CourtListener 10699756•People v. Hernandez CA2/8
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Filed 10/9/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B325468
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA482331
v.
ALLAN HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shelly B. Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
A jury convicted Allan Hernandez of 11 counts of sexual
abuse against his stepdaughter T.M. and his daughter J.H. We
affirm. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
Heidy N. lived in Honduras with her daughter T.M. We
refer to her as Heidy.
When Heidy was 20 years old, she met the 37-year-old
Hernandez, who was visiting Honduras from Los Angeles. They
began seeing each other romantically during Hernandez’s visits
and eventually had two children born in Honduras, a daughter,
J.H., and a son. After J.H. was born, Heidy and the children
moved into a house in Honduras that Hernandez provided.
Heidy and the children joined Hernandez in Los Angeles
when T.M. was eight, J.H. was five, and their brother was
two. Heidy and Hernandez married the next year. Hernandez
hired an immigration attorney to help Heidy and the children
with immigration.
The couple fought a lot.
When Heidy tried to break up with Hernandez, he would
threaten to take the children and to send Heidy back to
Honduras, or to kill her. T.M. and J.H. looked scared during the
arguments, and their brother would cry.
Hernandez was very jealous of Heidy’s relationship with
any other person. He constantly tried to take her phone to look
through it.
In 2019, Hernandez went to visit his family in Honduras.
While he was there, he saw a picture of flowers Heidy posted on
Facebook. Hernandez was incensed because he believed they
were from another man. He called Heidy. When he asked her
about this, she hung up.
2
Hernandez cut his trip short to return and confront Heidy.
When Hernandez returned, the couple argued.
Hernandez punched a hole in a wall.
Heidy had in fact started seeing another man, Alexander
Martinez.
Heidy called Martinez to get her.
T.M. joined her at Martinez’s home a few days later.
After J.H. told Heidy that Hernandez had spanked her with
a belt, Heidy called the police. Officers, accompanied by Heidy,
picked J.H. and her brother up and took them to the station to
document the marks on J.H.
About a month later, social worker Celia Reyna visited
Heidy and Martinez to investigate claims Hernandez had made.
Hernandez accused Heidy of using drugs and acting in an
inappropriately sexual way in front of T.M. Hernandez accused
Martinez of showing T.M. pornography.
During the investigation, Hernandez admitted he hit J.H.
with a belt.
In later dependency proceedings, a juvenile court awarded
Heidy custody of all three children. J.H. and her brother moved
in with Heidy and Martinez.
As part of her investigation, the social worker asked T.M.
and J.H. whether anyone had touched them inappropriately.
Both girls initially denied it.
When the social worker asked a third time, in individual
interviews, each girl said Hernandez had touched her. Heidy and
Martinez took the girls to the police station, where they repeated
the statements. Each girl was also interviewed by a forensic
psychologist.
3
An information charged Hernandez with 17 counts of oral
copulation or sexual penetration and lewd acts on T.M. and J.H.
T.M. and J.H. applied for U-visas, which required the
district attorney’s office to confirm that they had cooperated in
the case against Hernandez. The district attorney made this
certification about 16 months before the trial started.
Both girls testified at Hernandez’s jury trial. T.M. was now
15. She had difficulty remembering some of the details, but
testified that the first time Hernandez touched her was while
they still lived in Honduras. When asked about incidents that
occurred in Los Angeles, T.M. testified to a specific incident when
she was 10 when she was playing outside with neighbors.
Hernandez called her inside on the pretext that she needed to
clean something. When she got inside, Hernandez instead
started caressing and grabbing her shoulders and butt.
Hernandez undressed her and continued to touch her shoulders,
butt, chest, and thighs. Hernandez then took his clothes off.
T.M. ended up on the bed with him standing over her.
Hernandez’s penis touched her vagina.
About a week later, Hernandez took T.M. to work with
him. On the way back, he parked his van, put cardboard in all of
the windows and touched T.M. He again took both their clothes
off and used his penis to touch her vagina, hurting her. T.M. said
Hernandez took her to work and touched her in the van about
five times. One time, Hernandez licked T.M.’s vagina. Another
few times, Hernandez grabbed T.M.’s head and tried to move her
head toward his penis to make her lick it. On another occasion,
Hernandez put his fingers in T.M.’s vagina.
T.M. also testified to incidents that occurred in their
apartment. Once, T.M. woke up in the middle of the night, and
4
Hernandez was touching her butt and back. She was laying face
down, and Hernandez pulled her pants down. She felt something
go in between her buttocks and touch her anus, causing her pain.
Hernandez would kiss T.M. and put his tongue in her
mouth. T.M. would turn away. Hernandez then asked if she
“want[ed] some” and said he would not force her. T.M. did not
respond, but Hernandez continued to touch her anyway. At
times, T.M. would cry when Hernandez touched her. He told her
not to tell anyone. She was afraid if she did tell, she would be
taken away from her parents. Hernandez touched her when she
was 10 and 11, but stopped when she turned 12.
J.H. was 12 when she testified at trial. She said the first
time Hernandez touched her was when she was entering fourth
grade. She was in bed, and Hernandez got in bed with her and
stroked her thighs “in a weird way.” She pushed his hand off, but
he put it back, and began touching her stomach. He then moved
his hand under the waistband of her leggings and underwear and
began touching her private part in a back and forth motion with a
little squeezing. Hernandez told J.H. not to tell her mom or he
would hit her.
A few months later, Hernandez again got in bed with
J.H. He grabbed her and turned her towards him before kissing
her on the lips and trying to put his tongue inside his mouth.
She pushed him away. Hernandez again warned J.H. not to tell
her mom.
In the summer before fifth grade, Hernandez again got in
bed with J.H. and touched and squeezed her thigh. She tried to
move, but Hernandez stopped only when Heidy and T.M.
returned home.
5
J.H. did not immediately reveal the abuse because she was
afraid Hernandez would hit her. After Heidy got custody of J.H.
and she moved in with her, J.H. felt comfortable saying what
happened.
Each girl testified she had not been told she had to say
certain things or testify a particular way to stay in the U.S.
Heidy said she never told the girls to lie.
Clinical Psychologist Jamie Jones testified at trial about
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, which explains
the behavior of children who have been sexually abused by people
they know. This includes explanations that children often delay
coming forward and, when they do, reveal only part of the story.
Jones, as well as the court, stated this syndrome is not a tool for
determining whether a particular child has, or has not, been
sexually abused.
Hernandez testified in his defense.
He said, after Heidy cheated on him, he told her he would
no longer help Heidy get legal residency. After Heidy and T.M.
moved in with Martinez, Martinez called Hernandez and said
they were “going to fuck [him] up” by reporting him to the
police. Two weeks later, Reyna began investigating allegations of
Hernandez inappropriately touching T.M. and J.H.
Hernandez denied ever touching either girl
inappropriately. He denied ever taking T.M. to work with him
alone. Hernandez said T.M. and J.H. had been told to tell these
lies so they could get U-visas and stay in the U.S.
He testified the girls did not like him because he was strict,
while Heidy and Martinez were not.
Hernandez’s sister and one of his customers testified to his
good character.
6
The jury convicted Hernandez of three counts of oral
copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger
(§ 288.7, subd. (b)), four counts of lewd acts on a child under 14
years old (§ 288, subd. (a)), and one count of oral copulation of a
person under 14 years old (§ 288a, now renumbered § 287, subd.
(c)(1)) against T.M. and three counts of a lewd act on a child
under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)) against J.H. His total
sentence was 63 years to life in prison.
II
Hernandez challenges his convictions on several grounds.
A
Hernandez argues the trial court erred in allowing T.M.’s
and J.H.’s testimony because it was coerced and therefore
inherently unreliable. This argument is incorrect.
The prosecutor rightly argues Hernandez forfeited this
argument by not raising it at the trial court. (People v. Marchand
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060.)
Even on the merits, this claim fails. Our review is
independent. (People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811.)
Hernandez claims that T.M.’s and J.H.’s testimony was
coerced because they were required by the terms of the U-visa to
cooperate with law enforcement in prosecuting him. Hernandez
states this meant they had to “do as law enforcement wished” and
“raised an unacceptable risk that the witness’ stories were
fabricated by Heidy and themselves” to ensure they remained in
the U.S.
Hernandez’s argument misunderstands the nature of the
coercion doctrine, which applies when the government overcomes
the witness’s will. (Cf. People v. Fultz (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 395,
7
421 [witness who only agrees to testify truthfully and not in a
particular manner does not give coerced testimony].)
Hernandez says the appropriate analogy is to cases where
the government exerts overwhelming pressure on a person to
implicate someone else lest the witness be charged. Courts have
found coercion where police made improper threats,
misrepresentations, and promises of leniency. (See, e.g., People v.
Lee (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 772, 783 [police threatened to use
“irrefutable” proof in form of polygraph results to blame witness
unless witness blamed person police wanted].)
Hernandez points to no evidence like that.
Instead, Hernandez claims the pressure came from the
family’s desire to stay in the U.S. Fear of deportation,
Hernandez maintains, was a “powerful motivator” to lie.
This evidence would go to the credibility of the girls. It is a
classic kind of bias, as when a witness testifies pursuant to a plea
agreement or immunity agreement. (See, e.g., People v. Wilson
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 919.) Witness bias of this kind is the
routine stuff of cross-examinations and closing arguments.
Hernandez unrestrictedly argued this point to the jury.
The jury, however, believed the girls and disbelieved
Hernandez. Hernandez’s coercion argument is not a reason to
disturb this credibility determination.
B
Hernandez claims the trial court erred by permitting expert
testimony regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome. This evidence was proper. We review for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 214.)
Hernandez concedes California case law allows evidence of
this syndrome. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–
8
1302 [allowing expert to testify about the syndrome for limited
purpose].) However, he claims other jurisdictions have banned it
and argues California should do the same. His arguments are
meritless.
Hernandez cites a Pennsylvania case from 1992 that held it
was error to admit expert evidence about the Syndrome.
(Commonwealth v. Dunkle (1992) 529 Pa. 168181–184, 602 A.2d
830, 836–838.) However, Commonwealth v. Jones (2020) 663 Pa.
20, 44, 240 A.3d 881, 896–897, held that Dunkle had been
effectively overruled by legislation as to the type of testimony
allowed in this case. (Ibid. [“[W]e now necessarily hold that
Section 5920 effectively overruled Dunkle to the extent that case
can be read as categorically prohibiting expert testimony
concerning victim behavior in response to sexual abuse due to it
being within the ken of laypeople and not requiring expert
analysis”].)
Hernandez cites a Ninth Circuit case that relied on the
now-defunct Dunkle. (Franklin v. Henry (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d
1270, 1273.)
More recent Ninth Circuit cases approve this evidence.
(See, e.g., Brodit v. Cambra (9th Cir. 2003) 350 F.3d 985, 991
[“we have held that CSAAS testimony is admissible in federal
child-sexual-abuse trials, when the testimony concerns general
characteristics of victims and is not used to opine that a specific
child is telling the truth”].)
The trial court obeyed California law. California courts
have long allowed evidence of this syndrome for the limited
purpose of dispelling commonly held myths or misconceptions
about child victims of sexual abuse. The evidence helps juries
9
evaluating the credibility of these victims. (People v. Sedano
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479.)
Jones testified the syndrome was not a diagnostic tool.
Rather, it was an explanation of the behavior of sexually abused
children that might otherwise appear to undermine the child’s
credibility. The court also gave the proper limiting instructions.
(See People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393–394
[regarding mandatory instructions].)
Hernandez argues this syndrome evidence causes the jury
to believe the child witness. California courts reject this claim so
long as certain precautions are taken. (Sedano, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 485 [proper limiting instructions meant this
evidence was proper].)
Hernandez concedes California allows this type of
testimony under certain conditions. He concedes this court
satisfied those conditions. There was no error.
C
Hernandez argues the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial
misconduct by eliciting evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct.
The prosecutor again correctly notes Hernandez forfeited
this issue by failing to request a different or stronger
admonishment or instruction when the court and counsel
discussed this issue. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518,
553.)
For purposes of analysis, we assume without deciding this
testimony was improper. This testimony was not prejudicial.
This argument fails.
When questioning T.M., the prosecutor asked when
Hernandez first touched her. The young T.M. was reluctant to
speak about the issue in a roomful of strangers. The prosecutor
10
sought to put her at greater ease and to get her talking by asking
when it started. Eventually T.M. replied it was while she lived in
Honduras.
After T.M. described events in Honduras, the prosecutor
asked her about what had happened after she moved to the U.S.
At the prosecutor’s request, the court instructed the jury it
was not to consider for any purpose testimony about conduct
outside the U.S.
We presume jurors understand and follow the court’s
instructions. (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 431
(Buenrostro).) T.M.’s limited testimony about conduct in
Honduras was not prejudicial.
Hernandez claims this evidence was prejudicial. His
argument is illogical, as follows.
Hernandez claims this testimony undermined his defense
that the girls were lying to avoid being deported. He contends
that, if Heidy and her daughters were concocting a story about
this abuse so they could stay in the U.S., they would not include
abuse in Honduras. Hernandez concludes this testimony “was
clearly devastating to the defense.”
This claim is illogical because, if Heidy and her daughters
were concocting the abuse, they would be inclined to fabricate a
tale of more detailed and long-lasting abuse, because that would
be the more believable invention.
In sum, referring to earlier abuse did not undermine
Hernandez’s defense. There was no prejudice.
D
During trial Hernandez moved for a mistrial based on
another incident of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The court
11
correctly denied the motion. Again we review for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor showed a slide
listing the elements for violation of section 288.7, subdivision
(b). The slide stated that there were two ways to show a
violation: committing oral copulation or digital penetration. The
first is a general intent crime, the second a specific intent offense
requiring a specific intent to obtain sexual arousal or
gratification. (§ 288, subds. (b)(1), (2).) The slide omitted the
requirement of specific intent to obtain sexual arousal or
gratification. The instructions the court gave correctly listed the
elements. The court told the jury multiple times that the court’s
instructions overrode anything said by the attorneys.
Hernandez argues that, even though the court gave correct
instructions, because even the correct instructions were
confusing, the error was not harmless. He provides no authority
for this assertion.
The court properly instructed the jury, the jurors took the
correct instructions into the jury room, and the court told the jury
those instructions controlled. There was no error. (See
Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 431.)
E
Hernandez argues the court incorrectly gave the modified
unanimity instruction in CALCRIM 3501 over his objection. We
reject this point. Our review is independent. (People v. Thomas
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.) We evaluate whether the instruction
accurately stated the law and whether there was a reasonable
likelihood it caused the jury to misapply the law. (People v. Lewis
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900.)
CALCRIM No. 3501, as given, stated:
12
“The defendant is charged in Counts 1-3 with oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or
younger, the child being [T.M.], in violation of Penal Code section
288.7(b) and alleged to have occurred between March 30, 2014
and February 27, 2017. The defendant is charged in Counts 4-7
with lewd act upon a child, the child being [T.M.], in violation of
Penal Code section 288(a) between February 28, 2017 to
February 27, 2018. The defendant is charged in Counts 8 and 9
with oral copulation of a child under 14, the child being [T.M.], in
violation of Penal Code section 288a(c)(1) and alleged to have
occurred between February 28, 2017 to February 27, 2018. The
defendant is charged in Counts 13-17 with lewd act upon a child,
the child being [T.M.], in violation of Penal Code section 288(a)
between February 28, 2017 to February 27, 2019.
“The defendant is also charged in Counts 10-12 with lewd
act upon a child, the child being [J.H.], in violation of Penal Code
section 288(a) between February 25, 2018 to July 29, 2019. The
People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove
that the defendant committed these offenses. You must not find
the defendant guilty unless:
“1. You all agree that the People have proved that the
defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all agree
on which act he committed;
“OR
“2. You all agree that the People have proved that the
defendant committed all the acts alleged to have occurred during
this time period and have proved that the defendant committed
at least the number of offenses charged.”
CALCRIM 3501 is the modified unanimity instruction: it
differs from the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM 3500,
13
by adding the second paragraph as an alternative way to reach
unanimity. It is appropriate when a witness provides generic
evidence about the kind of acts committed, the number of acts
committed, and the general time period in which the acts
occurred. (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540,
557.) This happened in this case, as Hernandez concedes, by
noting T.M. stated he molested her five times in his van, but
described only four specific instances.
Hernandez claims that the testimony about abuse in
Honduras made this instruction unclear because the jury would
not know whether that abuse counted as the “alleged abuse”
referenced in the instruction. This argument is meritless. Again,
we expect the jury to be able to follow the court’s instruction, and
here the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony about
Honduras. (Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 431.) However,
even if the jury did not follow the instruction, the jury could
convict only if all jurors agreed all alleged instances happened.
Thus, if the jury improperly considered the Honduras testimony,
it still found all of the U.S. abuse also happened, so Hernandez
could not have been prejudiced.
Hernandez further argues the instruction was unclear
because it did not answer the questions by who and over what
time period. These questions were answered by the counts
themselves. The jury would not have been confused.
(Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 431.)
F
There was no cumulative error because there was no error.
14
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
RUBIN, J. *1
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
15
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