People v. Jones CA3

CourtListener 10686914Calctapp1 ott 2025

Testo completo

Filed 10/1/25 P. v. Jones CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101944

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 62-190657B,
62-190657C)
v.

DESTINY JUANAE MARIE JONES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Codefendants Destiny Juanae Marie Jones and Kenterra Marie Larkins targeted
the retailer Lululemon and, over two days, robbed its stores in the Sacramento area. Not
long after they walked out of the Roseville store with bags full of stolen merchandise,
police detained them and recovered over $15,000 worth of merchandise. Jones and
Larkins ultimately pled no contest to grand theft and organized retail theft and the trial
court sentenced each of them to a prison term. On appeal, they each raise several
challenges to their sentence, contending the court abused its discretion in denying
probation and failing to impose a split sentence involving supervision and instead

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erroneously imposed the middle term. We disagree with their contentions and thus
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2023, the prosecutor charged Larkins and Jones1 with grand theft of property
(Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)2 (counts one (as to both), five & seven (as to Larkins only)),
organized retail theft (§ 490.4, subd. (a)(1) (counts two (as to both), four & six (as to
Larkins only)), fraudulent possession of personal identifying information of 10 or more
victims (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3) (count three)), and possession of burglary tools (§ 466
(count eight)).
Pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, Larkins pled no contest to grand theft and
organized retail theft (counts one & two) and Jones pled no contest to organized retail
theft (count two). Under the terms of the agreement, the remaining counts were
dismissed pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. In addition, Larkins
understood the sentence “lid” to be two years eight months, and Jones understood her
sentence lid to be two years.
A. Factual Basis
The following served as the factual basis for the plea, to which Larkins and Jones
each stipulated. “On or about October 25, 2022, in Placer County, the Defendants
Kenterra Marie Larkins, Areyana Nina Hill and Destiny Juanae Marie Jones in violation
of Penal Code Section 487, did willfully and unlawfully take possession of property
owned by Lululemon without the owner’s consent.

1 Case No. 62-190657C is associated with Larkins and case No. 62-190657B is
associated with Jones. The prosecutor also charged codefendant Areyana Hill; she is not
a party to this appeal.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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“And when they moved and took possession of the Lululemon merchandise, they
had intended to permanently deprive Lululemon of that material. The value of the stolen
merchandise for that date exceeded $950. As per Defendants . . . . [¶] Kenterra Marie
Larkins and Destiny Juanae Marie Jones on or about October 25, 2022, in Placer County,
those two defendants in violation of Penal Code Section 490.4 did willfully and
unlawfully act in concert with one or more persons to steal merchandise from one or
more merchant premises with the intent to sell, exchange, return the merchandise for
value. And that this conduct was committed on more than one occasion within a 12-
month period with the stolen goods exceeding $950.
“More specifically, Your Honor, as occurring on October 25th of 2022, in Placer
County, these three defendants that are before the court today entered the Lululemon at
the Galleria [mall]. They entered the store together, grabbed approximately 129 leggings
valued at $15,222. [¶] They then left the mall and went in a car together that was
registered to Defendant Larkins. The car was subsequently stopped. All of the
merchandise was recovered, and all three were passengers within the vehicle.
“Moreover, Your Honor, as to Defendant Jones and Larkins for the 490.4, there is
also evidence that the day prior in Sacramento on October 24th of 2022, both Defendant
Jones and Defendant Larkins were identified as going into the Lululemon at—in
Sacramento and stealing items from that store as well.”
B. Sentencing Hearing
The probation department prepared a pre- and postplea report for both Jones and
Larkins. As to each defendant, a probation officer initially indicated that probation was a
viable option but, in the postplea reports, a different officer ultimately recommended the
court sentence each defendant to a term of two years; the officer opined that section 654
applied to Larkins’s offenses.
During the sentencing hearing, an organized retail crime investigator for
Lululemon testified that one of the factors leading to the apprehension of Jones and

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Larkins was the use of technology that is expensive and represents an additional loss to
the company. He also described “what happens in a store when these kinds of incidents
take place. There is four to five people that come in, full masks. They make their way
through the store. Pull out trash bags in front of customers during business hours. It’s
very detrimental to a business as a whole. It makes people feel unsafe in a business. It
makes the employees feel unsafe.”
C. Jones’s Sentencing
The prosecutor submitted a sentencing memorandum, to which she attached two
exhibits: text messages between Jones and Larkins in which they planned retail thefts
and photos of the event leading to the instant charges. During the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor stated that although she initially thought a two-year sentence was too harsh,
the text messages between Jones and Larkins indicated they planned to “hit” more stores
in the Bay Area and planned to sell their goods to a “fence” who would resell the stolen
merchandise. The prosecutor opined that this was not a situation where two young
women were caught up in incidents of peer pressure. Rather, the thefts were something
they spoke about in a cavalier manner and with sophistication, including indicating
knowledge of when less security would be present at different stores. The prosecutor
further argued that the submitted photos showed “the brazenness of these women to go in
and carry out large amounts of merchandise often in front of multiple employees. At
least on two of the videos that I watched there were children in the store when all of this
was going on.” Finally, the prosecutor noted, “we also know they were carrying pepper
spray I believe at the Sacramento one.”
Defense counsel responded that Jones was “quite young” and was “working on
herself.” Jones herself expressed remorse and noted that she was young and has worked
hard to change her life around.
In sentencing Jones, the trial court made the following comments:

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“In considering whether or not . . . probation is appropriate, the Court notes the
defendant is eligible for probation; however, the Court must consider Rule 4.414, the
criteria affecting probation. The Court also considers some of the factors in aggravation
and mitigation in relation to considering whether or not probation is appropriate.
“In considering the facts related to the crime, for this particular case as related to
this particular defendant, the nature of this crime compared to other instances is
exceedingly more serious than other instances. This is not a simple grand theft. This is
not a simple grand theft of $1,000. This is not a shop lifting case. This is an organized,
planned, sophisticated assault, not only on the store but assault on the people in the store
who are subject to being hurt when such an event occurs and such a crime occurs. The
Court is concerned the seriousness of this includes the fact that there were children
present, so the nature and seriousness and circumstances of this crime compared to other
instances of theft crimes or even the same crime is quite serious.
“In addition, the Court considered whether or not the defendant was armed with or
used a weapon. The Court also considered the monetary loss. The probation report
indicates that the monetary loss was $33,276; however, it appears that between the two
stores that there is substantial other losses, so that’s a substantial loss.
“The Court has also considered whether Ms. Jones was an active or passive
participant. Based on all available information, she was an active participant, not only an
active participant, but a participant in the planning of the matter in terms of the
sophistication and then whether or not the crime involved sophistication. Clearly by all
available information, it did. The Court also considered -- and I note in terms of the
facts, just the fact that they were so quick demonstrates the sophistication of the crime.
“Related to the facts related to the defendant, certainly she is willing to comply
with probation. Certainly her ability to comply appears she may have the ability to
comply with probation, and in addition minimal, no criminal record of note.

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Notwithstanding the mention in the probation report about the prior arrests, no
convictions.
“The Court has also considered the defendant’s life in terms of whether or not
there is an impact there in terms adverse consequences. But in evaluating whether or not
probation is appropriate, the Court considered all of those factors, but also considered,
again, any factors in aggravation and mitigation as relates to whether or not probation is
appropriate. And, again, I get back to the question of sophistication, the planning
involved in such an event, the loss, the great loss, and whether or not the conduct
involved violence, and the fact that there are people present. Certainly that was a factor
the Court has considered. But the Court also considered that factor in mitigation relating
to the lack of record and her youth. Nineteen at the time of the event.
“I don’t know that I could say it any better than probation, because when I balance
all of those factors to determine whether or not probation is appropriate, probation at
page 16 of her report line 1 states, quote, ‘The magnitude of the defendant’s crimes
cannot be overlooked. She chose to conspire with multiple codefendants to deprive the
victim of over $15,000 worth of merchandise. The defendant and codefendants’ brazen
act of theft put store employees and innocent bystanders’—innocent bystanders—
‘including children at risk of harm during the quick escape and get away.’ That’s the
primary thing to focus on.
“I have considered the defendant’s remorse as well expressed here today.
Obviously different, but expressed here today. And also, as probation did, I give credit to
her lack of criminal history, but when I weigh and balance all those factors, the factors
that weigh in favor of denying probation are greater, and so I would decline and I would
deny probation based on that assessment.
“Turning now to the question of whether or not—what term, what 1170 sentence
the Court should impose, the Court has in this particular case—because the People agreed
to a lid of two years, the maximum the Court can impose is the middle term of two years.

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Of course the Court could also impose 16 months. Then the Court will have to decide
whether or not mandatory supervision is appropriate, but in this particular case based on
the factors that I've already mentioned—I won’t restate them here—based on all of the
factors that the Court considers in determining the appropriate term, again, the Court has
considered the information obviously in the probation report, but in terms of the middle
term, the middle term is appropriate; after considering Rules of Court 4.421 and 4.423,
the middle term is appropriate.
“So for a violation of Penal Code section 490.4(a)(1) as charged in Count Two, the
defendant will be sentenced pursuant to 1170(h) to the county jail for the middle term of
two years, and the Court will designate that as the principal term.”
After the court imposed the sentence, the court asked the parties if there was
anything further that they wanted to say and defense counsel responded: “No, Your
Honor. Thank you.”
D. Larkins’s Sentencing
The prosecutor submitted a sentencing memo requesting imposition of a two-year
eight-month sentence, arguing that Larkins’s repeated participation in a sophisticated
organized retail theft crew warranted the sentence lid. As support, the prosecutor
attached several photos of the incident and text messages between Larkins and Jones in
which they planned retail thefts and communicated how to offload the stolen materials for
profit.
With respect to Larkins, the trial court provided the following reasoning.
“With respect to whether or not probation is appropriate, I have considered that,
and so that’s what I’m going to talk about now. Again, you are eligible for probation.
And in considering whether or not probation is appropriate, I considered the Rules of
Court 4.414, and I’ve also considered any factors in aggravation or mitigation that factor
in to whether or not probation is appropriate.

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“In considering this, because there is a dispute about the pepper spray issue, I am
going to set that aside. I’m not considering that for purposes of your sentence, but I am
considering the seriousness of this offense, which is Rule 4.414(a)(1), the nature, the
seriousness, the circumstances of the crime as compared to other instances. You have
already heard me say that this is not a simple theft. It is undisputed according to the
arguments that I heard today that you were involved in stealing over $48,000 worth of
merchandise; that it was not an opportunistic crime. It was a sophisticated crime. It was
planned. It was serious. Again, it was very brazen. There were children present. The
public was present. As I said before, it was a full-on assault with several people on this
store open to the public. It would be no different than going in to anyplace open to the
public with a number of people and stealing. This was a very, very serious crime. There
is no doubt about that based on all available information.
“In addition, when I have to consider whether or not to grant probation, I have to
consider the amount of loss. The probation report for you says the loss was $33,276, but
as set forth here today, the loss appears to be $48,496. That’s a significant amount of loss
for anyone.
“I also have to consider and I have considered whether you were an active or
passive participant. Based on all available information, I can’t overlook that you were
active. You were an active participant. You were involved in the planning. Involved
in—as it was mentioned earlier today, October 25th wasn’t the only time. There was all
this planning that led up to this event on October 25th. Apparently there were other
events. But in terms of the separation of that conduct, that planning is significant in and
of itself. The actual act of going into Lululemon on October 25th was serious.
“Part of the evaluation is whether or not the crime was sophisticated or
professional. In this case you wore a mask. There was a duffle bag. Carrying garbage
bags. There were many codefendants. Clearly you knew exactly where you were going

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because your direction was in and out, so clearly it was sophisticated and it was not
opportunistic.
“In terms of the facts relating to you, I have to consider in terms of granting
probation, and clearly you are willing to comply with probation. Clearly you
demonstrated over the course of the pretrial proceedings that you can comply because
you complied with these terms. You have the familial support. You have no criminal
history other than those DMV violations, but no criminal history. You have training and
education. Certainly there is going to be an effect on your child with imprisonment.
Certainly there is [sic] adverse consequences related to the felony conviction. At the
same time, you’ve expressed remorse. I think your remorse is genuine. But when I think
about how much potential you have and I think about the decisions you’ve made in the
past, I also have to weigh and balance that with protecting society, punishing you,
isolating you for a time period. I have to weigh and balance all of those things together.
“In terms of the factors in aggravation as they relate to whether or not I grant
probation, I considered all those same things in terms of the sophistication, the planning,
the taking of great monetary value, the vulnerability of the victims, your lack of criminal
record. You were 22 at the time of the offense. You are 24 now. I’ve considered all of
those factors.
“After a full consideration I weigh and balance all of those factors, it’s the
seriousness of your conduct. The seriousness of the planning, the brazen conduct, the
amount of money that was at stake, the people you put in a place that you would not have
been wanting to be a victim of such a crime. I know that based on everything I read
about you. You have it in you to be better. You will be better, but right now I have to
deal with what decisions you made in the past. Based on all of that information, I am
going to decline to grant you probation. I’m going to deny probation.”
The trial court sentenced Larkins to the aggregate term of two years eight months
as follows: the middle term of two years on count one plus eight months, one-third the

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middle term, on count two. The court subsequently asked defense counsel whether there
was anything else to address and counsel only asked for a delayed date to report for
sentencing.
Each defendant filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Jones’s Midterm Sentencing
Jones contends the trial court erred in imposing the middle term, as her youth was
a factor in mitigation requiring imposition of a presumptive low term pursuant to section
1170, subdivision (b)(6). Jones further contends the court abused its discretion in
imposing the middle term because the aggravating factors are not supported by the
record. We disagree.
“After a sufficient factual basis to support the circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation is found, the court enjoys broad discretion in its sentencing determination.”
(People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205.) We review the court’s sentencing
decisions for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428,
fn. 8.) “That ‘discretion must be exercised in a manner that is not arbitrary and
capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an
“individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.” ’
[Citation.] The court abuses ‘its discretion . . . if it relies upon circumstances that are not
relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision.’ ”
(Hilburn, at p. 206.) The court’s “ ‘ “decision will not be reversed merely because
reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor
warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) In other words, “a trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (Ibid.)

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Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “When a judgment of imprisonment is
to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided.” California Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d)3 provides: “In selecting
between the middle and lower terms of imprisonment, the sentencing judge may consider
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and any other factor reasonably related to the
sentencing decision. The court may consider factors in aggravation and mitigation,
whether or not the factors have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial.”
Section 1170 also contains a presumption in favor of the lower term if certain
mitigating circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of an offense,
including if the defendant is younger than 26 years old (or was at the time of the crime).
(People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765; § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B); see also
rule 4.423(b)(6) [circumstances in mitigation include when a defendant is under 26 years
of age or was under 26 years of age when the offense was committed].) Rule 4.421 sets
forth circumstances in aggravation that a court may consider in sentencing if a
presumptive lower term factor contributed to an offense. Under those circumstances, the
trial court may impose the middle term only if it finds that the aggravating circumstances
in rule 4.421 outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
A. Lower Term
Jones contends the trial court erred in considering her youthfulness as a “regular or
normal mitigating factor as opposed to being a super mitigant” that requires imposition of
the low term. She contends that because the record establishes this super mitigant, she

3 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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was not required to specifically request consideration of the low term and the trial court’s
failure to impose it indicates the court misunderstood its statutory obligation. The People
contend Jones forfeited this argument by failing to mention section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6) during the sentencing hearing and, in the alternative, that the record does not show
Jones’s youth was a contributing factor to the charged offense. According to the People,
the presumption that the low term should be imposed was never triggered. We agree with
the People.
First, Jones forfeited this claim by failing to ask the trial court to impose a lower
term sentence pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). (People v. Achane (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043-1044.) “A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise
‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices’ if the party did not object to the sentence at trial.” (People v.
Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 751.) Such an objection must fairly inform the trial
court and the prosecution of the basis for the objection so that the prosecution can
respond appropriately, and the court can make an informed ruling. (See People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435 [interpreting the objection requirement in Evid. Code,
§ 353]; cf. People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [claim forfeited where
defendant “raised no specific objections at the time of sentencing,” so trial court lacked
“a genuine opportunity to correct any errors it may have made”].) “A trial court’s
decision whether to apply [section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)] . . . depends on both factual
determinations and the exercise of discretion,” which means that the defendant must raise
the issue in the trial court and develop a record in order to raise the issue on appeal.
(Achane, at p. 1044.) Jones did not do so here, thus she has forfeited the issue.
Even if not forfeited, we disagree Jones is entitled to relief. Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) only applies if a defendant’s youth was “a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) It is not enough to show that the
defendant was under 26 years old at the time of the underlying offense. (People v.

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Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 992.) While it may seem reasonable to presume
a defendant’s youth is a contributing factor whenever a youth commits a crime, the
Legislature opted to require a finding of causation as to all the circumstances in section
1170, subdivision (b)(6), and “we have no authority to rewrite the statute.” (Fredrickson,
at p. 993, fn. 7; see In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23 [appellate courts may not
rewrite unambiguous statutes].)
Although all the parties acknowledged Jones was young—only 19 years old at the
time of the offense—neither the probation report nor defense counsel suggested that
Jones’s youthfulness contributed to the commission of the offenses in this case. On
appeal, Jones claims the record shows that her mother had health issues that required
Jones to become a provider at a young age, but this also fails to explain how youthfulness
was a contributing factor in the offense. Indeed, the evidence indicates she engaged in
sophisticated planning and reflection rather than in impetuous behavior that is often a
hallmark of youth. (See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283 [Among the
“ ‘hallmark features’ ” of youth are “ ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences’ ”].)
B. Middle Term
Jones next contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a middle term
sentence because the aggravating factors were not supported by the evidence and did not
outweigh those in mitigation. To the extent she contends the court failed to properly
weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, she has forfeited this claim by failing to
raise the issue at sentencing. As a general rule, “all ‘claims involving the trial court’s
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ raised for the
first time on appeal are not subject to review.” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849,
852.)
With respect to Jones’s contention that the court’s decision was not factually
supported, we note that “[t]he plain language and statutory context of Penal Code section

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1170, subdivision (b) are clear the Legislature did not intend to impose evidentiary or
proof requirements or restrictions on the imposition of a middle term sentence. (Compare
Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1) with Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2), (6).) In imposing a
middle term sentence, all that section 1170 requires is that the court apply the Judicial
Council’s sentencing rules and that the court state the facts and reasons for imposing the
middle term on the record at the time of sentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subds. (a)(3),
(b)(5), (c); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.401 et seq. [felony sentencing rules].)” (People
v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1223-1224.)
Jones does not challenge the trial court’s findings that she took part in a
sophisticated organized retail theft or that it resulted in a substantial loss for the company.
(See rule 4.421(a)(8) & (a)(9).) Because under rule 4.420 the court was not required to
rely on any “aggravating” factors when choosing between the middle and lower terms, it
reasonably could have relied on none or on these factors alone to impose a midterm
sentence. (Cf. People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 964 [where trial court’s consideration
of circumstances in aggravation is permissible under the traditional sentencing guidelines
set forth in the rules, the trial court did not err in relying upon that circumstance in
aggravation].)
Jones acknowledges that one valid factor may support the middle term sentence.
However, she contends the record shows the trial court’s primary consideration in
imposing the middle term was the danger the court speculated to be present during the
commission of the offense. She contends the trial court had no support for its findings
that: this was an assault with a risk of harm to others, that children were present or that
Jones was armed with pepper spray.
First, we agree with the People that there is no indication from the court’s ruling
that it considered Jones armed with pepper spray as a factor supporting the middle term;
the court made no such finding.

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Next, she claims there was no support for the court’s concern that children were
present during the theft. Yet the prosecutor represented that she watched two videos of
the theft that showed children present. This statement provides sufficient evidentiary
support. Jones did not object to the prosecutor’s representation of the evidence at the
sentencing hearing and does not now offer any reason why the trial court could not
lawfully consider that statement, thus forfeiting any admissibility claim. (See People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, 356 [complaints about the manner in which the trial
court exercises its sentencing discretion, including “cases in which the stated reasons
allegedly do not apply to the particular case” are subject to forfeiture].) Because “[t]he
court may consider . . . statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the
prosecution, . . . and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing” the
court’s reliance on such evidence was not improper. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(4).)
Finally, we disagree with Jones’s interpretation of the trial court’s comment that
this was “an organized, planned, sophisticated assault, not only on the store but assault
on the people in the store who are subject to being hurt when such an event occurs.”
(Italics added.) Contrary to Jones’s contention, this statement does not constitute a
finding that anyone was harmed or attacked by Jones. Rather, it demonstrates
consideration of the fact that other people were present and that such an event has the
possibility to result in harm of others. Indeed, Jones herself acknowledges there was
potential for harm. (See People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419
[acknowledging a shoplifting may turn “into a robbery when the thief is confronted by a
LPO [loss prevention officer], and the thief assaults the LPO in an attempt to get away”].)
The Lululemon investigator testified that employees and shoppers are often scared in
these types of cases and, the prosecutor submitted photos of the theft in this case that
confirmed the presence of others. While Jones contends it was improper to consider the
possibility of such harm, such consideration is consistent with the sentencing goal of
providing protection to society. (Rule 4.410(a)(1).)

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In sum, the record establishes the court carefully considered the relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching its determination as to sentencing.
This decision was an appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial court and Jones fails
to persuade us the court operated out of the bounds of reason in making its conclusion.
II
Larkins’s Consecutive Sentences
Larkins contends that the court abused its discretion when it imposed a
consecutive term for count two because both offenses arose from the same operative facts
and were not predominantly independent of each other. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that consecutive sentences
were appropriate under section 654 because the elements for organized retail theft and
grand theft are different and that organized retail theft encapsulates “a larger scheme or
conspiracy, working in concert with others over 12 months.” Defense counsel disagreed,
arguing the two offenses involved the same course of conduct and that one cannot
commit an organized retail theft offense “without actually completing the theft.”
In imposing consecutive sentences on counts one and two for Larkins, the trial
court made the following comments.
“Again, it comes back down in your particular case to we have two separate
crimes, because we have the crime that you committed on the 25th.
“When I look back at the plea transcript, I looked at the statement of facts and
proposed stipulated facts. They were definitely delineated as two separate things in the
plea transcript. One was the amount of work and sophistication and planning you did
with the other people to steal the merchandise, and then it was committed over a course
of a period of time. Then the second separate offense was the one committed on the 25th
at Lululemon, and so those two things.

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“The other piece is where probation talks about this wasn’t an isolated incident.
This wasn’t a situation where you were just hanging out with friends and somebody said,
“Hey, let’s go do this.” No. You had thought about it. You had time to reflect. Days
went by. You had time to reflect. On any of those occasions you could have said, “No,
I’m not going to do this.” You went through with your plan and continued to do it.
Those are the things that factor in to my decision in terms of what sentence to impose.
“So as a result, I am going to impose for a violation of Penal Code section 487(a) a
midterm of two years. That’s going to be the principal term. In terms of considering, I
have considered the totality of the circumstances and the factors set forth in California
Rule of Court 4.425 related to the subordinate term and whether or not I’m going to
sentence you consecutive or concurrently. I also carefully considered the circumstances,
the factors set forth in California Rule of Court 4.424 and Penal Code section 654, and I
am going to make a specific finding that 654 doesn’t apply, not only based on how the
evidence was laid out in terms of the stipulated facts for purposes of the plea, but the
information contained in the report as I previously said.”
B. Analysis
Before a trial court determines whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive
sentence, it must determine whether section 654 applies. (Rule 4.424.) Section 654
provides in part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)
“When a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses for which section 654 prohibits
multiple punishment, the trial court must impose sentence for one of them and stay
imposition of sentence for the others.” (People v. Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720, 722.)
If section 654 does not apply, and there are no other statutory restrictions, the trial court
has broad discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. (People v. Shaw
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 453, 458-459.)

17
In her opening brief, Larkins does not specifically contend the trial court erred in
finding section 654 inapplicable. Indeed, she only mentions section 654 to note that the
probation department opined that it should apply. In her reply brief, Larkins contends
that one of her “strongest arguments” is that the probation department found that section
654 applied and contends without citing any authority that the court’s finding that section
654 did not apply was not supported by the record. Because any challenge to the trial
court’s determination that section 654 does not apply is not properly set forth and
developed on appeal, this argument is forfeited. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th
936, 1017, fn. 26 [“ ‘points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be
considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before’ ”]; see also
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument”].) Accordingly,
we limit our consideration of Larkins’s argument to whether the court abused its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences under rule 4.425.
When a person is convicted of two or more crimes, the sentences “shall run
concurrently or consecutively.” (§ 669.) “It is well established that a trial court has
discretion to determine whether several sentences are to run concurrently or
consecutively.” (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20.) “ ‘The burden is on the
party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977, quoting
People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831.)
Rule 4.425 sets forth some of the factors used in determining whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences. Under rule 4.425(a), these include: “(1) The crimes
and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; [¶] . . . [¶] (3) The
crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed
so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.” The
court may also consider any circumstances in aggravation or mitigation in deciding

18
whether to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, except facts “used to
impose the upper term,” “used to otherwise enhance the defendant’s sentence,” or that are
“element[s] of the crime.” (Rule 4.425(b); see § 1170, subd. (b).) Therefore, rule 4.425
acts as a guideline for the trial court and not a requirement. (Rule 4.425 [“[f]actors
affecting the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences include
. . .”]; see People v. Calderon (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82, 86-87 [“[the factors in rule
4.425] are guidelines, not rigid rules courts are bound to apply in every case”].)
“Only one criterion or factor in aggravation is necessary to support a consecutive
sentence.” (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552.) The court’s finding that
Larkins participated in a scheme that resulted in a “significant amount of loss” is an
aggravating factor that justifies a consecutive sentence and is a factor Larkins does not
challenge. (See rules 4.421(a)(9) & 4.425(b); People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
1094, 1104 [“in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court
could have considered the same aggravating factors it had considered in deciding to
impose the middle term”].) Thus, the sentencing decision was within the bounds of
reason based on this fact alone.
Nevertheless, Larkins contends that consecutive sentences are not warranted
because both of her convictions arose from the same incident in Roseville. The People
counter that consecutive sentences were appropriately imposed because Larkins admitted
this was not a “one time” incident; the factual basis included a stipulation that Larkins
and Jones were identified as stealing items from the Sacramento Lululemon store the day
prior. We agree with the People.
As charged and pled to here, Larkins committed organized retail theft by
“[a]ct[ing] in concert with one or more persons to steal merchandise from one or more
merchant’s premises or online marketplace with the intent to sell, exchange, or return the
merchandise for value.” (§ 490.4, subd. (a)(1).) Larkins also committed grand theft
when the “property taken [was] of a value exceeding nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).”

19
(§ 487, subd. (a).) Larkins further stipulated to the fact that she and Jones were identified
as going into the Lululemon store in Sacramento the day before and stealing items. Thus,
the factual basis establishes that Larkins engaged in an ongoing plan to work with Jones
to steal merchandise from one or more marketplaces and, separately, that she walked into
one of those marketplaces and actually stole items worth over $950. Contrary to
Larkins’s contention, the court’s ruling was not improper and as a result, Larkins has not
met her burden to show the trial court abused its discretion.
III
Denial of Probation
Larkins contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant her
probation. Jones joins her argument. We disagree.
“Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release
into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation. (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.1.)” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) In granting probation,
the court’s primary considerations are: “ ‘the nature of the offense; the interests of
justice, including punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, and
enforcement of conditions of probation; the loss to the victim; and the needs of the
defendant.’ ” (Ibid., quoting § 1202.7.)
“ ‘A denial or a grant of probation generally rests within the broad discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.’ [Citation.] A court abuses
its discretion ‘whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances
being considered.’ [Citation.] We will not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of
discretion ‘when it has considered all facts bearing on the offense and the defendant to be
sentenced.’ ” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910.) “ ‘[O]nly in a
very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court

20
in the matter of denying or revoking probation.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
437, 443.)
Larkins and Jones each contend probation was appropriate in light of their
individual factors in mitigation, including the lack of a criminal history, the fact that this
was a property crime and not one of violence, and the fact that they each had education
and training, plans for the future and were willing to comply with the terms of probation.
They contend that the court failed to give appropriate weight to public safety
considerations mandated by section 1202.7 and did not articulate how granting probation
would pose a danger to the community. They further contend that the court failed to
properly consider that they would be able to pay off restitution earlier if on probation.
The People respond that Larkins and Jones have failed to demonstrate the court abused its
discretion when the record establishes that the court considered rule 4.414 and considered
and weighed appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors.
Jones and Larkins forfeited these claims by failing to object during sentencing.
(See People v. Smith, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 852.) At no time did either defense counsel
object to, seek clarification on, or request to change the sentencing factors as stated by
the court. Indeed, when asked by the trial court whether there was anything else to
discuss after the court indicated its sentence, defense counsel for both Larkins and Jones
replied in the negative. (See People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1222.)
Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, we cannot find that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant probation. The trial court did not abandon
its role as an impartial judicial officer as it considered the lack of criminal history, the
arguments of counsel, and the reports and letters of support submitted at sentencing. The
court gave a lengthy and reasoned explanation for its sentencing choice as to each
defendant, specifically considering the amount of loss, the nature of the offense, factors
regarding the needs of each defendant, and the public’s safety. Weighing these factors

21
with additional factors in mitigation, the court ultimately opined that Larkins’s and
Jones’s conduct was serious, brazen, resulted in a large amount of loss, and subjected the
public to criminal activity that could have resulted in harm. Although one probation
officer initially opined that probation may be a viable option as to both Larkins and
Jones, another probation officer disagreed and, during sentencing, the court was not
required to follow either recommendation in those reports. (People v. Downey, supra,
82 Cal.App.4th at p. 910; accord People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 683, superseded
by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 92,
fn. 6.) Contrary to Larkins’s and Jones’s claim, the court’s decision does not exceed the
bounds of reason, and we will therefore uphold it on appeal. (Downey, at pp. 909-910;
see also People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [abuse of discretion is shown
“whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being
considered”].)
IV
Refusal to Impose a Split Sentence
Larkins contends, and Jones joins in the argument, that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to split her sentence to include a term of mandatory supervision
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(A). We disagree.
A. Additional Background
In declining to impose a split sentence for Larkins, the trial court made the
following comments:
“Now, the next evaluation that I have to make is whether or not that I split the
sentence or I suspend a portion of that sentence and place you on mandatory supervision
for any portion of that sentence. And after a full consideration, I do find after considering
Penal Code section 1170(h)(5)(a) and California Rule of Court 4.415, that I do find in the
interest of justice that mandatory supervision is not appropriate. Again, for all the same
reasons I set forth here today. Again, the Court—this is an amount of great taking. It was

22
sophisticated. It was planned. It was professional. It was brazen. There were vulnerable
people. Again, I weighed and balanced all the information contained in the probation
report, and I would decline to place you on mandatory supervision.”
Jones’s defense attorney requested that the trial court grant probation, stating “in
the alternative some type of split sentence.” In declining to suspend a portion of Jones’s
sentence and place her on mandatory supervision pursuant to section 1170, subdivision
(h)(5)(A), the trial court made the following comments:
“The question now becomes whether or not the Court splits the sentence, and in
determining whether or not to split the sentence pursuant to 1170(h)(5)(a) and Rule of
Court 4.415, I have also considered whether or not to allow Ms. Jones to spend some
time on mandatory supervision. And after a full consideration, again, I weigh and
balance just the absolute seriousness of this offense, the people that were present that
were put at risk, the vulnerability of the people, the sophistication, the planning, the
organization, the value, the amount of money that was taken. This is not a simple theft
case. This is a serious, significant case where the parties and the defendant should be
very lucky that nobody was injured, that nobody was hurt, that nobody did anything to
hurt anybody physically. When I weigh and balance all of those things, I would deny and
decline. I find that in the interest of justice that mandatory supervision is not appropriate
in this case pursuant to 1170(h)(5)(a) and Rule of Court 4.415 for all of the reasons that I
have previously stated and considered.”
B. Analysis
A trial court has the discretion to either sentence a low-level felony offender to
county jail or impose a “ ‘split sentence consisting of county jail followed by a period of
mandatory supervision.’ ” (People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467; see also
People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418-1419.) In the latter scenario, the court
suspends execution of the concluding portion of the offender’s sentence and releases
them into the community under the supervision of the probation department. (People v.

23
Avignone (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1233, 1240.) The period of supervision is “mandatory
and may not be earlier terminated, except by court order.” (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).)
Each of the crimes of which Jones and Larkins are convicted qualifies for such a
split sentence. (§ 490.4, subd. (b)(1) [the offense is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding one year or pursuant to subd. (h) of § 1170]; § 489 [same for
§ 487].) Moreover, a split sentence is the presumptive sentence “[u]nless the court finds,
in the interests of justice,” that such a sentence “is not appropriate in a particular case,”
and that a court is required to “state the reasons for [any] denial” of a split sentence “on
the record.” (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(A); rule 4.415(a), (d); see People v. Arce (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 613, 618.) Rule 4.415(b) provides a list of criteria a trial court may
consider when it contemplates denying a split sentence.
Larkins and Jones contend that the court failed to identify case-specific factors that
overcome the statutory presumption favoring a split sentence and instead merely
provided a “generic recitation” of the aggravating factors. They contend the factors in
this case favor mandatory supervision and that none of the grounds for denying
mandatory supervision under rule 4.415(b) apply. Neither Larkins nor Jones raised these
complaints with the trial court and, consequently, has forfeited the challenge on appeal.
(People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353 [“defects in the court’s statement of reasons
are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention”].)
Addressing the merits, however, we disagree with Larkins and Jones. In
determining whether to split the sentence pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(A)
and rule 4.415 for Jones and Larkins, the court considered the seriousness and brazenness
of the offense, the vulnerable people that were present, the sophistication and the
planning, as well as the value of the items taken. These were appropriate factors for the
court to consider in determining that a split sentence was not in the interests of justice,
given that the factors set forth in rule 4.415(b) are not all-inclusive. (See rule 4.415(b)
[court’s determination that mandatory supervision is not appropriate “must be based on

24
factors that are specific to a particular case or defendant,” and “[f]actors the court may
consider include: [four listed factors]” (italics added)]; see also rule 4.408(a) [“The
listing of factors in these rules for making discretionary sentencing decisions is not
exhaustive and does not prohibit a trial judge from using additional criteria reasonably
related to the decision being made”].)
Based on the foregoing and the trial court’s consideration of factors specific to the
case and each defendant, we cannot say that the court abused its broad discretion in
determining, in the interests of justice, that a split sentence was not appropriate. (See
People v. Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; People v. Stuckey (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 898, 916 [“What the interests of justice require in a particular case
constitutes a question uniquely addressed to the broad judicial discretion of the trial
court”]; accord, People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 179; see also § 1170,
subd. (h)(5)(A).)
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
RENNER, J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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