CourtListener 10681918•People v. Ruiz CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 9/30/25 P. v. Ruiz CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086171
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. RIF1905203)
ALFREDO ORTEGA RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside, John M.
Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Alfredo Ortega Ruiz molested his stepdaughter D.A. multiple times
from when she was around 15 years to 17 years old.1 When D.A.’s sister C.R.
was between 11 and 14 years old, Ortega Ruiz molested C.R. once. D.A.
eventually disclosed the abuse. Following an investigation, the People
charged Ortega Ruiz with molesting both D.A. and C.R.
Before trial, the People moved in limine to present expert testimony
about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Ortega Ruiz
did not object, and the court granted the motion. The CSAAS expert
explained common behaviors of child molestation victims. At the end of trial,
the court instructed the jury using the version of CALCRIM No. 1193 in
effect at the time. The jury found Ortega Ruiz guilty of all counts.
On appeal, Ortega Ruiz challenges the admissibility of CSAAS
testimony and the use of CALCRIM No. 1193. Specifically, he claims the
court erred in admitting the expert testimony on CSAAS because it has been
“debunked” by the originator of the concept. He also contends CALCRIM
No. 1193 misstates the law by instructing the jury it may use CSAAS to
evaluate victim credibility, and it misleads jurors into using CSAAS as direct
proof of guilt.
We conclude Ortega Ruiz forfeited these arguments by failing to object.
Even if the arguments were not forfeited, we would conclude they lack merit.
Accordingly, we affirm.
1 The first amended information lists D.A.’s age at the time of abuse as
14 and 15, which differs slightly from the ages provided by her testimony.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Ortega Ruiz with one count of lewd act on a child
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,2 § 288, subd. (a); count 1), five counts of lewd
act on a child 14 and 15 years old and more than 10 years younger than the
defendant (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 2 through 6), and a misdemeanor count
of annoying or molesting a child (§ 647.6, subd. (a); count 7). The amended
information also alleged a serious prior offense, a strike prior, and two
aggravating factors.
A. Pretrial Motions
The prosecution filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce expert
testimony to dispel common misconceptions about child abuse and to explain
the victims’ ”self-impeaching” behavior, such as delayed disclosure or
recantation. The prosecutor confirmed the expert’s testimony would be
generic and generalized. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of
CSAAS testimony. He asked for leeway to cross-examine the expert about
the theories and the opinions behind the theories, as well as whether the
expert had read any articles about false child abuse allegations. The
prosecutor objected to eliciting any testimony about percentages or ratios
about false disclosures by victims. The trial court granted the motion in
limine but clarified it would not permit any questions or testimony that
included percentages or ratios of false disclosures.
B. D.A.’s Testimony
When D.A. was in high school, she lived in a home with her stepfather
Ortega Ruiz, her sister C.R., her two half-brothers, and her mother.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
Ortega Ruiz first molested D.A. when she was roughly 15 years old.
They were alone in a bedroom watching TV under the covers. Ortega Ruiz
put his hand over D.A.’s pants, covering her vagina. Then, he unbuckled her
pants and placed his hand under her underwear. When she pushed his hand
away, he tried a second time. He said something like, “Come on. It’s just my
finger. It’s not going to do anything to you.”
The next time Ortega Ruiz touched D.A., she was alone in the garage,
doing laundry. He walked in, closed the door, and forcibly kissed her, holding
her face in his hands. He also fondled her breasts under her bra. He touched
her in a similar manner at least a dozen other times in the garage. He also
touched and kissed her in his bedroom.
When D.A. was about 16 and a sophomore in high school, when no one
else was home, he directed her into the bathroom and instructed her to watch
him masturbate. He also put his hand in her pants, under her underwear,
and rubbed her vagina. With prompting, D.A. estimated it lasted 15 minutes.
When D.A.’s mother knocked on the front door of the home to be let in,
Ortega Ruiz told D.A. to run into her room. She obeyed and pretended to be
asleep. D.A. initially could not remember how many other times Ortega Ruiz
touched her in a similar manner. When asked again, she agreed it happened
more than twice.
Another time, a naked Ortega Ruiz entered D.A. and C.R.’s room. D.A.
told C.R., with whom she shared a bed, “Stay under the bed [covers] and
pretend [to be] asleep.” D.A. coughed loudly to draw attention, and her
mother entered the room. Her mother asked Ortega Ruiz what he was doing
and ordered him to leave before D.A. and C.R. woke up and saw him. D.A.
did not remember how old she was when this happened.
4
When D.A. was about 17, Ortega Ruiz molested her multiple times.
Once, Ortega Ruiz and D.A. were alone, lying in bed. He locked the bedroom
door. He had his pants off and pulled D.A.’s pants down. He put his hand on
her vagina and started rubbing it. He was playing with himself and tried to
make D.A. sit on top of him. After about 20 minutes, he got dressed and left;
D.A. pretended to fall asleep.
During another incident, D.A., her mother, and Ortega Ruiz were in
bed. D.A.’s mother left to go check on the food, and Ortega Ruiz took D.A.’s
hand and forced it on his penis, skin to skin. He put his hand over hers and
started stroking himself. D.A. initially could not remember how many times
Ortega Ruiz forced her to touch his penis, then offered at least three times.
Another time, Ortega Ruiz and D.A. were in his room, lying in bed
when he turned on an electric razor with tape over where the blades should
be. He placed it in D.A.’s vagina.
One incident occurred in the living room. D.A. and her sister were
sitting on either side of Ortega Ruiz on the couch, covered with a blanket. He
first touched D.A. Then she saw movement under the blanket on C.R.’s side.
C.R. got up and ran, so D.A. used that excuse to run after her. C.R. disclosed
to D.A. what happened. D.A. told C.R. she would take care of it. She did not
speak with Ortega Ruiz after she heard what C.R. said.
D.A. did not disclose the molestation to an adult during the two years it
occurred. D.A. told C.R. when she was considering speaking up about it.
D.A. initially did not remember disclosing the molestation to her
mother. Once the prosecutor refreshed her recollection with a transcript of
an earlier interview between D.A. and a social worker, she recalled telling
her mother. Her mother did nothing about the abuse.
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D.A. disclosed to her aunt that Ortega Ruiz tried touching her. D.A.
testified her aunt reported it to the police, but Ortega Ruiz and her mom told
police, “No, everything is okay here. You guys can go.”
Within a month of disclosing the molestation to her aunt in
December 2019, D.A. told a teacher that Ortega Ruiz was making her sleep in
the garage, even though this was untrue. D.A. thought if she did not
exaggerate, she might not get help because when she told her mother, her
mother did nothing. D.A. told child protective services that she lied to her
teacher about sleeping in the garage.
D.A. thought if she disclosed the molestation, the family would fall
apart. She did not want the family to break up. She also was afraid nothing
would happen in response to her allegations, or Ortega Ruiz would hit her.
Before D.A. disclosed the molestation, the police had been to the family
home multiple times due to reports of domestic violence. The police spoke
with D.A., but she did not disclose the sexual abuse. She pretended
everything was “okay,” and they were doing “fine.”
The defense questioned D.A.’s credibility and asked about her motives.
D.A. testified that a day or two before Ortega Ruiz was arrested for
molestation, he cleared out the room D.A. used and made her sleep
elsewhere. Also, her parents had various arguments about child custody in
the event of divorce, and D.A. would witness Ortega Ruiz hitting her mother.
The defense also asked D.A. about inconsistencies between her trial
testimony and her interviews with the police and social worker. And counsel
questioned D.A. about specific incidents she disclosed for the first time in
trial. For instance, she never told social workers or law enforcement about
the time where Ortega Ruiz entered her room naked, with an erect penis.
6
C. C.R.’s Testimony
C.R. was about 11 years old when Ortega Ruiz molested her. D.A. and
C.R. were sitting on either side of Ortega Ruiz on the couch in the living
room. He grabbed at C.R. under the blanket, and she pushed him away. C.R.
got up and said she was going to sleep and went back to her room. She spoke
to D.A. about the incident within days of it occurring.
C.R. only reported the abuse by Ortega Ruiz to D.A. However, C.R. told
police and the social worker about the abuse when they interviewed C.R. in
response to D.A.’s disclosure.
The defense challenged C.R.’s credibility by cross-examining her about
inconsistencies between her testimony and D.A.’s testimony, as well as
inconsistencies within C.R.’s own statements. For example, D.A. testified
that she followed C.R. to the room when C.R. ran out after the sofa incident,
but C.R. testified they first discussed it a few weeks or months after the fact,
then she did not remember. C.R. initially testified she did not disclose the
abuse to her mother, but she said otherwise to the social worker and the
police.
D. The Aunt’s Testimony
The aunt testified that D.A. once told her Ortega Ruiz was engaging in
sexual misconduct, but she did not believe D.A. because Ortega Ruiz behaved
differently around her. She did not report to police what D.A. disclosed, but
she did tell D.A.’s school.
E. The People’s CSAAS Expert
Dr. Jody Ward, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified as an
expert about CSAAS. As part of her testimony, she explained her limited
role. She was there to talk generally about how children respond to sexual
abuse. She would not form opinions or offer insight into any of the people
7
involved in the case. Her purpose was not to assist the jury with whether the
victims were telling the truth, or whether the defendant committed the
crimes. She did not know anything about the facts or details of the case, had
not reviewed any of the police reports, and had not interviewed any
witnesses. She was present only to discuss CSAAS, which is a pattern of
behavior that many children exhibit when they have been sexually abused.
CSAAS helps understand why children do what they do in response to sexual
abuse because it can be counterintuitive.
Dr. Ward described CSAAS as “a group of symptoms that are thought
to be—a pattern of behaviors that are thought to come from a certain cause,
sexual abuse.” It cannot be used in hindsight to determine whether the
symptoms were the result of sexual abuse. She acknowledged that
Dr. Roland Summit, who originally coined the term “child abuse
accommodation syndrome” wished he had called it a pattern of behaviors or
child sexual abuse accommodation pattern, rather than a “syndrome.”
Unlike children who have been abused by strangers, children who have
been abused by people with whom they have an ongoing relationship tend not
to report the abuse right away, and they tend not to be believed because it
does not fit society’s idea of how sexual abuse should occur.
Dr. Ward described the five elements of CSAAS: secrecy, helplessness,
entrapment and accommodation, disclosures that are delayed or
unconvincing, and retraction or recantation. Secrecy refers to how abuse
occurs in secret because witnesses rarely observe it. Also, children tend to
keep the sexual abuse secret for very long periods of time.
Helplessness refers to the power imbalance between adults and
children because children are dependent on adults to meet their basic needs.
A child in a sexually abusive situation does not have enough self-sufficiency
8
to escape the relationship. Thus, children find other ways to cope with
ongoing abuse.
Entrapment and accommodation refer to why abusers believe they can
repeatedly abuse children: Because children tend to keep the abuse a secret
for long periods. When children become entrapped, they learn ways to
accommodate the abuse, including by acquiescing and believing they must
put up with the sexual abuse to receive the positive aspects of the
relationship—such as financial support from the perpetrator, making the
child feel special—things that may not be obvious to an outsider. Also,
children may unwittingly put themselves in sexually abusive situations.
Sometimes they develop blind spots because they do not recognize they are in
danger or in an abusive dynamic.
During the abuse, children may disassociate as a coping mechanism.
Disassociating can affect memory. As with any autobiographical memory,
peripheral details about a memory fades, but the gist of the memory remains
the same. When sexual abuse occurs repeatedly with similar incidents,
victims tend to group the events into one memory of what normally occurred.
They may not be able to give a particular date or small details.
Research shows that children typically wait before reporting. They
usually disclose the abuse piecemeal and over time, depending on the
receptiveness of the other person.
Recantation or retraction refers to some children’s minimization or
reversal of abuse claims in response to post-disclosure events. Once children
disclose sexual abuse, they go through intrusive interviews with police, social
workers and other professionals. Their families split apart. They may be
taken out of the home and put in protective custody. The perpetrators, with
whom the children had close relationships, are now facing serious
9
consequences due to the disclosure. So, children sometimes recant
allegations.
Helplessness always applies, and child abuse almost always occurs in
secret. The other factors may or may not be present.
F. Ortega Ruiz’s Testimony
Ortega Ruiz testified that as D.A. grew up, she became belligerent and
disobedient toward him. He denied any sexual abuse, domestic violence, or
physical discipline. Ortega Ruiz had been completely impotent for 20 years.
Forty-eight hours before Ortega Ruiz’s arrest, he and his wife argued
over possible divorce and child custody. He opined the molestation
accusations were made up to take his sons away from him.
G. Jury Instructions
Without objection and after the close of evidence, the court provided the
jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1193 that instructed the jury
on how it may use CSAAS testimony in its deliberation.3
The instruction as read stated:
“You have heard testimony from [Dr. Jody Ward] regarding child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
“[Dr. Jody Ward]’s testimony about child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him.
“You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
[D.A.’s and C.R.’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct
of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the
believability of their testimony.”
3 The court instructed the jury with the version of CALCRIM No. 1193
that was current in July 2022. CALCRIM No. 1193 was modified in
September 2022, after this trial. (Jud. Council of Cal., Advisory Com. Rep.,
Crim. Jury Instns. (Sept. 2022).)
10
H. Verdict and Sentencing.
The jury convicted Ortega Ruiz of all seven counts. The trial court
struck a prior strike and found both aggravating factors true. The court
sentenced Ortega Ruiz to nine years and four months in state prison, with a
one-year sentence running concurrently.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Admitting CSAAS Evidence
Ortega Ruiz contends the court erred by admitting CSAAS evidence
because CSAAS is no longer valid psychology.
We review the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.) “ ‘[A] trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 430.)
A. Ortega Ruiz Forfeited any Objection to the Admission of CSAAS
Testimony
Ortega Ruiz did not object to the admission of CSAAS expert testimony.
Instead, his attorney negotiated the type of cross-examination in which he
could engage. This request implicitly approved of the admission of the
CSAAS evidence. Because he did not object to the admission of this evidence,
he forfeited any challenge to it. (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 674;
Evid. Code, § 353.)
B. Ortega Ruiz Does Not Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ortega Ruiz contends his attorney’s failure to object to the admission of
CSAAS evidence demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel. (See
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688.) However, an
attorney’s “[r]epresentation does not become deficient for failing to make
meritless objections.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 (Ochoa).)
11
As Ortega Ruiz acknowledges, our Supreme Court has held that CSAAS
evidence is relevant and admissible. (See People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d
1289, 1300–1301 (McAlpin).) The superior court was bound by the Supreme
Court’s decision in McAlpin. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity Sales, Inc.) [explaining lower courts
must follow Supreme Court precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis].)
Thus, objecting to the admission of the CSAAS testimony would have been
futile. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the failure to object to the admission
of the evidence demonstrates deficient representation. (See Ochoa, at p. 463.)
Even if the issue were not forfeited, we would nonetheless find no error.
C. CSAAS’s Evidence Has Not Been “Debunked”
Ortega Ruiz contends the original basis of CSAAS has been
“debunked,” because Dr. Summit wrote a follow-up article “to address
‘subsequent distortions that court misuse has imposed,’ ” implying the
evidence is invalid.4 (See Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual
Accommodation Syndrome, Vol. I(4), (1992) Journal of Child Sex Abuse,
p. 153.) Therefore, he argues, the CSAAS testimony should have been
excluded. He also directs us to State v. J.L.G. (N.J. 2018) 234 N.J. 265, 271
(J.L.G.), a New Jersey state court opinion that considered Dr. Roland’s
follow-up article when it disallowed the use of four of the five CSAAS
elements. He asks us to follow its example. We decline.
4 Ortega Ruiz implies that Dr. Summit’s follow-up article repudiates
court use of CSAAS evidence in court, contending the basis for allowing
CSAAS has been “debunked.” The journal article was not considered by the
trial court or provided to us. We reviewed the article. Although we do not
base our decision on our review (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [absent extraordinary circumstances, courts
of appeal do not consider matters not presented to the trial court]), we
disagree with Ortega Ruiz’s interpretation of the article’s conclusions.
12
First, we do not find J.L.G. persuasive. There, the defendant
challenged the admissibility of CSAAS evidence on the ground that it was not
sufficiently reliable to meet New Jersey’s evidentiary standards or the test of
scientific reliability under Frye v. United States (DC Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013
(Frye). (J.L.G., supra, 234 N.J. at pp. 279–280, 292, 301.) However,
California courts do not apply Kelly/Frye5 to CSAAS evidence. As the court
explained in People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473 (Munch), this
type of expert testimony is based on clinical experience and professional
literature in the area “meets ‘traditional standards for competent expert
opinion, without need for additional screening procedures [under
Kelly/Frye].’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 473.) Thus, the basis for the court’s
decision in J.L.G. does not apply here.
Second, Ortega Ruiz acknowledges California courts have found
CSAAS testimony is proper. Our Supreme Court has concluded expert
testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is admissible
because it can assist the trier of fact (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a)) by
providing information to help jurors evaluate the evidence. (McAlpin, supra,
53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301.) Thus, even were we to believe that we should
follow J.L.G.’s lead, we would not do so. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc., supra,
57 Cal.2d at p. 455; People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 216
[McAlpin decision is binding on admissibility of CSAAS evidence regardless
of contrary decisions from other jurisdictions].)
Ortega Ruiz argues we are not constrained by McAlpin, contending
lower courts are not bound by Supreme Court opinions that are “based on an
erroneous determination of historic fact.” (In re Javier A. (1984) 159
5 People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24.
13
Cal.App.3d 913, 954 (Javier A.).)6 But the court in Javier ultimately
concluded it was compelled by Auto Equity to follow Supreme Court
precedent. (Id. at pp. 952–956.) We likewise conclude we are bound by our
Supreme Court’s decisions. There was no abuse of discretion.
II.
The Court Did Not Err By Instructing the Jury with
CALCRIM No. 1193
Ortega Ruiz contends CALCRIM No. 1193 misstates the law by
allowing the jury to use CSAAS to evaluate victim credibility and misleads
the jury into using CSAAS as direct proof of guilt.
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Fiore (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378.) “ ‘[W]e examine the instructions as a whole.
The test we apply is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jurors would
have understood the instructions in a manner that violated a defendant’s
rights. [Citation.] In this regard, we presume that jurors are intelligent
individuals who are capable of understanding instructions and applying them
to the facts of the case before them.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Instructions should be
interpreted, if possible, so as to support the judgment rather than defeat it if
they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.” ‘ [Citation.]” (People
v. Webb (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 901, 906.)
A. Ortega Ruiz Forfeited His Objection to CALCRIM No. 1193
Ortega Ruiz acknowledges he failed to object to the use of CALCRIM
No. 1193. He argues he did not forfeit the issue on appeal because an
6 Javier does not address CSAAS evidence. It asked whether a “juvenile
may be constitutionally denied a right to jury trial in a delinquency
proceeding where his wardship and consequent loss of freedom depends upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a specified felony.”
(Javier A., supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at pp. 918–919.)
14
inaccurate jury instruction affects a substantial right. (§ 1259.) We conclude
Ortega Ruiz forfeited the issue on appeal, (see People v. Lang (1989) 49
Cal.3d 991, 1024), but even were we to consider the argument on the merits,
we would conclude there was no instructional error.
B. CALCRIM No. 1193 Is an Accurate Statement of Law
Ortega Ruiz contends CALCRIM No. 1193 misstates the law because it
says the jury may use CSAAS “in evaluating the believability of [the victims’]
testimony.” (See CALCRIM No. 1193.) He argues the current instruction
allows a jury to use CSAAS testimony as “direct proof of the defendant’s
guilt.” But he also recognizes that “a number of opinions have concluded that
CALCRIM No. 1193 accurately instructs on the limited use of CSAAS
evidence.”
We agree with those courts concluding the version of CALCRIM
No. 1193 used at Ortega Ruiz’s trial “accurately informs the jury on the
limited use of CSAAS evidence” and “does not: (a) improperly allow an
alleged minor victim of sexual abuse to corroborate her own testimony;
(b) violate due process; or (c) misapply the burden of proof.” (People v.
Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162; see also Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 473–474; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503–504
(Gonzales).)
The portion of CALCRIM No. 1193 that permits jurors to use CSAAS
information to evaluate the believability of a victim’s testimony does not
misstate the law. “[I]t is well established in California law CSAAS evidence
is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged
child victim of child abuse. [Citations.]” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 171; McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301.)
15
Further, CALCRIM No. 1193 informs jurors that the CSAAS testimony
is “not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged
against him.” (CALCRIM No. 1193.) Thus, the instruction helps minimize
the possibility of the jury conflating CSAAS with evidence of guilt.7 (People
v. Flores (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 438, 458, 459, fn. 5.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
7 Because we conclude the version of CALCRIM No. 1193 used was an
accurate statement of law, Ortega Ruiz could not have been prejudiced by its
use.
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