Graham v. Curry CA3

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Filed 10/6/25 Graham v. Curry CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)
----
STEPHANIE GRAHAM et al., C100930

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2020-00290114)

v.

CRYSTAL MARIA CURRY,

Defendant and Respondent.

James E. Vendley (James)1 and Dorothy L. Vendley (Dorothy), a married couple,
established the James E. Vendley Family Revocable 1975 Trust (the 1975 Trust). Under
the terms of one amendment, the trust would divide into specified subtrusts upon the
death of the first spouse—Trust A (a revocable trust), and Trusts B and C (irrevocable
trusts). Each subtrust had a distinct purpose and beneficiary structure.
James died in 1993, triggering the subtrust provision. In 1998, Dorothy, as
surviving settlor and trustee, executed a quitclaim deed conveying real property on Tyler

1 Given the shared surname, we will refer to this individual and his wife by their
first names and mean no disrespect.

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Foote Crossing Road in Nevada City (the Tyler Foote property) from the 1975 Trust to
Trust C. In 2004, as part of a wider property swap between the subtrusts, she executed a
quitclaim deed purporting to convey the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A.
Dorothy died in 2018.
Plaintiffs Stephanie Graham and Kristen Graham, two of the settlors’
grandchildren and beneficiaries under all three subtrusts, filed a petition under Probate
Code section 850 for an order determining title to the Tyler Foote property. Defendant
Crystal Curry, another grandchild and a beneficiary under Trust B and Trust C, but
disinherited from Trust A, filed a cross-petition seeking to invalidate the 2004 Tyler Foote
property transfer and to confirm that property as an asset of Trust C. Both sides moved
for summary judgment. Citing the irrevocable nature of Trust C, the trial court denied
plaintiffs’ motion, granted defendant’s motion, and granted defendant’s cross-petition for
an order confirming that the Tyler Foote property was an asset of Trust C and cancelling
the 2004 quitclaim deed.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred because: (1) defendant’s cross-
petition was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 366.2, and (2) Dorothy’s
2004 conveyance of the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A was effective and
the Tyler Foote property was an asset of Trust A, not Trust C.
We will reverse. We agree with defendant that her cross-petition was not time-
barred by section 366.2. We further conclude, however, that defendant failed to establish,
as a legal matter, that the conveyance of the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A
was invalid based on the irrevocable character of Trust C. We also conclude that
defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of material fact as to whether the exchange

2 Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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of the four properties among the subtrusts changed the total value of defendant’s trust
estate in violation of the express terms of the 1975 Trust.
BACKGROUND
Establishment and Amendment of the 1975 Trust
James and Dorothy were married and had three children, James Vendley, Jr., Scott
Vendley, and Mary Jane Graham. James, Jr., died on March 21, 2003, survived by his
two children, defendant and Mark Vendley. Mary died on February 19, 2015, survived by
her two children, plaintiffs.
As originally established, the 1975 Trust provided that, upon the death of the first
spouse, the trust would be divided into two separate trusts, Trust A and Trust B. Trust A
was to consist of the surviving spouse’s separate property and the surviving spouse’s
share in the community property. Trust B was to consist of the deceased spouse’s
separate property and the deceased spouse’s share in the community property.
On January 22, 1982, James and Dorothy executed a fourth amendment to the
1975 Trust. Under the fourth amendment, upon the death of the first spouse, the trust
now would be divided into three separate trusts. Trust A was to consist of the surviving
spouse’s separate property and the surviving spouse’s share in the community property.
Trust B was to consist of the deceased spouse’s separate property and the deceased
spouse’s share in the community property up to the maximum exemption allowable for
federal estate tax purposes. And Trust C was to consist of the balance of the deceased
spouse’s share in the trust estate. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the trustee
“ ‘shall hold, administer and distribute Trust B, Trust C and any portion of Trust A not
disposed of . . . to the issue of the marriage of the Settlors living on the date of the death
of the survivor of the Settlors, by right of representation.’ ” Thus, Trust C was to be
distributed in equal shares to the settlors’ three children, or their issue by right of
representation.

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On August 1, 1990, by quitclaim deed, James and Dorothy transferred into the
1975 Trust the Tyler Foote property consisting of three parcels in Nevada City, legally
described as: “Northwest 1/4 of Northeast 1/4 of Section 32 and West 1/2 of Northwest
1/4 of Section 33, Township 18, North Range 9 East, being 117 acres more or less.”
James died on December 26, 1993. As a result, the three subtrusts became
operative. Dorothy became the successor trustee. Her interests in the trust estate were
allocated to Trust A, which remained revocable during her lifetime. Under paragraph 8 of
the 1975 Trust, Trust C became irrevocable upon its creation.
On November 17, 1998, Dorothy, as trustee, executed a quitclaim deed, conveying
the Tyler Foote property into Trust C.
On June 23, 2004, Dorothy executed a sixth amendment to the 1975 Trust. The
sixth amendment expressly disinherited defendant and Mark Vendley, the children of
James Vendley, Jr., from Trust A. In a letter dated June 24, 2004, attorney Irving Joseph
notified Dorothy that he was enclosing four deeds necessary “to cause the proper funding
for the various trusts.” He stated: “We have transferred the Mine property to Trust C, the
Tyler Foote . . . property to Trust A, the 1300 C Street property to Trust B and the 1310 C
Street property to Trust C.”
On July 16, 2004, Dorothy executed four quitclaim deeds. She executed a
quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A.
Although the Tyler Foote property is located in Nevada County, the deed was erroneously
recorded in Sacramento County. Dorothy executed a quitclaim deed transferring “twenty
(20) percent interest in” certain Mine property from Trust A to Trust C. She executed a
quitclaim deed transferring property at 1300 C Street in Sacramento from Trust C to Trust
B. Lastly, she executed a quitclaim deed transferring property at 1310 C Street in
Sacramento from Trust B to Trust C. The four quitclaim deeds did not declare a value for
any of the properties.
Dorothy died in 2018.

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Plaintiffs’ Petition
On December 4, 2020, plaintiffs filed a petition pursuant to Probate Code section
850 seeking an order determining title to the Tyler Foote property. Plaintiffs alleged that,
due to the improper recording of the 2004 quitclaim deed in Sacramento County, Deryk
Walcott, the successor trustee, had “declined to effectuate the transfer of title into Trust A
as a result of a potential conflict between the beneficiaries of Trust A, and Trust C . . . .”
Plaintiffs sought an order stating that the Tyler Foote property was an asset of Trust A.
Defendant’s Cross-petition
On April 13, 2021, defendant filed a cross-petition seeking to invalidate the 2004
Tyler Foote property quitclaim deed and to confirm that the property was a property of
Trust C. Defendant alleged that, when Dorothy executed the 2004 quitclaim deed,
purporting to convey the Tyler Foote property from Trust C, an irrevocable trust, to Trust
A, she acted contrary to her authority under the 1975 Trust and in violation of her
fiduciary duty and her obligations under the Probate Code. Defendant further asserted
that the transfer of the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A would reduce the
value of assets passing to Trust C beneficiaries in violation of the terms of the 1975 Trust.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the pleadings and
documents demonstrated that the Tyler Foote property was a Trust C asset. She further
argued that the undisputed material facts showed that Trust C became irrevocable at the
time of James’s death. Therefore, Dorothy had no authority to transfer the Tyler Foote
property out of Trust C. Defendant argued that Dorothy’s attempt to do so breached her
fiduciary duty because the express terms of the 1975 Trust prohibited a trustee from
changing or altering between beneficiaries the total value of the beneficiaries’ trust
estates.

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Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication
Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. They
argued that paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust authorized Dorothy as successor trustee to
allocate trust assets, provided that her allocation did not alter the total value of Trust C.
Plaintiffs further argued there was no evidence that the reallocation of trust assets reduced
the value of Trust C.
Tentative Ruling
In a tentative ruling, the trial court concluded that defendant was entitled to
judgment confirming that the Tyler Foote property was an asset of Trust C. It rejected
plaintiffs’ contention that defendant’s claims were time-barred. The trial court then
determined that defendant had established that Trust C was irrevocable at the time
Dorothy purported to convey the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A. It further
found that the 1998 transfer of the Tyler Foote property into Trust C was irrevocable,
given the language of paragraph 8 of the 1975 Trust. The trial court also found that the
purported transfer of the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A “violated the terms
of the trust providing for equal shares to the three children or the issue of the three
children . . . .” Rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that paragraph 5, which gave the trustee
discretion to reallocate trust assets between the subtrusts (including irrevocable
subtrusts), provided that they do not change the total value of each beneficiary’s trust
estate, the trial court concluded: “First, such a reading would render the irrevocability
language in Paragraph 8 to be meaningless. Second, the attempted transfer of the Tyler
Foote Road from the irrevocable trust to the survivor’s trust undeniably altered
[defendant’s] total value in the trust estate.” The court continued: “even if the attempted
transfer did not alter any party’s ‘total value’ in the trust estate, the transfer was not
authorized since Dorothy expressly lost any ability to transfer the property out of Trust C
back in 1998. The attempted transfer in 2004 violated Paragraph 8 of the [1975] Trust
even if there was no alteration in the total value of ‘such beneficiary’s Trust Estate.’ ”

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The Order Appealed From
Following additional briefing and a hearing, in an order filed January 31, 2024, the
trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, granted defendant’s cross-petition for an order confirming that
the Tyler Foote property was an asset of Trust C and cancelling the 2004 quitclaim deed,
ordered judgment entered in favor of defendant, and ordered the trustee to take all
necessary actions to confirm the Tyler Foote property was an asset of Trust C.
The trial court determined that defendant’s claims were not time-barred, although
on different grounds than those in its tentative ruling. The court agreed with defendant
that section 366.2 did not apply to her cross-petition, concluding that “both of the
pending petitions concern the affairs of the trust as provided at Probate Code section
17200 and not ‘on a liability of a person’ pursuant to . . . Section 366.2.”
The trial court concluded: “According to Probate Code section 15400, Dorothy’s
earlier 1998 transfer was irrevocable given the clear and unambiguous language of
paragraph 8 of the [1975] Trust. As previously noted, there is no dispute that any transfer
by the surviving spouse into Trust C made that transfer irrevocable. Once a valid transfer
of property is made into an irrevocable trust, the surviving spouse no longer has the
ability to dispose of property placed into the irrevocable trust. (Dudek v. Dudek (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 154, 170 [(Dudek).]) When a trust becomes irrevocable, the surviving
settlor no longer has the power to change a distribution out of an irrevocable trust.
[Citation.]” The court also found that the purported transfer of the Tyler Foote property
from Trust C to Trust A violated the terms of the 1975 Trust providing for equal shares
among the three children or their issue.

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DISCUSSION
I
Summary Judgment
“ ‘A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”
(Grayot v. Bank of Stockton (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 8, 13; see § 437c, subd. (c).) “ ‘[T]he
party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a
prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.’ [Citation.]
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to
demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] We review the
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.” (Grayot, at p. 13.)
II
Statute of Limitations
A. The Parties’ Contentions
Plaintiffs argue that the one-year limitations period in section 366.2 applied to
defendant’s cross-petition, and, because her cross-petition was filed almost three years
after Dorothy’s death, her claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erred in ruling that defendant’s cross-petition pertained to “ ‘affairs of the trust’ ” (Prob.
Code, § 17200) rather than being an action brought “ ‘on a liability of a person’ ”
(§ 366.2). Plaintiffs maintain that section 366.2 applies to liability against a person both
in the person’s individual capacity and in the person’s capacity as trustee.
Defendant counters that her cross-petition was brought pursuant to Probate Code
sections 850 and 17200 and concerned the internal affairs of a trust. Section 366.2 does
not apply because defendant’s cross-petition was not based on the personal liability of a
trustee and did not concern a cause of action “ ‘on a liability of a person.’ ” According to
defendant, the three-year period in Probate Code section 16460 controlled.

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We conclude that defendant’s cross-petition concerned the internal affairs of a
trust, and that section 366.2 and its one-year limitations period did not apply.
B. Statutory Construction
For purposes of determining the applicable limitations period, “ ‘[t]he relevant
facts are undisputed. The key issue is the interpretation and application of’ ” the
statutory provisions on which the parties rely. (Smith v. Myers (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
586, 592.) “ ‘ “Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory
standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the
provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context,
because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent.” [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is
no ambiguity in the statutory language. [Citation.] If, however, “the statutory language
may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, ‘ “ ‘courts may consider various
extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the
legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the
statute.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
C. The Limitations Periods on which the Parties Rely
Section 366.2, subdivision (a), upon which plaintiffs rely, provides: “If a person
against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in
contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the
expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action
may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that
would have been applicable does not apply.” (§ 366.2, subd. (a), italics added.)
“ ‘[O]n its face, section 366.2 applies to claims that could have been brought
against the decedent had he or she lived.’ ” (Yeh v. Tai (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 953, 963.)
That section “concern[s] personal liability of a deceased person.” (Ibid., italics added.)

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“Liability of the person, or ‘personal liability’ means ‘[l]iability for which one is
personally accountable and for which a wronged party can seek satisfaction out of the
wrongdoer’s personal assets.’ ” (Estate of Yool (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 867, 875, italics
added.) “The December 1989 California Law Revision Commission recommendation on
the proposed legislation amending Code of Civil Procedure former section 353 [now
section 366.2] explained that ‘the one year statute of limitations is intended to apply in
any action on a debt of the decedent . . . .’ ” (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 301, 308.)
Defendant relies on Probate Code section 17200, which provides, as relevant here,
that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter
concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.”
(Prob. Code, § 17200, subd. (a), italics added.) Probate Code section 16460 provides
that, unless a claim is otherwise barred: “(1) If a beneficiary has received an interim or
final account in writing, or other written report, that adequately discloses the existence of
a claim against the trustee for breach of trust, the claim is barred as to that beneficiary
unless a proceeding to assert the claim is commenced within three years after receipt of
the account or report. An account or report adequately discloses existence of a claim if it
provides sufficient information so that the beneficiary knows of the claim or reasonably
should have inquired into the existence of the claim. [¶] (2) If an interim or final account
in writing or other written report does not adequately disclose the existence of a claim
against the trustee for breach of trust or if a beneficiary does not receive any written
account or report, the claim is barred as to that beneficiary unless a proceeding to assert
the claim is commenced within three years after the beneficiary discovered, or reasonably
should have discovered, the subject of the claim.” (Prob. Code, § 16460, subd. (a).)
D. Analysis
The applicable statute of limitations is to be determined by the underlying right
asserted. (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 76.) “The determination of

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whether a particular statute of limitations applies to a cause of action is a question of law
that we review de novo.” (Wang v. Nesse (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
Defendant’s cross-petition sought to determine title to a trust asset and to
invalidate a deed. Defendant sought “to confirm” that the Tyler Foote property was an
asset of Trust C. The cross-petition alleged that Dorothy, “contrary to her authority under
the [1975] Trust and in violation of her fiduciary duties executed a Quitclaim Deed,
attempting to transfer the Tyler Foote Properties from Subtrust C, to Subtrust A . . . .”
The cross-petition further alleged that, contrary to the terms of the 1975 Trust, this
transfer would reduce the value of the assets passing to Trust C beneficiaries. The cross-
petition alleged that Dorothy’s purported conveyance of the Tyler Foote property from
Trust C to Trust A was “made without authorization and [was] contrary to restrictions on
Dorothy’s powers as trustee under the Trust.” The cross-petition further alleged that, in
making this unauthorized transfer, Dorothy, as trustee, violated her fiduciary duty and
violated her obligations under the Probate Code (1) to administer the 1975 Trust in
accordance with its terms (Prob. Code, § 16000), (2) to administer the 1975 Trust solely
in the interests of the beneficiaries (Prob. Code, § 16002), (3) to deal impartially with the
beneficiaries (Prob. Code, § 16003), (4) to avoid conflicts of interest (Prob. Code,
§ 16004), and (5) to exercise discretionary powers reasonably (Prob. Code, § 16080).
Defendant’s cross-petition does not seek to recover for the personal liability of
Dorothy. (See Yeh v. Tai, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 963.) Nor does it seek to recover a
debt owed by Dorothy (see Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 308), individually or in her capacity as trustee. As defendant argues, nowhere in her
cross-petition did she raise any issue or allegation that Dorothy was personally liable for
her actions, or that sought recompense from Dorothy’s personal assets. The cross-
petition seeks to undo, set aside, or invalidate an act performed by the trustee.
We disagree with plaintiffs that the cross-petition “is predicated on Dorothy’s
liability as trustee of the Trust, arising from her purported ‘violation of her fiduciary duty’

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in transferring the Tyler Foote Property to Trust A.” (Italics added.) Plaintiffs seize on
the cross-petition’s language concerning Dorothy’s alleged breach of her fiduciary duty
and her obligations under the Probate Code to suggest that defendant seeks to recover
from Dorothy or her estate in tort. But the cross-petition seeks to address the internal
affairs of the 1975 Trust (Prob. Code, § 17200, subd. (a)), specifically whether the
transfer of title to the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A was valid. This is a
claim “concerning the internal affairs of the trust” (Prob. Code, § 17200, subd. (a)), not a
claim “brought on a liability of the person” (§ 366.2, subd. (a)).
Plaintiffs argue that “ ‘[t]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form of
action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of
limitations . . . .’ ” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 23.) While this may
be true, it does not help plaintiffs. While defendant in her cross-petition does recite that
Dorothy, as trustee, breached her fiduciary duty, the nature of the right sued upon in the
cross-petition—the gravamen of the pleading—is a challenge to the former trustee’s
conveyance of the Tyler Foote property from irrevocable Trust C to Trust A, allegedly in
violation of the terms of the 1975 Trust. It is not a harm to be redressed by Dorothy
personally for injury resulting from a tortious breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs’
framing of the cross-petition and contentions to the contrary are unavailing.
Plaintiffs also argue that Probate Code section 16460 and its three-year limitations
period did not apply because defendant’s cross-petition is not based on the receipt of an
interim or final account or other written report. However, this argument ignores
subdivision (a)(2) of Probate Code section 16460, which provides: “If an interim or final
account in writing or other written report does not adequately disclose the existence of a
claim against the trustee for breach of trust or if a beneficiary does not receive any
written account or report, the claim is barred as to that beneficiary unless a proceeding to
assert the claim is commenced within three years after the beneficiary discovered, or
reasonably should have discovered, the subject of the claim.” (Prob. Code, § 16460,

12
subd. (a)(2), italics added.) The case law on which plaintiffs rely for the premise that this
section is not triggered in the absence of an interim or final account or other written
report (Di Grazia v. Anderlini (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1347-1348) predated the
amendment of Probate Code section 16460, effective January 1, 1997 (Stats. 1996,
ch. 862, § 40), to add the italicized language (see Noggle v. Bank of America (1999)
70 Cal.App.4th 853, 858-860 [discussing this amendment to Prob. Code, § 16460 and the
intent behind that amendment to reject the Di Grazia holding]).
In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue that, even if the three-year limitations period in
Probate Code section 16460 applies, defendant has not pled nor proved that the cross-
petition was timely. We find this argument forfeited. While plaintiffs argued in their
opening brief that Probate Code section 16460 did not apply, they did not argue that, if it
did apply, the cross-petition was not timely under that section. The general “ ‘rule is that
points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good
reason is shown for failure to present them before.’ ” (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764; accord, Simpson v. The Kroger Corp. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
1352, 1370; see also Rubinstein v. Fakheri (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 797, 809 [defendant
forfeited statute of limitations argument by failing to raise it in his opening brief and
failing to offer a good explanation for his failure to raise it earlier]). Plaintiffs have
forfeited this issue raised for the first time in their reply brief.
The trial court properly concluded that the cross-petition was not time-barred.
III
Conveyance of the Tyler Foote Property
A. The Parties’ Contentions
Plaintiffs argue that the conveyance of the Tyler Foote property was proper and did
not breach any fiduciary duty. According to plaintiffs, under the Probate Code and the
terms of the 1975 Trust, as amended, Dorothy, as trustee, was authorized to exchange
assets between subtrusts, as long as she did not alter the total value of a beneficiary’s trust

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estate. Plaintiffs maintain that paragraph 8 of the 1975 Trust also did not bar Dorothy’s
exchange of assets between the subtrusts. Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendant
submitted no evidence to establish that the exchange of properties between the subtrusts
reduced the value of Trust C.
Defendant responds that the trial court correctly concluded that Dorothy lacked the
authority to transfer the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A because Trust C was
an irrevocable trust and because paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust prohibited Dorothy
from altering the total value of a beneficiary’s trust estate.
We conclude defendant did not establish, as a matter of law, that the irrevocable
character of Trust C barred the conveyance of the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to
Trust A as part of a transfer of assets between the subtrusts. We further conclude that
defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of material fact as to whether the
conveyance resulted in a change or alteration in the value of her trust estate.
B. Interpretation of Trust Instruments
“ ‘In construing trust instruments, . . . the duty of the court is to first ascertain and
then, if possible, give effect to the intent of the maker.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]f the court can
ascertain the testator’s intent from the words actually used in the instrument, the inquiry
ends. [Citation.] “ ‘Where the terms of [the instrument] are free from ambiguity, the
language used must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning and legal import and
the intention of the testator ascertained thereby.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The proper interpretation
of a trust instrument is a question of law subject to independent review, ‘ “unless
interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict therein.” ’ ”
(Zahnleuter v. Mueller (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1305.)
C. Relevant Provisions of the 1975 Trust
Paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust, pertaining to powers of the trustee, provided:
“Upon any division of the Trust Estate into separate shares or trusts and upon any
distribution, the Trustee may apportion and allocate the assets of the Trust Estate in cash

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or in kind, or partly in cash and partly in kind, or in undivided interests, in such manner
as the Trustee in the Trustee’s discretion deems advisable. The Trustee may sell such
property as the Trustee deems necessary to make such division or distribution. After any
division of the Trust Estate, the Trustee may make joint investments with funds from
some or all of the several shares or trusts. Provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall give the Trustee any authority to change or alter as between beneficiaries
the total value of such beneficiary’s Trust Estate.”
Paragraph 7.C. of the 1975 Trust gave the trustee the authority to, among other
things, “manage, control, sell, convey, exchange, partition, divide, [and] subdivide” trust
property. Paragraph 7.D. authorized the trustee to “invest and reinvest the principal, and
income if the Trustee is required to accumulate it, and to purchase or acquire by exchange
or otherwise therewith every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of
investment . . . .”
Under paragraph 8 of the 1975 Trust, during the lifetime of both settlors, the trust
could be revoked in whole or in part by either settlor, and could be amended with the
written agreement of both spouses. However, “after the death of the predeceased spouse,
the surviving spouse shall have the power to alter or amend or revoke Trust A, but there-
after Trust B may not be altered, amended or revoked by any person. From and after the
death of the surviving spouse, Trust A may not be altered, amended or revoked by any
person.”
D. Undisputed Facts and Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion
The following facts are undisputed: James’s death in 1993 resulted in the creation
of subtrusts A, B, and C. Trust C was an irrevocable trust upon its inception. Dorothy, as
trustee, conveyed the Tyler Foote property into Trust C by quitclaim deed in 1998. In
2004, Dorothy executed four quitclaim deeds purporting to reconvey properties among
the subtrusts. The quitclaim deeds purported to convey: the Tyler Foote property from
Trust C to Trust A; the Mine property from Trust A to Trust C; 1300 C Street in

15
Sacramento from Trust C to Trust B; and 1310 C Street in Sacramento from Trust B to
Trust C.
In her motion for summary judgment, defendant argued that the Tyler Foote
property was a Trust C asset; that Trust C became irrevocable at the time of James’s
death; that, as a result, Dorothy had no authority to transfer the Tyler Foote property out
of Trust C; and that Dorothy’s attempt to do so breached her fiduciary duty because the
express terms of the 1975 Trust prohibited a trustee from changing or altering between
beneficiaries the total value of the beneficiaries’ estates.
To determine defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment, we first address
whether the character of Trust C as an irrevocable trust prevented Dorothy from
conveying the Tyler Foote property out of it.
E. Irrevocable Nature of Trust C
“An irrevocable trust is one that may not or may no longer be amended or
revoked.” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2025) Trusts, § 2(4).)
“Irrevocable trusts are binding, even on their trustors.” (Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 35, 37 (Aguilar).) By making a trust irrevocable following the death of
one of the settlors, the surviving settlor trustee lacks the ability to change the planned
distribution thereafter, absent the consent of the beneficiaries of the trust. (Id. at p. 40.)
Once an irrevocable trust is created and a valid transfer of property is made to the trust,
“the settlor no longer has any right to possess or otherwise dispose of the property placed
in an irrevocable trust, such that that individual has no ability to reverse course or change
his or her mind later.” (Dudek, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 170, fn. 13.) “With the
creation of an irrevocable trust, trust beneficiaries acquire a vested and present beneficial
interest in the trust property, and their interests are not subject to divestment as with a
revocable trust.” (Empire Properties v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
781, 787.)

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Upon its establishment as an irrevocable trust at the time of James’s death, Trust C
could not be “amended or revoked.” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2025)
Trusts, § 2(4).) The surviving settlor trustee could not “change th[e] planned
distribution” of Trust C, absent the consent of the beneficiaries (Aguilar, supra,
168 Cal.App.4th at p. 40), and the settlor could not “otherwise dispose of the property
placed in [the] irrevocable trust . . . .” (Dudek, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 170, fn. 13.)
Additionally, the beneficiaries acquired a “beneficial interest in the trust property” of
which they could not be divested. (Empire Properties v. County of Los Angeles, supra,
44 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) None of the foregoing, however, expressly prohibited the
transfer or exchange of properties among the subtrusts at issue here, so long as the
exchange did not divest a beneficiary of the beneficiary’s “vested and present beneficial
interest in the trust property.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs argue that both the express terms of the 1975 Trust and the Probate Code
allowed for the exchange of assets between subtrusts, including irrevocable subtrusts,
provided that, as stated in paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust, such exchange did not
change or alter the total value of a beneficiary’s trust estate.
Paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust authorizes the trustee, “[u]pon any division of the
Trust Estate into separate shares or trusts and upon any distribution,” to “apportion and
allocate the assets of the Trust Estate . . . in such manner as the Trustee in the Trustee’s
discretion deems advisable.” That paragraph further provides, however, “that nothing
herein contained shall give the Trustee any authority to change or alter as between
beneficiaries the total value of such beneficiary’s Trust Estate.” Paragraph 5.B. on its
face does not limit its applicability to the revocable Trust A. Plaintiffs argue that
provisions like paragraph 5.B. are commonly known as “ ‘replacement right’ ” or “ ‘swap
power’ ” clauses. Plaintiffs also emphasize paragraph 7.C., which expressly conferred on
the trustee the authority, to, among other things, “manage, control, sell, convey, [and]

17
exchange” property. We agree that these provisions of the 1975 Trust support plaintiffs’
position.
Plaintiffs also rely on two sections of the Probate Code. Probate Code section
16226 provides: “The trustee has the power to acquire or dispose of property, for cash or
on credit, at public or private sale, or by exchange.” Probate Code section 16227
provides: “The trustee has the power to manage, control, divide, develop, improve,
exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon trust property or any interest
therein.” On their faces, these sections do not limit their application to revocable trusts.
Moreover, no case authority citing these Probate Code sections has held that they apply
only to revocable trusts or do not apply to irrevocable trusts.
The terms of the 1975 Trust and the Probate Code sections on which plaintiffs rely
support their position that the exchange of property among subtrusts by the trustee was
not prohibited provided, under paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust, that the exchange did
not change the value of a beneficiary’s trust estate.
The trial court relied on paragraph 8 of the 1975 Trust, which establishes that, after
the death of the first spouse, the 1975 Trust split into subtrusts, and the subtrusts holding
the deceased spouse’s property “may not be altered, amended, or revoked by any person.”
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we conclude the plaintiffs’ position does not render
paragraph 8 of the 1975 Trust meaningless. We conclude that paragraphs 5.B. and 8 can
be harmonized provided that an irrevocable trust is understood as being one that may not
be “amended or revoked” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2025) Trusts,
§ 2(4)), but may be subject to having property exchanged in and out of the trust if
authorized by the terms of the trust and if carried out in strict compliance with the trust
terms—under the 1975 Trust, that means not affecting the value of a beneficiary’s trust
estate.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, defendant has not identified any
provision of the Probate Code or the 1975 Trust that prohibits the exchange of properties

18
between an irrevocable subtrust and a revocable subtrust so long as the exchange does not
change a beneficiary’s share in the trust estate. The case law on which the trial court
relied and on which defendant relies on appeal, establishes that “[i]rrevocable trusts are
binding, even on their trustors” (Aguilar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 37), that a
surviving settlor trustee lacks the ability to change the planned distribution of an
irrevocable trust absent the consent of the beneficiaries (id. at p. 40), and that, once an
irrevocable trust is created and a valid transfer of property is made to the trust, “the
settlor no longer has any right to possess or otherwise dispose of the property placed in
an irrevocable trust, such that that individual has no ability to reverse course or change
his or her mind later” (Dudek, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 170, fn. 13). However, these
cases do not hold that property may not be exchanged between an irrevocable subtrust
and a revocable subtrust where, as here, such transfer or exchange is authorized by the
express terms of the trust.
We conclude that defendant failed to establish that Dorothy violated her duty to
properly administer the 1975 Trust, according to its terms and under the Probate Code, by
exchanging properties between the subtrusts.
F. Altering the Total Value of a Beneficiary’s Trust Estate
In her summary judgment motion, defendant averred that the conveyance of the
Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A worked “a significant change in the value of
the beneficiaries’ estate as contained in Trust C.” On appeal, she argues that the
conveyance “undeniably” altered the total value of her share of the trust estate in
violation of paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust.
As stated, under paragraph 5.B., Dorothy had discretion as trustee to “apportion
and allocate the assets of the Trust Estate” as she deemed advisable. However, that
paragraph further provides that any such apportionment or allocation must not change or
alter, as between beneficiaries, the total value of a beneficiary’s trust estate. Thus,
assuming the exchange of properties among subtrusts was not otherwise prohibited,

19
paragraph 5.B. prohibits such exchange if it changes or alters, as between beneficiaries,
the total value of a beneficiary’s trust estate. If the conveyances did change the value of
defendant’s trust estate, they violated the express terms of the 1975 Trust.
The record does not contain any valuations of the four properties transferred
between subtrusts. Defendant has not offered or identified any evidence to support her
claim that the conveyance of the Tyler Foote property from Trust C to Trust A, one of
four conveyances executed as part of an exchange of properties among the subtrusts,
“undeniably” altered the total value of her share of the trust estate. Thus, in support of
her motion for summary judgment, defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of
material fact as to whether the conveyances changed or altered the total value of her trust
estate in violation of paragraph 5.B. of the 1975 Trust.

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DISPOSITION
The January 31, 2024, order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to vacate so much of that order as granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and enter a new order denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1), (2).)

\s\
Krause, Acting P. J.

We concur:

\s\
Mesiwala, J.

\s\
Wiseman, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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