In re B.J. CA1/4

CourtListener 10677086Calctapp24 set 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/24/25 In re B.J. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re B.J. et al., Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172270
v.
(Sonoma County
C.J.,
Super. Ct. No. DEP655702,
Defendant and DEP655802)
Appellant.

C.J. (mother) appeals an order terminating her parental
rights to her now six-year-old son B.J. and four-year-old daughter
J.G. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1
She contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) denying a
request by the children’s maternal grandmother (grandmother)
for consideration as relative placement for the children under an
alternative permanent plan; (2) denying her section 388 petition,

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare

and Institutions Code.
which sought to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and grant her
custody of her children; and (3) terminating her parental rights
after declining to apply the parental-benefit exception. We find
no error and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
In February 2022, the Sonoma County Department of
Social Services (department) filed dependency petitions under
section 300, subdivision (b) to protect then three-year-old B.J.,
nine-month-old J.G., and their 15-year-old sibling, E.J. The
petitions alleged that the children were at risk of serious physical
harm due to substance abuse by J.G.’s father (father) and a
pattern of violent outbursts by father against mother, who failed
to protect herself and the children from harm.2
At the time the petitions were filed, mother was living with
the children in grandmother’s home. At the detention hearing,
the court ordered that the children remain in mother’s care.
In advance of the jurisdiction hearing, the department
recommended that the petitions be sustained, the children
remain in mother’s care with family maintenance services, and a
six-month review hearing be scheduled. At the hearing, the court
sustained the allegations of the petitions and adopted the
department’s recommendations.
In September 2022, the department filed a supplemental
petition alleging that the previous disposition was not effective in

2 J.G.’s father did not participate in the proceedings and

has not filed an appeal of the order terminating his parental
rights. The department was unable to locate the fathers of the
other two children.

2
the protection of the children. The petition alleged that, while
caring for the children, mother relapsed on methamphetamine
and amphetamines as evidenced by a positive drug screening on
July 31, 2022. Additionally, the petition alleged that on June 25,
2022, mother informed the department that she was threatened
by father with the children present and on July 31, 2022, mother
was assaulted by father.
The report prepared for the detention hearing on the
supplemental petition recommended the children be removed
from mother’s care. The department expressed concern that, if
the parents continued to use substances and not to comply with
their case plan, the children would be at great risk of emotional
and physical harm. The report also indicated that grandmother
was willing to be considered for placement for B.J. and E.J. but
that it would require mother to find another residence.
At the hearing, the children were detained. E.J. was placed
with his maternal grandmother.3 The two younger siblings were
placed together in a nonrelative foster home. The six-month
review hearing was vacated and a jurisdiction/disposition hearing
was set for October 2022.
In advance of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the
department recommended that the children continue in their
foster care placements and that mother be afforded reunification
services. The department acknowledged grandmother’s request
that B.J. be placed in her care but noted that “there are some

3 Mother’s parental rights were not terminated as to E.J.

and he is not a party to the present appeal.

3
things that need to be changed to the safety of the home for it to
be suitable for a child his age.” According to the older sibling,
grandmother could not take care of both B.J. and J.G. because
they would be “too much” for her and she would have to take
them both to work with her.
The court sustained the allegations of the supplemental
petition, removed the children from mother’s care, and ordered
family reunification services to mother. The court also scheduled
a six-month review hearing.
In the six-month review report, filed in March 2023, the
department recommended continuing reunification services to
mother. The department acknowledged that mother had moved
out of grandmother’s home so that the older sibling could be
placed with grandmother and that grandmother still wanted B.J.
placed with her, but stated that he could not be placed with her
because of the current condition and configuration of her home.
In supplemental reports filed in April and July 2023, the
department changed its recommendation and requested
termination of reunification services for B.J. and J.G. due to their
young ages and mother’s lack of progress in completing her case
plan. At the hearing, however, the parties stipulated to an
additional six months of reunification services for mother, and a
twelve-month review hearing was set for September 2023.
In the twelve-month review report, the department
recommended terminating reunification services. Again, the
report indicates that grandmother expressed her interest in
having B.J. placed in her home. The department reported that it

4
had referred grandmother to an agency in the fall of 2022 to
address the concerns about the configuration of her home, but
that grandmother “has not been able to adequately change the
conditions of the home.”
At the review hearing, the parties again stipulated to an
additional six months of reunification services for mother. The
eighteen-month review hearing was scheduled for March 2024.
In the eighteen-month review report filed in April 2024, the
department recommended terminating reunification services to
mother and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The report
explained that mother continued not to comply with drug testing
and there were numerous occasions where she would test the
following day or miss tests altogether. She struggled with time
management and missed visits with the children, therapy
appointments, and her mom’s group. Mother attended individual
therapy with one provider until September 2023, and in
December 2023 was referred for additional counseling with a
different provider, but that provider ended therapy after mother
missed and cancelled sessions, noting mother felt she did not
need therapy. The provider reported to the department that she
suspected mother was using substances. Mother was encouraged
to go to a support group for mothers, but the facilitator noted she
was no longer attending and had not attended in over month.
Mother did not want to take any medications and did not feel like
she needed any. She reported that her stress and mental health
issues were directly related to her not being able to be with her
children full time. She asserted that she was being abused by the

5
department, and that if her children were returned and the
department was not involved, she would have no mental health
issues. Mother was referred to an outpatient drug treatment
program but was unable to complete the assessment due to
aggressive outbursts during the appointment. She asserts that
she does not have substance problem and does not need
treatment. The report also notes that while her urinalysis tests
have consistently come back negative, testing staff has alerted
the department that they believe she is using a shampoo bottle to
squeeze urine out of for her tests. The department opined that
“[t]his is in combination with her previous hair follicle tests
having come back with positive or very concerning results.”
Finally, the department provided evidence that mother was living
with a man who had recently had reunification services for his
own children terminated due to his substance use.
The department acknowledged that grandmother was now
requesting placement of both of the younger siblings, but
expressed concern because the children’s “behaviors have been
problematic after visits with the grandmother.”
At the hearing in June 2024, mother withdrew her contest
and her attorney indicated he would be filing a section 388
petition at a later date asking for return. The court terminated
reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for
October 2024.
In September 2024, at the department’s request, the court
suspended mother’s visitation after she refused to adhere to
visitation guidelines set forth by the department after an incident

6
where mother followed the visitation monitor and children after
they left the visit.
On October 2, 2024, mother filed a section 388 petition,
asking the court to return the children to her care and order
family maintenance services. Her petition asserted that she has
“made substantial progress towards completing her caseplan and
has thus removed the concerns leading to dependency
jurisdiction.” She indicated that the requested order was in the
children’s best interests because the children “love their mother
very much, enjoy spending as much time with her as possible and
providing a safe stable mother to them while reunifying children
with parents is always in the best interests of the minors.”
Mother attached to the petition a 300-page document detailing
her compliance with her case plan since the initiation of these
proceedings.
Around the same time, the department submitted its
section 366.26 report, in which it recommended terminating
parental rights with adoption as the permanent plan. The report
stated that the children had lived with the same caregivers since
September 2022 and that their caregivers wished to adopt them.
The report considered the beneficial-relationship exception and
concluded that it did not apply.
Finally, the department completed and submitted to the
court an assessment of the maternal grandmother’s request for
placement of the children. The assessment concluded, based on
its consideration of the section 361.3 factors, that the
grandmother would not be a suitable placement for the children.

7
In December 2024 and January 2025, the court held a
contested hearing on mother’s request to change the order
terminating reunification services, the department’s request for
an order terminating mother’s parental rights and selection of a
plan of adoption for the minors, and grandmother’s request for
consideration as relative placement for the children under an
alternative permanent plan. After hearing testimony by
grandmother, mother, and the social worker, the court issued its
order.
Addressing mother’s section 388 petition first, the court
found that mother had not met her burden of showing new
evidence or a change of circumstance since the June 2024 order
was entered that would justify her proposed change. The court
found that mother “presented little or no evidence which would
suggest that she has made any progress towards completing her
case plan,” including addressing her sobriety, substance abuse,
and mental health issues. The court added that it was also
making a finding that granting mother’s petition was not in the
best interests of the children.
The court also denied grandmother’s placement request,
finding that the children were in a sound placement with their
caregivers and that grandmother was not a suitable placement
for the children.
Finally, the court found by clear and convincing evidence
that it was likely the children would be adopted and that
termination of parental rights was in the children’s best
interests. The court found that the beneficial parental and

8
sibling relationship exceptions did not apply. Accordingly, the
court terminated parental rights and ordered a plan of adoption
for the children.
DISCUSSION
I. Grandmother’s Request for Placement
A. Legal Background
Under section 309, subdivision (d), when a child is
detained, “[i]f a relative . . . is available and requests emergency
placement of the child . . ., the county welfare department shall
initiate an assessment of the relative’s . . . suitability for
emergency placement . . . .” Once the court takes jurisdiction
over the child, if the child is removed from parental custody, the
department must identify and locate the child’s adult relatives
and “provide to all adult relatives who are located, except when
that relative’s history of family or domestic violence makes
notification inappropriate, within 30 days of removal of the child,
written notification and shall also, whenever appropriate, provide
oral notification” of, among other enumerated things, “[a]n
explanation of the various options to participate in the care and
placement of the child and support for the child’s family.” (§ 309,
subd. (e)(1)(B).)
Under section 361.3, subdivision (a), a relative who
requests placement of the child shall be given “preferential
consideration.” Preferential consideration “means that the
relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be
considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) The
department is required to assess those relatives seeking

9
placement according to the factors listed in section 361.3,
subdivision (a) (1)–(8) (placement factors) and must document
those efforts in the social study prepared for the disposition
hearing. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(8)(B).) After the disposition hearing,
“whenever a new placement of the child must be made,
consideration for placement shall again be given as described in
this section to relatives who have not been found to be unsuitable
and who will fulfill the child’s reunification or permanent plan
requirements.” (§ 361.3, subd. (d).)
In In re Joseph T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 795, the
court rejected the argument that section 361.3, subdivision (d)
limits application of the relative placement preference after
disposition. The court held that, “when a qualified relative
comes forward after the initial placement and during the family
reunification period and seeks placement of the child,” the
preference applies regardless of whether a new placement is
required or is otherwise being considered by the dependency
court. (In re Joseph T., at p. 795.)
In In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 712, 723,
(Isabella G.) the court held that if a relative makes a request for
placement of a dependent child before the disposition hearing
but the department does not timely complete a relative home
assessment as required by law, the relative requesting
placement is entitled to a hearing under section 361.3 without a
showing that a change in placement is needed and even if
reunification services have been terminated.

10
B. Additional Factual Background
As detailed above, grandmother requested to be considered
for placement for B.J. prior to the detention hearing and
reiterated her request throughout the proceedings. Initially, the
department indicated that the delay in consideration for
placement was due to the condition and configuration of her
home. In February 2024, after grandmother expressed
frustration that, despite making the suggested modifications, no
one had come out to assess her home, a social worker came and
took pictures. The social worker told her, however, that the
department “is not looking to moving the children into her home
since it seems like the case is moving to [family maintenance]”
and because the “children are stable in their placements[.]”
In September 2024, two years after the children were
removed from their parents’ custody, the department completed
its assessment of grandmother’s request. Based on the social
worker’s application of the statutory placement factors, the
department recommended that the court find grandmother
unsuitable for placement. The assessment explains that, while
grandmother has addressed the issues in her physical home that
the department previously identified, the department continued
to have serious concerns about grandmother’s ability to protect
the children from harm.
The assessment states that when the children were living
in grandmother’s home with family maintenance services,
grandmother failed to meet the children’s needs and neglected
their safety by failing to alert the department that mother was

11
continuing to experience domestic violence and abusing
substances, and by allowing J.G. to leave with her father while he
was under the influence of substances, which ultimately led to
the police incident that resulted in the children’s removal. The
assessment states further that grandmother has not
demonstrated “good moral character” as evidenced by her
disrespectful and volatile behavior towards the current foster
family and her failure to protect the children as noted above. In
addition, the assessment expresses concern about grandmother’s
continued inability to “accurately assess when [mother] is a
safety concern to [the children], leaving them in a vulnerable
situation,” as demonstrated by her report to the social worker in
September 2024 that despite strong indications to the contrary,
mother was “doing very well lately, ha[d] done everything the
Department ha[d] asked of her, and [was] not abusing
substances.” The social worker reported that, while grandmother
“has some insight into her daughter’s past substance abuse,” she
cannot “clearly articulate the indicators of when her daughter
has relapsed or is in active substance abuse” and that
grandmother “believes her daughter is sober, whereas the
Department has serious concerns regarding [mother’s] sobriety.”
The assessment also explains that grandmother was
participating in unsupervised visitation when the older brother
visited with his siblings but that the visits were reduced and
were required to be supervised after the children began
exhibiting signs of anxiety and aggression after the visits.
According to the assessment, the children’s therapist opined that

12
it would “likely be detrimental to their mental health and safety
if they were to live with [grandmother] due to the extreme
behaviors following visits.” Finally, the assessment indicates
that B.J. has indicated a preference to remain in his current
placement.
At the section 366.26 hearing, after admitting the
assessment into evidence and taking testimony from
grandmother, the court denied her request for placement. The
court explained, “With regard to maternal Grandmother’s request
for placement, this Court is entirely unconvinced that it would be
in the children’s best interest to be uprooted and placed with
their maternal Grandmother. First and foremost, they are in a
sound placement with their current caregivers and this Court is
not about to upend that arrangement. But even if they were not
in such a healthy environment, the evidence would not support
placement with maternal Grandmother. The record is replete
with evidence that maternal Grandmother’s relationship with her
daughter is wildly unhealthy. The Court found evidence showing
that when the children were briefly placed in maternal
Grandmother’s care, she essentially lived in fear of Mother and
what would happen to her and the children. She was so afraid,
she neglected to advise the Department of her belief that Mother
and her boyfriend were using drugs until well after the children
had been detained. [¶] Additionally, Mother herself has
repeatedly and often cited her mother’s care of her as the reason
for her own troubles. She blames her mother and has described
her many times as emotionally abusive. This is a theme

13
espoused by Mother and Grandmother, i.e., that their
relationship has been fraught with emotional abuse. The risk of
exposing the children to this otherwise fractious and troubled
mother-daughter relationship is far too high to warrant any
consideration of maternal Grandmother as a potential placement,
particularly in light of the healthy situation the children are now
in.”
C. Analysis
Mother contends that the department failed to comply with
the requirements of section 309 at the time of the children’s
detention and to afford maternal grandmother preferential
placement consideration as required by section 361.3. She
argues further that the department’s eventual assessment of
placement with grandmother was not “complete” and that the
belated evaluation, conducted on the “eve of the section 366.26
hearing,” did not give grandmother a “ ‘fair chance’ and
opportunity for placement or preferential consideration.”
1. Forfeiture
The department contends that mother forfeited her
arguments by failing to raise placement at any time before the
section 366.26 hearing. We agree, in limited part, that mother
forfeited her claims regarding the department’s failure to comply
with section 309 at the time of the children’s detention. (In re
A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 500−501.) If mother believed the
social worker had not complied with statutory requirements in
pursuing the grandmother as a relative placement at the time of
the disposition, she should have raised the issue in the trial court

14
or on appeal at that time. Mother has not, however, forfeited her
challenge to the court’s denial of grandmother’s request for
preferential placement under section 361.3 at the section 366.26
hearing.
2. Standing
The department argues that mother lacks standing to
challenge the denial of grandmother’s request for placement
because her reunification services had been terminated and she
has not demonstrated how the court’s decision not to place the
children with grandmother advances her argument against
terminating parental rights.
On appeal, a parent is precluded from raising issues that
do not affect his or her rights. (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034–1035 (Cesar V.).) Generally, “[o]nce a
parent’s reunification services have been terminated, the parent
has no standing to appeal relative placement preference issues.”
(In re Jayden M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460; Cesar V., at
pp. 1034–1035.) In In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 238, the
court recognized, however, that “[a] parent’s appeal from a
judgment terminating parental rights [can] confer[] standing to
appeal an order concerning the dependent child’s placement . . . if
the placement order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument
against terminating parental rights.” In other words, parents
have standing if the “possibility exist[s] that reversing [the
placement decision] might lead the juvenile court not to
terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 237.) On appeal, “[w]e
liberally construe the issue of standing and resolve doubts in

15
favor of the right to appeal.” (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th
1, 9.)
Here, mother argued against the termination of her
parental rights in the juvenile court on the grounds that (1) the
court should grant her section 388 petition and return the
children to her with family maintenance services; (2) the parental
and sibling relationship exceptions precluded termination of her
parental rights; and (3) guardianship with grandmother was a
more appropriate alternative plan to adoption. Mother argues
that she has standing to appeal the placement decision because it
had the potential to alter the court’s determination of the child’s
best interests in connection with the arguments she asserted at
the hearing and thus, might have led the juvenile court to not
terminate her parental rights.
Given how intertwined the placement decision was with the
court’s ruling on mother’s section 388 petition and the
termination of parental rights, we cannot conclude on the record
before us that mother lacks standing to challenge the placement
decision. It is possible that, had the children’s placement been
changed, the court’s analysis at the termination hearing might
have been altered. (See In re Esperanza C. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054 [resolving doubts in favor of mother’s
right to appeal where alternative permanency plan to adoption
was unlikely but nonetheless remained a statutory option for the
juvenile court]; In re H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 10
[parents had standing to appeal where the placement decision
had “the potential to alter the court’s determination of the child's

16
best interests and the appropriate permanency plan for that
child, and thus may affect a parent’s interest in his or her legal
status with respect to the child”].) For this reason, this case is
distinguishable from In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at page 238, in
which the father did not make any argument in opposition to the
termination of his parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing.
3. The Section 316.3 Assessment
There is no real dispute that the grandmother timely
requested placement of the children and the department failed to
complete the assessment as required by law. But we reject
mother’s argument that this “violation of a ‘mandatory’ duty”
requires reversal of the order terminating parental rights. In
Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 712, the court held that
when placement is timely requested but the assessment is
improperly delayed, the court must hold a hearing and evaluate
the placement request under section 361.3. That is precisely
what the court did here. The department conducted an
assessment in September 2024, and the court considered the
request at a hearing consistent with the requirements set out in
Isabella G. Accordingly, we review the court’s rejection of the
grandmother’s placement request for an abuse of discretion.
(In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067–1068,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Cesar V.,
supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032.)
Contrary to mother’s argument, the department’s
assessment was sufficiently complete. Mother’s suggestion that
the assessment merely expressed “concern that grandmother may

17
not have done what could have been done to protect the children
from mother or father when the children were living with her
[but] . . . did not assess the remainder of section 361.3 factors” is
not supported by the record. The assessment separately
considered each of the factors before concluding that placement
with grandmother would not be in the children’s best interests.
It is therefore distinguishable from In re H.G., supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at page 15, cited by mother, in which the
department’s assessment considered only two of the section 361.3
factors.
Mother asserts further that the assessment “appears to be
a post-hoc” justification for denying placement and that the
department “obviously” did not believe its concerns were serious
or it would not have placed the older sibling with grandmother.
The assessment acknowledged, however, that the older sibling
was placed with grandmother, but explained that his needs
presented vastly different responsibilities and safety concerns.
The older sibling was old enough to care for his own basic needs
and could seek out help if needed, whereas the younger siblings
could not. The department indicated that grandmother’s
inability to assess safety or protect the children made her unsafe
to care for the young, vulnerable children.
Contrary to mother’s argument, the department’s concern
that grandmother may not have been able to recognize when
mother was using drugs is not “mere speculation.” Nor is the
department’s concern that grandmother would not protect the
children speculative. The assessment sets forth the factual basis

18
for its opinion: grandmother’s conduct prior to the removal of the
children and her statements at an interview conducted in
September 2024. In addition to noting that grandmother “could
not clearly articulate the indicators of when her daughter has
relapsed,” the assessment notes that, during the September 2024
interview, grandmother “was unable to appropriately answer the
majority of questions that were asked of her. When asked about
discipline and parenting experience, [she] provided stories to the
interviewers that were loosely related to the questions. She
stated that it was difficult for her to come up with answers when
she does not know what the future holds or exactly what the
situation will be like in the future. This lack of ability to
formulate safety plans has the department concerned that
[grandmother] would be unable to provide effective care and
control of the children.”
Mother also asserts that the department’s determination
that grandmother had not demonstrated “good moral character”
was based on conduct which lacked “depravity, substance abuse,
or the like” and thus, was not demonstrative of moral character.
Neither party cites authority defining good moral character for
purposes of child custody. For our purposes, however, it is the
facts set forth in the assessment that are important, not the
department’s determination as to whether they reflect poor moral
character. The facts are that grandmother had a history of
disrespectful and volatile behavior towards the foster parents and
failed to report safety concerns to the department.

19
Finally, mother argues that the department and the court
“did not give [grandmother] a ‘fair chance’ and opportunity for
placement or preferential consideration” and improperly relied on
“the bonds forged with the foster family during the time when the
Department was not exercising any diligence in the assessment
of the grandmother for placement.” In Isabella G., supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at page 723, the court emphasized that a
relative requesting placement need not show that “the change of
placement was in the child’s best interest,” but that the court
must decide whether “placement with a relative is in the child’s
best interest.” Even assuming that the court improperly
concluded that uprooting the children would not be in their best
interests, the court also expressly concluded that “even if they
were not in such a healthy environment, the evidence would not
support placement with maternal Grandmother.”
Mother’s reliance on In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284
is similarly misplaced. In that case, the court reversed an order
terminating parental rights where the record established that the
social services agency disregarded the statutory mandate that
preference in the placement of a child removed from the custody
of his parents be given to qualified family relatives and the trial
court erred in failing to apply the statutory preference for relative
placement. (In re R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1308.)
There, the relative had requested placement almost immediately
upon the child’s detention and, while the assessment was
commenced, it was not completed before parental rights were
terminated more than two years later. (Id. at pp. 1297, 1299.)

20
The court remanded with instructions that the social services
agency “submit new reports and recommendations which update
the relevant facts and apply the correct standards” and the court
review the agency’s decisions and act upon its recommendations
pursuant to appropriate standards. (Id. at p. 1308.) Critically,
the court advised, “We recognize that what is in the child’s best
interests at this point, almost two and one-half years after his
birth, may well differ from what would have been his best
interests when he was still an infant. The passage of time may
have strengthened R.T.’s bonds with his caretakers and other
circumstances may have developed that bear on an evaluation of
his best interest. Meaningful redress for past mistakes may not
be possible, but we cannot unwind the clock. The interests of
stability and continuity may or may not prevail over familial
bonds. This difficult question must be decided in the first
instance by the juvenile court under the governing legal
standards, which must be applied to the circumstances as they
exist at the time of the hearing on remand.” (Ibid.)
Here, unlike in In re R.T., the department completed the
assessment, albeit belatedly, and the court considered
grandmother’s request under the proper standard. We cannot
know what might have happened had the children been placed
with grandmother at the time of the disposition and had she been
afforded appropriate support and services, but it does not appear
that the court abused its discretion in rejecting placement with
grandmother when the matter was ultimately decided.
II. Mother’s Petition for Modification

21
Under section 388, a party may petition the court to
change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The
petitioning party has the burden to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that there is a change of circumstances or new
evidence, and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best
interests. (§ 388; In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120.)
When, as here, a section 388 petition is filed after
reunification services have been terminated, the juvenile court’s
overriding concern is the child’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) A section 388 petition at this time
“provides a means for the court to address a legitimate change of
circumstances while protecting the child’s need for prompt
resolution of his custody status.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993)
5 Cal.4th 295, 309; In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109,
1123 [“The parent’s interests in the care, custody and
companionship of the child are no longer paramount; and the
focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and
stability”].) At this stage, there is a rebuttable presumption that
continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. (In re
Marilyn H., at p. 310.) The best interests standard, however,
requires more than “a simplistic comparison between the natural
parent’s and the caretakers’ households.” (In re Kimberly F.
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530.) In determining whether a
section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the
juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural
history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of
the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem

22
was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal,
the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the
change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made
sooner. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; In re
Kimberly F., at p. 532 [factors to consider in determining child’s
best interests include “(1) the seriousness of the problem which
led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of
that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the
dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the
degree to which the problem may be easily removed or
ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been”].)
We review the denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse
of discretion. (In re N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.) A
juvenile court “ ‘abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong
legal standard or its factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.’ ” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718,
728.)
Mother contends the court applied an incorrect legal
standard to the determination of her petition. She argues that
the trial court improperly required her to prove that she had
resolved the issues that gave rise to jurisdiction and is currently
“free of her dependency on drugs.” We find no error.
In making its ruling, the court recited in considerable
detail the issues that led to the dependency proceedings, the
services provided by the department to address those issues, and
mother’s minimal participation in those services. The court
“carefully considered mother’s testimony denying her current

23
use and dependency on illegal substances” and found it to be
“wholly unbelievable.” The court added that “even if it is true
that she is presently clean and sober, Mother’s testimony is
scant in the face of clear and convincing evidence that she spent
almost the life of these cases mired in delusion about whether
she had a drug problem, denying what she now admits was her
use of methamphetamine, projecting her delusion onto others,
abusing social workers and accusing them of only being out to
steal her children, berating Department staff for pressuring her
to comply with her case plan, and spinning her wheels when it
came to visitation which was frequently marred by inappropriate
behaviors on her part calculated to disrupt the children’s sense
of well-being.” In sum, the court found that there was “no basis
on which it can conclude that by a preponderance of evidence
Mother has made progress in completing her case plan and is
free of her dependency upon drugs. She may or may not be
currently sober or abstaining from use of drugs, but that is not
the same thing as being sufficiently clean and sober so as to
warrant returning the children to her care. That would require
that she actually had engaged in her case plan when she had the
chance and demonstrated to the Court, and her service
providers, that she has put her troubled past behind her.
Mother is required to show that she has resolved the issues
which gave rise to the Court’s jurisdiction, and she very simply
has failed to do that.”
Initially, we reject mother’s argument that her drug use
was not a “problem” that led to the dependency proceeding.

24
While the initial petition was focused on mother’s failure to
protect the children from father’s conduct, the subsequent
petition and events established that mother’s drug use was a
serious concern as well and that mother repeatedly failed to
acknowledge and address it. In denying mother’s section 388
petition, the court remarked, “The Court has been reminded that
the children were initially detained but not removed from
Mother’s care because she was involved in a violent relationship
which posed a serious risk of harm to the children. They were
left in Mother’s care because she was believed to be attempting
to extricate herself from her violent relationship with [father]
and his drug abuse, and it appeared that with assistance and
with him out of her life, she might be able to offer the children a
safe and sober living environment. However, it became apparent
early on that Mother herself was abusing substances, which she
now describes as her trying quote-unquote to cope with her
violent relationship with . . . father. She also testified that her
use of methamphetamine after the children had been left in her
care under the plan of family maintenance did not amount to,
quote, ‘Active use,’ end quote, as that would, in her view, imply
that she was using every day. [¶] According to her, she was
only using methamphetamine about two times per month when
the Department filed a supplemental petition.” The trial court
noted that despite being advised that she would need to submit
to a substance use evaluation, participate in a drug treatment
program, and submit to random drug tests, she had not, as of the

25
hearing, completed a substance abuse program and her
compliance with testing had been problematic as well.
Mother’s substance abuse issues permeated the dependency
proceedings. Under these circumstances, requiring her to prove
that she had addressed those issues and was currently free from
drugs is not inconsistent with applicable legal standards. “In the
context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted
treatment in the past, a showing of materially changed
circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period of
sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (In re N.F.,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121, citing In re C.J.W. (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [“parents’ most recent efforts at
sobriety ‘were only three months old’ and did not demonstrate
changed circumstances”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
415, 423, [“parent’s seven months of sobriety since his last
relapse were insufficient to show changed circumstances, given
the parent’s history”]; In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at
p. 531, fn. 9, [“ ‘It is the nature of addiction that one must be
“clean” for a much longer period than 120 days to show real
reform’ ”].)
In any event, any possible error in the court’s articulation
of the standard is harmless in this case. Contrary to mother’s
assertion, there was no reasonable possibility that the court
would have reached a different outcome had it merely required
her to show a “legitimate change in circumstances.” Here, while
mother’s evidence might support a finding that she had engaged
in some services—established a safe home, started therapy, and

26
obtained a restraining order against J.G.’s father—the record
does not establish a legitimate change in circumstances with
regard to her drug use. Mother does not deny that she never
engaged in drug treatment, and at the hearing she continued to
insist that treatment was unnecessary. On appeal, she fails to
acknowledge her burden of proof when she argues, “Although
mother did not submit for drug testing after the termination of
services in June of 2024, there was no evidence that mother
continued to use drugs. During her visitation after June of 2024,
there was no indication that she was under the influence or
suspicion that she was under the influence in visitation. There
was no report from the therapist, psychiatric nurse, or parenting
class providers that mother was under the influence after June of
2024.”
Finally, contrary to mother’s assertion, the court did not
improperly compare her to the foster parents in determining the
best interest of the children. The court did not address the
children’s bonds with their foster parents at all in explaining its
reasons for the denial of mother’s section 388 petition. The court
reasonably concluded that the return of the children to mother’s
care would not be in their interests given her failure to address
the substance abuse issues as directed by her case plan.
Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of mother’s
section 388 petition.
III. Parental-Benefit Exception
In In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 629 (Caden C.), the
Court explained, “[W]hen a court proceeds to select a permanent

27
placement for a child who cannot be returned to a parent’s care,
the parent may avoid termination of parental rights in certain
circumstances defined by statute. One of these is the parental-
benefit exception.” The exception “requires a parent to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . that the parent has
regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship, and that terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (Ibid. [citing
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)].) “[T]he exception applies in
situations . . . where severing the child’s relationship with the
parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new
adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.” (Id. at pp. 629–
630.)
“Because terminating parental rights eliminates any legal
basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts
must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the
relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court
must therefore determine “how the child would be affected by
losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like
for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s
life.” (Ibid.) Overall, the court asks “whether losing the
relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent
not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive
home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
We review the first two Caden C. factors—whether the
parent has visited the child regularly and whether the child
would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship—for

28
substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–
640.) We likewise review the factual determinations underlying
the third factor for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.) We
review the court’s ultimate decision as to the third factor—
whether terminating the parent-child relationship would be
detrimental to the child—for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
Mother argues that the record supports application of the
parental-benefit exception and that the court relied on
impermissible factors in reaching its conclusion that the
exception was not applicable.
Initially, we note that although the trial court confirmed
that it had concluded that the exception was not applicable, it did
not expressly conduct an analysis under Caden C. on the record.
The court, however, was not required to do so, nor was it required
to make any specific findings on the record. (In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) While “a statement by the trial court
of its findings (or reasons) for its decision is helpful in conducting
appellate review, it was not a legal requirement in this instance.”
(Ibid.) Accordingly, we presume the court understood the
applicable law and correctly applied it in the absence of evidence
to the contrary. (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 780
[“As a general rule ‘ “a trial court is presumed to have been aware
of and followed the applicable law” ’ ”].) Moreover, so long as this
court concludes that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion and/or that sufficient evidence supported the juvenile
court’s ultimate ruling, the court’s reasons for its ruling are
irrelevant. (Anderson v. Davidson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 136, 144

29
[“ ‘ “[W]e will affirm a judgment correct on any legal basis, even if
that basis was not invoked by the trial court. [Citation.] There
can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if
the decision itself is correct” ’ ”].) As discussed below, we find no
error in the court’s determination that the parental-benefit
exception did not apply.
A. Regular Visitation
The department’s report indicates that mother visited
consistently with the children until visitation was suspended in
September 2024. At the hearing, the department argued that,
given the suspension of visitation, the first Caden C. factor had
not been met. On appeal, the department reiterates its position
that mother’s failure to visit in the several months preceding the
hearing precludes application of the exception. Mother insists
that she visited consistently to the extent permitted by the court
order. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“[t]he question
is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account
‘the extent permitted by court orders’ ”].)
Absent an express finding by the trial court, we must
assume the court resolved this factor against mother and ask
whether substantial evidence supports the court’s implied
finding. Here, the record is clear that fault for the lack of
visitation rests squarely on mother’s shoulders. At the hearing
on the department’s request to suspend visitation, the
department argued, “Unfortunately, Mother has shown an
inability or unwillingness to commit to following the guidelines
for visitation. There has been a history of unsafe behavior during

30
visits and in front of the children. Many visitation monitors do
not feel safe supervising visits with this Mom. [¶] There [have]
been several incidents. One where she was holding onto [B.J.]
and wouldn’t let him go and return to the foster parents despite
being requested to do so. There has been—Mom’s been
aggressive, raised both her hands in a gesture indicative she
might hit the visit monitor. This was in the visitation area of the
office. [¶] During the last visit, September 4th, Mother followed
the visit monitor with the children in the car. Prior to that, she
wouldn’t release the door after helping the kids in the car, stating
she wants the monitor to leave until she was able to call her
attorney.” The social worker testified that, after the September 4
incident, she drew up some guidelines and attempted to meet
with mother, but mother was either incapable of understanding
the reasons for the guidelines or refused to participate in the
conversation. The social worker also testified that mother’s
aggressive behavior “creates a lot of conflict within particularly
with [B.J.] I think what tends to happen is Mom is very
emotional, and [B.J.] tends to co-regulate with her and become
very emotional and upset and is very interesting to observe
because at that exact moment, [J.G.] backs away generally and
will stand with the visit supervisor and encourage [B.J.]. Come
on, [B.J.], it’s time to go, and it’s very sad to watch that.” Minor’s
counsel also agreed with the department’s request.
Arguably, the failure to visit in the three months preceding
the termination of parental rights precludes application of the

31
exception. While we could resolve this issue on this ground, we
briefly address mother’s remaining arguments.
B. Substantial Positive Relationship/Detriment
The department’s section 366.26 report indicated that,
“[b]ased on the children’s age and the fact that they have been in
care for the past two years and [mother’s] continued concerning
behaviors during visits that result in additional conflict and
stress for the children, the Department believes that continuing
the mother/child relationship would not be beneficial as the
relationship is not one of substantial, positive emotional
attachment for either [child].” The report added, “Given the fact
that there does not appear to be substantial, positive emotional
attachment, the instability the children experienced in [mother’s]
care due to domestic violence and substance abuse, and the
continued unwillingness or inability of [mother] to properly
assess the children’s needs and conduct herself in a healthy
manor [sic] during visitation, the need of the children for
permanency far outweighs any harm of severing the parent/child
relationship between the children and their mother.”
At the hearing, the department argued that “[t]here’s not a
substantial positive relationship such that these children should
not be adopted. [¶] They would indeed continue to thrive. They
don’t ask for more visits with their mother. They’re not crying
about it. Their behaviors have gotten better and improved. B.J.
is doing better in school. J.G. isn’t exhibiting the same behavior
she had before. In fact, they’ve actually been doing much better
since visits have stopped. That alone indicates that the

32
relationship isn’t so substantial and positive such that the . . .
adoption shouldn’t go forward.” Minor’s counsel agreed, noting,
“We are in a rare circumstance where we don’t typically get a
practice run of what life would be like without visits with the
parents. Here we’ve had that. Since September 4th, mom hasn’t
had visits. We’ve gotten to see from that sample size to see what
life would be like for them and the evidence here shows that they
are doing extraordinarily well. They continue to do better and
they continue to thrive.” With regard to the last two factors, the
children’s counsel argued, I “do not see a substantial positive
bond. I do not see the positive. . . . Because of [mother’s]
behaviors, they’re not positive for the children. In a sense they’re
being parentified because of what they’ve been subjected to.
[¶] And I do believe it would be [] detrimental if they were taken
from this home. They deserve stability. They deserve to be
children. I implore Your Honor to please find and move forward
with the Department’s recommendation to terminate parental
rights and order the permanent plan of adoption.”
Substantial evidence supports the court’s implicit finding
that the children do not have a significant parental bond with
mother and that termination of parental rights would not be
detrimental to the children. We note that mother focuses solely
on the strength of her relationship with B.J. and argues that if
the court’s order is reversed as to him, the order as to J.G. should
be reversed as well. This is undoubtably because the evidence
with respect to J.G. is clear. She was a year old when removed
from her mother’s care and has spent the majority of her life with

33
her foster parents. B.J., however, having spent the first three
years of his life with mother, undeniably has more of a
relationship with mother. As mother notes, the record contains
statements from B.J.’s therapist and the social worker reflecting
the existence of a parental bond with both his foster parents and
mother. The record also reflects, however, that B.J.’s
relationship with his mother was not always healthy and that
visits resulted in extreme anxiety and misbehavior. As argued at
the hearing, his anxiety and misbehavior improved considerably
after visitation was suspended. It is clear that termination of the
relationship has not been detrimental to the children in the short
term.
Contrary to mother’s argument, there is no reason to
believe that the termination of the relationship will be
detrimental to the children in the long term. Even assuming,
however, that mother and B.J. share some degree of a parental
bond, the termination of which might result in some long term
detriment, on the record before us, the court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the stability offered by adoption
greatly outweighed the preservation of that relationship.
Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating mother’s
parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

34

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