CourtListener 10690295•Farahani v. Maddocks CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 10/3/25 Farahani v. Maddocks CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
POORAN FARAHANI et al., as B327259
Trustees, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV31400)
v.
SUSAN C. MADDOCKS, as
Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Lia Martin, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Campbell & Farahani, Frances M. Campbell, and Nima
Farahani for Plaintiffs and Appellants
Nicolson Law Group, Daniel S. Cho, and Andrew T.
Cooledge for Defendant and Respondent
**********
This nuisance action arises from a dispute between
neighboring residential property owners. Plaintiffs and
appellants Pooran and Masoud Farahani, as Trustees of the
Farahani Living Trust (plaintiffs), are downslope neighbors of
defendant and respondent Susan C. Maddocks, as Trustee of the
Susan C. Maddocks Revocable Trust (defendant). Plaintiffs
allege their property is being damaged due to ongoing erosion on
defendant’s property, resulting in a loss of subjacent and lateral
support at their shared boundary. The trial court sustained
defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend on the ground
plaintiffs’ nuisance claim alleged a permanent nuisance that was
time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 338. Plaintiffs
appeal from the judgment of dismissal, arguing their first
amended complaint stated a timely claim for a continuing
nuisance and, alternatively, that the court erred in declining to
grant leave to amend to cure any defects.
We conclude the first amended complaint adequately
pleads a continuing nuisance and that no time-bar appears on the
face of the pleading. We therefore vacate the dismissal entered
in defendant’s favor, reverse the order sustaining the demurrer
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this action on August 17, 2020. After
defendant answered the original complaint, plaintiffs filed a
motion to amend which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiffs
filed a first amended complaint which, like their original
complaint, stated one cause of action for private nuisance. We
assume the facts alleged in the first amended complaint to be
true to resolve whether plaintiffs have stated a legally viable
claim. (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v.
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Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010
(Centinela).)
Plaintiffs own a parcel of residential property located
downslope from a property owned by defendant. The two
properties share a common boundary and are located on
Winnetka Avenue in the city of Woodland Hills.
“In or around February 2017,” a water pipe broke on
defendant’s property near the boundary with plaintiffs’ property.
Plaintiffs spoke with defendant about repairing the broken pipe
but “[d]efendant refused to do so.” “At that time, Plaintiffs
believed that the broken water pipe was causing damage” to their
property “because of an increasing number of cracks in the
driveway.” Defendant’s neglect and failure to maintain her
property resulted in the “continuing erosion of the lateral and
subjacent support” for plaintiffs’ property.
Plaintiffs believe the cracks in their driveway may “have
been caused in part by the loss of subjacent support,” first noticed
after the water pipe break, but that ongoing erosion and the loss
of “lateral support” may also be a factor in the continuing damage
to their property. The loss of lateral support is due to the “bare,
vertical cut” in the land on defendant’s property which is “eroding
and collapsing” in various locations, as well as the lack of a
retaining wall. Defendant’s property is only being partially
supported by a garage wall.
As a consequence of the loss of sufficient subjacent and
lateral support, plaintiffs’ property is being damaged, including
the land under and around their driveway. Defendant’s failure to
maintain her property has caused a continuing private nuisance
that must be abated through installation of a retaining wall.
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Defendant filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint.
The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on the
ground that plaintiffs’ nuisance claim was time-barred under the
three-year statute of limitations codified at Code of Civil
Procedure section 338. A judgment of dismissal with prejudice
was entered in defendant’s favor on December 6, 2022, notice of
which was served by defendant on December 20, 2022.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Where the lower court has entered a judgment of dismissal
after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, our review
is de novo. (Centinela, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; accord, Erlach
v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1291
(Erlach).) For the limited purpose of reviewing the legal
sufficiency of the challenged pleading, we “ ‘ “ ‘treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.]
We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ” ’ ”
(Centinela, at p. 1010.) In determining whether the operative
complaint states a cause of action, “ ‘ “we give the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We are not concerned at the pleading
stage with evidentiary matters or the “plaintiff’s ability to prove
the allegations.” (Erlach, at p. 1291.)
Plaintiffs allege one cause of action for private nuisance,
defined as “[a]nything which is . . . an obstruction to the free use
of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.)
Defendant contends, as she did below, that plaintiffs allege
a permanent nuisance based on a single incident in February
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2017 of a water pipe breaking and causing erosion. Defendant
says a claim based on a permanent nuisance must be filed within
three years of the creation of the nuisance (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 338), plaintiffs filed this action more than three years later in
August 2020, and the action is therefore time-barred. We are not
persuaded.
A demurrer based on a statute of limitations defense will
not be sustained where the allegations show only that the action
may be, but is not necessarily, time-barred. (Lee v. Hanley (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1225, 1232.) In order to successfully assert a statute
of limitations defense on demurrer, the time-bar “ ‘ “ ‘must clearly
and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not
enough that the complaint shows that the action may be
barred.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) As we explain, there is no
unequivocal time-bar that appears on the face of plaintiffs’ first
amended complaint.
The viability of defendant’s statute of limitations argument
hinges on whether plaintiffs have alleged a permanent or
continuing nuisance. “ ‘In general, a permanent nuisance is . . .
a permanent injury to property for which damages are assessed
once and for all, while a continuing nuisance is considered to be
a series of successive injuries for which the plaintiff must bring
successive actions.’ ” (Madani v. Rabinowitz (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 602, 608 (Madani).) The statute of limitations
begins to run on a permanent nuisance on the creation of the
nuisance, and bars claims filed after expiration of the statutory
period. (Ibid.)
In contrast, the ongoing damage caused by a continuing
nuisance results in separate wrongs, each of which commences a
new period within which to bring an action. (Madani, supra,
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45 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) Thus, where the nuisance is
continuing, an action may be brought at any time to recover the
damages that have accrued within the statute of limitations
period, even though the nuisance was originally created outside
of that period. (Ibid.) A plaintiff may bring successive actions
until the continuing nuisance is abated, with recovery being
limited in each such action to actual damages suffered during the
statutory period. (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 869 (Baker).) Prospective
damages are unavailable. (Ibid.)
With little explanation, defendant asserts that plaintiffs
alleged a permanent nuisance. We do not agree.
Permanent nuisances generally have been found when a
structure is involved, “such as a building encroaching upon the
plaintiff’s land.” (Baker, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 869.) Continuing
nuisances historically involved “an ongoing . . . disturbance, . . .
caused by noise, vibration or foul odor” but “more substantial
physical invasions of land have been held to be continuing in
character.” (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991)
230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1146 (Mangini I).) Moreover, the
continuing nature of a nuisance “refers to the continuing damage
caused by the offensive condition, not to the acts causing the
offensive condition to occur.” (Id. at p. 1147.)
The Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘the crucial test of
the permanency of a trespass or nuisance is whether the trespass
or nuisance can be discontinued or abated.’ ” (Mangini v. Aerojet-
General Corp. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1087, 1097 (Mangini v. Aerojet),
quoting Mangini I, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d. at p. 1148; accord,
Madani, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 608–609.) “ ‘[A]batable’
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means that the nuisance can be remedied at a reasonable cost by
reasonable means.” (Mangini v. Aerojet, at p. 1103.)
Baker instructs “we should be particularly cautious not to
enlarge the category of permanent nuisances beyond those
structures or conditions that truly are permanent. Where some
means of abatement exists, there is little or no incentive to make
remedial efforts once the nuisance is classified as permanent.
Such a result is at odds with tort law’s philosophy of encouraging
innovation and repair to decrease future harm.” (Baker, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 872; accord, Mangini I, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1148 [“In cases of doubt respecting the permanency of an
injury caused by a nuisance, courts are inclined to favor the right
to successive actions”].)
Here, plaintiffs have alleged their property is being
damaged on an ongoing basis due to the loss of subjacent and
lateral support from defendant’s property. Plaintiffs allege the
loss of support may have been triggered by a February 2017
water pipe break that defendant refused to repair. Plaintiffs also
allege there is a cut or some form of grading on defendant’s
property, for which no date is alleged, that is collapsing and
eroding in various places and is also contributing to the loss of
lateral support to plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs allege the
ongoing erosion and damage to their property, which may or may
not have multiple causes, can be abated by, at a minimum, the
construction of a retaining wall. We conclude these allegations
adequately state a continuing nuisance sufficient to survive
demurrer. No facts are pled that unequivocally demonstrate a
permanent nuisance that was created before August 2017.
In addition, as defendant concedes, it is well-settled that
“[i]n case of doubt as to the permanency of the injury the plaintiff
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may elect whether to treat a particular nuisance as permanent or
continuing.” (Baker, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 870; Mangini I, supra,
230 Cal.App.3d at p. 1145.) Nothing in the first amended
complaint reflects an election by plaintiffs to treat the nuisance
as permanent. Indeed, the allegations assert the opposite.
Plaintiffs allege ongoing damage. Whether the alleged slope
failure is reasonably abatable and properly characterized as a
continuing nuisance are questions of fact that may require expert
testimony, both of which are questions more appropriately
resolved on the merits. (See, e.g., Madani, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th
at p. 607; Mangini I, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 1147, fn. 14;
Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 583, 598.)
Finally, we are mindful of the fact we may consider
allegations in the original complaint in order to determine
whether a plaintiff has deleted harmful or contradictory
allegations in an effort to state a viable claim. (McBride v. Smith
(2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.) Our review of the original
complaint raises no concerns in this regard. Plaintiffs’ original
complaint alleged injury because of the February 2017 water pipe
break that defendant refused to repair and the ongoing erosion
impacting their property. The first amended complaint still
references the water pipe break near the property boundary and
adds new allegations that ongoing erosion on defendant’s
property may also be a cause, or the primary cause, of the
continuing slope failure occurring at the parties’ mutual
boundary. The allegations are not contradictory.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendant
and respondent Susan C. Maddocks, as Trustee of the Susan C.
Maddocks Revocable Trust, is vacated. The order sustaining
defendant’s demurrer to the first amended complaint is reversed.
On remand, the superior court is ordered to vacate its order and
enter a new order overruling the demurrer and ordering
defendant to answer the first amended complaint.
Plaintiffs and appellants shall recover their costs of appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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