People v. Rojas CA4/3

CourtListener 10677109Calctapp24 set 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Rojas CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063778

v. (Super. Ct. No. 16CF0323)

ERIC ALEX ROJAS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed
Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Penal Code section 1172.751 renders prior prison term
enhancements imposed under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), legally
invalid and provides a resentencing procedure for inmates “serving a term for
a judgment that includes” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)) such an enhancement. The
question we confront is whether a defendant who completed serving his
original term, but is serving an additional term due to crimes committed in
prison, qualifies for resentencing.
We conclude he does not. Following the reasoning of People v.
Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440 (Escobedo), we hold that Rojas is no
longer “serving a term for a judgment that includes” the invalid enhancement
and is therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, Rojas pleaded guilty to attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)) and other offenses and enhancements, including a one-year prior-
prison enhancement pursuant to former section 667.5, subdivision (b). He
was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years in state prison, consisting of
five years for the attempted murder plus a one year consecutive term for
personally using a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court
imposed but struck the punishment for the section 667.5 enhancement at
sentencing.
While incarcerated, Rojas committed additional crimes, resulting
in two separate convictions in Kern County Superior Court.2 In 2020, he was

1
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We grant Rojas’s unopposed motion to augment the record with the

abstracts of judgment for the two in-prison convictions.
2
convicted in Kern County of assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§
4501, subd. (a)) and sentenced to a prison term of two years and four months.
In 2022, he was convicted in Kern County of assault and battery by a
prisoner (§§ 4501, subd. (b); 4501.5) and sentenced to a 10-year prison term.
On November 14, 2023—more than six years after being
sentenced in the Orange County case—the Orange County Public Defender
filed a petition for recall and resentencing on Rojas’s behalf pursuant to
sections 1172.7 and 1172.75, noting that his name appeared on a list
provided by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) of persons potentially eligible for relief.3 On December 15, 2023, the
superior court denied the petition in a written order, finding Rojas ineligible
for relief because the prior-prison term enhancement in his 2016 case had
been stayed or stricken at the time of sentencing.
Rojas timely appealed. His appointed counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, finding no arguable issues.
After the California Supreme Court issued its decision in People v. Rhodius
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius), this court requested supplemental briefing
from the parties on Rojas’s entitlement to resentencing. Both parties
submitted supplemental briefs.
DISCUSSION
We initially requested supplemental briefing on whether a
defendant whose section 667.5 enhancement has been stricken qualifies for
relief under section 1172.75—a question expressly left open by our Supreme

3
We grant Rojas's unopposed request for judicial notice of a redacted
version of the California Department of Corrections List of persons eligible
for Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing in Orange County.
3
Court in Rhodius. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1066, fn.2.) In their
supplemental brief, the People have conceded that the rationale of Rhodius
extends to stricken enhancements, not merely stayed enhancements. We
accept that concession for purposes of this appeal.
However, the People have raised a second issue, which Rojas also
addressed in his supplemental brief: whether a defendant who has completed
serving his original term that included a section 667.75 enhancement, but is
still serving a term resulting from an in-prison conviction, qualifies for relief
under section 1172.5. Resolving this issue presents a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024, 1032.)
Section 1172.75 provides that any sentence enhancement
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under former section 667.5, subdivision (b),
is “legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute directs the CDCR to
identify inmates who are “serving a term for a judgment that includes” such
an enhancement and notify the sentencing court. Upon receiving this
notification, the court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.
Under the plain language of section 1172.75, Rojas is not eligible
for relief because he is not “currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes” an invalid enhancement. Section 1170.1, subdivision (c), provides,
“In the case of any person convicted of one or more felonies committed while
the person is confined in the state prison,” where “the law either requires the
terms to be served consecutively or the court imposes consecutive terms, the
term of imprisonment for all the convictions that the person is required to
serve consecutively shall commence from the time the person would
otherwise have been released from prison.” As this statute makes clear, the

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term resulting from the in-prison offenses is separate and begins when the
earlier prison term is fully served. Rojas has already completed the six year
term imposed in his 2016 Orange County judgment. His present
incarceration stems solely from the two subsequent judgments from Kern
County for the assaults he committed while in prison. Neither of those
judgments includes a prior prison term enhancement under former section
667.5. Under the plain language of the statute, therefore, he is not “serving a
term for a judgment that includes” such an enhancement. Thus, he is
ineligible for relief.
The court in Escobedo reached the same conclusion on nearly
identical facts. In Escobedo, the defendants had been sentenced to prison
terms that included now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. While in
prison, they committed new crimes and received new, consecutive sentences.
The court held they were ineligible for section 1172.75 relief because when
they filed their resentencing petitions, they had already completed their
original terms and were serving new terms for their in-prison offenses. As we
have, the court relied on section 1170.1, subdivision (c), to conclude that “the
prior prison term enhancements for the [original] convictions did not carry
over to the consecutive sentences imposed for the new in-prison offenses.”
(Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 440 at p. 451.)
Rojas argues Escobedo is unpersuasive and urges us to follow In
re Brissette (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 147, which held that a consecutive term
for an in-prison offense is a “component of a single total sentence” rather than
an entirely separate sentence. (Id. at p. 172.) However, the issue in Brissette
was entirely different than what we face here. The question there arose
under the compassionate release statute, section 1172.2. The issue that had

5
arisen was that the defendant had been originally sentenced by the Los
Angeles County Superior Court, but was later sentenced by the Kern County
Superior Court for an in-prison offense. The California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation had sent notices to both superior courts that
the defendant was eligible for compassionate release due to his medical
condition. The Kern County Superior Court denied release. Two months later,
the Los Angeles Superior Court granted the petition for compassionate
release. (Id. at pp. 156-157.) The question on appeal was, which court was the
proper venue for the petition. The Brissette court resolved that dilemma by
holding that the term for the original offense and the term for the in-prison
offense combine to make a single aggregate sentence, and the sentencing
court is deemed to be the last court to issue a sentence — i.e., the court that
sentenced the defendant for the in-prison offense. (Id. at pp. 171-172.)
Because Kern County was the last sentencing court, its denial of the
compassionate release petition prevailed.
Rojas’s reliance on Brissette is misplaced. That court’s focus was
on the meaning of a “sentence” for jurisdictional purposes. Section 1172.75,
by contrast, uses the more specific phrase “serving a term for a judgment.”
The Brissette court observed that when an in-prison term is involved, “there
remains a single total sentence. That single total sentence is composed of two
separate and distinct components: an outside-prison term and a Thompson
term that are calculated and derived separately from each other.”4 (Id. at p.
171.) Here, the critical concept in section 1172.75 is the term, not the

4 “The fully consecutive sentence imposed under section 1170.1(c) for an

in-prison offense is often called a ‘Thompson term,’ in reference to In re
Thompson.” (Brissette, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 168 (citing 172
Cal.App.3d 256).)
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sentence. Rojas is not serving a term resulting from a judgment that includes
a prison-prior enhancement. He already served that term. Because only the
2016 judgment included the now-invalid enhancement, and he has fully
served the term for that judgment, he is ineligible for relief under section
1172.75.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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