People v. Keeler CA3

CourtListener 10679563Calctapp29 set 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/29/25 P. v. Keeler CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101868

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 18F6285,
18F6285)
v.

JULIUS ANTHONY KEELER,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Julius Anthony Keeler appeals his multiple convictions, including for
burglary and attempted carjacking. He and the People ask us to remand the matter for the
trial court to reconsider his request for mental health diversion given recent amendments to
Penal Code1 section 1001.36. Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand
the matter for further consideration under section 1001.36.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In case No. 18F6260 (case No. 6260), defendant was charged in 2018 with one count
of first degree residential burglary (§ 459; count 1), two counts of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 3), one count of unlawful driving or

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4), and one count of receiving a
stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a); count 5). It was further alleged defendant had a prior
strike (§ 1170.12), a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and three prior prison terms
(former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
In case No. 18F6285 (case No. 6285), defendant was charged in 2018 with attempted
carjacking. (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664.) It was further alleged defendant had a prior strike
(§ 1170.12) and a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). A firearm use enhancement
was also alleged. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)
In October 2020, defendant applied for pretrial diversion pursuant to former
section 1001.36. In February 2021, the trial court found defendant had a mental illness but
denied his petition because it was not the “main contributor” to his crimes. Instead,
defendant’s substance abuse was the “primary factor” that caused his mental state that led to
him committing crimes. The trial court also reasoned that defendant had been armed and
under the influence during the attempted carjacking, making his crimes “very dangerous and
violent.”
In February 2022, defendant pled guilty in case No. 6260 to first degree residential
burglary, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and receiving a stolen vehicle. As to each
offense, he admitted the prior strike and prior serious felony allegations. In case No. 6285,
defendant pled guilty to attempted carjacking. He also admitted the prior strike allegation
and the firearm use enhancement. Defendant stipulated to an aggregate prison sentence of
16 years eight months, and the remaining allegations would be dismissed. The trial court
released defendant prior to sentencing pursuant to a Cruz waiver, with the understanding
that, should he fail to appear for sentencing, he would be sentenced to 19 years in prison.
(People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247.) Defendant did not appear for sentencing.
Defendant was later committed to prison in several unrelated cases out of Riverside
and San Diego Counties.

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In February 2024, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and admissions in the
cases at issue in this appeal. Defendant argued he lacked the mental capacity to enter a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea due to mental health issues and recent changes to
his medication. During a June 2024 hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion,
reasoning that defendant understood what he was doing when he entered his plea.
In July 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an aggregate term of 18
years on all the Shasta, Riverside, and San Diego Counties cases.
Defendant timely appealed the Shasta County cases and obtained a certificate of
probable cause in both cases.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant asks us to conditionally reverse and remand the matter for reconsideration
of his October 2020 application for mental health diversion. Citing People v. Frahs (2020)
9 Cal.5th 618, defendant argues he is entitled to retroactive application of the most recent
amendments to section 1001.36. (Frahs, at pp. 630-631.) The People agree that conditional
reversal and remand is necessary, and so do we.
In October 2020, when defendant first brought his motion for mental health
diversion, section 1001.36 listed six criteria that a defendant had to meet to be eligible for
diversion. Three of the criteria required that the court be “satisfied” that (1) the defendant
suffers from a recognized mental disorder, (2) the disorder was a “significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense,” and (3) “the defendant will not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the community.”
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A), (B), (F), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 497, § 203, eff.
Jan. 1, 2020.) The remaining criteria required that (1) a mental health expert provide an
opinion that the defendant’s mental health symptoms would respond to treatment, (2) the
defendant give his or her consent to diversion and waive his or her right to a speedy trial,

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and (3) the defendant agree to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion. (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)(C)-(E).)
After defendant’s guilty pleas, section 1001.36 was amended multiple times. As
relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1001.36
effective January 1, 2023, which was two years after the trial court denied defendant’s
motion in February 2021. (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1.) Among other changes, the 2023
amendments recharacterized the first two requirements -- that the defendant be diagnosed
with a recognized mental illness and the mental illness be a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense -- as eligibility criteria. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2).)
Under the amended statute, “a defendant’s eligibility no longer turned on findings to the
court’s ‘satisfaction.’ ” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.)
Instead, when a defendant has been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder, he or she
is now “generally eligible” for diversion. (People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113,
120 (Brown).) Such a diagnosis creates a presumption that the defendant’s diagnosed
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged crime. (Ibid.)
Overcoming that presumption requires clear and convincing evidence that the mental
disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement
in the alleged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2); Brown, at p. 120.)
If the defendant meets the two enumerated eligibility requirements, “the court must
consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) A
defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if four criteria are met, which include (1) the
opinion of a qualified mental health expert that the defendant’s symptoms would respond to
mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)) and (2) the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if treated in the community” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4)). Section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) was also amended to include
consideration of the defendant’s treatment plan, along with the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, current offense, and other factors the court deems appropriate.

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A court retains discretion to deny diversion where a defendant makes a prima facie
showing that he or she meets all the express statutory requirements. (Sarmiento v. Superior
Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) But, it must do so in line with the “ ‘ “principles
and purpose of the governing law,” ’ ” which includes a strong legislative preference for
such treatment of mental health disorders. (Id. at pp. 892-893.)
Defendant argues, and the People concede, that the amendments to section 1001.36
apply retroactively to defendant’s case. We accept that concession. (See Brown, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 125 [the 2023 amendments to § 1001.36 apply retroactively to all
nonfinal judgments].) And, even though defendant failed to renew his application for
diversion prior to sentencing, we also decline to find the issue forfeited. (Brown, at pp. 127-
128 [a defendant who originally asked for diversion prior to trial but failed to renew the
application under the amended statute does not forfeit the issue on appeal].)
As the People acknowledge, it is unclear whether the trial court would reach the same
conclusions about eligibility or suitability under the new law. (Brown, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 128.) The court acknowledged defendant suffered from mental illness
but found it was not the “main contributor” to his crimes. This analysis differs from the
current version of section 1001.36’s presumption that a diagnosed mental disorder is a
significant factor in the commission of the charged crimes. (Brown, at p. 120.) In addition,
although the court found defendant’s crimes were “very dangerous and violent,” it did not
consider whether defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if
treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Under the circumstances, we will
conditionally reverse and remand the matter for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s
eligibility for diversion under the current version of section 1001.36. (Brown, at p. 129.)
II
Defendant further argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. According to defendant, the trial court “misadvise[d]” him during the plea
hearing that the attempted carjacking would not constitute a violent felony. As a result,

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when he entered his guilty pleas, he believed that none of the crimes were violent felonies.
When he later learned he had, in fact, pled guilty to a violent felony, he asked his attorney to
file a motion to withdraw his plea. We find defendant’s contentions meritless.
1. Additional Procedural Background
In his plea agreement form, defendant initialed the box indicating he understood that,
by pleading guilty to a violent felony, he would accrue only up to 15 percent of
conduct/worktime credit. He also initialed the box indicating he had an opportunity to
discuss the consequences of his plea. In addition, he signed the statement that he had read
the form, discussed each item with his attorney, and the effects of any enhancements or
special allegations had been explained to him. His attorney also signed the form saying that
she had reviewed the form with defendant, answered all his questions, and explained the
consequences of his plea and the effect of any enhancements or special allegations.
During the February 2022 plea hearing, defendant confirmed for the trial court that
his attorney had reviewed the plea form with him and answered all his questions. The trial
court explained that defendant would be pleading to a first degree residential burglary and
attempted carjacking, both of which were strikes. The court also explained that the firearm
use allegation (§ 12022.53) was a violent felony. Defendant confirmed he understood he
would be pleading to two new strikes. The trial court then informed defendant that he
would be sentenced to prison for 16 years eight months, and he would “be serving that term
at 85 percent because of the fact that the firearm use allegation is going to qualify as a
violent felony.” Defendant again confirmed he understood.
Prior to taking defendant’s plea on the attempted carjacking count in case No. 6285,
the court explained that the charging document described the crime as a violent felony. “I
am striking that language because as an attempt, it is a . . . serious offense but not a violent
offense.” Defendant then pled to that offense and admitted the firearm use allegation.
During the June 2024 hearing regarding defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea,
defendant testified that, before his guilty pleas, he thought he would be eligible under

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Proposition 572 to serve only the “base term” of the “controlling case,” namely the
residential burglary. Defendant also thought “the enhancements would fall off once [he] hit
prison.” But, he claimed, he learned after his plea that he would have to serve 85 percent of
his sentence because he pled to a violent offense. According to defendant, had he known he
would have to serve 85 percent of his sentence, he would not have entered his guilty plea.
Defendant’s trial attorney testified that she was aware of defendant’s mental health
history and that he was on medication at the time of the plea, but she was able to discuss the
plea agreement with him “at length,” and she did not observe any concerning symptoms.
Although she did not specifically recall the details of their conversation about Proposition
57, she was aware at the time of defendant’s plea that “any violent charge” such as the
firearm use enhancement would make him ineligible for early parole consideration under
Proposition 57, “so if that came up, I would have communicated that to him.” In addition,
she would never proceed with a plea deal if she realized that one of her clients did not
understand or took issue with the agreement.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, reasoning the record indicated defendant
was competent to enter his plea and understood the consequences of his plea.
2. Legal Background
Inmates incarcerated in state prison can earn conduct/worktime credits. (§ 2930 et
seq.) Typically, inmates may earn up to one day of worktime credit for each actual day of
incarceration. (§ 2933, subd. (b); In re Canady, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026.)
However, those convicted of violent felonies as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c)
“shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit.” (§ 2933.1, subd. (a).) Under

2 Proposition 57, also known as the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, increases
conduct credit earnings and establishes a process for early parole consideration for eligible
defendants convicted of nonviolent crimes. (In re Canady (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1022,
1027, 1033-1034.)

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section 667.5, attempted carjacking is not a violent felony, but “[a]ny violation of Section
12022.53” is. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(22).)
A trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for “good cause
shown” at any time before judgment. (§ 1018.) “ ‘Mistake, ignorance or any other factor
overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea’
under section 1018 [citation], and section 1018 states that its provisions ‘shall be liberally
construed . . . to promote justice.’ ” (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 894.) “A
defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance must
present clear and convincing evidence in support of the claim.” (Ibid.) Where a trial court
has misadvised a defendant about the consequences of his plea, the defendant is entitled to
relief only if he or she establishes that he or she was “prejudiced by the misadvisement, i.e.,
that the defendant would not have entered the plea of guilty had the trial court given a
proper advisement.” (In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352.)
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to not allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea under section 1018. (People v. Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 894.)
“ ‘Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of
that discretion “must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 270-271.)
In conducting this analysis, “a reviewing court must adopt the trial court’s factual findings if
substantial evidence supports them.” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)
3. Analysis
We find no merit in defendant’s contentions that the trial court misadvised him or
that he misunderstood the consequences of his plea with respect to his accrual of conduct or
worktime credit while in prison. Defendant indicated he understood in the plea form that, if
he was convicted of a violent felony, he would accrue only up to 15 percent of conduct or
worktime credit. He also indicated he had discussed with his attorney the effects of any

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enhancements or special allegations. Defendant’s trial attorney testified that she was aware
that any violent felony charge (such as the firearm use allegation) would result in defendant
serving 85 percent of his sentence, and she would have communicated that with him had the
question arisen. During the plea hearing, the trial court explained that the firearm use
allegation was a violent felony. The court further explained that defendant would be serving
his prison sentence at 85 percent because the firearm use allegation was a violent felony,
and defendant confirmed he understood. The trial court’s comments about the nature of the
attempted carjacking count merely (and correctly) informed defendant that the count was
not, by itself, a violent felony. Considering the entire record, we find that the trial court did
not misadvise defendant. Defendant has not established that he misunderstood the
consequences of his plea, nor that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to withdraw his plea.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to reconsider whether defendant is eligible for mental health diversion under
the current section 1001.36. If the trial court determines defendant qualifies for diversion, it
must grant diversion. If the court determines defendant is ineligible for diversion, then the
court shall reinstate the judgment of conviction.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
DUARTE, J.

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