People v. Rickner CA1/3

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Filed 10/6/25 P. v. Rickner CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171421
v.
MATTHEW RICKNER, (Del Norte County
Super. Ct. No. CF249003)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Matthew Rickner appeals from a judgment after a jury
found him guilty of multiple offenses, including the murder of his mother,
and assault with a semiautomatic firearm against his father. Earlier in the
proceedings, the trial court held a competency hearing and found defendant
mentally competent to stand trial. During trial, defense counsel requested
that the court suspend criminal proceedings and hold a second competency
hearing, but the court declined to do so. In contending the court’s failure to
do so violated his due process rights, defendant argues he presented
sufficient evidence of a substantial change in circumstances that cast serious
doubt on the court’s prior competency finding. We find no error and affirm
the judgment.

1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting and Investigation
At all relevant times, defendant’s parents, Michael and Phyliss
Rickner,1 lived in Crescent City. Defendant previously lived in Sacramento
but moved to his parents’ home in or around September 2023.
On the evening of December 29, 2023, Phyliss informed Michael that
their .45 caliber firearm was missing from their bedroom. Phyliss confronted
defendant and demanded return of the gun. She reached for the pockets of
defendant’s sweatshirt, but he pushed her away and ran out the back door of
the home. Michael had not noticed such erratic behavior from defendant
prior to that night.
Phyliss called 911 and told the dispatcher that her son was “acting
crazy” and “strange,” and that a firearm was missing. The dispatcher asked
if defendant had a history of strange behavior, and Phyliss answered
affirmatively, stating he has “bipolar and schizoaffective disorder” and was
“acting erratically” and “imagining things.” Phyliss added, “And he’s not on
any meds.” The dispatcher informed Phyliss that officers were on their way.
Phyliss told Michael that defendant had mentioned something about
their neighbor, so she went to check on him. Michael eventually found
defendant in their backyard patio holding the missing gun. Defendant
refused to return it and accused Michael of molesting defendant’s son. At one
point, defendant cocked the gun and aimed it at Michael. Defendant
eventually lowered the gun, put it behind his waistband, and moved to
another area of the property.

1 We refer to the family members by their first names to avoid confusion.
No disrespect is intended.

2
Michael received a return call from 911 and requested that officers be
sent to the residence. After the dispatcher said officers were on their way,
the phone line went dead. It was later revealed that the power cord for the
landline had been unplugged.
Michael was near the front door of the residence when Phyliss walked
past him and went inside. Michael and the neighbor heard defendant and
Phyliss arguing inside the house. Michael heard defendant say, “you’ve been
holding information from me.” A gunshot rang out, followed by Phyliss
screaming and another shot. Michael and the neighbor ran towards the
neighbor’s home and heard more gunshots. Michael hid in some nearby
bushes and called 911, reporting that defendant had shot Phyliss.
When the police arrived, they found the front door to the Rickners’
residence ajar and the home mostly dark. Phyliss was lying on the ground,
deceased, with three shell casings near her body. She had suffered multiple
gunshot wounds, including a shot to the back of the head.
The police searched the residence and perimeter for defendant but did
not find him. A few hours later, highway patrol officers spotted defendant
walking along a nearby road. He fled but fell and was apprehended. The
officers found a loaded firearm tucked into defendant’s waistband, and
Michael later identified it as the one missing from their bedroom. During a
search of defendant’s person, officers found a loaded magazine, a
methamphetamine pipe, and a plastic bag containing a white substance that
was later determined to be 11 grams of methamphetamine. All spent rounds
and casings found at the scene were determined to have been fired by the
firearm seized from defendant.
Del Norte County Sheriff’s Sergeant Silas Grigsby escorted defendant
to a patrol car and “advised him that he was under arrest for murder.”

3
Defendant put his head down and said, “She’s gone,” even though Grisby had
not identified the victim or the victim’s gender. Defendant then tried to pull
his arm out of Grigsby’s grasp and kicked him in the leg, but Grigsby was
able to place him into the patrol car.
A search of defendant’s bedroom revealed two bottles for antipsychotic
medications. One prescription, filled the previous year on November 30,
2022, was for Olanzapine, and the bottle contained 29 of 30 pills. Another
bottle found in defendant’s bedroom had a May 10, 2022 prescription for 90
pills of Olanzapine and was empty. Three bottles of medication for
depression were found in the bedroom with prescription dates in April, May,
and November of 2022, and each bottle still contained several pills. A bottle
of medication for anxiety was also found, with a prescription date of June 10,
2022, and it contained one pill out of 90.
An autopsy revealed that Phyliss died of multiple gunshot wounds to
the head, neck, chest, and back. Several bullets entered through the right
side of her chest and right arm but were not fatal. The gunshot wound to the
back of the victim’s head was “immediately incapacitating,” and the
pathologist believed this was the last shot fired “because if it occurred first, I
don’t think you could have then in that position shot her front, side, and
back.”
B. Charges
On January 3, 2024, defendant was charged by complaint with murder
(Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a); count one); assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count two); grand theft of a firearm (§ 487,
subd. (d)(2); count three); disconnecting a telephone line (§ 591; count four);
possession of a controlled substance with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf.

2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

4
Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count five); resisting an executive officer (§ 69,
subd. (a); count six); misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1); count seven); and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used
for smoking controlled substances (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.1, subd. (a),
11364, subd. (a); count eight). As to counts one and two, the complaint
alleged various enhancements for firearm use and discharge causing great
bodily harm. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(8), 667.5, subd. (c)(8).)
C. Competency Hearing
In late January 2025, defendant’s appointed counsel, Karen Olson, told
the trial court she had met with defendant and was prepared to go forward
with the preliminary hearing scheduled for the next day. On the day of the
hearing, however, Olson declared doubt as to defendant’s mental competency,
explaining he had suddenly become “nonresponsive” and “non-verbal” and
was “lying under the bed . . . as opposed to being on the bed itself.” The trial
court had defendant transported to the courtroom, observed his demeanor,
and ordered a psychiatric evaluation to be performed by Dr. Kimel Limon.
In February 2024, Dr. Limon submitted two forensic evaluation reports
stating her opinion that defendant was not competent to stand trial. In her
revised report, Dr. Limon explained that defendant was evaluated twice in
February 2024, but “did not respond to questions” and “refused to be
interviewed.” Dr. Limon based her opinions on court records, police reports,
and discussions with defense counsel.3 Dr. Limon also highlighted the

3 Dr. Limon included Olson’s reports that defendant “presented with
bizarre thoughts related to celestial beings and not being physically present
(e.g., out of body experience),” and that his speech was awkward (e.g., “ ‘Fine,
I am’ ”), his mood was incongruent with his speech, and he was lying in an
awkward position under his bunk on the floor.

5
statements by Phyliss that defendant had a history of bipolar and
schizoaffective disorders and “was experiencing an increase in delusions and
hallucinations,” with “uncertain” medication compliance.
Dr. Limon’s revised report included a sheriff’s incident narrative from
January 2024 that defendant went on a “hunger strike” for several days and
became “verbally nonresponsive to others including the staff and other
inmates.” He requested to be prescribed Olanzapine, but the request “was
denied by the provider for unknown reasons.” Defendant was also reported to
have “ongoing bizarre behavior” including blocking an officer’s pathway to the
stairs, being “verbally nonresponsive,” and “engag[ing] in a blank star[e].”
According to Dr. Limon, defendant “responded to a few questions, but
was soft spoken and hard to understand. He stopped talking, stared and
refused to respond to any further questions during the first visit. During the
second visit, he was located in an observation cell. He mumbled something
and when asked to speak up he yelled ‘I don’t know what is going on.’ He
subsequently disengaged and refused to speak.” Dr. Limon opined that
defendant met diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder of “Unspecified
Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder and Unspecified
Bipolar and Related Disorder,” and that his history of methamphetamine use
“may produce psychotic symptoms similar to Schizophrenia.” Dr. Limon
acknowledged “[t]here is currently not enough information to provide a more
specific diagnosis.”
Regarding the possibility that defendant was malingering, Dr. Limon
acknowledged that defendant “was not formally assessed for feigning mental
illness as he refused to participate in the evaluation.” However, Dr. Limon
remarked, “There was no evidence to suggest that [defendant] was feigning
mental illness.”

6
Dr. Limon opined that defendant “is in a decompensated state and is
not currently prescribed medications. It’s likely that his mental illness
interferes with his current ability to stand trial.” Dr. Limon further opined
that defendant’s understanding of the nature of the legal proceedings was
“impaired” because he has “poor insight into his mental illness,” and that his
selective muteness, particularly with counsel, precluded his “having a
rational, meaningful discussion with his attorney regarding his set of legal
circumstances.”
On February 21, 2024, the trial court held a competency hearing. Both
sides waived a jury trial and agreed Dr. Limon’s revised report could be
submitted in lieu of her testimony. Sergeant Grigsby testified regarding
defendant’s conduct during his arrest, including his remark, “She’s gone,”
when told he was arrested for murder. Michael testified that when defendant
moved back into the parents’ home in September 2023, he worked for
Michael, a commercial fisherman, and was a good worker and fast learner.
Michael had never previously seen defendant act in a nonresponsive manner
as he had after his arrest and believed that defendant was putting on an
“act.” Del Norte County Sheriff’s Deputy Leann McClaflin testified that in
her interview of defendant after his arrest, defendant said he assumed she
was a detective and twice asked for an attorney. McClaflin found defendant
to be coherent and appropriately responsive.
The trial court found that defendant was competent to stand trial, and
that he was feigning incompetence. The court reinstated criminal
proceedings and denied Olson’s subsequent request to be relieved as counsel.4

4 The minute order reflects that during the competency hearing, “[a]n
incident” occurred “which resulted in the Defendant being further restrained
by jail staff.”

7
In March 2024, the district attorney filed an information containing the
same counts and allegations as the complaint.
D. Trial Proceedings
Trial commenced in May 2024. At the outset of trial, prosecutor Todd
Zocchi suggested the trial court preemptively admonish defendant about
disruptive courtroom behavior because, at the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing, defendant had “acted as if he was going to headbutt Detective
Balch.” In response, Olson argued an admonition might “trigger my client
more than make things smoother,” and she noted defendant’s behavior had
improved since the preliminary hearing. Specifically, Olson explained that,
despite defendant’s earlier “noncommunicative” and “aggressive” behaviors,
she has since been able to speak with him and they had met three times.
1. Olson’s Second Declaration of Doubt
On the third day of trial (May 23, 2024), as the prosecution neared the
end of its case in chief, Olson told the trial court that during her jail visit
with defendant that day, “it became evident to me that his understanding of
the proceedings and the charges that are levied against him is questionable.
I think he is decomposing. I can’t put my finger on it, but he is unable to
track questions that I’ve posed with him, to assimilate information, and
respond accordingly.” Olson felt defendant had “some competency issues,”
especially in relation to his ability to assist in his defense because she could
not “get him to focus or concentrate or even give me simple answers in
response to simple questions regarding the state of the evidence and the
charges against him and what that means.”
As an example, Olson stated she “explained some legal issues to him,
asked him a specific question whether he understood what I was telling him,
and his response to me with a hand gesture was, ‘Subpoena.’ [¶] So that’s

8
similar to what I got today with respect to talking to him about an option to
have him testify, what I would be questioning him about. And his focus was
on me subpoenaing Axon or the body camera footage from officers that have
testified. [¶] I told him I’ve already—I have those. We’ve seen some of them.
But he insisted that it needed to be subpoenaed. And then also implied that
he should be questioning my relationship with Mr. Zocchi and whether I’m
working for the prosecution.” The trial court suggested defendant was
mistaking the fact that “both of you have used first names in the courtroom
with each other” as a basis to question counsel’s representation of him.
Olson further told the trial court about a discussion she had had with a
bailiff and defendant’s “questionable behavior and responses” that were “way
out there.” The trial court asked the bailiff about this incident, and he
explained that “defendant was messing with the tablet. So I told him to not
mess with the tablet, and he responded with, ‘Pearcey, you need to get off
your high horse.’ [¶] So then I said, ‘No high horse here.’ [¶] And then he
said something about a sushi bar or something.” Asked by the court if it
appeared “that he’s disoriented or he’s just messing with you,” the bailiff
responded, “I think there’s some messing around.”
Zocchi argued that defendant’s “subpoena” request was rational
because he appeared to be telling Olson “to subpoena something.” Olson
agreed this was an accurate account “for that particular moment” but
indicated defendant later repeated that request and would “not directly
answer questions that I pose to him to try to elicit whether or not he
completely understands what’s going on.” When pressed by the court for
more specifics, Olson explained, “I went in today, and this is what really
made me focus on whether he’s competent, and explained to him his right to
not testify, explained to him my thoughts on a defense of voluntary

9
intoxication, asked him if he understood what I was talking about. And
instead of answering in a yes or no, he went into a speech about things that I
should know, meaning me, things that you should know, put a finger up to
his lips like it was a secret. And then discontinued talking and stared at me.
[¶] So I tried again to talk to him about whether or not he’s willing to testify.
He questioned why I would want him to do that. And I tried to explain to
him that it’s not my choice whether he testifies or not; it’s his choice. But
there’s some advantages and disadvantages that, obviously, come along with
that. [¶] He then went into a, for lack of a better term, a request and said
that he is concerned about the other charges and wanting those to be
dismissed and wanting me to subpoena Axon video to support the fact that
there was no PC 69 committed. [¶] I tried to explain to him that those
charges were the least of my concerns at the moment, trying to talk to him to
find out whether or not I feel he has the ability and also trying to get some
factual statements from him to see if I’m on the right track, and could not get
him to answer in any specific manner to the questions I was posing about the
factual situation.”
The trial court concluded there was no substantial change of
circumstances or new evidence that cast serious doubt on the validity of the
court’s prior finding of defendant’s competence. The court found that, if
anything, “there appears to be a change in the better. He’s communicating
with Ms. Olson, frankly. And they appear to be logical to me in the context
he wants other [mobile video audio recording system (MVAR)] on a Penal
Code 69, which is one of the charges. It really is. And not all the MVARs
have been shown. That’s for sure. I’ve not seen the full MVARs of all these
cases. And I doubt very much the defendant has either, nor anybody,
frankly, at this point, but maybe the law enforcement officers themselves. If

10
he wants additional records subpoenaed, that’s an intelligent thing to
request. Even during trial you have that right. [¶] He has concerns that the
counsels are too familiar with each other. They are calling each other by
their first names. I noted that the first day in court. I think I said that in
open court just recently about how familiar the parties are. I normally don’t
see that in trials. Usually last names used. But instead it’s been first names.
That’s a logical response from the defendant. . . . [¶] Then it’s clear to me
that he’s not delusional. He has a computer right in front him. I know
inmates don’t have computers in front of them in their cells in Del Norte
County, and he’s decided, apparently, to mess with the computer, told Officer
Pearcey to get off his high horse and made some crack about wanting sushi,
which I take is a logical joke that most people would crack about. I mean, we
have dine and—dine and dash services and things of that nature. [¶] So all
that appears to the court to be extremely logical, not a change in
circumstances for the worse, but clearly for the better.”
2. Marsden Motion
The following day, May 24, 2024, the trial court and counsel met for a
preliminary discussion on jury instructions. The court first memorialized the
parties’ stipulation to off-the-record discussions about potential jury
instructions before indicating that defendant had made a motion under
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) for the appointment of new
counsel. The court held a Marsden hearing, during which defendant
explained that he did not feel Olson’s representation had been beneficial, and
that outstanding evidence had not been provided by the prosecution. The
court denied the Marsden motion and resumed trial proceedings.
During an ensuing discussion between the trial court and counsel,
Olson remarked, “There may be a slim chance that my client testifies. I don’t

11
believe that’s going to be the case at this point in time.” Defendant
interjected, “Oh, it’s going to fucking happen now.” Shortly thereafter, while
the court and counsel discussed the instruction for assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, defendant interrupted Zocchi, stating, “No. You
already done disrespecting me multiple times. I have remained cool
throughout this whole process. Shut your fucking mouth.” The following
exchange then occurred:
“THE DEFENDANT: I’m not even moving. You’re the one jerking me
around, dude. My hands are open.
THE BAILIFF: You can’t do that.
THE DEFENDANT: My hands are open. You see that? My hands are
fucking open. That’s right. My hands are open.
THE BAILIFF: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: You going to drag her up from that pit? [¶] You
already done fucked up by saying my salmon was good. You were referring to
my ex.
THE BAILIFF: Hey, Rickner—
THE DEFENDANT: I’ve fucking had enough of your fucking mouth.
THE COURT: Record it all, please.
THE DEFENDANT: I bit my fucking tongue. I have had enough.
Fucking do something. Do your fucking job.”
The trial court noted defendant had “started to stand up when
handcuffed. He was told to remain seated. Appeared to remain seated.”
Defendant stated, “Mess with my fucking kids. You can just fuck off. [¶] If
you won’t put me in a wreck with that fool, then I will fuck one of your guards
off. You should have never brought them in.”

12
Following a short recess, the trial court announced on the record that
defendant “voluntarily absented himself due to his conduct whereby he
threatened to kill one of the officers and unfortunately started to stand up
towards them and then started making various threats.” Zocchi moved to
shackle defendant for the remainder of the trial proceedings, but the court
said it would not rule on the motion without defendant present. The court
further remarked, “I don’t know if he heard me during his threats to the
officers or not in an attempt to calm him down. Apparently, he did not calm
down. He was quite upset over the ruling I gave in Marsden, which is what
appears to have really set him off. He’s simply aggravated over the court’s
ruling.”
3. Motion to Shackle
At the next session of trial on May 28, 2024, the trial court began by
noting that defendant was “refusing to attend.” With a pending hearing on
the prosecutor’s motion to shackle, Olson agreed to attempt to procure
defendant’s presence. After a short recess, defendant returned to the
courtroom. When the prosecutor requested that defendant be placed in
restraints for the remainder of the case, the following transpired:
“THE DEFENDANT: Oh, I stood up, and you got pissy; huh?
THE COURT: Okay. Stop right there. Stop right there.
THE DEFENDANT: Where is that huge bag?
THE COURT: I am now going to advise the defendant that if he
continues to interrupt—
THE DEFENDANT: Give me contempt of court.
THE COURT: —I’ll have him removed, and it will be held as a
voluntary absence.”

13
Zocchi then read from a correctional officer’s report regarding an
incident that occurred at the jail where defendant was housed. During
Zocchi’s reading, defendant interrupted several times, stating he did not
threaten to kill one of the correctional officers. The trial court admonished
defendant, “You continue to interrupt, you will be removed, and the trial will
continue.” Defendant responded, “That’s fine. We can continue the trial
then. Let’s get all the evidence on the table that’s being withheld.” After
further interruptions from defendant, the court ordered his removal from the
courtroom.
The hearing on the motion to shackle continued with Zocchi reading
further from the correctional officer’s report. According to the report,
defendant made “ ‘multiple vulgar statements about Officer Pearcey, he
stated he planned to go off in court again.’ ” When the officer asked
defendant for clarification, defendant “ ‘stated he went off in court today,
(May 24th, 2024), and will do it again on Tuesday, which he believes to be his
next court appearance.’ ” It was further reported that defendant asked an
officer to find Pearcey “ ‘so that they could go to the rec. and fight,’ ” and
added, “ ‘ “Better bring those two midgets.” ’ ”
After further argument, the trial court granted the motion to shackle
defendant. In so ruling, the court noted that one of the reasons for its
decision was that during the proceedings, defendant’s demeanor had
“appeared cold” and his disruptive behavior appeared “calculated” as “he
smiled at the court with a smirk while he was doing so.” With regard to
defendant’s calling the individuals who were with Pearcey midgets, the court
observed “Mr. Pearcey stands well over six feet tall, is a very muscular man,
and the other two officers that were with him were probably a foot shorter

14
each when the outburst occurred last week.” In sum, the court found that “all
these comments appear to be reasonable and calculated.”
Defendant eventually took the witness stand against his counsel’s
advice but merely stated, “I don’t really have nothing to say right now. I’m
still waiting for all the evidence to be brought forward.”
E. Judgment and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and also found true the
allegations regarding firearm use and aggravating factors. The trial court
sentenced defendant to 40 years to life and to a determinate term of 20 years
and eight months.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or
convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.”
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 846–847 (Rogers).) “If, during the
pendency of an action and prior to judgment, . . . a doubt arises in the mind of
the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, the judge shall state
that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the defendant
whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally
competent.” (§ 1368, subd. (a).) “If counsel informs the court that they
believe the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall
order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to be
determined pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369.” (Id., subd. (b).) “The
court’s duty to conduct a competency hearing may arise at any time prior to
judgment.” (Rogers, at p. 847.)

15
A defendant is presumed to be competent (People v. Huggins (2006) 38
Cal.4th 175, 191 (Huggins)) and has the burden of proving incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence (§ 1369, subd. (c)(3); People v. Medina (1990)
51 Cal.3d 870, 881–886). “A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he or
she lacks a ‘ “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as well as a
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” (Rogers, supra, 39
Cal.4th at pp. 846–847.)
“ ‘When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence,
due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing.
[Citation.] “Evidence is ‘substantial’ if it raises a reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s competence to stand trial.” ’ [Citation.] Absent substantial
evidence of a defendant’s incompetence, ‘the decision to order such a hearing
[is] left to the court's discretion.’ ” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395,
432.) “Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources,
including the defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental
evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.) However, to be entitled to
a competency hearing, “a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid
behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little
bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense
counsel.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508 (Ramos).)
“[A] reviewing court generally gives great deference to a trial court’s
decision whether to hold a competency hearing,” as ‘ “[a]n appellate court is
in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial court as
indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the
proceedings, or sheer temper.” ’ ” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33.)
“On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence,

16
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court’s
finding.” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)
In this case, defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to hold a
second competency hearing after defense counsel declared doubt as to his
competency on the third day of trial. “When a competency hearing has
already been held and defendant has been found competent to stand trial, . . .
a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency
hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or
with new evidence' casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.”
(People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 (Jones).) “[T]he duty to suspend
is not triggered by information that substantially duplicates evidence already
considered at an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant’s competence;
when faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant’s
mental state, the court may rely on a prior competence finding rather than
convening a new hearing to cover largely the same ground.” (People v. Rodas
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 234–235 (Rodas).)
In making the determination whether to hold a second competency
hearing, “ ‘the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations
into account . . . ,’ particularly if the defendant has ‘actively participated in
the trial’ and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and converse
with the defendant.” (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234.) “We apply a
deferential standard of review to a trial court’s ruling concerning whether
another competency hearing must be held. [Citation.] We review such a
determination for substantial evidence in support of it.” (Huggins, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 220.)
With these authorities in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. As
recounted above, Olson’s chief concern on the third day of trial was

17
defendant’s perceived inability to respond to her questions, which caused her
to again question whether he understood the nature of the proceedings and
the charges against him. We agree with the trial court that Olson did not
present a “ ‘substantial change of circumstances’ ” (Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
p. 1153) from the first competency hearing, which was also based on
defendant’s overall nonresponsiveness to Olson and others. That defendant’s
communication with counsel improved somewhat in the interim does not
cause us to conclude otherwise, as the record reflects defendant
intermittently engaged in coherent interactions with various people
throughout the criminal proceedings.
Likewise, Olson’s mere belief that defendant was decompensating
during trial was insufficient to compel the trial court to suspend criminal
proceedings and hold a second competency hearing. “A declaration of doubt
by counsel alone is not sufficient to trigger a statutory right to a competency
hearing. Section 1368 is written in terms of whether a doubt arises in the
mind of the trial judge and is then confirmed by defense counsel.” (People v.
Garcia (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 163, 170.) Granted, there was evidence in the
record that defendant was bipolar and had schizoaffective disorder (e.g.,
Phyliss’s statements in the 911 call), but this evidence was already known at
the time of the first competency hearing, and there was no new evidence
suggesting defendant’s conduct during trial was attributable to a worsening
mental or emotional state. “[E]ven a history of serious mental illness does
not necessarily constitute substantial evidence of incompetence that would
require a court to declare a doubt concerning a defendant’s competence and to
conduct a hearing on that issue.” (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 714,
citing Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 508; see also People v. Buenrostro (2018)
6 Cal.5th 367, 389 [“ ‘a defendant who refuses to work with his lawyer out of

18
spite alone is not incompetent,’ for example, ‘even if that defendant has a
serious mental disease or defect’ ”].)
Defendant insists his decompensating mental state was evidenced by
his “bizarre” conduct and remarks during trial. In defendant’s view, his
“disjointed, incoherent references to matters that were wholly unrelated to
the proceedings provide direct evidence . . . of an inability to comprehend or
assist in his own defense.” We are not convinced. “ ‘[M]ore is required to
raise a doubt [as to a defendant’s competence] than mere bizarre actions
[citation] or bizarre statements [citation] or statements of defense counsel
that defendant is incapable of cooperating in his defense.’ ” (People v.
Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 431.) For example, in a case involving similar
circumstances, the California Supreme Court held the “[d]efendant’s cursing
and disruptive actions displayed an unwillingness to assist in his defense, but
did not necessarily bear on his competence to do so, or reflect a substantial
change of circumstances or new evidence casting serious doubt on the validity
of the prior finding of the defendant’s competence.” (People v. Medina (1995)
11 Cal.4th 694, 735.)
Meanwhile, there was ample evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant had the ability both to consult with counsel if he
were so inclined and to understand the proceedings and charges against him.
(Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 846–847.) Defendant’s flight from police, his
apt response to being told he was under arrest for murder (“She’s gone”), and
his refusal to be interrogated by someone he identified as a detective without
an attorney present demonstrated an awareness of his actions and the
proceedings brought against him. Notably, in conversations with defense
counsel, defendant specifically referenced the charge under section 69 for
resisting an executive officer and appeared to believe that subpoenaing

19
additional body cam footage would yield exculpatory evidence on this count.5
Many of defendant’s remarks during trial, though disruptive, demonstrated
an understanding of the roles of the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel.
His suggestion that Olson “subpoena” additional body cam footage from the
prosecution reflected his awareness that Olson represented him and made
decisions about what evidence to obtain in his defense. His attempt to
complete the trial court’s sentence by saying he could be held in “contempt of
court” for his continued interruptions demonstrated an awareness of the
disruptiveness of his actions and the judge’s authority in maintaining order
over the proceedings. Even his suspicion that Olson was working for the
prosecution reflected an understanding of her role as his representative in an
adversarial process. And as the trial court reasonably noted, the accusation
seemed to logically stem from Zocchi’s practice of referring to Olson by her
first name during formal trial proceedings.
Moreover, many of defendant’s remarks during trial were not, as he
claims, “wholly unrelated to the proceedings” when viewed in context and
with deference to the trial court. For instance, defendant’s outbursts
regarding his “kids” and his “ex” came after Michael’s testimony denying his
molestation of defendant’s children by pointing out that defendant or his ex-

5 Defendant insists this was not a rational request to subpoena
additional footage but an irrational request for the same footage that had
already been shown at trial. Setting aside whether this perceived difference
logically bore on the issue of competency, our review of the record does not
disclose that defendant made such a clear distinction in his subpoena request
to Olson. Meanwhile, at other times, defendant expressed his concerns
regarding evidence that “has not been provided by the prosecution” or was
being “withheld,” and it is undisputed the prosecution had not shown the full
MVAR footage at trial. On this record, the trial court could reasonably
conclude defendant was asking Olson to subpoena additional, not duplicative,
evidence.

20
girlfriend (the children’s mother) were always around when Michael saw the
children. Defendant’s “sushi” remark to the bailiff appeared to be an
attempt, in jest, to order food from a court tablet. On this point, the bailiff
indicated there was “some messing around” during this exchange, and the
cold appellate record sheds no light on defendant’s demeanor when he made
this remark. Viewed in a light most favorable to the court’s decision,
defendant’s remarks, though disruptive, had a logical connection to what was
happening during trial.
Many of defendant’s other outbursts were consistent with his general
hostility toward law enforcement. The record is replete with defendant’s
attempts to goad and physically attack law enforcement officers. He attacked
Sergeant Grigsby during his arrest, and he attempted to headbutt a detective
at the preliminary hearing. Upset by the denial of his Marsden motion,
defendant threatened to “fuck one of your guards off.” In the sheriff’s report
cited in support of the shackling motion, defendant was reported as having
demanded that he and Officer Pearcey “ ‘go to the rec. and fight.’ ”
Defendant’s reference to “midgets” was, in the trial court’s reasonable view,
simply an offensive term directed against two officers who were shorter than
the main target of his hostility, Officer Pearcey. Defendant’s outbursts may
have shown that he “was angry and upset, and perhaps that he wished to
interrupt the proceedings, but it was not evidence sufficient to require the
trial court to conduct a mental competency hearing.” (People v. Elliot (2012)
53 Cal.4th 535, 583.)
Critically, the record also contains more direct evidence that
defendant’s outbursts were part of a calculated attempt to disrupt the
proceedings. As the prosecutor noted in support of the shackling motion,
defendant was reported as saying he “ ‘planned to go off in court again’ ” on

21
the next scheduled trial date, just as he had done at the prior session. (Italics
added.) The court also stated for the record that defendant’s disruptive
behavior appeared “calculated” because “he smiled at the court with a smirk
while he was doing so.” Such personal observations are properly taken into
account by a court in deciding whether to order a second competency motion.
(Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234.) In sum, the trial court was in a position
far better than this court to evaluate how defendant’s behavior bore on the
question of his competence to stand trial.
Defendant’s remaining arguments are similarly unavailing. He cites
Rodas for the proposition that a second competency hearing was required
because it is “possible” his failure to take antipsychotic medication was
causing him to decompensate over time. Rodas is distinguishable. There, the
defendant was initially found to be mentally incompetent and was ordered to
a state hospital where he was treated for several months with antipsychotic
medication. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 230–231.) At the start of the jury
trial a few months later, the trial court denied a request for a second
competency hearing despite learning that defendant “had stopped taking
antipsychotic medication—on which his prior competence finding was
effectively conditioned—and was again displaying symptoms similar to those
he exhibited during prior bouts of incompetence.” (Id. at p. 235.) In holding
there was a substantial change in circumstances that compelled a second
competency hearing, the Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant’s
stoppage of medication and reversion to past symptoms “painted a starkly
different picture from that contained in the medical director’s certification”
that supported the prior competency finding. (Ibid.)
Here, in contrast, the prior finding of defendant’s competency was not
conditioned on his remaining medicated. As the trial court found at the

22
February 2024 competency hearing, defendant had apparently stopped
taking his antipsychotic medication many months before, as far back as
November 2022. Nothing in the record suggests that defendant resumed and
then discontinued taking antipsychotic medication during his time in
custody. Thus, unlike the situation in Rodas, there were no changed
circumstances with respect to defendant’s medication use (or nonuse)
between the first competency hearing and Olson’s second declaration of
doubt.
Defendant insists the trial court’s finding that he stopped taking his
antipsychotic medication some time ago “had no solid basis in the evidence.”
In defendant’s view, the fact that Phyliss thought to tell the 911 dispatcher
that defendant was not on any meds “under such stressful circumstances
seems to indicate that his failure to do was a fairly recent event.” We again
are not convinced, as nothing in Phyliss’s statement to the 911 dispatcher
(“And he’s not on any meds”) compels the conclusion that she was reporting a
recent stoppage in defendant’s medication use. In any event, on substantial
evidence review, we accept all evidence that supports the trial court’s decision
and disregard the contrary evidence. (Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax
Bd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213.) Here, the evidence that defendant’s
most recent prescription bottle for antipsychotic medication was dated
November 2022 and was nearly full reasonably supported the court’s finding
that defendant had stopped taking the medication long before the first
competency hearing. Thus, the court could reasonably conclude defendant’s
unruly behavior during trial was not attributable to any recent cessation in
medication use.
Finally, defendant contends the evidence supporting the trial court’s
original competence finding—e.g., defendant’s flight during his arrest, his

23
requests for an attorney, and Michael’s belief that defendant was
malingering—was not “particularly compelling.” Starting from that premise,
defendant argues “the original finding of competence can hardly be said to
have been based on such solid evidence as to make a substantial change in
circumstance unlikely.” To be clear, defendant’s appeal is reasonably
understood as a challenge to the trial court’s refusal to hold a second
competency hearing, not to its initial finding of competence. Thus, he has
forfeited any argument on the latter issue. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10
Cal.4th 764, 793.) Nor does defendant cite any authority suggesting that the
threshold for proving a substantial change in circumstances for a second
competency hearing is reduced where the evidence on the initial competence
finding is perceived as not “particularly compelling.”
In any event, we are satisfied the trial court’s original competence
finding and its decision declining a second competency hearing were both
adequately supported by substantial evidence for the reasons discussed.
That Dr. Limon found defendant to be incompetent was not dispositive. As
recounted, substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
defendant was malingering, and Dr. Limon had not formally tested defendant
on that topic.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. Rickner (A171421)

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