. [¶] (3) The court has made a
finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative
disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd. (a) (section
875(a)).) Section 875, subdivision (e)(3) (section 875(e)(3))
generally requires a juvenile court to discharge a ward to
probation at the conclusion of his or her baseline confinement
term (discussed further post). Section 875, subdivision (e)(4)
(section 875(e)(4)) provides that if a juvenile court later “finds
that the ward has failed materially to comply with the reasonable
orders of probation imposed by the court, the court may order
that the ward be returned to a juvenile facility . . . for a period
not to exceed either the remainder of the baseline term, including
any court-ordered modifications, or six months, whichever is
longer, and in any case not to exceed the maximum confinement
limits of subdivision (c).”
6
In the absence of any other wardship proceedings or
offenses, section 875(e)(4) would support the juvenile court’s
order on Petition 11. The juvenile court properly committed V.D.
to an SYTF in July 2022 based on V.D.’s then-most recent
February 2022 offense in Petition 10 – robbery, which is
described in section 707(b). It then placed him on probation
supervision after he completed his modified baseline term, just as
section 875(e)(3) envisioned. Section 875(e)(4) therefore would
have allowed the juvenile court to order V.D. to be returned to an
SYTF for six months because of his probation violation, since six
months was longer than the remainder of the completed baseline
term.
However, by the time of the juvenile court’s disposition
hearing on Petition 11, the February 2022 robbery was no longer
the most recent offense for which V.D. had been adjudicated.
V.D. had committed robbery in December 2023, and the juvenile
court had adjudicated that offense in the same disposition
hearing by committing V.D. to an SYTF for three years on
Petition 12. Because it was no longer the most recent offense, the
robbery underlying Petition 10 no longer satisfied section
875(a)(2), so the juvenile court could no longer rely on it to
impose the six-month suspended SYTF term on Petition 11 under
section 875(e)(4).
The People contend that both SYTF commitments the
juvenile court imposed were proper because section 875(e)(4)
authorized the suspended six-month term for the probation
violation based on the February 2022 robbery, and section 875(a)
7
separately authorized the new three-year term for Petition 12
based on the new San Francisco robbery. This argument is
mistaken, as our Supreme Court’s decision in Greg. F., supra, 55
Cal.4th 393, demonstrates.
Greg F. dealt with Welfare and Institutions Code section
733, a statute similar to Welfare and Institutions Code section
875, that governed the pre-realignment commitments of minors
to the DJJ. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 400, 404.) Welfare
and Institutions Code section 733, subdivision (c) states that a
ward cannot be committed to the DJJ “unless ‘the most recent
offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true
by the court’ . . . is one of the violent offenses listed in section 707,
subdivision (b)” or one of the sex offenses listed in Penal Code
section 290.008. (Greg F., at p. 400, italics omitted.) The juvenile
court in Greg F. sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 petition alleging that a minor had committed an
offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (b), but the juvenile court did not place him in the
DJJ.3 (Greg F., at pp. 400–401.) The district attorney later filed
a new Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging
that the minor had committed two new offenses that are not
described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (b). (Greg F., at p. 401.) After the minor admitted
one of the offenses, the district attorney filed a notice of probation
3 Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 400, referred to the DJJ as
the Division of Juvenile Facilities or DJF, but the two terms are
used interchangeably. (In re M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p.
448, fn. 7.) For consistency, we refer to it as the DJJ.
8
violation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 and
moved to withdraw the plea and dismiss the Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 petition because he wanted to make
the minor eligible for commitment to the DJJ. (Greg F., at pp.
401–402.)
The Supreme Court held the juvenile court had the
authority to dismiss the second petition. (Greg F., supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 400.) The court began by examining Welfare and
Institutions Code section 733, subdivision (c)’s language
preventing a minor from being committed to the DJJ if “ ‘the
most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found
to be true by the court is not’ ” described in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) or Penal Code
section 290.008, subdivision (c). (Greg F., at p. 404.) The court
observed that because Welfare and Institutions Code section 733,
subdivision (c)’s “commitment limitation depends on the nature of
‘the most recent offense alleged in any petition’ ” and probation
violations are raised by a notice under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 777 and not a petition, “the statute does not bar
[DJJ] commitments imposed for probation violations on
qualifying offenses.” (Greg F., at pp. 404–405; accord, id. at p.
410.) But commitment to DJJ “cannot be ordered based on a past
offense in the ward’s juvenile record if the ward’s most recent
offense does not qualify.” (Id. at p. 404.) “[I]f the prosecution
alleges the new offense in a 602 petition instead of a 777 notice, a
commitment to [DJJ] is potentially foreclosed because the new
602 petition becomes the relevant petition for determining the
9
minor’s ‘most recent offense alleged in any petition’ for purposes
of section 733(c).” (Id. at pp. 410–411.) Because the prosecutor
had mistakenly raised the minor’s most recent offense in a new
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition rather than a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 notice, the court had to
decide whether the juvenile court could dismiss the new petition
after the minor admitted the offense so that the most recent
offense adjudicated in a petition would be the first offense
making him eligible for commitment to the DJJ. (Greg F., at p.
405.) The Supreme Court went on to conclude that the
prosecutor could do so. (Id. at pp. 405–420.)
In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 947, expanded on Greg F.
and held that commitment to the DJJ required not only that an
eligible offense be alleged in the most recent petition, but also
that the eligible offense be the most recently committed offense
alleged in that petition. (See also In re J.P. (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 74, 77 [juvenile court had authority to dismiss one
allegation in a petition to make a ward eligible for an SYTF
commitment under § 875]; In re J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410,
413 [juvenile court can dismiss fully adjudicated section 602
petitions to make a ward eligible for commitment to the DJJ]; but
see In re A.O. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 390, 395–397 [holding, in
part because of the “sparse record” before it, that juvenile court
improperly dismissed non-707(b) offense in petition to make ward
eligible for DJJ].)
Although Greg F. involved section 733 rather than section
875, the similarity of the language in the statutes, as well as the
10
fact that the Legislature intended commitment to SYTFs to
replace commitment to the DJJ, counsels in favor of following
Greg F. in the interpretation of section 875. (Moran v. Murtaugh
Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785 [“ ‘Where
. . . legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent
statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or
substantially similar language, we may presume that the
Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary
intent clearly appears.’ ”]; see In re L.H. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
591, 603 [construing § 875 in part by reference to statutes
governing commitments to the DJJ]; In re M.B., supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at pp. 460–461, 466–469 [same].) Pursuant to Greg
F., the juvenile court could not impose an SYTF commitment for
the notice of probation violation in Petition 11. When it imposed
the suspended six-month term in Petition 11, the juvenile court
had already adjudicated Petition 12, making the robbery offense
in that petition “the most recent offense for which the juvenile
has been adjudicated.” (§ 875(a)(2).) Even if we view the
adjudications of Petitions 11 and 12 as simultaneous because the
disposition hearings for both took place at the same time, the
offense in Petition 12 was more recent than the offense in
Petition 10 on which the probation violation notice rested. Under
In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at page 947, the juvenile court still
could not impose an SYTF commitment under Petition 11.
Although section 875(e)(4) explicitly addresses grants of
probation while section 733 does not, this distinction does not
compel a different result. The definition of “most recent offense”
11
drove Greg F.’s analysis. That language is identical in both
statutes. Nothing in section 875 suggests the Legislature
intended to have section 875 operate differently than section 733,
or to allow additional consecutive or concurrent commitments to
an SYTF based on probation violations and section 602 petitions.
V.D. asks us to strike the suspended six-month SYTF term
on Petition 11 as being in excess of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. However, in criminal court, “when part of a sentence
is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; see
also In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1140 [“every
time a ward appears for disposition, the court may consider the
minor’s entire history and the order must be all encompassing”].)
Additionally, a juvenile court that commits a ward to an SYTF
must conduct progress reviews every six months to determine
whether to reduce the baseline term (§ 875, subd. (e)(1)(A)
(§ 875(e)(1)(A)), so the juvenile court is more knowledgeable
about V.D.’s current circumstances. Indeed, V.D. augmented the
record with evidence that the juvenile court reduced the term of
the SYTF commitment by five months and stepped V.D. down to
a less restrictive placement after the disposition order.
Accordingly, we will reverse the juvenile court’s disposition order
and remand for the juvenile court to enter a new order.
12
II. Maximum Term of Confinement
V.D. next contends the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it set the maximum confinement term under section 875.
We are not convinced.
Section 875, subdivisions (b) and (c), require a juvenile
court committing a ward to an SYTF to set baseline and
maximum terms of confinement. The baseline term is set “based
on the most serious recent offense for which the ward has been
adjudicated” and represents “the time in custody necessary to
meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to
prepare the ward for discharge to a period of probation
supervision in the community. The baseline term of confinement
for the ward shall be determined according to offense-based
classifications that are approved by the Judicial Council . . . .’’
(§ 875, subd. (b)(1) (§ 875(b)(1).) As noted ante, the juvenile court
may modify the baseline term at progress hearings held every six
months. (§ 875(e)(1)(A).)
Section 875, subdivision (c)(1) (§ 875(c)(1)) states that a
juvenile court must also “set a maximum term of confinement for
the ward based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or
matters that brought or continued the ward under the
jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
rehabilitation.” “The maximum term of confinement shall
represent the longest term of confinement in a facility that the
ward may serve subject to” three conditions. (§ 875(c)(1).)
Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) (§ 875(c)(1)(A)) establishes that
“[a] ward committed to a secure youth treatment facility under
13
this section shall not be held in secure confinement beyond” 23 or
25 years of age, depending on the ward’s offense, “or two years
from the date of the commitment, whichever occurs later.”
Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(B) (§ 875(c)(1)(B)) states, “The
maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the middle term
of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of
the same offense or offenses.” It also recognizes that a juvenile
court may aggregate the terms on multiple counts or petitions,
including previously sustained petitions. (Ibid.) And section 875,
subdivision (c)(1)(C) (§ 875(c)(1)(C)) declares, “Precommitment
credits for time served must be applied against the maximum
term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.”
The juvenile court set a baseline term of three years based
on the Judicial Council classifications. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.806(d).) It set a maximum term of confinement of five
years and four months based on aggregating V.D.’s offenses, a
term that would end in May 2029. V.D. does not quarrel with
this calculation under section 875(c)(1)(B). He instead points out
that the May 2029 maximum term of confinement extends past
the date he turns 23 in February 2029. He contends this violates
the condition in section 875(c)(1)(A) that a minor not be held in
an SYTF beyond 23 years of age.
A different Division of this court recently considered and
rejected this argument in In re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 591.
That case considered whether a juvenile court correctly set a
maximum confinement term of 25 years, which would expire well
beyond the ward’s 25th birthday. (Id. at p. 599.) The court held
14
that the age-based limits in section 875(c)(1)(A) operated “to
provide a separate ceiling on the length of a ward’s physical
confinement.” (In re L.H., at pp. 599–600; see also In re M.B.,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 461, fn. 21 [describing § 875(c)(1)(A)
as providing a “separate cap” on a ward’s “actual time spent in
confinement”].) In re L.H. reached this conclusion in part by
noting that all three subparagraphs follow the “ ‘subject to’ ”
phrase in section 875(c)(1) and concluding that they all “limit[]
the actual length of a ward’s confinement time, and not
necessarily the juvenile court’s discretion to set a maximum term
of confinement.” (In re L.H., at pp. 600–601.)
The court contrasted the language used in section
875(c)(1)(A), which states that a ward “shall not be held in secure
confinement beyond” the relevant age cutoffs, with the language
used in section 875(c)(1)(B), which states that the “maximum
term of confinement shall not exceed the middle term of
imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the
same offense or offenses.” (§ 875(c)(1)(A)–(B), italics added; In re
L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.) The difference between
section 875(c)(1)(A)’s “shall not be held” and section 875(c)(1)(B)’s
“shall not exceed” indicated that the Legislature intended the
former to “refer to a separate cap on a ward’s actual confinement
time” while the latter limits the maximum term that a juvenile
court sets. (In re L.H., at p. 601.) Section 875(c)(1)(C),
meanwhile, presumes that the juvenile court has already set a
maximum limit and directs the court to then apply
precommitment credits against it. (In re L.H., at p. 601.) In re
15
L.H. noted that an earlier version of the statute had stated that “
‘the maximum period of confinement shall not exceed’ ” a ward’s
25th birthday, but the Legislature had amended it to replace that
language with the “ ‘shall not be held’ ” phrasing. (Id. at p. 604,
italics omitted.) The court viewed this change as “strong
evidence” that section 875(c)(1)(A) should not be construed as
limiting the calculation of the maximum term of confinement. (In
re L.H., at p. 604.)
In re L.H. took guidance from the statutes that governed
commitments to the DJJ before realignment, whose age-based
discharge requirements courts had interpreted as “providing a
cap on a ward’s actual confinement time separate from the
maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court.” (In re
L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 602–603, citing, inter alia, In
re R.O. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1497 & fn. 3 [“maximum
term of confinement” is a “theoretical maximum period of
confinement” because a ward usually “cannot be confined beyond
his 25th birthday”].) The court also found its interpretation
comported most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent
behind the statute. (In re L.H., at p. 605.) Because section
875(c)(1)(C) requires a juvenile court to apply a ward’s
precommitment credits against the maximum term of
confinement, limiting the calculated maximum term of
confinement to a ward’s 23rd or 25th birthday based on section
875(c)(1)(B) would make such a ward’s commitment even shorter
after the application of credits, while a younger ward who
committed a similar offense would only receive the
16
precommitment credits against the full length of the section
875(c)(1)(B) term. (In re L.H., at p. 605.)
The court rejected the ward’s argument that calculating a
maximum term of confinement under section 875(c)(1)(B) would
be an idle act if section 875(c)(1)(A) imposed a separate cap. (In
re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 606.) It found this would
not be true in every case, since many wards’ maximum terms will
end before the age cutoff. (Ibid.) The court also observed that a
ward should generally be discharged upon the expiration of the
baseline term set under section 875(b)(1), which may be shorter
than the maximum term of confinement and can be reduced still
further at progress review hearings. (In re L.H., at p. 606.)
L.H. also rejected the ward’s statutory and equal protection
arguments, based on In re Ernesto L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 31,
34, that the juvenile court erred by applying his precommitment
credits against the theoretical maximum confinement time rather
than the jurisdictional age 25 limit in section 875(c)(1)(A). (In re
L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–608.) The court noted,
consistent with this court’s decision in In re M.B., supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at page 466, that section 875 already operates in the
way that In re Ernesto L. decided the DJJ statutes should have.
(In re L.H., at p. 607.) This is in part because the maximum term
under section 875(c)(1)(B) can be less than the maximum
sentence an adult might face. (In re L.H., at p. 607.; see
§ 875(c)(1)(B) [“The maximum term of confinement shall not
exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed
17
upon an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses,” italics
added].)
V.D. argues that In re L.H. was wrongly decided and urges
us not to follow it. He first contends that because a juvenile
court’s jurisdiction ends at a ward’s 25th birthday, setting a
maximum term of confinement beyond that date is either an
unlawful assertion of power or an idle act and is inconsistent
with the implicit premise of juvenile court jurisdiction that a
minor can be rehabilitated within the time of juvenile court
jurisdiction. The primary answer to this is that the plain
language of the statute and the intentionally different wording
the Legislature used in the different subparagraphs of section
875(c)(1) compel the conclusion that the age cutoffs in section
875(c)(1)(A) operate as an independent cap on the time a minor
will serve. (See In re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 599–
601, 604–605.) Besides, a ward is presumptively discharged at
the end of the baseline term, not the end of the maximum term.
(§ 875(e)(3).) Calculating a maximum term of confinement that a
minor most likely will not serve is therefore not an improper
assertion of jurisdiction. Nor is it an idle act, since, among other
things, a long maximum term can signal to a ward the gravity of
his or her offenses. Moreover, setting a maximum term of
confinement is a longstanding practice. (See In re L.H., at pp.
602–604.) It was common for juvenile courts to set maximum
terms of confinement to the DJJ that extended past the end of
juvenile court jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 603; see, e.g., Greg F., supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 402 [noting that juvenile court set maximum
18
term of confinement of 17 years for 11-year old ward].) As In re
L.H. noted at page 606, courts at the time recognized that “ ‘[i]n
practice, the maximum term of imprisonment rarely determines
the actual period of confinement of a ward committed to’ secure
confinement.” We discern nothing in section 875 that suggests
the Legislature intended to depart from this practice after
realignment.
Second, V.D. faults In re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
page 601 for treating sections 875(c)(1)(A) and 875(c)(1)(B) as
limiting “the actual length of a ward’s confinement time” while
interpreting section 875(c)(1)(C) as a limit on the maximum term
of exposure rather than the actual term. We agree that this
specific passage in In re L.H. is somewhat unclear because it
states that all three subparagraphs in section 875(c)(1) limit the
actual length of confinement but then relies on different wording
of the subparagraphs to construe section 875(c)(1)(A) as
independently limiting the actual term of confinement while
section 875(c)(1)(B) limits the maximum term of confinement that
a juvenile court may set. (In re L.H., at pp. 600–601.) But the
rest of In re L.H. makes clear that the court meant only that the
maximum time of confinement that a ward serves is “subject to”
(§ 875(c)(1)) all three subparagraphs in the sense that the
maximum term the court sets is subordinate to or possibly
affected by them. (In re L.H., at pp. 600–601; see Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary (2025) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/subject to> [as of October 14, 2025]
[defining “subject to” as meaning “possibly affected by”].) In re
19
L.H. does not say that each subparagraph impacts the maximum
term of confinement in precisely the same way, and its analysis of
the language in the different subparagraphs shows that they do
not. (In re L.H., at p. 601.)
Third, V.D. contends that In re L.H.’s analysis fails to
effectuate the Legislature’s intent that realignment result in the
placement of wards in the least restrictive environment
appropriate and reduce the use of confinement. This argument,
too, founders on the plain language of the statute and the fact
that section 875’s language resembles the language of the
statutes that previously governed commitments to the DJJ, as
discussed ante. Regardless of the Legislature’s stated intent
behind realignment as a whole, the Legislature did not
materially change the specific language at issue here, so there is
no reason to construe the same language differently now.
V.D. contends that In re L.H. is inconsistent with the
holding in In re Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at page 34, that
precommitment credits for a DJJ commitment had to be applied
against a maximum term of confinement rather than a
theoretical maximum term of exposure. In re M.B. and In re L.H.
have already rejected the same argument, pointing out that their
interpretations of section 875(c) give wards the benefits of
precommitment credits just as In re Ernesto L. held was required
under the DJJ statutes. (In re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 607–608; In re M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–469;
see also In re Jose R. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 839, 848 [rejecting
20
comparison to In re Ernesto L. and DJJ-related statutes because
§ 875(c)(1)(C) is clear].)
Finally, V.D. argues that In re L.H.’s interpretation of
section 875 must be rejected under the rule of lenity or the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance or constitutional doubt
because it would deprive him of the benefit of his precommitment
credits, in violation of his constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection, and double jeopardy.4 (People v. Reynoza (2024)
15 Cal.5th 982, 1012 [under rule of lenity, ambiguities in a
criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant];
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1373 [when a statute
is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which makes it
unconstitutional or raises “serious and doubtful constitutional
questions,” courts will adopt the interpretation that makes the
statute valid or free from doubt as to its constitutionality].) V.D.
bases this argument on the fact that when a maximum term of
confinement extends beyond the age cutoff in section 875(c)(1)(A),
applying credits to that maximum term may not shorten the
actual term of confinement that a minor serves.
This argument is not persuasive. Section 875(c)(1)(A) is not
reasonably susceptible to V.D.’s interpretation for the reasons
discussed ante, so these doctrines do not come into play. (People
4 To the extent that V.D. goes beyond the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance and contends more directly that section
875(c)(1)(A) violates his constitutional rights, we note that he
waited until his reply brief to raise the issue, thereby depriving
the People of the opportunity to respond to it. We therefore
decline to undertake a full constitutional analysis. (People v.
Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1030, fn. 8.)
21
v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889 [rule of lenity “applies ‘ “only
if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body
intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty
to justify invoking the rule” ’ ”]; People v. Engram (2010) 50
Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [“a statute must be construed, if reasonably
possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional
question,” italics added].) Nor are the constitutional arguments
V.D. raises so serious as to call into doubt In re L.H.’s
interpretation of section 875(c)(1)(A). Commitment credits can
shorten a ward’s actual time served when they reduce a
maximum term of confinement to a date before a ward’s relevant
age cutoff. This is true here, where the maximum term of five
years and four months the court set ends in May 2029. But after
the application of the 776 days of precommitment credits that the
juvenile court awarded (disregarding for the moment the
additional credits V.D. claims in this appeal), it ends in April
2027, which is almost two years before V.D.’s 23rd birthday.
Precommitment credits can also operate to reduce a baseline
term, as occurred here when the juvenile court reduced the
baseline term from four years to three after realizing that the
maximum term, after precommitment credits, would have
expired earlier than a four-year baseline term. The Legislature’s
provision of an age-based cutoff in section 875(c)(1)(A) that
applies in some scenarios to release a ward from confinement
even earlier does not unconstitutionally deprive wards of the
benefit of their credits. The fact that V.D. would have benefitted
22
more from his preferred interpretation of the statute does not
mean In re L.H.’s interpretation is constitutionally infirm.5
III. Precommitment Credits
For the first time on appeal, V.D. challenges the juvenile
court’s calculation of his precommitment credits in several
respects. As noted ante, Welfare and Institutions Code section
875(c)(1)(C) states, “Precommitment credits for time served must
be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set
pursuant to this subdivision.” The statute does not prescribe how
credits are to be calculated, but it is well established that Welfare
and Institutions Code section 726, which applies to minors
committed to an SYTF (In re M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p.
466; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(5)), requires credits to be
calculated under Penal Code section 2900.5.6 (In re Antwon R.
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 352.)
5 V.D. separately argues that the juvenile court’s
calculation of a three-year baseline term was improper because it
extends past the end of the maximum confinement term that he
contends was proper, after his precommitment credits are
applied. Because the three-year baseline term does not exceed
the maximum confinement term that the juvenile court set and
that we have found to be proper, even after credits are applied,
we need not discuss this argument.
6 Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a) states in
pertinent part, “In all felony and misdemeanor convictions,
. . . when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not
limited to, any time spent in a jail, camp, work furlough facility,
halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile
detention facility, or similar residential institution, all days of
custody of the defendant . . . shall be credited upon his or her
term of imprisonment . . . .”
23
V.D. contends and the People concede that he is entitled to
additional credits for time spent on electronic monitoring and for
the final partial days of various periods of custody. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 628.2, subd. (c) [minors are entitled to precommitment
credit for time on electronic monitoring]; People v. Smith (1989)
211 Cal.App.3d 523, 526 [for the purposes of Penal Code section
2900.5, defendants are entitled to a full day of credit for any
partial day in custody].) However, we cannot total the precise
number of credits due from these periods because we cannot tell
from the record how the juvenile court calculated its credits in
the first place. The court stated that it had calculated 768 days
of credits while the probation officer had calculated 776 days of
credits. The disposition report states that V.D. was entitled to 43
days of credits. The custody days reflected on the booking
summary attached to the disposition report total 901 days. As
the People point out, the juvenile court’s order placing the minor
on probation in August 2023, well over a year earlier, states that
V.D. was then entitled to 894 days of credit. Because the record
does not allow us to determine what the correct number of credits
should be, we will leave this issue to the juvenile court on
remand. We are already remanding for the juvenile court to
fashion a new disposition order, so the credits calculation will
need to be updated in any event. Neither V.D. nor the People
oppose a remand for recalculation of credits.
When it recalculates V.D.’s credits, the juvenile court can
also consider in the first instance V.D.’s argument, raised for the
first time on appeal, that he is entitled to credits beginning with
24
the dates of his arrests rather than the dates of his bookings into
juvenile facilities. Given the lack of clarity in the record about
the juvenile court’s calculations as a whole, we cannot determine
exactly how large of a period is at issue in this argument.
Clarifying the record could also affect our evaluation of the
argument. In general, it is not clear from the record or the
parties’ arguments exactly what type of detention V.D. was
subject to between his arrests and his bookings into juvenile hall.
This lack of clarity prevents us from evaluating V.D.’s arguments
that minors in juvenile court should be treated differently than
adults for the purposes of custody credits. To take the most
significant example, the People contended the entire period
between V.D’s arrest in Los Angeles on January 30, 2020, and his
booking into juvenile hall in Alameda County on February 4,
2020, should be excluded. It seems unlikely that the minor was
not booked into any juvenile facility during the five days before
he was booked into Alameda County juvenile hall. But even if he
were not booked into some type of custody, the significant length
of this period tends to bolster V.D.’s argument that he should be
entitled to credit for pre-booking time, at least in some
circumstances. (Cf. People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914,
919–920 [refusing to give credit for three-hour period between
arrest and booking].) Additionally, the People ignore V.D.’s claim
that he is entitled to additional credit for time spent in custody in
San Francisco on Petition 12, even though the disposition report’s
calculation of 43 days of credit includes 23 days for that period.
Before we can meaningfully review the question of pre-booking
25
credits, such ambiguities in the record need to be clarified. We
will therefore remand for the juvenile court to address such
issues and any others the parties raise.
IV. Restitution Fine
Finally, V.D. contends the $100 restitution fine the juvenile
court imposed must be stricken. He points out that while this
appeal was pending, the Legislature amended section 730.6,
subdivision (a)(2) to state that a juvenile court “shall not impose
a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found
to be a person described in Section 602.” (Stats. 2024, ch. 805,
§ 6, eff. Jan. 1, 2025.) He argues he is entitled to the retroactive
effect of this ameliorative change in the law because his case is
not yet final and the Legislature did not state that the new law is
only prospective. (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673.)
The People concede the point, and we accept their concession. On
remand, the juvenile court shall omit any restitution fines from
its new disposition order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s disposition order is reversed. The
matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
26
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
CLAY, J.*
In re V.D. / People v. V.D. (A169633)
* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
27
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