CourtListener 10677719•People v. Mattea CA3
Testo completo
Filed 9/25/25 P. v. Mattea CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101544
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22F03480)
v.
WILLIAM JOHN MATTEA,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant William John Mattea guilty of 86 counts of various sexual
offenses. It also found true a one strike special circumstance allegation under Penal
Code1 section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4), which applied to multiple convictions. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 810 years to life, plus seven years eight months in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends insufficient evidence supports multiple counts of oral
1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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copulation of one victim and multiple counts of sexual penetration and lewd acts on
another. We agree as to three counts of lewd acts and accordingly reverse defendant’s
convictions for lewd acts in counts 83 through 85. We further strike the eight-month
sentence imposed for each of those counts. The judgment is affirmed as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was Mary S.’s uncle. When Mary was five years old, defendant started
touching her upper inner thigh. When Mary was “like nine or ten” years old, she would
go to defendant’s house “at least a few times a week” and he would put his fingers in her
vagina “probably every other time [she] went there” for a visit. This conduct stopped
when she was 15 years old. At 11 or 12 years old, defendant penetrated Mary’s vagina
with his penis while the two laid on his bed watching television. This happened “a few
times a month” until she was 13 or 14 years old. When Mary was 11 or 12 years old,
defendant started orally copulating her a few times a month until she was 13 or 14 years
old. From when Mary was 12 years old until she was 13 or 14 years old, defendant
infrequently penetrated her rectum with his penis and fingers. Defendant attempted to
penetrate Mary’s vagina with his fingers and his penis while swimming alone with her in
the pool, but he could not accomplish the act. The last time defendant touched Mary
while the two were alone in the pool was when Mary “was, like, 14 [years old].”
Emily D.’s parents were friends with defendant and his wife. Emily spent much of
her childhood with defendant and thought of him as an uncle. When she was growing up,
she visited his house a few times a month. “[M]ostly every time [she went] over,” he
took her into his office and made her watch pornography while sitting on his lap. When
Emily sat on defendant’s lap, she felt his erection against her buttocks.
When Emily was five years old, she gave defendant massages every time she
visited his house, and the massages included her touching his penis. After these
massages, defendant would remove Emily’s clothes and give her a massage that included
touching her vagina. One time when Emily was six or seven years old, defendant put
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chocolate in her vagina and licked it. During her trial testimony, Emily did not remember
defendant putting his mouth on her vagina any other time. In a forensic interview before
trial, Emily said defendant licked her vagina “maybe every few times [she went] over.
Like every once in a while. Maybe like once or twice a month” from when she was in
kindergarten until second grade.
Whenever defendant and Emily swam together in his pool, Emily would use her
foot to massage defendant’s penis into an erection. This happened more than 10 times a
month during the summer. Defendant’s behavior stopped at the start of the COVID-19
pandemic when Emily was in seventh grade.
Based on the above facts, the jury found defendant guilty of 86 offenses, including
10 counts of oral copulation of Emily when she was 10 years of age or younger, five
counts of sexual penetration of Mary when she was 10 years of age or younger, and five
counts of lewd acts on Mary when she was 14 or 15 years old. The jury also found true a
one strike special circumstance allegation, which applied to multiple convictions. The
trial court sentenced defendant to 810 years to life, plus seven years eight months in
prison.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports multiple counts of oral
copulation of Emily and multiple counts of sexual penetration and lewd acts on Mary.
We agree in part.
I
Applicable Law
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears an “enormous
burden.” (People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.) “It is the exclusive
function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, when considering a challenge to the
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sufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment,
resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of
the trier of fact’s determination. (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 483-
484.) We reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 (Jones), our Supreme Court addressed the
quantum of proof necessary to support a conviction in a child molestation case. (Id. at
pp. 314-316.) Our Supreme Court held that even “generic” testimony regarding multiple
molestations over a period of time—unspecific as to time, place, or circumstance—is
sufficiently substantial to support a conviction. (Id. at pp. 313-315.) Our Supreme Court
reasoned that “the particular details surrounding a child molestation charge are not
elements of the offense and are [therefore] unnecessary to sustain a conviction.” (Id. at
p. 315.) To provide substantial evidence, the victim merely must describe (1) “the kind
of act or acts committed with sufficient specificity” to assure that unlawful conduct
indeed “occurred and to differentiate between the various [acts] of proscribed conduct”;
(2) “the number of acts committed with sufficient certainty to support each of the counts
alleged”; and (3) “the general time period in which the acts occurred . . . , to assure the
acts were committed within the applicable limitation period.” (Id. at pp. 315-316, italics
omitted.) “Additional details regarding the time, place or circumstance of the various
assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or substantiality of the victim’s testimony,
but are not essential to sustain a conviction.” (Id. at p. 316.)
In Jones, the victim testified that molestations recurred once or twice a month over
a roughly two-year period of time. (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 303, 322-323.) Our
Supreme Court held that the victim’s testimony constituted substantial evidence to
support the six counts of child molestation, each charging one event in a different
two‑month period. (Ibid.) The court cited with approval the analysis in People v. Moore
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(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1400, in which “the victim specified the type of conduct involved
(rape) and its frequency (‘almost every night’ for three months), and confirmed that such
conduct occurred during the limitation period,” concluding that “[n]othing more is
required to establish the substantiality of the victim’s testimony in child molestation
cases.” (Jones, at p. 316; see also People v. Garcia (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023
[evidence sufficient because it proved that the defendant committed at least the number
of offenses charged].)
II
Sufficient Evidence Supports All But Three Counts Of Lewd Acts On Mary
All of defendant’s contentions center around the assertion that Mary’s and Emily’s
testimony lacked sufficient certainty to sustain multiple convictions for certain offenses.
For example, defendant concedes Emily’s testimony about the chocolate incident was
sufficient to sustain one conviction for oral copulation when she was 10 years of age or
younger. He contends, however, Emily’s statements during her forensic interview—that
he licked her vagina “maybe every few times [she went] over [to his house,] [l]ike every
once in a while[,] [m]aybe like once or twice a month” when she was in kindergarten
until second grade—were insufficient to convict him of any further counts for oral
copulation when she was 10 years of age or younger. Defendant classifies Emily’s
testimony regarding the frequency of the acts as being equivocal and ambiguous,
especially when considered with her trial testimony that she did not remember specific
acts of oral copulation.
Emily’s forensic interview was offered for the truth. Whether Emily’s statements
during testimony or during her forensic interview were more credible was an issue
reserved for the jury. (People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 771 [“we do not . . .
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses”].) Given the jury convicted defendant of 10
counts of oral copulation of Emily, it necessarily accepted Emily’s statements during her
forensic interview as more credible than her trial testimony. We are bound by this
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credibility determination (People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 342, fn. 3); and thus, we
will analyze Emily’s statements during the forensic interview for sufficient evidence.
Construing Emily’s statements that defendant licked her vagina “[m]aybe like
once or twice a month” from kindergarten until second grade narrowly, Emily still said
defendant orally copulated her over the course of two years when she was 10 years of age
or younger at least once a month. This is sufficient to sustain the nine counts of oral
copulation defendant challenges on appeal. (Cf. People v. Tompkins (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1261 [sufficient evidence supported conviction for two counts of
digital penetration where the minor testified it happened “once, maybe twice” and the
investigator testified the victim previously recalled two to three occasions].) While
Emily may have expressed uncertainty at the frequency of the acts of oral copulation, her
uncertainty was to the upper range of occurrences and not the lower range. Defendant
was convicted of nine counts of oral copulation in addition to the chocolate incident,
which is supported by the lower range of frequency Emily accounted for in her
statements during the forensic interview. (See People v. Garcia, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1023.)
For the same reasons, sufficient evidence supports defendant’s convictions for five
counts of sexual penetration of Mary when she was 10 years of age or younger. Mary
testified that when she was “like nine or ten” years old, she would go to defendant’s
house “at least a few times a week” and he would put his fingers in her vagina “probably
every other time [she] went there” for a visit. Assuming the lesser range of occurrences,
i.e., that defendant’s conduct occurred when Mary was only 10 years old and a single
time every week, Mary provided more than sufficient evidence to account for five acts of
sexual penetration when she was 10 years of age or younger. Contrary to defendant’s
contention, Mary’s use of the word probably when testifying to the frequency of
defendant’s acts of sexual penetration does not undermine the reasonable inference that at
least five acts of sexual penetration occurred when Mary was 10 years of age or younger.
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All that is required is testimony to “the number of acts committed with sufficient
certainty to support each of the counts alleged.” (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 315-316,
some italics added.) Mary’s testimony met that standard.
Finally, defendant argues Mary’s testimony was insufficient to convict him of four
of the five counts of lewd acts committed on her when she was 14 or 15 years old. He
contends Mary’s estimation of her age was too uncertain to substantiate more than one
count of lewd acts during the age range alleged. The People agree three of the five
convictions must be reversed but argue two are supported by sufficient evidence. We
agree with the People.
Mary testified defendant’s conduct of digitally penetrating her vagina continued
until she was 15 years old. Mary did not specify the frequency of the conduct at this time
in her life, providing sufficient evidence defendant digitally penetrated her at least one
time when she was between the ages of 14 and 15 years old. Mary further testified the
last time defendant touched her inappropriately while the two were alone in the pool was
when Mary “was, like, 14 [years old].” This testimony is sufficient to sustain an
additional conviction for lewd acts on Mary when she was 14 or 15 years old. Contrary
to defendant’s contention, Mary’s use of the word “like” when describing her age does
not undermine the reasonable inference that at least one count of lewd acts occurred
while she was in the pool with defendant when she was 14 years old. Accordingly,
Mary’s testimony provided sufficient certainty two counts of lewd acts occurred when
she was 14 or 15 years old. The remaining lewd acts convictions committed on Mary
when she was 14 or 15 years old lack evidentiary support through Mary’s testimony and
must be reversed.
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DISPOSITION
Counts 83 through 85 are reversed and the eight-month sentence imposed for each
of those counts is stricken. The judgment is affirmed as modified. The trial court shall
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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