In re N.C. CA2/5

CourtListener 10677085Calctapp24 set 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/24/25 In re N.C. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re N.C., et al., Persons Coming B342892
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP03356)
AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

A.N., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Appellant Minors N.C. and K.C.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, County Counsel, Kim
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent T.C.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent A.N.

________________________________

A.N. (Mother) and T.C. (Father) are the parents of two
sons: two-year-old N.C. and five-day-old K.C. (collectively,
Minors).1 The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) instituted dependency
proceedings after Mother and K.C. tested positive for
amphetamines at the hospital when K.C. was born. The juvenile
court dismissed the petition because, after its review of a recent
appellate decision, it believed it must conclude there was an
insufficient nexus between the parents’ substance abuse and a
risk of serious physical harm to Minors. Minors and the
Department noticed appeals from the dismissal, we issued a writ
of supersedeas to stay the juvenile court’s dismissal order, and we
now consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s ruling.

1
These were Minors’ ages at the initiation of dependency
proceedings.

2
I. BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2024, Father received a call from the
paternal grandfather who said Mother was suffering severe
stomach pain; in the background, Father could hear Mother
screaming.2 Father left work and drove home, and by the time he
arrived, Mother had delivered K.C. Father called 911 and an
ambulance transported Mother and K.C. to the hospital where
staff determined K.C. was born at 35 weeks gestation and
weighing four pounds and 14 ounces. While at the hospital,
Mother and K.C.’s toxicology tests were positive for
amphetamines.
On the day K.C. was born, an emergency response social
worker from the Department spoke with hospital staff and
Mother. A charge nurse advised Mother said she had no prenatal
care because she did not know she was pregnant, she denied any
substance abuse, and she explained the positive test as the result
of something she may have gotten on her hands at a party prior
to giving birth. The charge nurse also related that while there
were no signs K.C. suffered from Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome,
he did have poor feeding scores due to an undeveloped suck
reflex. The charge nurse further advised Mother was unable to
stay awake. Because Mother was “out of it” and could not
securely hold K.C., he was moved to the nursery for safety
reasons. The charge nurse opined Mother’s inability to stay
awake was typical of a “meth patient.” A different nurse on staff

2
At the time, the family was living with the paternal
grandparents. When the Department filed its petition, Mother
and Father moved out of the home so that Minors could be placed
with the paternal grandparents.

3
similarly reported Mother was falling asleep “mid-answer” to
questions. Another nurse advised Father also had difficulty
staying awake during his short visit with Mother and K.C. and
believed he was under the influence of “some drug or something.”
Mother, who had difficulty keeping her eyes open during
her interview with the Department social worker, initially denied
all substance abuse. As the interview progressed, however, she
admitted that beginning in March 2024, she began taking a blue
pill shaped like an “ace” once a week; Mother stated she paid $50
for each pill and the pills made her feel “up, happy.” She
described taking the pills at parties held at the home of one of
Father’s clients, where drugs were “all over the place, cocaine,
pills, people smoking everything.” Although “everyone” had been
asking if she was pregnant for months, Mother thought she was
just getting fat and did not suspect she was pregnant until she
felt K.C. kicking approximately two weeks before she gave birth.
After she felt K.C. moving inside her, Mother elected not to take
a pregnancy test or go to a doctor because she felt ashamed about
her “partying, with all the pills,” “and all the new things we had
been trying.” Despite knowing she was pregnant, on October 15,
2024, two days before she gave birth, she went to a party and
consumed alcohol. That was the party she referenced when
claiming someone slipped something in her drink that caused her
to test positive for amphetamine.
The following day, the social worker spoke with Father.
When asked about Mother’s substance abuse, Father stated he
“forgot the details.” When pressed, he admitted he and Mother
“do weed,” microdose “THC and [mu]shrooms,” and “do these
[c]andies” at parties. He clarified that he and Mother only use
MDMA/ecstasy “at parties or events,” admitted they had “tried”

4
cocaine “sometime in the last year,” and stated they occasionally
use weed and alcohol when socializing with friends. Despite this
history of substance use, Father maintained he and Mother
“aren’t drug users like that” and repeated, “We do not do drugs.
We do not do that, [we] just do it for fun when hanging out with
friends.” When asked about K.C.’s positive test for amphetamine,
Father’s response was: “‘Lots of kids use drugs!’”
As part of its investigation, the Department also spoke with
the paternal grandparents and a paternal aunt. The paternal
grandparents denied ever suspecting Mother and Father used
drugs or alcohol. The paternal aunt did suspect drug use but
never witnessed it.
In October 2024, when K.C. was set to be released from the
hospital, the Department sought and obtained a removal order
for K.C. Three days later, the Department filed a dependency
petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)(1).3 The petition alleged Minors were at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a
result of their parents’ substance abuse. At the initial hearing,
the juvenile court detained Minors from their parents, ordered
monitored visitation for Mother and Father, and set an
adjudication hearing.
In advance of that hearing, a Department investigator re-
interviewed the parents. Mother continued to deny knowing
what exactly the blue pills were that she took at the client
parties, but she affirmed they made her “happy.” In addition,
Mother denied any substance abuse history, experimenting with

3
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

5
drugs, and any knowledge of Father using drugs. She
acknowledged she should not have gone to the party that was
held two days before she gave birth to K.C. and consumed
alcohol; she denied, however, taking any drugs at that party.
Father maintained he could not account for Mother’s positive
toxicology screen following K.C.’s birth and stated he and Mother
“don’t do drugs . . . we’re not addicts.” When cautioned by the
investigator about conflicts with his prior statements to the
Department, Father contended the social workers had “mixed up
the story” and continued to deny any drug use by either him or
Mother: “We are clean, normal[,] good parents. . . . We wouldn’t
have had a baby if we were using drugs.” Father stated he was
enrolled in random drug testing and in the process of enrolling in
a substance abuse program.
The Department reported the family had no prior child
welfare history or criminal convictions and the parents had been
cooperative and consistent in their visitation with Minors. The
Department also reported that Mother’s on-demand drug test on
October 22—five days after giving birth—revealed a high level of
methamphetamine and amphetamine. (Father’s on-demand drug
test from that same day was negative.) The Department reported
further that Minors appeared physically healthy and were not
exhibiting any signs of emotional distress.
In a last minute information report, the Department
advised that all of the parents’ drug tests in the month of
November had been negative.4 In addition, the Department
clarified Father was not yet enrolled in an outpatient drug

4
Father was a “no show” for his only drug test in December
2024.

6
program due to funding issues. Although Mother was enrolled in
a substance abuse program, she had missed all of her scheduled
group sessions and had attended only one individual phone
session (and did so only because the counselor took the initiative
and contacted Mother). That counselor related that Mother had
not been transparent about her drug history, had not displayed
any accountability for or insight into her behavior, and spoke “as
if all is perfect.”
The juvenile court held an adjudication hearing in
December 2024. After admitting the Department’s various
reports in evidence, taking judicial notice of the proceeding’s file,
and hearing argument from counsel, the court dismissed the
petition without prejudice. Relying on In re B.D. (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 315, the court found the evidence was insufficient to
establish a “nexus” between Mother and Father’s substance
abuse and the alleged risk of harm to Minors. We quote the
juvenile court’s on-the-record reasoning in full: “I’ll acknowledge
to the parties that be that I am always particularly bothered
whenever a mother is pregnant and takes drugs. It is something
that I don’t know that I typically could get over, and it just seems
selfish to me. [¶] I read In re B.D., and I see that there’s more to
it than simply that, and I have to consider the ability to parent
and whether there’s a nexus and whether the child has shown
any adverse consequences, and I have to look at the history, and
there’s a number of things that the court is obligated to consider,
and in doing so, I think that In re B.D. does limit my ability to
take jurisdiction on this case in light of the history of this family.
[¶] There have been no prior calls to—for care about their other
children, their other child [i.e., N.C.], I should say. Although
there’s positive toxicology here, which for me generally is ‘Okay.

7
This is not that difficult of a case to call’—my reading of In re
B.D. and the facts that are set forth within that have made me
reconsider all of the things that I thought were most important or
at least what the law now considers to be most important. [¶]
The court is going to dismiss the petition. I’m going to find
there’s no nexus. I don’t do that with any joy because I can tell
you I have a big issue with parents that are pregnant and taking
drugs, and that whole drug lifestyle is something I’m opposed to,
but I don’t believe there is a sufficiency for me to sustain the
allegations in light of In re B.D., and for those reasons, this
matter is dismissed.”

II. DISCUSSION
The juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition not
because it disbelieved the Department’s evidence but because it
believed, with apparent regret, that it was bound by the result in
B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 315. The juvenile court, however,
overread that opinion, and regardless, we face no such constraint.
Looking solely to the evidence in the record and governing law,
we hold no substantial evidence supports dismissal of the
petition. (In re J.M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 913, 922 [reviewing
decision to dismiss dependency petition for substantial evidence];
see generally In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 198-199.)
Mother and Father regularly used drugs before K.C.’s birth—
indeed, the record indicates Mother used amphetamine and other
substances while pregnant with K.C. and claimed she did not
know she was pregnant until two weeks before she was in labor.
After K.C.’s somewhat premature birth, Mother frequently fell
asleep when she was supposed to be caring for the infant—
behavior typical of a “meth patient,” according to a nurse—and

8
the child had a poor feeding reflex. This, and other evidence we
will outline, revealed drug abuse presenting a real risk of serious
physical harm to infant K.C. and toddler N.C. Because the
juvenile court was not required to wait until that risk
materialized into actual harm (see, e.g., In re Cole L. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 591, 602), it was error not to exercise dependency
jurisdiction.
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes a juvenile court
to exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child if the “child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of [¶] . . . [¶] (D) The
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the
child due to the parent’s or guardian’s . . . substance abuse.”
“[U]nder section 300(b)(1)(D), ‘substance abuse’ bears its ordinary
meaning of excessive use of drugs or alcohol . . . .” (In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 555.) To “supply grounds for dependency
jurisdiction, substance abuse must make the parent or guardian
unable to provide regular care for a child and lead to serious
physical harm to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm.”
(Id. at 546.) “Even if a parent’s or guardian’s excessive use of
drugs or alcohol has other negative manifestations, it does not
provide a basis for jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) unless
it also has these effects.” (Id. at 540.) A court may not apply a
presumption in favor of jurisdiction when a child is of “tender
years,” but “a child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the
care that the child may require and whether a
parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at substantial risk
of serious physical harm. Courts can properly take these facts
regarding a child into account, together with all other relevant

9
evidence, in deciding whether the government has met its burden
at the jurisdictional stage.” (Id. at 559.)
Here, Mother’s methamphetamine use rises to the level of
substance abuse.5 The trial court, though it believed it was
required to dismiss the dependency petition, concluded Mother
used drugs while pregnant with K.C. (as the toxicology test
indicated). Another drug test taken five days after K.C.’s birth
was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine at a “high
level.” Mother admitted to regularly “partying” at locations
where drugs were “‘all over the place’” and where she regularly
ingested pills. Mother explained she was at another of these
parties just two days before K.C.’s birth—and knowing she was
likely pregnant at that time.6 In addition, nurses who observed
Mother in the hospital after K.C.’s birth opined she exhibited “out
of it” behavior consistent with a “meth patient” and a “heavy drug
user[ ].”7 This is effectively expert opinion evidence that strongly

5
Because we so conclude, and because Father was alleged to
have failed to protect the children from Mother’s substance
abuse, we need not discuss whether Father is also properly
considered a methamphetamine abuser.
6
Mother admitted drinking alcohol at this party but claimed
someone at the party may have surreptitiously given her
methamphetamine by putting “something in [her] drink.”
7
According to one nurse, Mother was “‘unable to stay awake.
This kind of sleeping is typical of a meth patient, what we will
see is extreme sleepiness and then when they wake up, extreme
hunger.’” (We understand the nurse’s reference to a “meth
patient” as a reference to someone abusing methamphetamine
because it is unlikely a hypothetical mere user would be a

10
corroborates the other evidence establishing Mother was not just
a methamphetamine user, but a methamphetamine abuser.
Mother’s methamphetamine abuse also rendered her
unable to provide regular care for Minors and placed them at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. This is quite obvious
as to K.C. As one of the hospital nurses explained it when
interviewed by the Department, “It is not safe to release the baby
with her, she is not even able to stay awake, how would she be
able to carefully feed the baby? [K.C.] took one hour to eat one
ounce, that requires her to be patient and focused. We can do it,
but can she do it? I do not believe she can do that yet. She
cannot keep her eyes open, and she is nodding off all day. She is
in no condition.”8 It is also true, though, with respect to N.C. too.
The drug-induced extreme drowsiness and “out of it” condition
reported by the nurses (at even a momentous occasion like the
birth of a child) poses a comparable and perhaps even greater
risk of harm for an unsupervised toddler (able to walk on his
own) as it does for an unsupervised infant.9

“patient” requiring hospital or other medical treatment.) Another
nurse explained that Mother “‘kept falling asleep mid-answer in
[their] conversation, so the baby is going to be in the nursery for
now, because it would not be safe for her to hold the baby in the
state that she is in.”
8
Another nurse explained K.C. “was going to be in the
nursery for now” because it wouldn’t be safe for Mother to even
“hold the baby in the state that she is in.”
9
This is not an instance where the risk of harm attributable
to Mother’s inability to care for the very young children might
have been mitigated by Father’s presence in their life. The

11
B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 315 is not inconsistent with
the conclusion we have drawn, i.e., that it was error not to
assume jurisdiction over Minors based on the risk of serious
physical harm from Mother’s substance abuse. The mother in
B.D. once took pain medication (“norco,” or hydrocodone and
acetaminophen) that had not been prescribed for her before
giving birth to an infant who was found to have the drug in his
system when born. (Id. at 318-319.) The juvenile court sustained
a dependency petition alleging the child was at substantial risk of
suffering serious physical harm from the mother’s substance
abuse. (Id. at 323.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
even assuming there was evidence that mother abused opiate
pain medication, there was no substantial evidence that the
abuse caused serious physical harm to her son or put him at
substantial risk of suffering the same. (Id. at 325, 329-330.) In
so holding, the court emphasized “the drugs in [the mother’s]
system, and that showed up in [her son’s] meconium, were
prescription drugs, not categorically illegal narcotics.” (Id. at
326.) The B.D. court additionally noted the mother was
forthcoming about taking the “norco” pill for back pain before the
child’s birth (id. at 319, 331), there was no evidence that the child
“was premature, underweight, or unhealthy in any way” (id. at
326), there was “no evidence that mother was impaired when
caring for the children” (to the contrary, the mother was attentive
to the child at birth, was caring for him appropriately, and

record reveals the nurses believed he was also a heavy drug user
and high on drugs (repeatedly throwing his “‘head back with
mouth gaping open, and a head bobbing down from chin to
chest’”) while present at the hospital for K.C.’s birth.

12
“[n]either the nurse nor the hospital social worker expressed any
concerns about [the] mother’s ability to care for [the child]”) (id.
at 330), and there was “no evidence that mother had a prior child
welfare history related to substance abuse or inadequate care of
the children” (id. at 330-331).
The differences between B.D. and this case are many.
Here, the abused substances in question are methamphetamine
and other “categorically illegal narcotics,” not prescription
medication. Here, unlike the mother in B.D., Mother was far
from being fully forthcoming about her use of illegal substances.
Here, unlike the child in B.D., there was evidence that K.C. was
born slightly premature and had a poor feeding reflex. And most
important, there was undisputed evidence in this case from
multiple nurses that Mother was impaired when caring for
K.C.—so much so that the hospital staff concluded the child could
not be safely left in her care.
We therefore believe the juvenile court was mistaken when
believing B.D. stood as a bar to asserting dependency jurisdiction
in this case. Insofar as some facets of B.D. do bear some
similarity to the record here (e.g., the absence of prior substance
abuse child welfare history or an infant with a positive toxicology
screen at birth), we believe those similarities do not warrant
following B.D. in this case.

13
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order dismissing the dependency
petition is reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile
court with directions to vacate its order dismissing the petition,
to make a new and different order assuming jurisdiction over
Minors under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), and to hold a
hearing pursuant to section 358 at which it may consider Minors’
then-current circumstances when deciding what disposition is
appropriate.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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