CourtListener 10699768•Dhawan v. Saman CA2/5
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Filed 10/9/25 Dhawan v. Saman CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RAHUL DHAWAN, B344291
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24SMCP00513)
ALBERT SAMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Elaine W. Mandel, Judge. Affirmed.
Roger Lowenstein, for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Fredrick H. Stern and Fredrick H. Stern, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
Appellant Albert Saman (Buyer) appeals a trial court
judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of respondent
Rahul Dawhan (Seller) where Buyer alleged claims for
intentional and negligent misrepresentation and recission
against Seller in connection with the sale of a condominium unit,
and the arbitrator found Buyer had not proven liability. Buyer
contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to vacate
the arbitration award. Buyer argues that because the
arbitrator’s decision estopped his efforts to enforce a statutory
right to rescind the purchase agreement, the trial court should
have vacated the arbitration award under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) and Pearson Dental
Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665 (Pearson).
We reject Buyer’s argument that Pearson is applicable when a
buyer seeks to rescind a real estate purchase agreement, and we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Much of Buyer’s opening brief focuses on the underlying
real estate transaction and the evidence, but our summary here
focuses on the information relevant to Buyer’s key legal
argument on appeal. We also disregard any factual assertions or
arguments that are unsupported by proper record citations. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Le Mere v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 248; Fierro v.
Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5.)
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A. Overview
More than two years after purchasing a condominium unit,
Buyer initiated arbitration against Seller, alleging that Seller
had failed to disclose construction defects in the condominium
building. Buyer sought recission of the purchase agreement,
along with associated damages. Buyer later filed an amended
statement of arbitration claims, adding allegations that he sold
the unit to mitigate damages, and the “arbitration thus becomes
amended to allege money damages alone,” specifying categories of
monetary damages. After a bifurcated hearing on liability only,
the arbitrator found in favor of Seller, and later issued a final
award granting Seller attorney fees and costs. Buyer appeals
from the judgment entered after the trial court granted Seller’s
petition to confirm the arbitration award and denied Buyer’s
petition to vacate the award.
B. The Unit
Seller initially purchased the unit in 2016, and sold it to
Buyer in 2020. Seller’s disclosure documents make no mention of
any construction defects. Buyer moved into the unit in July
2020, and began to hear “popping” noises on many occasions in
and after July 2020. Buyer obtained from the homeowner’s
association (HOA) a 2019 report that attributed similar popping
sounds (experienced by other building occupants) to possible
problems with the building’s window construction.
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C. The Arbitration Proceedings
1. Original claim
Buyer’s original statement of claim alleged that Seller was
aware of the problems with the unit, and that “failure to disclose
these items that materially affected the value of Unit 102
constitutes fraud, concealment, deceit, misrepresentation (both
intentional and negligent).”
The allegations included an excerpt from Civil Code section
1689,1 and further alleged that recission “is permitted regardless
of the extent of [Seller’s] fault, so long as the consent of [Buyer]
was based on his own material mistake of fact, whether
fraudulently induced, negligently induced, or simply an innocent
mistake.” The claim allegation continued: “Rescission occurs at
the initiation of [Buyer]. This arbitration will confirm the
appropriateness of [Buyer’s] decision to rescind. [¶] Damages:
Rescission is an equitable remedy, designed to place the [Buyer]
in the status quo ante to the greatest extent possible. Therefore
the damages include the disaffirmance of the contract, the return
to [Buyer] of all consideration, the relinquishment to [Seller] of
possession of the property, and such ancillary damages such as
1 The language quoted in the claim provides that a party to
a contract may rescind the contract “[i]f the consent of the party
rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting with him, was
given by mistake, or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence, exercised by or with the connivance of the party
as to whom he rescinds, or of any other party to the contract
jointly interested with such party.” (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd.
(b)(1).)
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moving costs, costs of tenant improvements made before
discovery of the issues justifying rescission, fees and commissions
related to the sale of [the unit], and attorney[] fees as required by
the original contract.”
2. Amended claim
Buyer’s amended claim contained mostly the same
allegations with some minor changes, and also added the
following allegation regarding Buyer’s recission claim: “[Buyer]
has an obligation to mitigate damages. In order to do so, he
sought to sell [the unit]. [Seller] has declined to purchase the
property back from [Buyer]; therefore the unit was listed through
the MLS [multiple listing service]. After sales fell through due to
the impact of accurate disclosures, [Buyer] has recently
succeeded in selling at a substantially reduced price. As
expected, because of his disclosure of the construction defects and
HOA litigation against the developer, the popping noises and this
arbitration, the sale price was dramatically lower than the
original purchase price ($790,000 as opposed to $855,000). This
arbitration thus becomes amended to allege money damages
alone . . .”
3. Interim award
The arbitrator’s interim award stated that the trial had
been bifurcated by stipulation to address liability only. According
to the award, Buyer’s amended claim alleged intentional and/or
negligent failure to disclose defective conditions of property.
After summarizing the evidence and witness testimony presented
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by Buyer and Seller, the arbitrator determined that Buyer had
not proven that Seller was aware of and failed to disclose the
condition of the unit.
4. Final award, including award of attorney fees
The arbitrator issued a final award in September 2024,
granting Seller $94,602.15 in attorney fees and costs. The
arbitrator also noted Buyer’s request, following the interim
award, for the arbitrator to specifically address Buyer’s recission
and related claims. Seller responded that it had no objection to
arbitrator amending and supplementing the award to reflect the
fact that Buyer’s arguments were considered and rejected. In
that context, the arbitrator clarified that the equitable remedy of
recission was unavailable, both because Buyer had sold the unit
to a third party, making the remedy impracticable and
impossible, and because language in the amended claim stating
“[t]his arbitration thus becomes amended to allege money
damages alone,” put Seller on notice that Buyer would pursue
only legal damages as a remedy. The arbitrator also found that
there was no credible evidence to support a finding of mutual
mistake of fact, negligent misrepresentation, or fraud.
D. Trial Court Proceedings
In December 2024, the trial court granted Seller’s petition
to confirm the arbitration award and denied Buyer’s petition to
vacate or alter the arbitration award. The appellate record does
not contain either petition, but the court’s order summarizes
Buyer’s argument that by failing to address the recission
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argument, the arbitrator exceeded his authority as described in
Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4). The
trial court concluded that there was no basis to vacate the
arbitrator’s final award because the arbitrator found Buyer had
withdrawn his recission claim and there was no mistake of fact to
support recission.
Buyer filed a timely appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Buyer acknowledges the general rule of judicial deference
to an arbitrator’s decision, but contends that under Pearson,
supra, 48 Cal.4th 665, he is entitled to judicial review because
the arbitrator erroneously estopped him from pursuing his
statutory claim for recission. We disagree with Buyer’s argument
that any of the statutory provisions permitting judicial review of
an arbitration award apply here. (§ 1286.2, subd. (a).)
A. Legal Principles
“The legal standards governing judicial review of arbitration
awards are well established. ‘California law favors alternative
dispute resolution as a viable means of resolving legal conflicts.
“Because the decision to arbitrate grievances evinces the parties’
intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential delays
at the trial and appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component
of the parties’ agreement to submit to arbitration.” (Moncharsh [v.
Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Moncharsh)].) Generally, courts
cannot review arbitration awards for errors of fact or law, even when
those errors appear on the face of the award or cause substantial
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injustice to the parties. (Id. at pp. 6, 28.)’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc.
v. Browne George Ross LLP (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 749, 763.)
We apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s order
denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award. (Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9 (AMD);
Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 594, 608.)
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we keep in mind that the trial
court’s role in evaluating the arbitrator’s decision is necessarily
limited. “The principle of arbitral finality, the practical demands of
deciding on an appropriate remedy . . . , and the prior holdings of [the
California Supreme Court] all dictate that arbitrators, unless
expressly restricted by the agreement or the submission to
arbitration, have substantial discretion to determine the scope of
their contractual authority to fashion remedies, and that judicial
review of their awards must be correspondingly narrow and
deferential.” (AMD, at p. 376.)
The only grounds for judicially vacating an arbitration award
are set by statute. (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 10.) The
exceptions to the general limits on judicial review of arbitration
awards identified at section 1286.2, subdivision (a), are for extreme
circumstances to “protect against error that is so egregious as to
constitute misconduct or so profound as to render the process unfair.
The Legislature has authorized ‘judicial review in circumstances
involving serious problems with the award itself, or with the fairness
of the arbitration process.’ (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 12,
italics added.) ‘ “The statutory provisions for [review of an
arbitration award] are manifestly for the sole purpose of preventing
the misuse of the proceeding, where corruption, fraud, misconduct,
gross error, or mistake has been carried into the award to the
substantial prejudice of a party to the proceeding.” ’ [Citation.]”
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(Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368, fn. omitted.) An
arbitrator’s erroneous factual determinations or legal conclusions do
not establish grounds to vacate the award. (Id. at p. 367.)
As relevant here, a trial court must grant a motion to vacate an
arbitration award upon determining that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the
merits of the decision. (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).)2 The California
Supreme Court explained in Moncharsh, and reiterated in Pearson,
“It is well settled that ‘arbitrators do not exceed their powers merely
because they assign an erroneous reason for their decision.’ ”
(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 28; Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 676.) However, the court in Moncharsh “recognized ‘that there
may be some limited and exceptional circumstances justifying
judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision’ such as when ‘granting
finality to an arbitrator’s decision would be inconsistent with the
protection of a party’s statutory rights.’ (Moncharsh, supra, 3
Cal.4th at p. 32.) Because the issue did not arise in that case, the
Moncharsh court had no occasion to develop this exception.”
(Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 676.)
In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 (Armendariz), the California Supreme Court
2 To the extent Buyer’s argues that other provisions of the
statute, such as section 1286.2, subdivisions (a)(3) or (a)(5), might
provide grounds to vacate the award, Buyer does not contend that
such arguments were presented to the trial court, and so we do
not consider them here. (Vascos Excavation Group LLC v. Gold
(2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 842, 856–857 [party forfeited argument by
failing to raise it in the trial court].)
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examined whether an employee’s claim of sex discrimination under
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.) was subject to arbitration under a “mandatory employment
arbitration agreement, i.e., an agreement by an employee to arbitrate
wrongful termination or employment discrimination claims rather
than filing suit in court, which an employer imposes on a prospective
or current employee as a condition of employment.” (Armendariz, at
pp. 90–92.) Reasoning that “arbitration agreements that encompass
unwaivable statutory rights must be subject to particular scrutiny,”
and that there was “no question that the statutory rights established
by the FEHA are ‘for a public reason,’ ” the Armendariz court found it
“indisputable that an employment contract that required employees
to waive their rights under the FEHA to redress sexual harassment
or discrimination would be contrary to public policy and unlawful.”
(Id. at pp. 100–101.) The high court then articulated four minimal
requirements for arbitration of FEHA claims: “(1) the arbitration
agreement may not limit the damages normally available under the
statute (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 103); (2) there must be
discovery ‘sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim’ (id.
at p. 106); (3) there must be a written arbitration decision and
judicial review ‘ “sufficient to ensure the arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute” ’ (ibid.); and (4) the employer must ‘pay
all types of costs that are unique to arbitration’ (id. at p. 113).”
(Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1076–1077.)
Beyond requiring that “an arbitrator in an FEHA case must
issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly,
the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based,”
the Armendariz court did not articulate what standard of judicial
review would be adequate to ensure compliance with FEHA, in part
because there was not yet an arbitration award to consider.
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(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 107 [absent a petition to confirm
an arbitration award, the court lacked occasion to precisely articulate
the applicable standard of judicial review].)
Finally, in Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th 665, the high court
considered the “proper standard of judicial review of arbitration
awards arising from mandatory arbitration employment agreements
that arbitrate claims asserting the employee’s unwaivable statutory
rights.” (Id. at p. 679.) In the underlying arbitration, the arbitrator
had decided in favor of the employer and against the employee on the
employee’s claim of discrimination, and the employee had challenged
the arbitrator’s decision as violating FEHA’s statutory protections.
(Id. at pp. 669–670.) The holding in Pearson is limited to the facts of
the case and is quite narrow. The court held that when “an employee
subject to a mandatory employment arbitration agreement is unable
to obtain a hearing on the merits of his FEHA claims, or claims based
on other unwaivable statutory rights, because of an arbitration
award based on legal error, the trial court does not err in vacating
the award. Stated in other terms, construing the [California
Arbitration Act] in light of the Legislature’s intent that employees be
able to enforce their right to be free of unlawful discrimination under
FEHA, an arbitrator whose legal error has barred an employee
subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement from obtaining a
hearing on the merits of a claim based on such right has exceeded his
or her powers within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section
1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), and the arbitrator’s award may properly be
vacated. (See Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 106–107.)”
(Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 680.) The Pearson court expressly
refrained from considering whether, as argued by plaintiffs and
amicus curiae in that case, all legal errors or all errors involving the
arbitration statute are reviewable. Instead, the court explained, the
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arbitrator’s “clear legal error” was to misconstrue the procedural
framework under which the parties agreed the arbitration was to be
conducted, rather than misinterpreting the law governing the
underlying claim. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 679–680.) The
Court’s explanation continued: “It is difficult to imagine a more
paradigmatic example of when ‘granting finality to an arbitrator’s
decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party’s
statutory rights’ (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32) than the
present case, in which, as a result of allowing the procedural error to
stand, and through no fault of the employee or his attorney, the
employee will be unable to receive a hearing on the merits of his
FEHA claims in any forum.” (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 680.)
B. Analysis
Buyer argues that the arbitrator’s decision deprived him of
a statutory right to recission, and that under Pearson, the trial
court was required to vacate the arbitration award because of the
estoppel effect of the arbitrator’s rulings. But Pearson was a
narrow ruling focused on an employee’s ability to enforce
unwaivable statutory rights under FEHA that promote public
policy and articulate standards and protections available to all
employees. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 677 [enforcement of
statutory rights under FEHA “was for the public benefit and was
not waivable”], Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 100–101
[“arbitration agreements that encompass unwaivable statutory
rights must be subject to particular scrutiny”].) The other two
cases Buyer cites in his argument also involve efforts by
employees to enforce their rights under FEHA. (Castelo v. Xceed
Financial Credit Union (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 777 [no error in
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denying employee’s motion to vacate because arbitrator did not
commit clear legal error in enforcing release of future
employment discrimination claims]; Richey v. AutoNation, Inc.
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 913 [in rejecting employee’s wrongful
termination claims, any arbitrator error “did not deprive the
employee of an unwaivable statutory right” because arbitrator
found valid grounds for employee’s termination].)
We are unpersuaded that the reasoning and holding of
Pearson is broad enough to apply to the facts of this case, which
does not involve an employee seeking to enforce unwaivable
statutory rights under FEHA, but rather a buyer in a real estate
transaction seeking to rescind the purchase agreement. Although
Buyer does identify a statute underpinning his recission claim,
Civil Code section 1689, he cites to no relevant legal authority to
support his implicit argument that the right to recission is an
unwaivable statutory right similar to the rights of employees
protected under FEHA. In fact, ironically, the case Buyer quotes
from extensively in his opening brief to support his argument
that “[t]he subtext here is the public policy of guaranteeing a
victim access to justice[]” involves a plaintiff pursuing a claim
under FEHA, not a recission claim. (Nuño v. California State
University, Bakersfield (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 799, 810–811.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
plaintiff and respondent Rahul Dhawan.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KUMAR, J.*
* Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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