CourtListener 10699569•People v. Diaz CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 10/8/25 P. v. Diaz CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B340351
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA098848-01)
v.
OSCAR ROMERO DIAZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Jonathan Demson and Larry Pizarro, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2007 the People charged Oscar Romero Diaz with,
among other crimes, two counts of attempted premeditated
murder and alleged various firearm and gang enhancements. In
2008 Diaz pleaded no contest to two counts of attempted murder
and admitted he personally used a firearm, within the meaning
of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b).1 The trial court
sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 19 years.
In April 2022 Diaz filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6, checking the appropriate boxes to establish his
eligibility. The superior court appointed counsel for Diaz, the
People conceded Diaz stated a prima facie case, and the court
issued an order to show cause.
The superior court denied Diaz’s petition. The court stated:
“So the court’s understanding in this case is that Mr. Diaz’s
participation in this crime was as the driver in a two-person
drive-by shooting. Mr. Diaz was convicted of attempted murder.
The question is:· Was Mr. Diaz an aider and abettor pursuant to
the changes that were made to sections 188 and 189?” Citing two
cases holding an aider and abettor who does not have the intent
to kill can still under current law be convicted of second degree
murder on an implied malice theory, People v. Silva (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 632, 640, and People v. Vizcarra (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 377, 390-392, the court found beyond a reasonable
doubt Diaz was guilty of attempted murder. The court ruled:
1 The passenger in a car Diaz was driving made a gang sign
out the car window and shot a husband and wife who were
putting up Christmas lights in their front yard. The shooter hit
the wife in the face. She survived, and the couple described the
incident at the preliminary hearing.
2
“The People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [Diaz] is
guilty of attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to sections 188 and 189 . . . . [He] is not a person
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
the crime.”
Attempted murder, however, “cannot be based on a theory
of implied malice”; the defendant must intend to kill. (People v.
Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 605; see People v. Stone (2009)
46 Cal.4th 131, 139-140 [“[i]mplied malice—a conscious disregard
for life—suffices for murder but not attempted murder”]; People
v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 869 [attempted murder requires
the specific intent to kill]; Swain, at p. 605 [“‘“Specific intent to
kill is a necessary element of attempted murder.”’”]; People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456 [“Implied malice
cannot support a conviction of attempted murder.”]; People v.
Brito (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 316, 321 [“California courts have
consistently held” there is no crime of “attempted murder based
on implied malice”].) As the People properly concede, the
“superior court’s recitation of the definition of implied malice,
applicable to completed second degree murder, suggests that the
court was unaware of the correct legal standards for attempted
murder.” The superior court erred in finding Diaz was guilty of
attempted murder on an implied malice theory.
3
The order denying Diaz’s petition under section 1172.6 is
reversed. The superior court is directed to conduct a new
evidentiary hearing under the correct legal standard.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
4
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