Murray v. Quintero CA1/1

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Testo completo

Filed 10/8/25 Murray v. Quintero CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

AIS MURRAY,

Plaintiff and Appellant, A171533
v.
(Mendocino County Super. Ct.
YVONNE QUINTERO, et al., No. 23CV00230)
Defendants and Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
After Ais Murray sued his former employer (the Hopland Band of Pomo
Indians) for wrongful termination and other causes of action, Murray’s third
amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice and without leave to
amend. In this appeal, Murray challenges two post-judgment orders denying
his motions to vacate the judgment and tax costs, respectively. For the
reasons set forth below, Murray’s arguments concerning the denial of his
motion to vacate judgment are either untimely or forfeited, and his argument
concerning the denial of the motion to tax costs is unmeritorious.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)

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Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal as to the untimely claims and affirm
the challenged orders in all other respects.
Generally, a notice of appeal is untimely if it has been filed more than
“60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal . . . is served by a party
with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed
copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) Here, Murray filed the notice of appeal on September 17,
2024—many more than 60 days after he was served notice of entry of
judgment on May 14, 2024. And because Murray’s motion to vacate
judgment was also filed after the expiration of the 60-day period “prescribed
by rule 8.104 to appeal from the judgment,” that motion did not extend the
time to appeal from the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(c).) Thus,
any appeal from the judgment in this case is untimely.
Moreover, to allow an appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a
judgment “would have the effect of allowing two appeals from the same ruling
and might in some cases permit circumvention of the time limitations for
appealing from the judgment.” (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973)
10 Cal.3d 351, 358.) For that reason, “[a]n order denying a motion to vacate
an appealable judgment is generally not appealable if such appeal raises only
matters that could be reviewed on appeal from the judgment itself.” (Ibid.)
As we explain below, this rule precludes several of Murray’s claims regarding
the denial of his motion to vacate judgment.
Of the seven questions raised in Murray’s opening brief, the first six
concern his motion to vacate judgment. First, he argues the superior court
allowed a “hearing [on the defendants’ motion to quash] to take place without
proper filing (no motion or motion fee paid) of a motion having been
completed.” The hearing in question took place before Murray received notice

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of entry of judgment, and Murray had already made the filing-fee argument
months before that, so he certainly could have made this argument in an
appeal from the judgment. The same is true for Murray’s second claim,
alleging the superior court “allow[ed] a motion hearing to take place following
a Judge accepting receipt of a motion when no motion fee was paid in a
timely manner to the court.” And the rule from Rooney applies even more
straightforwardly to Murray’s fifth and sixth claims, which respectively
concern matters of tribal and individual immunity that go to the facial
validity of the complaint dismissed in the final judgment.
As for Murray’s third and fourth claims, they are irrelevant to the
challenged order. In his third claim, Murray objects to the way in which the
superior court allegedly made Murray’s “correspondence with the court public
while maintaining correspondence with the Defense private.” In his fourth
claim, Murray contends the superior court treated “him (Pro se) and his
actions differently than they treat[ed] lawyers (Defense Team).” But these
claims—when they do not simply reargue the untimely issues discussed
above—discuss matters that were not presented to the superior court in
Murray’s motion to vacate judgment. “ ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not
raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.’ ” (Delta Stewardship Council
Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1074.) Thus, to whatever extent these
third and fourth claims present matters that could not have been raised in an
appeal from the judgment, they nevertheless provide no basis for concluding
the superior court ruled incorrectly on Murray’s motion.
Finally, there is Murray’s seventh claim, which challenges the order
denying his motion to tax costs. As it appears in Murray’s opening brief, this
claim is wholly unsupported by any citation to legal authority, and we

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therefore “ ‘treat the contention as waived.’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as to Murray’s first, second, fifth, and sixth
claims. In all other respects, we affirm. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

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_________________________
Smiley, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

Murry v. Quintero A171533

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