Perez v. Perez CA2/4

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Filed 10/9/25 Perez v. Perez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

In re THE FRED PEREZ LIVING B335561, B338961
TRUST
Los Angeles County
MARIA PEREZ, Super. Ct. No.
19STPB10532
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LAURA PEREZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ana Maria Luna, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Kaplan, Kenegos & Kadin and David Scott
Kadin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Driskell, Gordon & Fetchik and Robert L. Driskell for
Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal arises from appellant Maria Perez’s petition
challenging the validity of the Fred Perez Living Trust (the
trust), created by her late husband, Fred Perez. After a bench
trial, the trial court ruled against Maria and in favor of
respondent Laura Perez, who is Fred’s adopted daughter from a
prior relationship, as well as the trust’s successor trustee and
sole beneficiary. The court found: (1) the trust did not fail due to
insufficient funding, as Fred’s inter vivos transfer of his interest
in his home to the trust was valid; (2) Fred had sufficient
capacity to create the trust; and (3) Laura proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the trust was not the product of undue
influence on her part, rebutting the presumption set forth in
Probate Code section 21380.1
On appeal, Maria challenges each of these findings. We
reject her contentions and affirm.

BACKGROUND

Fred and Maria were married in April 1984. While they
have no children together, they each have children from prior
relationships. Maria has a daughter. Fred has three sons who
are not parties to this appeal. Laura is Fred’s adopted daughter
from a prior marriage.2 Fred met Laura when she was seven

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity.
2 The trial court found that Laura was adopted by Fred in
Mexico before she came to the United States. It also found that
Fred received Laura into his home and openly held her out as his
daughter for 40 years. Maria’s opening brief solely references
this finding in its summary of the trial court’s statement of
decision, where it asserts the court “erroneously determined
Laura to be Fred’s adopted daughter without any documentary

2
years old. He brought Laura to the United States with her
mother and continued to raise her after her mother died. Except
for a three-year period in the 1990s, Laura has resided in the
family home located at 1241 North Azusa Avenue, Azusa (the
property), since its purchase in April 1994. Laura, Fred, and
Maria lived together until Fred’s death in October 2018, after
which Maria moved out of the property.
Maria and Fred purchased the property using earnings
from their lawn care business. Title to the property was
originally held by Laura and Fred as joint tenants. By way of a
quitclaim deed recorded in July 1997, Fred and Laura conveyed
the property to Fred and Maria, husband and wife, as joint
tenants. Subsequently, through a quitclaim deed recorded in
March 2017, Maria transferred her interest in the property from
herself, as joint tenant, to herself as her sole separate property.
In November 2017, Fred met with attorney Priscilla Solario
twice. At the second meeting held on November 29, 2017, Fred
created the trust, which was funded with “[a]ny and all interest
that in [sic] the real property located at 1241 North Azusa
Avenue, Azusa, California” and “[a]ll articles of personal and
household use and ornament of every kind and description and
wheresoever situated.” In conjunction with the trust agreement,
Fred executed a grant deed conveying his interest in the property
as “a married man” to himself as the trust’s trustee.
The trust designated Fred as its trustee and designated
Laura as its successor trustee. Laura was also designated the
sole beneficiary entitled to the trust’s assets—including Fred’s

evidence.” We treat this contention as forfeited, as it is
unaccompanied by reasoned analysis supported by citations to
legal authority. (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620.)

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“principal residence located at 1241 North Azusa Avenue, Azusa,
California”—upon his death. The trust expressly disinherited
Maria, two of Fred’s biological sons, and their respective issue.
Fred died in October 2018. Through a grant deed recorded
in November 2018, Laura, as the trust’s successor trustee,
conveyed the property to herself as “a single woman as her sole
and separate property . . . .”
In November 2019, Maria filed a petition under sections
17200 and 850, seeking an order determining the trust’s validity,
imposition of constructive trust, and attorney fees and costs.
Maria asserted the trust was invalid because (1) Fred lacked
sufficient capacity to create the trust in November 2017; and (2)
Laura unduly influenced Fred to create the trust. Laura objected
to the petition.
During the bench trial on the petition, Maria’s counsel
orally moved to amend the petition to assert an additional ground
challenging the trust’s validity. Specifically, counsel sought to
add the allegation that the trust was invalid due to insufficient
funding and lack of viable assets, as Fred’s transfer of his
interest in the property to the trust was invalid. The trial court
granted the motion.
After receiving briefing on the issue presented by the
petition’s amendment, the trial court found that Fred and Maria
owned the property as community property, and that the deeds
they executed in 2017 were insufficient to transmute the property
to separate property. Citing Masry v. Masry (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 738 (Masry), the trial court further found “[m]arried
persons may dispose of their share of the community without the
consent of the other spouse.” The court therefore found the
transfer of Fred’s interest in the property to the trust to be valid

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and consequently concluded the trust did not fail due to lack of
funding.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court issued a
statement of decision rejecting Maria’s challenges to the trust’s
validity. The court first reiterated that the property was Fred
and Maria’s community property and that per Masry, supra, 166
Cal.App.4th 738, Fred “was free to, and did, fund the trust with
his community property interest in the [property].” It then found:
(1) Laura rebutted the presumption set forth in section 21380,
subdivision (a)(3), as she proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the trust was not the product of undue influence on her part;
and (2) the evidence to which the court gave more weight showed
Fred had contractual capacity to execute the Trust agreement on
November 29, 2017.
Maria appealed.

DISCUSSION

After a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo and
the trial court’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)
In so doing, “[w]e review the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons
stated for the ruling. [Citations.] The rationale for this standard
is that there can be no prejudice from an error in logic or
reasoning if the decision itself is correct.” (Mireskandari v.
Gallagher (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 346, 357.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, “our review
‘begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the
entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the determination.’ ” (DeNike
v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 371, 381
(DeNike), italics omitted.) We do not reevaluate witness

5
credibility or reweigh the evidence. (Id. at p. 382.) We “will
uphold a judgment that is supported by substantial evidence even
if substantial evidence to the contrary also exists.” (Ibid.)

I. Validity of Deed Executed by Fred in 2017
Maria’s principal contention on appeal is that the trial
court should have found the trust invalid due to inadequate
funding. In her view, the trial court correctly found the property
to be Fred and Maria’s community property but improperly
concluded that Fred could transfer his interest in the property to
the trust during his lifetime without Maria’s consent. According
to Maria, Fred could have only transferred his interest in the
property to the trust if it was his separate property. Because he
and Maria never transmuted the property by following the steps
required under Family Code section 852, Maria argues, the grant
deed executed by Fred in November 2017 was invalid and thus
the trust fails due to insufficient funding.
While Maria’s argument raises a few valid points, it
ultimately misses the mark. She correctly observes that Fred
lacked the authority to transfer his interest in the property to the
trust during his lifetime without her consent. Although not cited
in her appellate briefs, the conveyance violated Family Code
section 1102, subdivision (a), which requires both spouses “to join
in executing an instrument by which . . . community real
property or an interest therein is . . . sold, conveyed, or
encumbered.” Further, as Maria suggests, Masry is inapplicable
here and does not hold that a spouse may unilaterally dispose of
an interest in community property. (See Masry, supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 743 [husband satisfied section 15401,
subdivision (a)(2) and validly revoked a family trust by delivering
written notice of revocation to himself as trustee].)

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But contrary to Maria’s argument, the validity of the
conveyance in question does not hinge upon whether Fred
transmuted his interest in the property from community to
separate property. The transfer of community property to a
third-party by one spouse without the consent of the other “is not
void, but voidable.” (Blethen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1926)
198 Cal. 91, 99.)3 Consequently, the transfer remains effective
unless the non-consenting spouse sets it aside. (See id; 4 Miller
& Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2025) § 11:57.) The question
therefore is whether the trial court correctly declined Maria’s
request in her amended petition to set aside Fred’s conveyance of
his interest in the property to the trust.
Hyatt v. Mabie (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 541 (Hyatt) is
instructive. There, the husband executed a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust encumbering his interest in a home
owned by himself and his wife as community property. (Id. at p.
543.) The wife was unaware of the encumbrance and discovered
it after entry of the judgment dissolving the marriage. (Id. at p.
544.) Subsequently, the home was sold, and the wife filed suit to
recover the sale proceeds owed to her former husband and the
deed of trust’s beneficiaries. (Id. at pp. 544–545.)
On appeal from the judgment entered against her, the wife
argued she was entitled to the home’s sale proceeds because the
deed of trust was void, as it was executed in violation of former
Civil Code section 5127, Family Code section 1102’s predecessor

3 Contrary to the assertion by Maria’s counsel at oral
argument, In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903 does not hold that the
transfer of community real property to a third-party by one
spouse without the consent of the other is void ab initio. (See id.
at pp. 911−912.)

7
statute. (Hyatt, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) The Court of
Appeal rejected her contention, reasoning: “[A] nonconsenting
spouse may, during the existence of the community, invalidate in
its entirety an encumbrance which does not conform to [former
Civil Code] section 5127. The remedy is designed to protect the
community. [Citation.] Since the community here had been
dissolved before [the wife] knew of the encumbrance, [she] no
longer had a right to void the encumbrance in its entirety. After
dissolution of the community, [the wife’s] right was limited to
voiding the encumbrance to the extent only of her interest in the
property. Since the encumbrance by its terms did not affect her
interest in the property, the remedy of partial invalidation would
not lie.” (Id. at p. 547.)
The present case is analogous to Hyatt. Maria sought to
invalidate the unauthorized transfer of her husband’s interest in
community property after the community’s dissolution (i.e.,
Fred’s death in October 2018). Under these circumstances, Maria
was only entitled to set aside the transfer insofar as it affected
her interest in the property. (See Hyatt, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at
p. 547.) Since the deed in question “by its terms did not affect her
interest in the property, the remedy of partial invalidation would
not lie.” (Ibid.) For this reason, the trial court properly declined
to void the November 2017 deed and correctly found that the
trust did not fail due to inadequate funding.4

4 In light of this conclusion, we need not address Maria’s
contention that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
her motion for reconsideration based on the court’s reliance on
Masry, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 738. Because the ruling was
correct regardless of its reliance on Masry, remand for

8
II. Capacity
In finding Fred had sufficient capacity to create the trust in
November 2017, the trial court applied the standard for
contractual capacity set forth in sections 811 and 812, rather
than the lower standard of testamentary capacity described in
section 6100.5. The parties do not dispute that the court applied
the correct standard in making its capacity finding.
Sections 810 through 812 apply where, as here, the
disputed trust instrument is “unquestionably more complex than
a will or codicil.” (Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346,
1352−1353.) Section 810 creates “a rebuttable presumption
affecting the burden of proof that all persons have the capacity to
make decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions.”
(§ 810, subd. (a).) The party seeking to prove a person’s
“incapacity to contract, to make a conveyance, . . . or to execute
trusts” must show that the person has a deficit in one or more of
the mental functions set forth in section 811, subdivision (a), and
that “the deficit, by itself or in combination with one or more
other mental function deficits, significantly impairs the person’s
ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of his or
her actions with regard to the type of act or decision in question.”
(§ 811, subd. (b).) In evaluating capacity, courts may consider
“the frequency, severity, and duration of periods of impairment”
arising from a mental function deficit. (Id., subd. (c).) “The mere
diagnosis of a mental or physical disorder shall not be sufficient
in and of itself to support a determination that a person . . . lacks
the capacity to do a certain act.” (Id., subd. (d).)

reconsideration would be futile. (See C.H. Duell, Inc. v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Corp. (1932) 128 Cal.App. 376, 385.)

9
While section 811 relates both to a person’s capacity to
make decisions and his or her capacity to perform certain acts,
section 812 pertains only to the former. Section 812 provides that
a person has mental capacity to make decisions if he or she is
able to communicate the decision while understanding and
appreciating (1) the rights, duties, and responsibilities created or
affected by decision; (2) the probable consequences for the
decisionmaker and any persons affected by the decision; and (3)
the significant risks, benefits, and reasonable alternatives
involved in the decision. (§ 812, subds. (a)–(c).)
In challenging the trial court’s capacity finding, Maria
essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence presented on the
issue. She asserts that, rather than giving it minimal weight, the
court should have accepted the testimony of her expert, Dr. Gary
Freedman-Harvey, opining Fred “lacked the capacity to
understand and appreciate” the documents he signed on
November 29, 2017 “based on his history of dementia.” She
further argues that the court should have disregarded attorney
Solario’s testimony relating to Fred’s capacity based on her
observations during their meetings.
We reject Maria’s contentions. The trial court was entitled
to reject Dr. Freedman-Harvey’s opinion even though Laura did
not present an expert of her own to rebut it. “As a general rule,
‘[p]rovided the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily, he may reject
in toto the testimony of a[n] [expert] witness, even though the
witness is uncontradicted. [Citations.]’ ” (Foreman & Clark
Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890.) The statement of
decision reflects that—far from being arbitrary—the court’s
rejection of Dr. Freedman-Harvey’s opinion was thoughtful and
deliberate. After summarizing Dr. Freedman-Harvey’s and

10
Solario’s testimony in detail, the trial court stated it was “giving
greater weight” to the latter over the former, explaining: (1) Dr.
Freedman-Harvey’s opinion rested entirely on Fred’s medical
records containing hearsay and “statements that may not have
been accurately recorded . . . or taken out of context and/or
supported by the conclusions of others”; and (2) Dr. Freedman-
Harvey “never testified to any specific deficit or deficits set forth
in . . . [s]ection 811 [subdivision] (a)(1) through (a)(4) which
substantially affected Fred’s decision to leave whatever interest
he had in the [property] to . . . Laura.”
Maria’s argument also fails to appreciate that, when
reviewing a finding for substantial evidence, we “do[ ] not
reweigh the evidence” and must “uphold a judgment that is
supported by substantial evidence even if substantial evidence to
the contrary also exists.” (DeNike, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p.
382.) As discussed below, under this standard, the trial court’s
factual findings must be upheld.
As of November 2017, Fred was 87 years old. In addition to
numerous physical ailments, Fred had diagnoses of dementia and
depression. He also had some hearing loss and refused to take
his blood pressure medication. Laura testified that in 2015 and
2016, Fred was “sharp, aware, talkative, knowledgeable and able
to recognize people by their names.” In 2017, she testified, Fred
“was still pretty lucid” but was walking slower than before.
According to Laura, Fred first expressed interest in
creating a living trust 5 to 10 years before he did so, after hearing
an attorney discuss trusts at the senior center he attended. Fred
was referred to Solario by his sister. Laura made the initial call
contacting Solario and took him to her office twice. She testified
that she was only present for a portion of Fred’s first meeting

11
with Solario, when “she learned that Maria had executed a
quitclaim of the . . . property to herself.” At all other times, Fred
met with Solario alone. On the date he signed the trust
agreement, Laura testified, “Fred was mentally sharp.”
Solario testified that Fred was referred to her office by his
sister. She was contacted in November 2017—although she could
not remember by whom—to discuss Fred’s estate plan. Solario
communicated with Fred in Spanish at all times. Although she
could not recall whether Laura was present during her first
meeting with Fred, Solario testified that she normally spoke to
clients alone.
During their first appointment on November 2, 2017,
Solario testified, Fred stated that he wanted to leave his share of
the property to Laura, and that he had discussed his plan with
Maria, noting “Laura had always paid for one-half of the
[property’s] mortgage, taxes, insurance, maintenance and
expenses . . . .” Fred also stated that he wanted to disinherit his
sons. Per her standard practice, and in Fred’s presence, Solario
then looked up the property’s last recorded deed. At that point,
she informed Fred that Maria executed a deed earlier in the year
which, in her view, severed Maria’s joint tenancy with Fred.
Fred “immediately reacted by saying ‘no wonder she’s been acting
strange’ and repeated th[e] statement again.” Unhappy that
Maria had filed the deed without telling him, Fred stated he
“wanted to transfer his one-half interest in the [property] to his
trust because Maria had broken the joint tenancy.”
In their second meeting on November 29, 2017, Solario met
with Fred in private for about 20 minutes before he signed his
estate planning documents, including the trust agreement. She
confirmed that Fred wanted to leave his interest in the property

12
to Laura, and that he wanted her to act as his agent. Fred told
Solario that he “wanted his wife and daughter to live in the
[property]” and that he “thought . . . his daughter or daughter-in-
law would buy out the interest of the other.” Solario further
testified that “Fred told her his wife and step-daughter were not
treating him well” and that “his daughter-in-law was a meddler
and his daughter was a good girl.” Based on her interaction with
Fred, Solario had no concerns regarding his ability to understand
the documents he was signing that day. He “gave no indication
that he had dementia” and apologized for his messy signature.
Fred paid Solario for her legal services.
We conclude substantial evidence demonstrates that Fred
did not have any deficits in one or more of the mental functions
listed in section 811, subdivision (a), which “significantly
impair[ed] [his] ability to understand and appreciate the
consequences of his . . . actions” in creating the Trust on
November 29, 2017. (§ 811, subd. (b).) We further conclude that
substantial evidence demonstrates Fred understood the rights,
duties, and responsibilities created by the trust; the consequences
for himself and others arising from the trust’s creation; and the
significant risks, benefits, and reasonable alternatives involved
his decision to create the Trust. (§ 812.) Substantial evidence
therefore supports the trial court’s finding that Fred had the
requisite contractual capacity to create the trust.

III. Undue Influence
The Probate Code defines “[u]ndue influence” as “excessive
persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from
acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in
inequity.” (§ 86; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a).) In
determining whether a result was produced by undue influence,

13
courts must consider the vulnerability of the victim, the
influencer’s apparent authority, the influencer’s actions or
tactics, and the equity of the result. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15610.70, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) “Evidence of an inequitable result,
without more, is not sufficient to prove undue influence.” (Id.,
subd. (b).) These statutory provisions supplement the common
law meaning of undue influence. (§ 86.)
Under common law, undue influence refers to “pressure
brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to
overcome the testator’s free will, amounting in effect to coercion
destroying the testator’s free agency.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28
Cal.4th 89, 96.) Mere opportunity and motive to exert influence
are insufficient. (Estate of Fritschi (1963) 60 Cal.2d 367, 373–
374.) There must be evidence showing that the influencer
actively participated in procuring the preparation of the
challenged instrument and exerted pressure amounting to
coercion destroying the testator’s free agency. (Id at p. 373.)
The party challenging the instrument in question
ordinarily bears the burden of proving undue influence. (Rice v.
Clark, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 96.) However, an instrument “is
presumed to be the product of . . . undue influence” if it contains a
donative transfer to “[a] care custodian of a transferor who is a
dependent adult” and “was executed during the period in which
the care custodian provided services to the transferor, or within
90 days before or after that period.” (§ 21380, subd. (a)(3).) This
“presumption may be rebutted by proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the donative transfer was not the
product of . . . undue influence.” (Id., subd. (b).)
The parties agree that section 21380, subdivision (a)
applies here, as Laura was Fred’s in-home caregiver paid by the

14
County of Los Angeles In-Home Supportive Services when he
executed the trust agreement in November 2017. The trial court
found Laura rebutted this statutory presumption because she
proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the trust was not
the result of undue influence. Thus, in reviewing this finding for
substantial evidence, we must “account for the clear and
convincing standard of proof” and decide “whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the” trust was not
the product of Laura’s undue influence. (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012 (O.B.); § 21380, subd. (b).)
In support of its undue influence finding, the trial court
acknowledged that Maria and Laura offered conflicting testimony
relating to Fred’s wishes and concerns regarding the property’s
disposition after his death. Based on the content of their
testimony and demeanor on the witness stand, the court found
Laura to be more credible. It also reiterated the minimal weight
it had accorded Dr. Freedman-Harvey’s testimony. Thus, relying
largely on Laura and Solario’s testimony relating to the
circumstances surrounding the trust’s creation, the trial court
found that while Fred and Laura shared a confidential
relationship, Laura played no active role in urging Fred’s
creation of the trust and had no involvement in the formulation
of the trust agreement’s terms.
The gravamen of Maria’s argument is that we should
disregard the trial court’s credibility findings and rely instead on
the testimony by Maria, Dr. Freedman-Harvey, and Fred’s
daughter-in-law to conclude Laura unduly influenced Fred to
create the trust leaving his interest in the property to Laura on
his death. This we cannot do. Maria’s contention fails because

15
she improperly asks us to disregard the applicable standard of
review. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008 [in reviewing a
finding made under the clear and convincing evidence standard,
we “do[ ] not reweigh the evidence” and “may not insert [our] own
views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of the
assessments conveyed by the judgment”].)
Applying the correct standard, we conclude there is
“substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
have found it highly probable” that Laura did not use excessive
persuasion or exert pressure on Fred to overcome his will and
effectively coerce him into creating the trust. (O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 996.) As discussed above, the evidence credited by
the trial court shows that Fred developed the idea to create a
trust on his own, based on an attorney-led discussion he had
attended at his senior center. He was referred to Solario by his
sister. Laura made initial contact with Solario and drove him to
their meetings. Her involvement ends there. For the most part,
Fred spoke to Solario alone. He expressed his testamentary
wishes outside of Laura’s presence, explaining to Solario that he
desired to leave his interest in the property to Laura based on her
payment of the property’s expenses, his positive relationship with
her, and his view that he had been mistreated by Maria and his
step-daughter. Fred likewise signed the trust agreement outside
of Laura’s presence. And Fred—not Laura—paid for Solario’s
legal services.
Substantial evidence therefore supports the trial court’s
finding that Laura proved, by clear and convincing evidence, the
trust was not the product of Laura’s undue influence.

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DISPOSITION

The April 2, 2024, order finding The Fred Perez Living
Trust to be valid is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

VAN ROOYEN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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